Kommentar zu Wajikra 5:29

‎‏‎ קול האלה ‎ה‎ושמע‎ [AND IF A SOUL SIN] AND HEAR THE VOICE OF AN OATH in a matter to which he was witness, i. e. that he (the person interested in the evidence) called upon him (the witness) by an oath that if he knows any evidence favourable to him he should testify for him before the court (cf. Sifra); if he does not tell it, he bears his iniquity.

AND HE IS A WITNESS, WHETHER HE HATH SEEN OR KNOWN³³²The section here discusses the offering of higher or lower value (see above, Note 15), the verse before us stating that this offering is required in the case of a false oath concerning testimony. Thus, if the person interested in the evidence called upon him by an oath, adjuring him that if he knows any evidence favorable to him he should testify before the court, and he swore that he knows of no testimony concerning him, when in fact he does know, in such a case, if he swore either unintentionally or wilfully, he must offer what is called an offering of higher or lower value. See “The Commandments,” Vol. I, pp. 82-83. In the following verse another transgression for which this offering is required is mentioned. — Ramban now proceeds to explain the sense of the triple expression, and he is a witness, or knows, or saw. These are not three separate matters, for it is impossible that one be a witness without seeing and knowing. Rather, Scripture is stating that if one hear the voice of adjuration that a party to a law-suit adjures him, concerning a matter in which he is a witness either by seeing or knowing of it, if he does not tell it he has committed an iniquity. Now the witness is not obligated to bring this offering unless he knows such a testimony that the party in suit who adjured him [to give witness] would have legally won his case because of it [and the witness nonetheless withheld his evidence]. It is for this reason that our Rabbis³³³Shebuoth 33b. interpreted [on the basis of the verse before us] that there is testimony which is valid by seeing without knowing, and [testimony which is valid] by knowing without seeing. How so? [Reuben says to Shimon:] “I have delivered to thee a maneh³³⁴A Hebrew unit of weight and value, equal to the sixtieth part of a talent. [as a loan] in the presence of such-and-such persons,” and [Shimon] claims “this never happened,³³⁵And Shimon claims: “Let such and such persons come and testify that they saw you [Reuben] delivering me the money, and I will pay you” (Rashi, ibid.). let the witnesses [you claim to have], come and testify.” This is a case of seeing without knowing [since although they saw Reuben handing the money to Shimon, they do not know the nature of this delivery, whether it was as a loan, or repayment of a loan that Shimon had originally made to him].³³⁶But since Shimon denied that this transaction had ever taken place, and says that if Reuben can produce the witnesses he claims he has to testify that they saw Reuben delivering him money, he will pay Reuben — then the witnesses’ testimony that they saw Reuben giving Shimon money is sufficiently valid to obligate Shimon to pay Reuben, although they did not know the nature of that transaction. If therefore they withhold their testimony, they are liable to bring the offering dealt with here. [If Reuben says to Shimon:] “You have admitted to owing me a maneh,³³⁴A Hebrew unit of weight and value, equal to the sixtieth part of a talent. in the presence of such-and-such persons,” [and Shimon replies]: “let them come and testify,” this is a case of knowing without seeing [and even though they did not see, they must testify what they know, and hence are liable if they withhold their evidence].
But in line with the plain meaning of Scripture, we need not [explain] the “seeing” here [to mean seeing] without knowing. Rather, the sense of the verse is as follows: whether he hath seen, meaning that he saw the loan or the sale completely [i.e., with knowledge], or known, i.e., that he heard [the defendants to the suit] admitting that transaction in the presence of witnesses, but he did not see it.
Now He does not state here: “and it is hidden from him,” [as He does in the following verse], because in this case [where the witness swears that he knows of no testimony for the party that adjures him to come and testify before the court], he is obligated to bring the offering [mentioned here in these verses] whether he swore [entirely] wilfully, or was in error on the oath whilst wilfully denying his knowledge of evidence. If, however, at the time of giving the oath he had forgotten the testimony, there is no guilt upon him.

כי תחטא, if one sins, etc. Why did the Torah have to introduce this paragraph with the words ונפש כי תחטא ושמעה?, It would have sufficed to write ונפש כי תשמע. Perhaps the reason is that the person who is the subject of this paragraph is one who had previously denied knowing of testimony which could result in an accused's exoneration. When he does so a second time, he proves that he had already incriminated himself previously. The Torah alludes to this state of affairs by writing נפש כי תחטא, someone who has already sinned, etc. The fact that the potential witness had lied already previously is accounted as a sin. All of this is confirmed by the letter ו the beginning of the word ונפש, at the start of this paragraph.

