Шмот 21:26 Ссылки в Талмуде: Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot, Jerusalem Talmud Kilayim, Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin & Jerusalem Talmud Bava Kamma

Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa said, there is disagreement about mortmain slaves. Rebbi Joḥanan said, if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁶Tosaphot in Giṭṭin 41a, s. v. אשה, are of the opinion that the Babli concurs.. Rebbi Eleazar said to him, they are eating heave by his power and you say so? He answered, do not paraphernalia slaves also eat by his power, and one says that if he sold them, they are not sold¹⁷If the wife is not from a priestly family, then her slaves can eat only because he made her his wife. He cannot sell them since nobody can sell what is not his; Tosephta 9:1.. From your own they¹⁸The developers of rabbinic doctrine. gave to you. It would be logical that one¹⁹A paraphernalia slave who is not property of a Cohen. should not eat heave. But they said that he eats²⁰As if he were the property of a Cohen., and they said, if he sold them, they are not sold. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Josiah. A baraita supports one and another baraita supports the other. A baraita supports Rebbi Eleazar: Paraphernalia slaves are freed on account of “tooth and eye”²¹If a slave loses a body part through his owner’s fault, he gains his freedom (Ex. 21:26). Paraphernalia slaves are property of the wife but not the husband. This part of the baraita is quoted in the Babli. Baba Qama 89a. from the wife but not the husband. Mortmain slaves²²This baraita holds that they are the husband’s property; therefore, he must have the absolute power to sell them, against R. Joḥanan. are freed by “tooth and eye” from the husband but not the wife. What does Rebbi Joḥanan do with this? They are quick to manumit²³The Babli agrees without a dissenting opinion., as we have stated²⁴Quoted as tannaitic text also in Giṭṭin 4:4 (fol. 45b), as amoraic in the Babli, Baba Qama 11b. 33b; Baba Meṣi‘a 44b.: If somebody mortgages²⁵Greek ὑποθήκη “mortgage”. a slave and later sold him, he is not sold²⁶The creditor can foreclose on the slave in the hands of the buyer.; if he freed him, he is freed²⁷The creditor has to sue the borrower for damages; he cannot put his hand on the ex-slave.. A baraita supports Rebbi Joḥanan: Neither mortmain slaves nor paraphernalia slaves are under the rules of “one or two days”²⁸Ex. 21:20. The exemption for the owner who hits his slave which provided that he is not prosecutable if the slave survives for two days is not available to either wife or husband. This baraita defines “owner” as a person who has both the right to and disposition of his property.
This text is also in the Babli Baba Qama 89b. and are freed by “tooth or eye” from neither the husband nor the wife. Where do they disagree? When he sold them forever or sold them for some time²⁹“Selling temporarily” is not selling the property but leasing the use of the property for a limited period.? If you say that he sold them permanently rather than temporarily, does everybody agree that they are sold? If you say that he sold them temporarily rather than permanently, does everybody agree that they are not sold? Let us hear from the following: ³⁰Ševi‘it 10:1 (Notes 22–24), in a slightly different version Babli Giṭṭin41a. If somebody mortgages his field to his wife for her ketubah or to a creditor for his claim and then sells it, it is sold and the buyer should beware for himself³¹The buyer has to insure himself against the possibility that the creditor or the wife at the dissolution of her marriage will foreclose the property and he will have to sue the seller for restitution of the sale price.. Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel says, for the ketubah of the wife it is not sold since it is unthinkable that a woman³²Without a male protector. Then the law has to protect her. should run around at courts of law. They said, Rebbi Eleazar parallels the rabbis, Rebbi Joḥanan Rabban Simeon ben Gamliel³³Since the wife has a lien on the mortmain slaves, the husband cannot alienate them without her consent, just as he cannot alienate real estate put up as collateral for her ketubah.
Rosh (R. Asher ben Ieḥiel) in his commentary on this Yerushalmi (Yebamot 7 #1) holds that the husband is prevented even from leasing the property without his wife’s consent. Rif (R. Isaac Fasi), Giṭṭin #472 holds that the husband may not sell but may lease for a limited time.. That means, we deal with a temporary sale. But if he sold permanently, everybody agrees that they are not sold.

