Cytowanie Komentarza do Psalmów 119:106

In this portion, the Holy One teaches about the oaths that a person swears. The one who does not keep his oaths commits the greatest sin among all the sins. When a person is always angry, he always comes to swearing. Afterwards, he has regret. Therefore, the Holy One said here, when someone makes a vow and he has regret, he should go before three people and say, I have regret. The three people should then absolve him of his vow. The Torah wrote, “heads of the Israelite tribes” [30:2], near the vows and donations that Israelites brought on the festivals. He wants to teach us that the leaders that are in each generation have the power to force the people to give charity and give donations, when they so desire. Our sages explicitly wrote, “an injunction to the courts that they should do.”¹B. Rosh Hashanah, 6a. This means that the court has the power to force someone to make a donation. If a woman makes a vow and she is still within her father’s authority, and he forbids the vow, then she should not keep the vow, because her father forbade it. When she has a husband and the husband forbids it, then she also should not keep it. When a woman makes a vow not to eat fruit or that she will fast, or that she will not adorn herself with beautiful clothes, or she will not go to the bathhouse, or she says, I will not sleep with you, her husband absolves her of these vows and can forbid her. She must put aside all the vows if her husband so wishes. To take an oath is a great sin even if he wants to keep the oath, as we find with Yannai the King. He owned a thousand cities and they were all destroyed because of a true oath. A person said to his friend: I will go to the city and he swore on it. He went and fulfilled his oath. Why were all the cities destroyed, because they always mentioned the name of God needlessly?²Numbers Rabbah, 22.1. From here we learn that even though they kept their oaths, yet they were punished. How much more so, when someone swears falsely. However, when the person makes a vow because he is afraid that the evil inclination will dissuade him, then he may swear to keep it, expecting that he wants to overcome the evil inclination. If the person is a glutton and a drunkard and he makes a vow that he will not eat meat or drink any wine, he is a good man. The Torah told us to make such vows, as the verse says, “I have firmly sworn to keep Your just rules” [Psalms, 119:106]. This means, David said: I have sworn to keep the commandments and Torah.

A moral/ethical approach would read together the words לאמור זה הדבר; this would reflect a teaching by Bamidbar Rabbah 22,1 where we are exhorted to be very circumspect with keeping vows and oaths. King Yannai owned two thousand asses and they all perished on account of a true oath [but an unnecessary one. Ed.] The example quoted in the Midrash has someone swear to his friend that he would consume a certain amount of food and drink in a certain place. Both parties went to that place and the one who had sworn the oath consumed the requisite amount of food and drink. A short while later all his asses perished. The moral lesson to be derived from this is that if G'd is so particular about a true but needless oath which a person swears, how much more particular will He be if someone perjures himself! In our paragraph the Torah goes on record that there are certain vows and oaths that G'd commands people to swear, i.e. לאמור זה הדבר, "to utter this word." לבני ישראל לאמור. According to Sanhedrin 56 the word לאמור is a reference to גלוי עריות, unchaste behaviour, illicit sex. [based on Jeremiah 3,1: לאמור הן ישלח איש את אשתו והלכה מאתו והיתה לאיש אחר, הישוב אליה עוד? הלא חנוף תחנף הארץ ההיא. "To say: 'if a man divorces his wife and she leaves him and marries another man, can he ever go back to her? Would not such a land be defiled?'" The unusual position of the word לאמור at the beginning of this verse leads to interpreting it as a "verbal under-taking" such as in marriage Ed.] In verse three the Torah uses the word איש to hint that "a man" who is able to control his carnal urges should employ the legislation of making vows to help him resist the evil urge to sleep with people forbidden to him. In other words, the vow entered into by a Nazirite who wants to reinforce his resolution to resist sexual temptation, is acceptable to G'd. We have a number of Midrashim discussing situations when Biblical personalities needed to reinforce their resolution to resist such temptation. (Ruth 3,13, Vayikra Rabbah 23,11, Psalms 119,106 "I have sworn an oath to keep Your just rules.")