והוא עד או ראה או ידע, “and he is a witness, either having seen or having definitive knowledge.” The Torah does not speak of three different scenarios here, for it is impossible for someone to be a witness to something that he has neither seen nor otherwise has definitive knowledge of. It must deal therefore with the case of someone beseeching his friend or acquaintance to testify on his behalf to a matter which he has definitive knowledge of by having been an eye witness of it, or having ironclad knowledge of when the matter is not subject to eyesight, such as testifying to words spoken. He may have heard a party admit owing money to another party, for instance. The presence of such a party when money changed hands, would be “seeing” something, the hearing of an admission, would be “knowing” something without the benefit of having seen it. It is also possible to explain the words והוא עד, to mean that this refers to knowledge which includes both having seen what happens and having understood its impact, such as having been present when the loan was handed over and receipt was confirmed by the recipient. The subsequent או ידע would then mean that although the party had been fully aware of the loan having been transacted, the recipient having acknowledged it, he had not seen the money change hands. The Torah, in this case, does not write: ונעלם ממנו, “it was concealed from him,” as it did in the next three verses, seeing that the refusal to testify is not an inadvertent sin but a deliberately committed one. If, at the time when requested to render an oath, the witness had indeed forgotten what he had known at the time, he does not need to render such an oath.

נפש כי תחטא ושמעה קול אלה, “If a person will sin, having heard a sound (demand) for an oath, etc.” Tanchuma Vayikra 7, commenting on this introduction writes as follows: “take note that when both the creatures in the celestial regions and the ones in the terrestrial regions were created their creation was the result of G’d employing only one half of His name, i.e. Isaiah 26,4 כי ביה ה' צור עולמים, ‘that the Lord employed only the letters י-ה of His name when creating the universe.’ He did so in order that the sinners should not become guilty of desecrating His entire name when sinning.” Observe the sequence of the wording of the Torah in our verse. Instead of the Torah writing אדם כי יקריב מכם לה’ קרבן, the Torah writes אדם כי יקריב מכם קרבן לה'. The reason that the name “for the Lord” appears only at the end is to prevent the possibility of someone dying after having uttered the words “for the Lord” without his being able to complete the sentence. This is how careful one has to be not to utter the name of the Lord in vain.
This attitude is reflected in Solomon writing in Kohelet 5,1 “be not rash with your mouth, and let not your heart be hasty to utter a word before G’d.” Our sages (Tanchuma Vayikra 7) said that Jews should not be rash with offering vows and they should not make a practice of uttering oaths (even true ones). .hey tell of a king called Har in whose time 2,000 towns were destroyed all because of a true oath, because the oath was not called for. What was the oath all about? A person (not just one) swore an oath to his friend that he would go to a certain place and eat and drink there. He completed the journey and kept his oath. All the towns in which they confirmed all their intentions by phrasing them as an oath were ruined. If this is what happened to towns whose inhabitants honoured their oaths, how much worse is in store for people who do not honour their oaths! When in the future, G’d will judge people, the ones who will be accused for swearing a false oath will be put in the same company as the witches, sorcerers, and adulterers. This is all based on Maleachi 3,5: “But I will step forward to contend against you and I will act as a relentless accuser against those who have no fear of Me; who practice sorcery, commit adultery, who swear falsely, who cheat labourers of their hire and who subvert the cause of the widow.” G’d said: “the mouth which I gave you was meant to be used to sing My praises. Instead you use it to defame Me.” This is what is meant by Solomon in Proverbs 16,4: “the Lord made everything for a purpose, for His sake.” Another verse commenting on this subject is found in Isaiah 57,20: “but the wicked are like the troubled sea which cannot rest, whose waters toss up mire and mud.” Just as the waves of the sea in their arrogance rise higher and higher only to collapse upon themselves and be broken as soon as they hit the sand along the shore and the wave following it does not learn a lesson from the fate of the preceding wave, so the wicked do not learn from the fate which has befallen other wicked people before by becoming penitents. This is why they are compared to the waves of the sea which do not know the meaning of ever coming to rest in the world. The righteous, on the other hand, do know the meaning of calm and quiet as testified by Jeremiah 30,10 who writes: “and Yaakov shall again have calm and quiet with none to trouble him.”

