Powtórzonego Prawa 24:2 Odniesienia do Talmudu: Jerusalem Talmud Gittin, Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot, Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin & Jerusalem Talmud Sotah

HALAKHAH: “If somebody in divorcing his wife,” etc. Rebbi Ilai⁴In the Babli (82b) this is ascribed to R. Yannai. There, the objection is that “she became another man’s” could be interpreted as “she became any other man’s”. said, the reason of Rebbi Eliezer: “She left his house, went, and became another man’s⁵Deut. 24:2.”, even if he did permit her only to one other man. This argument proves more than the Mishnah⁶By the mathematical principlequi nimium probat nihil probat, R. Ilai’s argument proves nothing.! The Mishnah said if she was permitted to all but forbidden to one other man; the argument is that he forbade her to all but permitted her only to one other man. What is the reason of Rebbi Eliezer? Death permits and divorce permits. Since death permits only partially⁷The pool of possible marriage partners available to a widow is smaller than the pool which was available to the same woman before her marriage since she is forbidden any close relatives of her deceased husband., so the bill of divorce permits only partially⁸Since the divorce does not remove the incest prohibitions, it seems possible that the husband can add prohibitions of his own.. What is the reason of the rabbis? “She left his house, went, and became another man’s”; it brackets marriage and divorce. Since her divorce is without participation of a third party, so her marriage must be without participation of a third party⁹If the former husband could impose marriage restrictions on his former wife, her remarriage would be subject to the former husband’s edict. This would create a kind of polyandry..

Rav said, none of these are invalid¹⁰As explained in Chapter 2, Note 132, if a Cohen divorces his wife with a document which is found to be invalid but which possibly might have been valid, (the technical term is: the document has the “smell” of a bill of divorce) one forces the Cohen to deliver a valid divorce document to his wife and he is prohibited from changing his mind and not divorce her. Rav states that all the bills of divorce mentioned in the Mishnah except the last do not have a “smell” of a bill of divorce; they are pieces of paper, not bills of divorce, neither valid nor invalid. except for the last which is invalid¹¹The bill written for two wives with identical names is invalid but if the husband is a Cohen he is forced to divorce the wife to whom the bill was delivered.. Issi¹²In the Babli, 24b/25a, Rav’s opinion is atributed to Rav Assi (= Issi) and vice versa. said, all are invalid¹³And force a definitive divorce if made by a Cohen. In the Babli, 24b, this position is attributed to Rav. except for the first which is not invalid. Rebbi Abba bar Ḥinena¹⁴An Amora of this name is not otherwise known. In the Geniza text, the name is Ze‘ur bar Ḥinena, known from both Talmudim as the name of a third-Century Amora who almost was killed by Queen Zenobia of Palmyra. said, all are invalid¹⁵In the Babli, 24b, this appears as Samuel’s opinion.. The word of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish implied that all are invalid since Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is invalid¹⁶The sentence about R. Simeon ben Laqish is missing in the Geniza text. R. Simeon ben Laqish considers the statement that the document is one of divorce so important that its writing without the explicit instruction by the husband invalidates the bill; cf. Chapter 2, Notes 100,101. But his choice of the word “invalid”, not that “there is no ‘smell’ of a divorce”, shows that in all cases he holds that any material expression of the husband’s desire to divorce prohibits the Cohen to remain married to his wife.. The word of Rebbi Joḥanan implied that none are invalid since Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he wrote the essential text with the formula, it is valid¹⁷R. Joḥanan strictly follows the Mishnah that only the names of husband and wife and the date have to be written by the explicit instruction of the husband. Therefore, he also follows the language of the Mishnah, not that the bills of divorce are simply invalid but are “invalid to be used in divorce”, meaning that the use of any of these documents cannot imply any divorce in any form. (The classical commentators all feel obliged to switch the positions attributed to R. Simeon ben Laqish and R. Joḥanan; this position cannot be sustained against the testimony of both mss.) The Babli, 25a, quotes R. Joḥanan in the sense given here but explains his disagreement with the position attributed here to Rav by the fact that he never admits retroactive validation of documents; therefore, he cannot admit that the husband has the power to decide after the writing of the document to which wife it shall apply.. Does the word of Rebbi Eleazar imply that none are invalid? Since Rebbi Eleazar asked: if one wrote a bill of preliminary marriage¹⁸Mishnah Qiddušin 1:1 states that a preliminary marriage can be effected either by a transfer of valuables, or a contract, or sexual relations. It is then explained [Qiddušin 1:1 (58c 1. 29), Babli 9a] that the contract is a written statement by the groom declaring his future bride to be his wife; the marriage is effected by the acceptance of the letter by the adressee (or, if she is underage, her father). not for a specific name¹⁹Meaning: not for a specific woman; since no name has to be written in the statement, it may simply read: By accepting this document, you are my wife. The document contains no formulaic text., does preliminary marriage take hold? If he had a problem with divorce, would he ask about preliminary marriage²⁰If he thought that any of the bills of divorce mentioned in the Mishnah would possibly count as active for a Cohen’s wife, he would have to ask about circumstances of divorce, where the problems are real and grave.? Since in the case of divorce, where the document is required to be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce will not touch her, is it not logical that in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage take hold with her²¹The Geniza text has a longer argument: “Since he has a problem with divorce where [the documents] are not invalid; therefore he asks about preliminary marriage. If you say he has a problem with divorce, he should not ask about preliminary marriage. Since in the case of divorce, where it is required that the document be for a specific name and he did not write for a specific name, divorce did not touch her; in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required, if it was not for a specific name preliminary marriage should take hold of her. It should be so. That is impossible. Since in the case of divorce, where it is required to be for a specific name, if it was not for a specific name, divorce did touch her; in the case of preliminary marriage, where a specific name is not required and he did not write for a specific name, preliminary marriage should take hold of her.” It is difficult to make coherent sense of this text.? That should be obvious to him. Really, the following is obvious to him: Since one inferred the bill of preliminary marriage only from divorce²²The validity of a preliminary marriage by a symbolic bride purchase is given biblical status by reading Deut. 24:1 “if a man take a wife” as “if a man buy a wife” since in Mishnaic Hebrew the verb לקח means “to buy” [Qiddušin1:1 (58b 1.35), Babli 4b]. The possibility of marriage by document is inferred from Deut. 24:2: “She [the divorcee] left his house, went and became another man‘s.” Since “becoming a manʻs” means to marry him, the verse connects leaving (divorce) with becoming (marriage). Since leaving is effected by a document, so becoming can be effected by a document [Qiddušin 1:1 (58b 1.33), Babli 9b]. Therefore, a document invalid for leaving must be invalid for becoming., and in the case of divorce she is not divorced, in the case of preliminary marriage she is not preliminarily married²³The Babli agrees, Qiddušin 9b. There, the question is attributed to R. Simeon ben Laqish; the argument agrees with the latter’s position as given here..

