פֿאַרבונדענע פּסוקים אויף ויקרא 27:30

So far following Rebbi Aqiba, following Rebbi Ismael⁶⁷The previous informal derivation is attributed to R. Aqiba; R. Ismael allows only formal derivations based on one of the principles enumerated in the Introduction to Sifra.? Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Ismael, an argument a minore ad majus. If heave which is forbidden to outsiders can be lifted, ‘orlah which is permitted to outsiders, not so much more⁶⁸This is incomprehensible since the next sentence implies that R. Ismael also admits that any use of 'orlah is forbidden.? No, if you said that about heave whose use is permitted, what can you say about ‘orlah whose use is prohibited! Rebbi Ḥinena: “Fruit, fruit” as equal decision⁶⁹This is a formal argument: If there is a tradition that a certain word can have only one meaning (“decision”), then the rules must be the same any time that word is used. Heave and tithes are from “fruit” (Lev. 27:30), ‘orlah refers to “fruit” (Lev. 19:23–24). Lev. 27:30 is written for reference; in the laws of ‘orlah the reference to “fruit” is necessary in Lev. 19:23 to define the subject but in Lev. 19:24 it might refer to the rules spelled out for heave. If that is true then R. Ismael must hold that ‘orlah and vineyard kilaim can be lifted by one in 100 since an “equal decision” cannot be only partially valid..