In which he is a witness. This is derived from “He is a witness,” which is redundant [since the verse had already stated “he heard an oath” and continues with “or saw or knew”]; it excludes a witness who heard [secondhand] from another witness, a relative, or an invalid [witness] — even though he hears an oath [demanding testimony] he is exempt. Also, it teaches: “And he is a witness” — now, at the time of the oath, he is a witness in the matter, [but if they made him take an oath that if he will become aware of testimony in the future that he must testify, he is exempt].

ושמעה קול אלה, “by having heard an oath demanding him to testify, and having ignored it;” all the other paragraphs distinguish between inadvertently committed sins and those committed deliberately except the one involving an oath, known as שבועת בטוי, “a futile oath,” which is automatically considered as the one who uttered it doing so while aware of its implications. Solomon confirmed this in Kohelet 5,5 when he said: אל תתן את פיך לחטיא את בשרך ואל תאמר לפני המלאך כי שגגה היא, למה יקצוף האלוקים על קולך וחבל את מעשה ידיך, “do not let your mouth bring you in disfavour; and do not plead before the messenger (angel) that it was only an error; but fear the Lord else He may be angered by your talk and destroy your possessions.” When G–d will sit in judgment of all of His creatures, He will place such people next to the sorcerers and adulterers, as we know from the prophet Malachi (Malachi 3,5) והייתי עד ממהר במשפים ובמנאפים ובנשבעים (בשמי) לשקר, “I will act as relentless accuser against those that have no fear of Me, who practice sorcery, commit adultery and who swear falsely (using My name).”

We may also explain the wording based on Shavuot 30 where we learn of the culpability of someone who denied under oath that he knew testimony (concerning return of a loan being claimed by the creditor) and was aware that he would be guilty of offering a sin-offering even if he had denied testimony only inadvertently, but said person did not know that he had to bring a sin-offering for his perjury. If he did not know that he was culpable for the denial under oath of such testimony though he was aware that he lied, he is not guilty of such a sin-offering. Rashi explains that the Talmud means that only if the accused was unaware that he knew testimony that would help the creditor and was unaware of any penalty for withholding such testimony would he be free from bringing a sin-offering. Maimonides writes in chapter 1 of his Hilchot Shavuot that the definition of an inadvertent sin involving an oath concerning testimony is that the witness was unaware that refusal to testify to something one had knowledge of results in such a witness having to bring a sin-offering, whereas that same person is aware that his oath is sinful and that he perjures himself by swearing it. We note therefore that in order to be guilty of bringing the sin-offering the person had to be aware that his action was both forbidden and a lie. When the Torah writes: ונפש כי תחטא the meaning is that regardless of whether the denial was intentional or unintentional the culprit is aware that he commits a sin; the Torah thereby excludes a person who was unaware of the sin or had forgotten that he had witnessed what he is accused of having witnessed is not obligated to render the oath mentioned in our verse. The Zohar understands this verse as referring to the warnings issued by G'd to the soul which descends into this deceitful world when entering man's body.

ושמעה קול אלה, when he heard a public imprecation, this is explained by the following statement in the Mishnah on folio 30 in tractate Shavuot: "Culpability for this kind of oath exists both when the guilty party swore in the presence of the court or without the presence of a court provided he volunteered the oath. If, however, he merely denied such knowledge without swearing to his denial or saying "Amen," confirming what was put to him, he is not culpable until he had specifically denied his knowing testimony in the presence of a court. So far the view of Rabbi Meir. The other rabbis hold that there is no culpability for a false oath be it in the presence of a court or otherwise unless the perjurer had specifically denied his knowledge of testimony in the presence of a court in so many words, i.e. that he did not know of any testimony which would help the accused. From the above we note that in the view of Rabbi Meir culpability does not depend on what the accused actually said but on what he heard. Hearing a request to testify by the court and failing to do so brings in its wake culpability, i.e. ושמעה קול אלה, as long as he has heard the request to render an oath.

The view of the other rabbis is explained by the ראב"ד and later authorities as follows: If the perjurer heard the demand to testify regardless of whether this was in the presence of a court or not, he is culpable if he denied knowledge even if he did not say "Amen," as long as his denial occurred in the presence of a court even at a different time than that when the demand to render an oath was made upon him. Again, the determining factor in his guilt is the fact that he failed to respond to a request to testify which he had heard with his ears.

