Myśl Żydowska do Psalmów 94:9

Man is not only a creature who combines opposite extremes of creation in a state of fusion, but his powers of perception also are twofold, consisting of cognitive processes by his senses as well as cognitive processes based on his intellect. Yediah, knowledge, is what we perceive by means of our intellect. This is the result of using the upper extremes of our powers of perception. Hakkarah, on the other hand, is perception by means of feeling, sensual perception, the lower end of our range of perceptual tools. The two processes work in different ways from one another, and what is perceived intellectually is not comprehended by the senses nor is what is sensually perceived understood intellectually. Intellectual perception extends to the general, whereas sensual perception extends to the particular. Intellectually, one can perceive the nature of the earth, but not all the innumerable details in it; sensually one can feel all these infinite little details without thereby arriving at any conclusions concerning their overall nature and purpose. Children proceed empirically when learning to distinguish between sensations and between different phenomena. Only much later do they become able to form overall concepts. Intellectual beings devoid of bodies proceed in the opposite manner. Our sages view man as enveloped in darkness, but able to recognize phenomena bathed in light. Angels, on the other hand, are situated within an ocean of light, unable to recognize what is immersed in darkness. The Almighty, of course, possesses the ability to perceive both what is bathed in light and what is surrounded by darkness. In this allegory, intellect is equated with "light." Man's advantage over the angels is, that in addition to intellect, he also possesses senses, enabling him to perceive the particular as well as the general by means of these senses. This is why Adam could distinguish correctly between animals, recognizing their individual characteristics. To return to the parable of light and darkness. If matter is perceived as an impediment to pure light (matter being opaque), then angels being unencumbered by matter due to their being purely spiritual beings have difficulty distinguishing different shades of matter, i.e. darkness. It is not unlike the difficulty experienced by a white man when trying to distinguish the features of, say, the Chinese. The Almighty, having created both light and matter, is thoroughly familiar with His creation. His powers of perception are entirely different from those of either man or angels. Adam had demonstrated his superior conceptual powers by naming both himself, the animals and his Creator. Since the terms "good," i.e. proper, or "gratifying," apply to both general concepts of knowledge as well as to particular objects of one's perception, the same needs to hold true for "bad," i.e. improper and "unpleasant," if we are to give meaning to the term "knowledge." Interestingly, the tree of knowledge is called the tree of knowledge of "good" and "evil," not the tree of knowledge of what is "true" and what is "false." The serpent refers to G-d as being able to distinguish between "good" and "evil." In Samuel II 14,17, we read of angels being defined as knowing "good and evil." Why then do our sages seem to deny that angels possess the power to distinguish between good and evil? Maimonides claims that man was unique in creation because he was the only creature to possess this ability. He claims that angels recognize only objective values such as truth and falsehood, not relative values such as "good" and "evil." If Adam called himself "Adam," this was because since the raw material that he himself was made of was "adamah," earth, i.e. davar murkav, matter composed of several elements. Hence, he was able to correctly identify other creatures composed of similar raw materials. He could also perceive in which way each differed from another. When the Midrash describes man's knowledge as merubah, this does not mean "greater," but "more variegated." A scholar who is an expert farmer at the same time, possesses a wider range of knowledge than his counterpart who is merely a theoretician. However, this advantage is merely quantitative, not qualitative. It does not mean that man's wisdom is superior to that of the angels. Since the terms "good,” “beautiful,” “dignified” etc. are intrinsically intellectual definitions, angels naturally must know them also as well as their opposites, although they need not be capable of possessing these characteristics. Since this is so, there is no good reason not to understand "and you will be like G-d knowing good and evil," as referring to the angels' ability in this regard (Genesis 3,5). In Samuel II 14,17, the wise woman from Tekoah also uses the term "elokim" for angels, just as G-d seems to do in our Parshah. The author rejects all those commentaries which avoid the peshat in the verses under discussion. He devotes many pages to disprove other commentators' opinions about the angels' powers of perception.

Logic has long stipulated that any prime cause producing certain effects, embodies the essence of the effect in itself. If honey cake is sweet, then the honey contributing to the sweetness of the cake must itself be sweet.

Some problems in the text of our Parshah.