Rebbi Ḥama bar Uqba⁴⁴A student of R. Yose ben Ḥanina and teacher of Rebbis Jeremiah, Jonah, Yose. said in the name of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Ḥanina, he who leads kilaim by voice will be whipped⁴⁵In the Babli, Baba Meẓi‘a 90b, this is a disagreement between R. Joḥanan and R. Simeon ben Laqish. The argument there is only whether speaking is considered an action, not as in the Yerushalmi that the yoking together of two animals of different species prepares the transgression.. We have stated so: “If he led it, if he made it draw, if he called it and it came, he is responsible to pay like a borrower.⁴⁶If a person takes an animal which is not his in any of the ways indicated, he becomes responsible for all damages incurred as if he had borrowed the animal, until he formally returns it to its owner. In the Babli (Qiddušin 22b) and the Tosephta (Qiddušin 1:7), a parallel statement is given referring to acquisition of movables. In talmudic theory, payment alone does not transfer property; the property bought must be acquired by actually taking possession of at least some of it. If somebody bought a herd of cattle and then called one of them and it came, he has acquired the herd.” But did not Samuel state: “If it was standing outside the Sabbath domain, he called it and it came after him, he is free.⁴⁷If his cattle was standing outside the domain he could walk in on the Sabbath (2000 cubits from the edge of his town) and he called it back, he has not infringed on the laws of the Sabbath since he did not actually step outside his domain. Hence, calling cannot be the same as actually leading.” There it comes of its own volition, here it is forced to walk⁴⁸Since leading two animals of different species is forbidden only if they are somehow bound together, which restricts the freedom of each animal to walk according to its own volition and makes the human the overpowering influence. The Babli (Baba Meẓi‘a 90b) seems to reject this argument by noting that if somebody bound two animals together and then another person came and drove them, or if somebody muzzled the mouth of an ox far away from grain and another person then led it to thresh grain, only the second person is guilty in either case. This rule is accepted in Yerushalmi Terumot 9:4 (fol. 46d); it is considered irrelevant as argument here. But did we not state: “If he clapped before his [a slave’s] eye and blinded it, before his [a slave’s] ear and made it deaf, he [the slave] does not attain freedom.⁴⁹A slave gains his freedom if he is severely injured by his master (Ex. 21:26–27). If the master hits the slave on his body, the slave goes free; near the body only if the slave could not move away. Similarly, for kilaim the rancher is responsible only if he restricts the freedom of movement of his animals.
The parallel discussion is in Babli Qiddušin 24b.” Rebbi Eliezer ben Rebbi Yose said before Rebbi Yose, there is a difference because he [the slave] could have fled. Know that it is so because we have stated: “If he grabbed him he is guilty.”

Why did we not state: By important limbs that do not regenerate³⁸⁰Ex. 21:26–27 prescribes that a slave who lost an eye or a permanent tooth by his master’s action must be given his freedom. “Tooth and eye” is generalized as “permanenent deficiency involving a visible essential limb.” (Mekhilta dR.Ismael Neziqin 9).? Rebbi Joḥanan ben Marius said, because of the disagreement. Some Tannaīm³⁸¹R. Ismael in Babli Giṭṭin 42b, R. Eliezer in Mekhilta dR.Ismael Neziqin9; an anonymous Tanna in Mekhilta dR.Šim‘on b.Jochai, p. 177. For this Tanna, the freedom of the injured slave is “freedom by document”, covered by the Mishnah. The omission in the Mishnah is an implicit indication that practice requires a bill of manumission. state that he needs a bill of manumission; some Tannaīm state that he does not need a bill of manumission³⁸²R. Meïr in Babli Giṭṭin 42b; cf. Giṭṭin 4:4, Note 100..