Although Maimonides rules in accordance with the view expressed by the majority of the rabbis that the denial must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer to be culpable, he disagrees by saying that in order to be culpable in the absence of a court the accused must have at least said "Amen." (compare his rulings in chapter 9 ruling 1 and in chapter 10 ruling 17). This means that he holds that a denial in the absence of a court does not result in culpability unless the potential witness had uttered the word "Amen" in response to a statement suggesting that he had no knowledge of such testimony. ראב"ד disagrees with Maimonides claiming that one cannot rule according to Rabbi Meir. Furthermore, it is not clear why either according to Rabbi Meir or according to the other rabbis it should matter that the court is present at the time the potential witness denies under oath that he has any such knowledge as he is accused of having. Thus far the words of the ראב"ד. The author of כסף משנה adds that he has no idea about Maimonides' source for distinguishing between a denial in the presence of the court and a similar denial in the absence of a court.

I believe that Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis disagreed only in a situation in which the potential witness volunteered his oath outside the confines of a court and did not deny any knowledge in the presence of the court at all. According to Rabbi Meir he would be guilty of perjury seeing Rabbi Meir derives this from a different kind of oath called שבועת הפקדון. Just as someone who denies having received money or objects on trust and he does so at his own behest he is guilty of perjury even if such an oath did not take place in the presence of a court. The other rabbis adhere to the principle known as דון מינה ואוקי באתרא, that one may derive the essential parts of one legislation and apply it to a different type of legislation without applying all the details pertaining to the legislation which serves as the source of the exegesis. [The principle is explained by Rashi in Shevuot 31. Ed.] In situations where the supposed witness is challenged to testify by third parties but not in the presence of a court, and the supposed witness declares that he does not know any such testimony, he does not have to bring a sin-offering even if he subsequently admits before a court that he had lied. When such a lie had occurred in front of a court and is subsequently retracted, the liar is guilty of the sin-offering according to all the rabbis.

Maimonides holds that any oath which is not sworn to in the presence of a court needs to be initiated by the person who swears it in order for him to be guilty of perjury and the sin-offering which is required. He derives this rule from the following words in the Mishnah quoted in Shevuot 31: "What is meant by the term שבועת העדות, "an oath concerning testimony?" If a party said to two others: "please testify on my behalf that you have been witnesses to a certain occurrence;" if the two people in question reply: "we swear we have no such knowledge," or if they simply say: "we do not know anything about the matter you want us to testify to (without volunteering an oath)" and the first party challenges them to confirm this on oath and they confirm it by saying "Amen," they are guilty of perjury. If the person demanding such an oath repeated his request five times but never in the presence of a court, and received a negative answer each time and both parties subsequently come to court where the ones who had denied their knowledge five times now admit that they did have knowledge, they are not guilty concerning their previous denials. If they deny their knowledge also in front of the court and are subsequently found to have lied, they are guilty of a sin-offering for every previous denial separately. Thus far the Mishnah. We note that according to the text of the Mishnah the witnesses had said "Amen." Who is the author of that Mishnah? If it is Rabbi Meir and there was no subsequent denial in the presence of a court we would have a disagreement between Rabbi Meir and the other rabbis in the previous Mishnah followed by this Mishnah in which all rabbis are agreed. We are entitled to view this anonymous Mishnah as reflecting the opinion of Rabbi Meir, seeing he is not quoted as diagreeing. Seeing that Maimonides demanded that the perjurer must have first denied his knowledge in front of a court before becoming liable for the sin-offering even if his original denial had been at his own initiative, it is clear that he interpreted the Mishnah according to the consensus of the Rabbis. The Mishnah spoke of the perjurers having said "Amen." When did they do so? When they were not in the presence of a court, for if they had denied their knowledge in front of the court they would have been guilty of perjury according to all opinions even without having uttered the word "Amen" as confirmation of an oath. It emerges that according to the view of the majority of rabbis the word "Amen" is the minimum required for such potential witnesses to become guilty of perjury when not in the presence of a court. [At any rate our author has succeeded in demonstrating that Maimonides did not rule according to a minority view so that the complaint of ראב"ד is not in place. Ed.]

Tossaphot, aware of an imprecision in the text of the Mishnah, state that this is due to the Mishnah's attempt to be brief; this is true if we were to assume that the alternative would have been for the perjurers to have said: "we do not know of any testimony we can offer on your behalf." Maimonides does not agree with this but holds that any oath sworn outside a court must be volunteered, i.e. the perjurer must have recited the substance of his oath with his own words. His reason is that the Torah discusses an occurrence in front of a court as we know from the words אם לוא יגיד, "if he will not reveal it." Only in such a situation is it enough for the perjurer to have merely heard the demand to testify, i.e. ושמעה קול for him to become guilty without uttering the substance of what he denies.