IF A MAN ‘YIDOR NEDER’ (VOWETH A VOW). “[This means if] a person says: ‘May there be konam¹³The word konam is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me that I shall not eat, or that I shall not do such-and-such a thing.’ I might think that even [if he vowed] that he would eat n’veilah¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. [which is forbidden by the Torah to be eaten] I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰Verse 3. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰Verse 3. which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do it].” This is Rashi’s language. But the text of the Sifre¹⁵Sifre, Matoth 153. is not so. Instead the Rabbis taught there [the following explanation] of [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond:¹⁰Verse 3. “I might think that even if ‘he swore’¹⁶The words “he swore” show clearly that the Sifre is speaking about an oath, while Rashi applied it to a vow. to eat n’veiloth and treifoth,¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. abominable things and reptiles, I apply to him [the verse], he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.¹⁰Verse 3. Scripture therefore says, to bind his soul with a bond,¹⁰Verse 3. which means [that he has the power] to forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but not to bind himself to do that which is forbidden [by means of vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah].” Thus the Rabbis [in the Sifre] mentioned this matter in connection with shevuoth (oaths), and the Rabbi [Rashi] changed it to apply to nedarim (vows).¹⁷The language of the verse before us is as follows: If a man ‘voweth a vow’ unto the Eternal, or ‘sweareth an oath’ to bind his soul with a bond. Ramban’s intent is to point out that Rashi, who made his comment on the phrase if a man voweth a vow, and speaks of konam [a term used only in vows], is diverging from the Sifre who gives this explanation on the phrase or sweareth an oath. Since, as will be explained further on, there are important legal differences between vows and oaths, Rashi’s application of the Sifre to the case of a vow [instead of to an oath] is thus incorrect. And in my opinion he was not mindful [about this],¹⁸In my “Kuntros on Variant Readings in Rashi according to the first print, Reggio 1475,” p. 27 (printed in Berliner’s Rashi, Feldheim, Jerusalem, 5730) I have shown that on the basis of a minor emendation in the text of Rashi [as found in the Reggio edition], Ramban’s criticism of Rashi disappears. for the Rabbis have said¹⁹Nedarim 2b. that in the case of vows one makes the [actual] object [referred to in the vow] forbidden to oneself [as when one says: “May this bread be konam¹³The word konam is a substitute for korban (offering), and is used for a vow of abstinence, meaning, “May this object be forbidden to me in the same way as it is forbidden to have any benefit from a holy offering.” upon me”], and therefore [vows] do not take effect upon non-tangible matters,²⁰Ibid., 13b. such as when one says, “A vow be upon me that I shall not speak to you, or that I shall not walk, or that I shall not sleep,” and similar expressions [affecting non-tangible matters]. Now this being so, it would appear that even in the case of a permitted object, if one said: “A vow be upon me that I shall eat today,” or “that I shall eat this loaf,” it is not a [valid] vow since this vow does not have any object at all on which to take effect, but [was expressed in such a way as to impose] a duty upon him [personally] to do it.²¹In other words, there is no question as to when a person “vows” to eat n’veilah [which is forbidden] that it is invalid, but even if he “vowed” to eat a permissible thing it is also invalid, since we do not find anywhere in the Gemara vows about matters which require one “to get up and do,” but only matters which require one to abstain from certain things. On the other hand, in the case of an “oath,” as where one says “I swear to eat this loaf,” the oath would indeed be valid. Since Rashi applied it to “vows,” it is therefore incorrect, as explained above. — The reason for this distinction between oaths and vows is as follows: An oath takes effect upon the person himself. Hence if he says, “I swear to eat the loaf,” he is obliged to do so. But a vow takes effect upon the object. Hence if he says, “This bread is ‘konam’ to me,” it is a valid vow and he may not eat it. But if he were to say, “A vow be upon me that I shall eat this loaf,” it would be invalid, since it is a contradiction in terms [the statement begins with a reference to a vow, but concludes with — “I shall eat …” — which is appropriate only for an oath]. And we do not find mentioned anywhere in the Gemara vows about [matters which require one] to “get up and do” [a particular action, but only about matters which require one to abstain from certain things, such as when he says, “May this loaf be konam upon me,” in which case he must fulfill the vow by not eating it]. And although we find in the case of vows [to G-d Who is] on high [that they are valid if uttered in the following manner]: “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,”²²Kinim 1:1. or “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a peace-offering” [which would seem to indicate that vows do take effect when expressed as an obligation resting upon a person, and not, as explained above, that they only take effect upon a specific object which itself becomes forbidden], this [vow is valid] because [there is a general principle that] dedicating something [verbally] to the Sanctuary creates an obligation on one’s property exactly as if it had been handed over to an ordinary person.