וְהַשְּׁמֻעָה֙ בָּ֣אָה עַד־יוֹאָ֔ב כִּ֣י יוֹאָ֗ב נָטָה֙ אַחֲרֵ֣י אֲדֹנִיָּ֔ה וְאַחֲרֵ֥י אַבְשָׁל֖וֹם לֹ֣א נָטָ֑ה וַיָּ֤נָס יוֹאָב֙ אֶל־אֹ֣הֶל יְהוָ֔ה וַֽיַּחֲזֵ֖ק בְּקַרְנ֥וֹת הַמִּזְבֵּֽחַ׃
Kabar itu sampai kepada Yoab, sebab Yoab telah memihak Adonia, walaupun ia tidak memihak Absalom. Lalu Yoab melarikan diri ke Kemah Yang Mahakekal dan memegang erat tanduk-tanduk mezbah.
Akeidat Yitzchak
At this point, the Torah proceeds to detail a list of laws dealing with human relationships in commerce etc., the first group containing relationships entered into willingly and openly which for some reason have gone sour. Afterwards the Torah deals with borrowings, exchanges etc. The second group deals with relationships not entered into through mutual consent. Theft, robbery, destruction of property,etc., including murder. These again can be subdivided into different groups, some involving violence, others merely subterfuge. Offences such as violence perpetrated on a fellow human being resulting in death, are listed first. If the death did not occur through premeditation, the penalty is exile. Similarly, violence resulting in death, deserves the death penalty. Anyone who smites a person causing death shall be executed, regardless of the circumstances. (21, 12) There are differences, however, in the way the penalty is administered, i.e. through a blood relation of the deceased victim, through heavenly tribunal, or through human Courts. The Talmud tells us that even though Jewish Courts may no longer have jurisdiction to apply the death penalty, death as a prerequisite for eventual atonement of the crime has not been abolished. G-d has His own ways of enforcing that the guilty does not go scot free. The classic example is found in Makkot 10. There are even different degrees of premeditation. When such premeditation is minimal,- according to the plain meaning of the passage,- the altar does protect the perpetrator from the ultimate penalty. When, however, there has clearly been cold blooded premeditation, then even the sanctuary itself is no refuge for the murderer. The Talmud in Makkot 12, explains the error made by Yoav concerning the function of the altar as a place of refuge. (4) Kidnapping is less serious than murder, since the victim may be freed at some future date. Cursing parents leaves even less in the way of visible damage, but the audacity is equal to or even greater than killing a human being that is not related to one. Next in line are the physical injuries not intended,- such as hurting unborn babies,- when the death penalty would at best have been incurred through a contingent liability. Therefore the fines imposed are monetary. Survivors of assaults are categorised according to the length of time the victims have survived. In any event, unless proper warning had been given to the perpetrator, the offender cannot be held liable by a human Court. Next comes violence perpetrated on one's own property, (slaves). People who treat other human beings like chattel, are themselves not fit members of society at all. If the Talmud (Shabbat 105) teaches that someone who smashes his own belongings in a fit of anger deserves to be ostracised, excommunicated,- surely he who does so to his slave deserves to be excommunicated even more. David's answer to the parable the prophet Nathan told him is instructive. In that parable we encounter both greed and lack of compassion. (Samuel II, chapter 12) Therefore, the rich man deserves the death penalty. In cases where the death of the victim is delayed by a day or more, the assault is no longer categorised as cruel, but as punitive in nature, i.e. the owner had wanted to teach the recalcitrant slave a lesson, and that is why he had beaten him. Just as we do not penalise someone who smashes his own belongings thinking thereby to accomplish something, so also with the slave, who is treated like property in this respect. After all, one does not direct one's cruelty at objects. Teachers who flog pupils with fatal results, are not accountable for murder, neither are doctors whose patients die through malpractice, since they had not planned to kill. (5) The slave is viewed both as an object and as a human being in Jewish law. (6) In the case of injury resulting during a fight, compensation is called for. In the event of an unborn baby being killed, the law is similar to the case of someone who had intended to kill A, and had killed B, instead, by mistake. He pays compensation to the heirs, and is himself not subject to an administered death penalty. (The laws about warning a prospective offender make this impossible anyways) The rule of not accepting kopher, conscience money in lieu of the death penalty is suspended in such a case. When our sages decided that the meaning of "an eye for an eye" is that this legislation has to be expressed in terms of financial compensation, they did so in order that the principle of "as he has done to him, so shall be done to him” can also be carried out at the same time. Removing the eye of a blind man who destroyed the eye of a seeing man, would hardly be justice. A priest who, as a result of losing one eye would no longer be able to perform service in the temple, is certainly more affected by the loss of such an eye than his counterpart who is a member of any other tribe. Minor variations, such as the difference in the quality of one's eyesight, social standing of either the injured or the offending party etc. are numerous, and all suggest that only by applying monetary compensation can the objective "as he has done so shall be done to him," be achieved in reasonable measure. (Leviticus 24, 19)