Mga Sanggunian sa Talmud para sa Mga Bilang 30:14: Jerusalem Talmud Nedarim, Jerusalem Talmud Yevamot, Jerusalem Talmud Kiddushin & Jerusalem Talmud Sotah

MISHNAH: All substitute names¹Since vows and oaths are sacral acts, the invocation of vow or oath is automatically the invocation of God’s Name. Just as God’s Name should not be invoked in vain, the people shied away from using the expressions “vow, making a vow” or “oath, swearing”. As explained in the next Note, one of the oblique references to a vow was the word qorbān and its substitute, as given in Mishnah 2. of vows²Making a vow is taking on an obligation. There are three kinds of vows found in talmudic literature.
A person may vow to bring a sacrifice or to give a certain sum to the Temple. This is a relatively simple matter since (Mishnah Qiddšin 1:6) “speaking to Higher Powers is like delivering to a human”; i. e., a promise to God is as final as delivering the merchandise in a commercial transaction. Therefore, these vows are only a minor topic in the present tractate.
A person may make a vow to become a nazir for a certain time; then he is required to abstain from grapes and grape products as well as from becoming impure by the impurity of the dead, and he must let his hair grow. This kind of vow is discussed in Tractate Nazir.
The main topic of Tractate Nedarim is “any vow or oath of prohibition to deprive oneself” (Num. 30:14), i. e., a vow in which a person for any reason prohibits to himself things which otherwise are permitted. One may also make a vow to forbid certain actions to oneself but the actions must be forbidden as things are forbidden. (Self-flagellation is forbidden in Judaism since inflicting any wound on oneself is forbidden except for medical purposes, Mishnah Baba qama 8:5.) Since an animal which was dedicated as a sacrifice is forbidden for any profane use, it became general practice to say about anything of which one wanted to prohibit all use for himself “this is qorbān for me”, or simply qorbān “sacrifice”. Therefore, if in Math. 15:5 it is noted that a son can say to his parents that all he possesses should be qorbān for them; on the surface it is the height of mistreatment of the parents if the son prohibits them any use whatsoever of his property and even prohibits himself to help his parents in any way. The rabbinic answer would be that if the son goes off to fight as a guerilla against the Romans, or the Herodian government, cutting off all ties might save his parents’ property from confiscation. (Cf. Peah 1:1, Note 113, about the unpredictability of the duty to honor father and mother: “Somebody might serve his father fattened meat and go to hell; another might bind his father to the grindstone and go to paradise.”) The vow could also be in error, cf. Mishnah 3:2. Chapter 4 shows that a person forbidding his property to another can nevertheless take care of that other person. Cf. also Chapter 9, Note 38.
{In Math. 15:5, Jesus complains that Pharisees declare a person free from prosecution (פָּטוּר) if he violates the commandment to honor and fear father and mother by maliciously forbidding his property to them. The pharisaic rule in question is that “a prohibition violated without an action is not prosecutable” (Babli Sanhedrin 63a/b). Speech is not counted as an action in this respect. The rule is opposed by R. Jehudah who in many cases represents older traditions (from his father’s teacher R. Eliezer.) The testimony of Math. shows that in this case, the majority opinion is the historic position. R. Jehudah’s position is that of the Qumran community in the Manual of Discipline and the Damascus Document.} are like vows, of bans³“Ban” is the irrevocable gift of property to the Temple, Lev. 27:28. like bans, of oaths⁴An oath is subject-related, in contrast to a vow which is object-related. If a person prohibits himself to eat any bread, that is an oath of deprivation. If he prohibits the use of a specified loaf, or even any loaf, on himself, that is a vow of deprivation. like oaths, of nazir vows⁵While this is also a vow of deprivation it follows its own rules, Num. 6:1–21. like nazir vows. If one says to another, I am vowed away from you⁶Here starts the detailed explanation of what substitute names are. All expressions in this sentence are examples of נדר הנאה “a vow [to forbid] usufruct”, in which A tells B that all of B’s property is forbidden to A as if it were a sacrifice or sacred property and A’s property to B.., I am separated from you, I am distanced from you, that I will not eat from yours, that I will not taste from yours, he is forbidden⁷All of B’s property, not only his food.. I am excommunicated from you, Rabbi Aqiba was stringent in that because of a doubt⁸R. Aqiba decided that, while the exact meaning of “excommunicated” in this context is unknown since the use of a judicial term by a private person is inappropriate, the most extensive interpretation must be adopted.. As vows of the wicked, he vowed as nazir, a sacrifice, and an oath⁹This sentence is very elliptic. Since the nazir prohibits vines and all their products for himself and he needs atonement for his status (Num. 6:11) one concludes (Nedarim 1:1, 36d 1. 50; Babli 10a) that it is essentially sinful to deprive oneself from permitted enjoyments. It follows that just people do not make vows of deprivation or nezirut. They also do not make vows of sacrifices since such a vow implies that the person will be financially responsible until a correct sacrifice has been presented in the Temple. Responsible people offer free-will gifts in which they designate an animal as sacrifice; if anything should happen to that animal before it is sacrificed he is not obligated to offer a replacement.