²³Therefore when he says, “I undertake upon myself [to bring] a burnt-offering,” it is as if he had actually separated a specific animal to be an offering. Thus his vow attaches to a definite object, and therefore it is valid. Or [it may be that] this is a stringency²⁴In other words, even if we are not to resort to the preceding explanation that a verbal promise to the Sanctuary is tantamount to actual delivery of the object, we may yet explain the reason why vows to the Sanctuary are valid, because of a stringency ordained by the Rabbis based on the fact that since ultimately he will set aside a specific animal for his offering, therefore the effect of the vow takes place immediately upon his utterance thereof, and all his property becomes mortgaged to the fulfillment of the vow. applicable [only] to vows to the Sanctuary, because they [such vows] involve an object which becomes forbidden to an ordinary person and invested [with sanctity] for the Sanctuary when [the object is actually] set aside [as an offering]; therefore right from the start [when he merely bound himself verbally to separate an animal as an offering at some future date], the obligation created by the vow takes effect upon his property. But the case of [ordinary] vows of utterance [about a secular matter] we have no such rule, because there is no [tangible] object existing at all, neither at the beginning [i.e., at the time of uttering the vow], nor at the end [i.e., at the time that the vow is to be fulfilled]. Similarly, [the expression of the Sifre mentioned by Rashi that] he can “forbid [upon himself] that which was [hitherto] permitted to him, but cannot allow himself to do that which is forbidden [by vowing to do that which is prohibited by the Torah]” is a statement which is not correct to make in connection with vows [as Rashi did], because they do take effect on matters of [religious] commandments, just as they do on secular matters [i.e., on matters which do not come within the scope of the commandments]. Thus someone who says in the form of a vow “I will not make a Booth [for the Festival of Tabernacles]” or “I will not put on phylacteries” is indeed forbidden [to make the Booth, or to put on the phylacteries] although he thereby violates a positive commandment.²⁵The reason for this is that since a vow takes effect upon a particular object (see Note 21), he may forbid the use of the particular Booth or of the phylacteries in the fulfillment of the commandment. But he cannot prohibit their use by means of an oath, swearing not to use them, since the oath creates a prohibition on the person, and that is invalid for him to do, since “he has already sworn on Sinai” to fulfill the commandment, and an oath does not take effect upon another oath, as will be explained. Similarly a man who vowed not to have [sexual] intercourse with his wife is forbidden [to have such intercourse with her] although he thereby violates a negative commandment.²⁶Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. Similarly, vows take effect to oblige one to observe a negative commandment [although, of course, he already is bound not to transgress it], such as if he vowed not to eat n’veilah¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. — [so that if he does it he violates two prohibitions: against eating n’veilah, and against breaking his vow, this principle being deduced] from the words of the Mishnah:²⁷Nedarim 17a. The Mishnah there establishes the distinction that a vow may take effect upon another vow, but one oath may not take effect upon another. From this Ramban deduces the teaching that if an object is prohibited to a person for some reason, such as n’veilah or treifah (see Note 14 above), or indeed any other prohibition, another vow — not to eat it — can still take effect upon that object doubly prohibiting the person from eating it, so that if he does eat it, he violates two prohibitions: one for having eaten n’veilah, and one for having violated his vow. “A vow may take effect upon a vow etc.”
Thus a vow takes effect to forbid [not only that which was previously permitted, but also to forbid] that which was [already] forbidden [such as when he vows not to eat n’veilah]¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96., and [a vow takes effect] not to do [something] which he is [commanded to do and] forbidden to transgress [such as the duty to have sexual intercourse with his wife,²⁶Exodus 21:10: her food, her raiment, and ‘her conjugal rights’ he shall not diminish. See Vol. II, pp. 356-357, where Ramban discusses at length the nature of this prohibition. as mentioned above], except that vows do not take effect to allow him to actively transgress a negative commandment.²⁸Thus if he vowed to eat the flesh of n’veilah which is prohibited by a negative commandment, the vow takes no effect whatever, so that if he does not eat it he is not punishable for having violated his word. But oaths are only able to render forbidden that which was [hitherto] permitted, and they do not apply at all to matters involving commandments, neither to transgress [the prohibition of] a negative commandment [even passively, such as by swearing not to have intercourse with his wife], nor to strengthen its observance [such as by swearing not to eat n’veilah],¹⁴N’veilah is an animal that has died a natural death, or was not properly slaughtered. Treifah is an animal suffering from a certain serious organic disease, even if it is properly slaughtered. Both are forbidden to be eaten by law of the Torah. See Vol. III, p. 343, Note 96. nor to neglect [the performance of] a positive commandment, such as [by saying]: “I swear that I will not make a Booth,” or “[I swear] that I will not put on phylacteries.” Even to strengthen the performance of a positive commandment [an oath] cannot take effect, so that if a person swears to fulfill a commandment and does not fulfill it, he is not liable for [breaking his] oath either to [the punishment of] stripes [if he deliberately neglects it] or to [bring] an offering [if he neglects it accidentally].²⁹The punishment for breaking an oath in optional matters deliberately is the same as for transgressing any negative commandment; i.e., stripes (Deuteronomy 25:1-3), and for accidentally breaking it, there is a duty to bring an offering (Leviticus 5:4-13). But if one swears to fulfill a positive commandment [e.g. “I swear to wear phylacteries”] the oath is invalid, because “he has already sworn at Mount Sinai” [to perform all the commandments of the Torah], and an oath does not take effect upon another oath (see Note 27). Therefore if he does not fulfill the commandment, he is responsible for neglect of a positive commandment, but is not subject to stripes or an offering for failure of fulfilling the additional oath, since his oath never took effect. But it is permitted for a person to encourage himself [to fulfill a commandment by swearing to do so], for it is written, I have sworn, and have confirmed it, to observe Thy righteous ordinances.³⁰Psalms 119:106. See Nedarim 8a. Therefore it is only with reference to swearing [and not, as implied by Rashi, to vows] that one can interpret [the expression] to bind his soul with a bond¹⁰Verse 3. [as the Sifre does, that he may forbid upon himself that which was hitherto permitted to him, but may not allow himself to do that which is forbidden, by means of swearing to do it]. These are great [i.e., complex and important] laws, and the scholar will find them [explained in the Talmud] in their [proper] places.