Kapłańska 4:2 Odniesienia do Talmudu: Jerusalem Talmud Horayot, Jerusalem Talmud Nazir, Jerusalem Talmud Shabbat & Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot

HALAKHAH: ⁷The text is that of the Leiden ms., the readings are those of the Yerushalmi text in the Bomberg Babli of 1520.“If the Court ruled.” etc. A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable. Everywhere it is said that a restriction after a restriction is an addition, but here it is said, a restriction after a restriction is to reduce? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is different here since there is written a restriction after a restriction after a restriction⁹It is a generally recognized principle that a double restriction is an addition and a double addition a restriction (Peah 6:9 Note 154, Yebamot 12:1 Note 10, Sotah9:2 Note 63, Roš Haššanah 1:1 56a l.58, Megillah 4:4 75b l.14; Babli Megillah23b, Yoma 43a, Bava qamma 15b, Bava batra 15a, Sanhedrin 15a,44b,66a, Makkot 9b, Ševuot 7b, Menahot 9b,67a, Hulin 132a.) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Rashi in Sanhedrin 15a s. v. חמשה..

HALAKHAH: “If the Anointed Priest ruled,” etc. A person; if the Anointed Priest.⁴Lev. 4:2,3.” This makes the Anointed like a private person⁵In v. 2, the High Priest is mentioned as “a person”; only in v. 3 as Anointed. It is concluded that the Anointed Priest follows the rules of private persons unless there is an indication to the contrary. Babli 7b, Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršeta 2(1).. Since the private person is not liable if he ate⁶Taking eating forbidden fat as standard example of a forbidden action. on the Court’s ruling, also neither is this one liable if he ate on the Court’s ruling. Since the private person is liable if he ate without a ruling, this one also should be liable if he ate without a ruling⁷The question is raised why does the Mishnah require a sacrifice only if the Anointed Priest first gives an inadvertent wrong instruction and then acts on it without realizing his error? This mixes required features of the purification offerings both of the Court (only after issuing a prescript, not acting on it themselves) and the private person (not instructing anybody but acting).; the verse says, for the fault of the people. As the people⁸This argument identifies “the people” as the Court. are liable only if they issued a ruling, this one also is liable only if he issued a ruling. There are Tannaïm who state that the people are the Court. Since the people⁸This argument identifies “the people” as the Court. are liable if they instructed and others acted, this one also should be liable if he ruled and others acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned. There are Tannaïm⁹Babli 7a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Pereq2(1,4). who state that the people are the public. Since the people are liable if others ruled and they acted, this one also should be liable if others ruled and he acted. The verse says, as he sinned. He brings for what he sinned but he does not bring for what others sinned¹⁰Including the Court. Since the High Priest is mentioned before the Court, his purification offering cannot be dependent on the Court’s ruling.. Rebbi Jacob¹¹In B: R. Jacob bar Aha. It is impossible to decide which reading is preferable or whether the same person is meant in both sources. in the name of Rebbi Eleazar. Only if he is competent to argue about practice¹²This shows that the rules are applicable to the High Priests of the Second Temple, who were invested but not anointed. The High Priests of the First Temple were supposed to be the guardians of the Law. The Hasmonean kings and the later High Priests mostly had no claim to learning.. Otherwise, would we say the incompetents give instructions? The anointed who ate following the Court’s prescript is not liable; following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable. Following the Court’s prescript he is not liable, since the prescript of others is nothing¹³The translation follows B. The text of the ms., “since the prescript of others is by all their prescripts” does not make any sense. compared to their prescripts¹⁴As explained in Note 10, the High Priests cannot be made dependent on the prescripts of others. The High Priest is “not dependent on the Court” ex officio. But as explained earlier, he cannot bring his purification offering unless his action was based on his own ruling.. Following another Anointed’s prescript he is liable, on condition that he instructed similarly¹⁵It is not required that the High Priest have original thoughts when acting; he is presumed to follow (correct) precedent..