Rebbi Ayvu bar Naggari, Crispus, in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish. “The dead man’s wife should not be outside, to a strange man⁵⁸Deut. 25:5. “To be” referring to a woman means “to be married”, Deut.24:2. זר “strange” means “outside the clan”, cf. Num. 17:5. This is interpreted here to mean “outside her marriage group”, e. g., the High Priest for the widow..” That is a wife who is a stranger to him. The Torah said, she should not be his wife even in case of a commandment. That being, she should not need ḥalîṣah! Rebbi Jeremiah⁵⁹In the differently formulated Babli parallel, 20a, the author is Rav. It seems therefore that one should read “Rav Jeremiah” (first generation Babylonian) rather than “Rebbi Jeremiah” (fifth generation Galilean). said: “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah⁶⁰Deut. 25:7 reads: “If the man does not want to take his sister-in-law, then his sister-in-law shall go to the elders at the gate and she shall say: My levir refuses to sustain his brother’s name in Israel, my levir does not agree.” The second “sister-in-law” seems unnecessary; if it were written “then she shall go” it would have the same meaning. Since we hold that no word in the Torah is unnecessary, R. Jeremiah concludes that there is a sister-in-law who goes even though the levir did not refuse but Heaven refused for him. This is the subject of the next paragraph.! If from “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, did the Torah not increase the cases of levirate⁶¹Since Deut. 25:7 also repeats “levir”, should there not be a levir who marries his sister-in-law even though the union otherwise would be forbidden?? Rebbi Ismael stated⁶²Sifry Deut. #289. There, the second “levir” is used to express what R. Jeremiah concluded from the first part of the verse: “My levir does not agree,” to exclude the case that the Omnipresent does not agree.: “My levir refuses”. That is, my levir refused, not that Heaven refused for him. In that case, she should not need ḥalîṣah! That means, the statement of Rebbi Jeremiah is needed, “his sister-in-law, his sister-in-law”, the Torah increased the cases of ḥalîṣah!