Since the wicked do make vows and swear, any expression of vow or oath declared to be in the form used by the wicked has to be interpreted to imply a maximum obligation. Still, somebody who simply says that he makes a vow of the wicked is not obligated for anything unless some object on which the vow could fall was before him at that moment. For example, if a loaf of bread was before him and he said, this loaf is for me as a vow of the wicked, he is forbidden to eat that loaf. If a long-haired nazir was passing before him and he said, that is for me as a vow of the wicked, he is a nazir for the standard period of 30 days.. As vows of the good ones, he did not say anything¹⁰Since good people do not make vows nor do they swear.. As their freewill gifts¹¹If somebody said, this loaf of bread is to me as a free-will gift of a just person, he means that for him it is qorbān and therefore forbidden for all usufruct. Similarly, if a long-haired nazir was passing before him and he said, that is for me as a free-will gift of the just, he is a nazir for the standard period of 30 days., he made a vow of nazir and sacrifice.

MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons¹The language of the Mishnah implies that the wife was told (maybe by hearsay), not that she received testimony that would stand up in court. This is clear from the following Mishnaiot and the discussion at the end of Halakhah 2. came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried²Without having her husband declared dead by a competent court. That a woman may remarry even if her husband’s death is not confirmed by two independent witnesses of sterling character (Deut. 19:15) is a rabbinic institution. and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands³It is clear that she has to leave the second husband since her marriage to him was invalid by biblical standards. As pointed out by both Talmudim, this shows that the rules of the Mishnah are rabbinical., she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows⁴Num. 30:14.. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah⁵If the deceased husband had sons from different wives, before the inheritance is distributed the ketubah of each wife should be given to her sons; only the remainder is distributed among all sons.. If they died⁶Before the divorce documents were executed and there are no children., the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “These are the vows which he can dissolve,” etc. It is written⁵Num. 30:14. The verse ends: “Her husband shall confirm it or her husband shall dissolve it.”: “Any vow and any oath of prohibition to mortify.” That covers only vows which contain mortification. Vows regarding the relations between him and her, from where? “Between a man and his wife⁶Num. 30:17. One opinion in this Halakhah (Notes 11 ff.) and the consensus in the Babli (79b) hold that the dissolution of vows of mortification is permanent since it is expressly sanctioned by the verse but that dissolution of a vow regarding marital relations, which is the result of an indirect inference, is valid only as long as the marriage continues. Such a dissolution would be automatically voided for the divorcee or widow. The Mishnah mentions only vows the husband can permanently dissolve..” So far the husband; the father from where? Since the husband can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her, so the father can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her⁷This argument seems to be taken out of thin air. It is explained in Sifry Num. 155: V. 17 reads “These are the principles which the Eternal commanded to Moses between a husband and his wife, between a father and his daughter, in her adolescence, in her father’s house.” Now this verse is really an appendix to the laws governing the married wife. It is concluded that the restrictions which apply to the husband in relation with his wife in his house also apply to the father in relation to the adolescent daughter in his house..