וְהַנָּבִ֣יא הַה֡וּא א֣וֹ חֹלֵם֩ הַחֲל֨וֹם הַה֜וּא יוּמָ֗ת כִּ֣י דִבֶּר־סָ֠רָה עַל־יְהוָ֨ה אֱלֹֽהֵיכֶ֜ם הַמּוֹצִ֥יא אֶתְכֶ֣ם ׀ מֵאֶ֣רֶץ מִצְרַ֗יִם וְהַפֹּֽדְךָ֙ מִבֵּ֣ית עֲבָדִ֔ים לְהַדִּֽיחֲךָ֙ מִן־הַדֶּ֔רֶךְ אֲשֶׁ֧ר צִוְּךָ֛ יְהוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֶ֖יךָ לָלֶ֣כֶת בָּ֑הּ וּבִֽעַרְתָּ֥ הָרָ֖ע מִקִּרְבֶּֽךָ׃
Prorok zaś ów, albo snowidz ów, uśmiercony będzie, gdyż głosił odstępstwo od Wiekuistego, Boga waszego, który wywiódł was z ziemi Micraim, i wyzwolił cię z domu niewoli, - aby zwieść cię z drogi, o której przykazał ci Wiekuisty, abyś postępował nią: a wytępisz to zło z pośród siebie.
Jerusalem Talmud Sanhedrin
Rebbi Zeˋira said, it says here “criminal” and it says there “criminal”, the prophet said it criminally284Deut. 18:22, the law of the false prophet. “Here” refers to the judge who refuses to obey the rulings of the Supreme Court, who acts criminally in his disobedience and is tried before the Supreme Court, Deut. 17:8–12.. Since about “criminal” used there, the verse speaks about a false prophet, also about “criminal” used here, the verse speaks about a false prophet285The verse does not speak about a false prophet but about a lower court judge who refuses to accept the authority of the Supreme Court. What is meant is that the procedural details given for the treatment of the rebellious judge also apply to the treatment of the false prophet. The argument is known as הֶקֵּשׁ “trap”. If the same word is used in two contexts, details found in one context and left indeterminate in the other can be transferred from one to the other. As a hermeneutic principle, heqqeš should be used only if the word in question is not loaded with additional meaning. But in Sifry Deut. 178, the expression “criminal” is interpreted to mean that the false prophet may be prosecuted only if criminal intent can be shown, not if he acted in error.
In the Babli, 16a, the argument is in the name of R. Yose ben Hanina.. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, it says here “spoke” and it says there, that the prophet would speak in the Eternal’s name. Since about “spoke” used there, the verse speaks about a false prophet, also about “spoke” used here, the verse speaks about a false prophet.286It seems that the heqqeš should not be about the verb דִּבֵּר but the noun דָּבָר “pronouncement”, referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of the rebellious judge, Deut. 17:10, and the false prophet who pronounces in the Eternal’s name, Deut. 18:20.
In the Babli, 16a, the argument is in the name of R. Yose ben Hanina.. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, it says here “spoke” and it says there, that the prophet would speak in the Eternal’s name. Since about “spoke” used there, the verse speaks about a false prophet, also about “spoke” used here, the verse speaks about a false prophet.286It seems that the heqqeš should not be about the verb דִּבֵּר but the noun דָּבָר “pronouncement”, referring to the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of the rebellious judge, Deut. 17:10, and the false prophet who pronounces in the Eternal’s name, Deut. 18:20.
