Еврейская мысль к Дварим 14:21

Some problems in the text of the Parshah. 1) Why does the Torah commence with the laws about servants, seeing that at the time the legislation was given to the Jewish people there were no servants? 2) What is so special about a servant leaving the employ of his master as a single man if he had been single at the time he had entered such employment? Why would a law for such contingency have to be legislated? 3) Why does the Torah say that a Jewish servant must not be sold to a gentile "nation?" It should have said that he must not be sold to a "gentile person!" Also, why does it say "if he did not do these three things for the servant?" It should have said "if he did not do one of these three things!" Why is the law about kidnapping placed between the laws about "hitting" parents and the law about "cursing parents?" 4) If a gentile slave is considered personal property, why does his death get avenged if he died as a result of maltreatment by his master? If, on the other hand, he is not considered personal property, why, if death occurs a day or two later than the beating he has absorbed, does the owner not face a penalty? 5) Since the Torah repeatedly calls for "eye for an eye," "injury for injury" etc., and the meaning is monetary compensation, why does the Talmud Baba Kamma 23, say, that the amount awarded varies with the social standing of the parties involved? 6) If the owner of a goring ox can escape the death penalty by payment of monetary compensation, why mention that he deserves the death sentence? The same argument can be raised concerning the death sentence in the case of a slave "life for a life," where the compensation is fixed at merely thirty shekalim! 7) Why does the Torah legislate compensation of four or five times the value when the thief has slaughtered or sold the animal he stole? 8) The requirement of a "trustee who acts out of friendship" to swear an oath that he had not failed in his duties, is worded in a peculiar manner. The preceding verse had described the objects as having been either stolen or lost. If so, it is clear that the keeper had not tampered with them! 9) In the case of the borrower, the Torah stipulates a) that the borrower is free from guilt if the animal was exercised with the owner's knowledge. The Torah goes on to say b) that the borrower is liable, if the owner is either not present or unaware of the use the animal has been put to. Surely, "(b)" is the only alternative to "(a)"! So why does the Torah spell it out once more? 10) What are the reasons for the respective penalties for the practice of witchcraft, lying with a beast, seduction and sacrificing to other deities? 11) If the line "if you lend money" is in the words of our sages one of the instances when the word im does not mean "if" but "when," why does the Torah not employ an expression that does not allow for any misunderstanding, instead of using words that have multiple meanings? 12) What is the meaning of the line "observe all the things which I have told you?" (23, 13) When and where did He tell the Jewish people?

And there are commandments that include matters of permission, such as "to the stranger who is within your gates you may sell" (Deuteronomy 14:21) and "you shall cast it to the dog" (Exodus 22:30), for the reasoning is connected to "And you shall be holy men to Me." Regarding torn flesh, it is not meant for your consumption but should be thrown to the guarding dog of your flock. Therefore, we learn from the tradition that it would always appear this way to them (the Israelites). "In them, you shall serve" (Exodus 20:5), for all the commandments were handed down from the hands of the forefathers, and there is no distinction between the words of the commandments and the words of the Torah, for both were given to us, and they received them from their forefathers, and their forefathers received them from the prophets, and everything came from the mouth of the Almighty through Moses.

The prohibition of “neveila” and “tereifa” serves to emphasize even more the attitude of compassionate feelings that man should have for all living things. That pathetic tereifa, isn’t it more appropriate to feel compassion for it, just like one feels more compassion for a suffering or sick person than a healthy person? However, the partnership that is found in compassionate feelings [for a tereifa animal] manifests itself in actuality when the time is right, together with the preservation of physical and spiritual health that is inherent in [the prohibition of eating tereifa], specifically that one should not share the same traits of animals of prey. And to awaken one to the fact that it is proper to distance oneself from their traits, and to be effective as well for their betterment, one is forbidden therefore to eat a tereifa lying in the field. A neveila that died on its own, hits at the root of terror from an kal-v'chomer argument, that if one is warned by the Torah to not take advantage of the tragedy and loss of life that happened to an animal that died on its own, even though [the animal] doesn’t lose anything from that, except as a sign of partnership in its suffering one could have by moving into the realm of its feelings[, then surely we should not take advanatge of animals that are healthy and have what to lose]. Through this, one would come to expand one's ethics to form a lesson that would improve the lot of animals ethically and physically. Certainly when that awareness has been completed, when man has the complete picture of the prohibition of eating neveila, he will not be able to raise his sword against a living animal that is dwelling with him and enjoying the sparkle of life. And when the depth of these prohibitions come to fruition, that is when the destiny will be fulfilled which is spoken about, (Deuteronomy 14:21) “For you are a holy nation to God your God.”