⁷This paragraph and the next are from Šabbat 7:2 (9c, 1. 11 ff.), as will be seen in the commentary. The variant readings refer to that text. The introductory section is from Šabbat 7:1 (9a, 1. 20–24), the one variant in spelling there is noted by: א.
Mishnah Šabbat 7:2 states that on the Sabbath, 39 different activities are forbidden. This means that a person who violates the Sabbath unintentionally may be liable for up to 39 purification sacrifices. The question then appears whether in other cases multiple sacrifices also are necessary. Rav Zakkai stated before Rebbi Joḥanan: If somebody sacrificed, burned incense, and poured a libation in one forgetting⁸He committed idolatry but forgot that sacrificing, burning incense, and pouring libations are forbidden as idolatrous actions, or he was conscious that these acts are part of idolatry but forgot that idolatry was forbidden., he is guilty for each action separately⁹In the Babli, Šabbat 72a, Sanhedrin 62a, the positions of R. Joḥanan and R. Zakkai are switched.. Rebbi Joḥanan told him, Babylonian! You crossed three rivers with your hands¹⁰Tigris, Euphrates, and Jordan. and were broken. He is guilty only once! ¹¹The sentences in braces are unintelligible here; they refer to and are quoted from a discussion in Šabbat 7:1 (fol. 9a) which deals with the introductory sentence to the chapter of purification offerings, Lev. 4:2: “Speak to the Children of Israel, saying: If a person sins unintentionally against any commandments of the Eternal that are not to be broken, and did from any one, from those.” This implies that sometimes a purification offering is due for violating one prohibition, and sometimes one sacrifice is valid for a number of those. In general, the answer depends on what was unintentional. If a person does not know that today is Sabbath, for all he does wrong he owes one sacrifice. If he knows that it is Sabbath but forgot what is forbidden, he owes one sacrifice for each category of forbidden work. The problem is first whether this principle also applies to idolatry, the sacrifice for which is not described in Lev. 4 but in Num. 15:22–26, and second what is the status of the details enumerated in the Second Commandment, in particular why a detail, “do not prostrate yourself before them” is mentioned before the principle “do not serve them”.{Before he broke¹²The reference to “breaking” here is a continuation of R. Joḥanan’s criticism of Rav Zakkai (who in the Babli is Rebbi Zakkai): If the Second Commandment is considered a unit, there are no “those” to be applied to idolatry. If all activities mentioned are separate rules, how can one bring only one sacrifice? in his hand there is “one” but not “those”; after he broke in his hand there are “those” but not “one”.} Rebbi Abba bar Mamal asked before Rebbi Ze‘ira: Should he not be guilty for each action separately? As you say for the Sabbath: “Do not perform any work¹³Ex. 20:10.,” principle. “Do not light fire in any of your dwelling places,¹⁴Ex. 35:3.” a detail. Was not lighting fire subsumed under the principle, but it is mentioned separately from this principle! Since lighting fire is special in that it is the work of a single individual¹⁵A forbidden action on the Sabbath which is executed only by the common effort of several people is not prosecutable. and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty¹⁶Needs a separate sacrifice. This is an application of the 9th hermeneutical principle of R. Ismael: Any detail which was subsumed under a principle but is mentioned separately in order to instruct, was not mentioned for itself but to explain the entire principle [Sifra Introduction 2; Pereq 1(1)]. In the text this is called “principle and detail”, which in the technical language of the Babli refers to the completely different rule No. 5 [Sifra Introduction (1,7)]. In Mekhilta dR. Ismael p. 347 the argument is attributed to R. Jonathan (who in the Babli, Šabbat 70a, appears as R. Nathan.)