Jerusalem Talmud Horayot
But would you not have eliminated the entire notion of one who watches a day for the next day106The literal text of the Mishnah could be read as a hypothetical ruling that there be no restriction on relations between a man and a temporary zavah. But since the verse declares the one who watches a day for the next day as being under the rules of niddah for whom such relations are forbidden (Lev. 18:19), such a ruling would in effect eliminate all rules for the one who watches a day for the next day. Cf. Note 99. Babli 4a.? If they said, the night is permitted but the day is forbidden. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bending? Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden107It is not at all clear to what the hapaxשחיחה refers. Since in the Mishnah the Sabbath is mentioned in second place, a reasonable reference would be to Mishnah Šabbat 1:1 which describes forbidden transactions on the Sabbath as, e. g., a person standing behind a window handing a parcel to another who is standing outside. While the distance by which the parcel is moved is irrelevant in practice since only the fact counts that it is transported across the border line between public and private domains, a ruling that a minimum distance be required for the transfer to be a violation of Sabbath law is thinkable.. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of prostrating? If they said, it is permitted to prostrate oneself but forbidden to sink down108While prostrating oneself before an idol is certainly subject to a biblical prohibition, there is no biblical definition of what constitutes prostrating. Since 1K.19:18 shows that going down on one’s knees is forbidden worship, it is possible to imagine a ruling that going down onone’s knees is prosecutable but other forms of prostration are not.. Would you not have eliminated the entire notion of taking out? Rebbi Samuel ben Rav Isaac said, if they said, one dried fig is permitted but two dried figs are forbidden109This refers to the prohibitions of the Sabbath. While the prohibition of moving things from one place to another is only one of the 49 categories of forbidden actions, its rules in effect cover half of Tractate Šabbat and all of Tractate ˋEruvin. Moving minute quantities from domain to domain is not punishable. For example, transporting vegetable seeds in a volume less that of a dried fig is not punishable (Mishnah Šabbat 9:7). The long list of minimal quantities is traditional, not biblical. A wrong ruling in these matters does not abolish the principle that some minimal quantity is defined for everything.. This follows him who said that bringing in and taking out are the same110Everybody agrees that “transporting” for the rules of the Sabbath comprises taking up, moving, and putting down. There is a discussion at the start of Tractate Šabbat (1:1, 2b l.11 ff.) whether the inclusion of putting down is scriptural or is a matter of indirect inference. If one accepts that “taking up” implies “putting down”, then the formulation of the Mishnah covers rulings both about taking up and putting down; but if the biblical status of “putting down” is different from “taking up”, the latter should have been mentioned. An answer is unnecessary since the consensus is that “taking up” implies “putting down”.. But for him who said that bringing in and taking out are two notions, would you not have eliminated the entire notion of bringing in? Rebbi Yose said, not that they said that it was permitted to eat fat; they knew that it is forbidden to eat fat, but the Torah gave permission to the Court to instruct111While fat is not mentioned in the Mishnah, R. Yose explains how the Court might be liable for a false ruling concerning fat. The only fat (חֵלֶב) forbidden for consumption is (a) fat of domestic animals which for any sacrifice would be burned on the altar and (b) the fat in which the hip tendons are embedded. All other fat is permitted (שׁוּמָן). The exact definition of each category is a matter of rabbinic tradition and as such within the purview of the Court.. Rebbi Abun bar Ḥiyya asked, the [amount of] an olive today and of two olives tomorrow112He asks whether the entire discussion about abolishing an entire commandment or only a detail makes any sense. If they would permit eating one olive-sized piece of ḥēlev today, two tomorrow, etc., they might come to disestablish the entire commandment by a succession of steps, none of which can be classified as total negation of the commandment.? What about a prophet and seducer113To whom the distinction between abolishing a commandment and modifying it also applies, Babli 4b, Sanhedrin11:8, Note 112 (Tosephta Sanhedrin14:13).? I could think that if they said to you, do not put on phylacteries today, put them on tomorrow114This would be a situation in which the accredited prophet could eliminate a commandment in steps, similar to the Court ruling on fat. Since phylacteries are mentioned in connection with the study of Torah (Deut. 6:8,11:18), wearing them is a daily biblical commandment., that you should listen to them. The verse says115There is no such verse. The reference is to Deut. 13:6 where the reading is בָּ֑הּ לָלֶ֣כֶת., to walk in them, in all of them, not only in part of them; you would have eliminated the notion of that entire day. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject116Since R. Bun bar Hiyya’s question could have been asked about any example in the Mishnah, but the Mishnah makes a distinction between eliminating and modifying a commandment. It is true that a modification is only a modification even if its open-ended iteration could result in eliminating the commandment.. Rebbi Mana understood it from the following107It is not at all clear to what the hapaxשחיחה refers. Since in the Mishnah the Sabbath is mentioned in second place, a reasonable reference would be to Mishnah Šabbat 1:1 which describes forbidden transactions on the Sabbath as, e. g., a person standing behind a window handing a parcel to another who is standing outside. While the distance by which the parcel is moved is irrelevant in practice since only the fact counts that it is transported across the border line between public and private domains, a ruling that a minimum distance be required for the transfer to be a violation of Sabbath law is thinkable.; Samuel bar Abba said, if they said, one cubit is permitted but two are forbidden. You can say that this is not elimination of the entire subject. And here it is not elimination of the entire subject.