Whether there is a connection between rules 5 and 9 is left open in the Babli, Baba qama 85a, decided in the negative in Menaḥot 55b. Menahem Cahana, in an exhaustive study of the problem (קווים לתולדות התפתחותה של מידת כלל ופרט בתקופת התנאים p. 173–216 in: Studies in Talmudic and Midrashic Literature in Memory of Tirzah Lifshitz) holds that the original Tannaïtic theory knew only of two principles, one which corresponded to the later (Babli, Sifra, Sifry) rules entitled “principle and detail”, “detail and principle”, “principle and detail and principle”; the other one referring to all rules which in Babylonian formulation start with “any detail which was subsumed under a principle”. His arguments support the thesis of the present commentary that Mekhilta, Sifra, Sifry (and Tosephta) in our hands are essentially Babylonian editions.. Also here¹⁷Regarding idolatry.: “Do not worship them,¹⁸Ex. 20:5.” a principle. “Do not prostrate yourself,¹⁸Ex. 20:5.” a detail. Was not prostrating itself included in the principle and why was it mentioned separately? To infer, to tell you that prostrating oneself is special in that it is the work of a single individual and one would be guilty for it alone, so everything for which alone one is guilty¹⁶Needs a separate sacrifice. This is an application of the 9th hermeneutical principle of R. Ismael: Any detail which was subsumed under a principle but is mentioned separately in order to instruct, was not mentioned for itself but to explain the entire principle [Sifra Introduction 2; Pereq 1(1)]. In the text this is called “principle and detail”, which in the technical language of the Babli refers to the completely different rule No. 5 [Sifra Introduction (1,7)]. In Mekhilta dR. Ismael p. 347 the argument is attributed to R. Jonathan (who in the Babli, Šabbat 70a, appears as R. Nathan.)
Whether there is a connection between rules 5 and 9 is left open in the Babli, Baba qama 85a, decided in the negative in Menaḥot 55b. Menahem Cahana, in an exhaustive study of the problem (קווים לתולדות התפתחותה של מידת כלל ופרט בתקופת התנאים p. 173–216 in: Studies in Talmudic and Midrashic Literature in Memory of Tirzah Lifshitz) holds that the original Tannaïtic theory knew only of two principles, one which corresponded to the later (Babli, Sifra, Sifry) rules entitled “principle and detail”, “detail and principle”, “principle and detail and principle”; the other one referring to all rules which in Babylonian formulation start with “any detail which was subsumed under a principle”. His arguments support the thesis of the present commentary that Mekhilta, Sifra, Sifry (and Tosephta) in our hands are essentially Babylonian editions.. He answered¹⁹R. Ze‘ira, answering R. Abba bar Mamal. The translation follows the text in Šabbat.: For the Sabbath, he mentioned the principle at one place and the details at another place. For idol worship, the principle is found close to the detail²⁰In the same sentence. If “prostrating” had been mentioned after “serving”, the 5th hermeneutical principle would imply that the two notions are identical in intent. As the verse stands, it cannot be interpreted as “principle and detail”.. He retorted: Is it not witten: “Do not prostrate yourself before another power”²¹Ex. 34:14.? He did not state the principle and the detail at the same spot! He said, since you do not infer anything from it close up, you cannot infer anything from afar²²Since 34:14 does not teach anything not contained in Ex. 20:5.. The colleagues say, it makes no difference; whether He gave the principle at one place and the detail at another, or gave principle and detail at the same place, it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He first gave the principle and then the detail. For idolatry, He gave the detail and only later the principle²³Therefore, the 9th principle does not apply to idolatry since the detail does not follow after the principle.. Rebbi Yose said, it makes no difference whether ²⁴Text from Šabbat.[He first gave the principle and then the detail or He gave the detail and only later the principle, or He gave principle, detail, and principle²⁵This really is the case for the Second Comandment.]; it is a matter of principle and detail. For the Sabbath, He gave a general prohibition of work, followed by details; for idolatry, He was indeterminate regarding its worship but detailed the worship of Heaven²⁶The prohibition refers to performing for idolatry any ceremony commanded for the worship of Heaven. The case of R. Zakkai really has no connection with the argument about the status of the mention of prostrating oneself in the Second Commandment..