Shevuot 32 asks: "whence do we know that the denial of the witnesses's knowledge must have occurred in the presence of the court so that he would only then be guilty for such denial (perjury)?" Abbaye answered there that we derive this from the words ואם לוא יגיד, "if he refuses to testify," and that these words only make sense in a setting in which one normally testifies, i.e. a court. Rabbi Papa counters that if we were to accept the exegetical comment by Abbaye we would come to the conclusion that even an oath freely volunteered but not within the confines of a court would not be subject to the laws of perjury seeing that it was not sworn at a place defined as one designated to hear testimony? This argument is rejected in light of a Baraitha which interprets the word לאחת, "one of" in 5,4 to mean that the party who has become guilty of perjury is liable for each violation separately. If we were to assume that any oath must be sworn only in front of a court in order for one to become guilty of perjury, why would we have to be told that if the perjurer perjured himself five times in the presence of a court (on the same subject) he needs to bring only a single sin-offering? It follows that an oath may be sworn to also outside a court, whereas the denial must have taken place in front of a court for the perjurer to be liable. All this teaches that the oath which is sworn in the presence of the court is identical to the one sworn outside the court, and that one is certainly liable for perjury if one had sworn falsely outside the court. Having accepted this, it makes no difference if the party who is the subject in our verse was sworn by others in the presence of the court or elsewhere.

This is important if we want to understand Maimonides' source for his ruling. The use of the word לאחת which we quoted to mean that the perjurer is liable for every previous denial is really problematical; after all, 5,4 speaks of שבועת בטוי [undertakings by a person on oath to either do something or not do something. Ed.]. How can we apply the rules which pertain to such an oath to the type of oath discussed in 5,1? The two types of oath are so dissimilar that we would need an exegetical instrument to permit us to derive הלכות applicable to the one kind of oath to the other! We are forced to conclude that the only situation in which the two oaths are comparable is when the שבועת העדות, the oath concerning testimony, has been entered into voluntarily just as the שבועת בטוי discussed in 5,4. In the case where the potential witness only responded to a challenge to deny his knowledge on oath there is no way we can derive a הלכה applicable to שבועת בטוי as applicable also to שבועת העדות. This is why Maimonides derives culpability in the case of שבועת העדות only when such denial occurred in the presence of the court. He saw no way of proving culpability of שבועת העדות which was imposed by the creditor on the supposed witnesses by comparison to culpability of the person who swore a שבועת בטוי. Let us now return to Rabbi Papa's suggestion that if we were to use Abbaye's interpretation of the words לוא יגיד, we would have to conclude that every oath has to be sworn in the presence of a court in order for someone to legally incriminate himself as guilty of perjury! We do not find that Abbaye rejected Rabbi Papa's conclusion! He only rejected Rabbi Papa's exegetical proof. This means that Abbaye agreed with Rabbi Papa that culpability for שבועת העדות, the denial of knowledge as a witness which is the result of the creditor initiating the formula of the oath, must have occurred in the presence of a court in order for the perjurer having to offer a sin-offering. Thus Abbaye's view is identical with the ruling of Maimonides.

According to all the foregoing we may interpret the words ושמעה קול אלה as referring to the perjurer having denied knowledge of what he had been invited to confirm even if he did not say "Amen." This must have taken place in the presence of a court as we derived from the words אם לוא יגיד. In the event he denied his knowledge by uttering an oath, he would also be liable for another aspect of this oath, the one that we derive from the גזרה שוה of the word תחטא occurring both here and in connection with the שבועת פקדון, (5,21) an oath in which one swears not to have been guilty of carelessness or other trespass involving an object entrusted to one to keep on behalf a third party, providing the denial occurred in court. As to the conclusion of the Talmud on Shevuot 32 that oaths may be sworn outside the court and result in the penalty for perjury, this refers to that kind of oath, i.e. someone denying that he had dealt treacherously with his fellow man's property while in fact having done so. [The unnecessary repetition of the word תחטא in those two paragraphs is the exegetical basis for learning across from one kind of oath to another. Ed.].

We have now completely understood the way Maimonides interprets our verse. Our verse speaks of a single scenario namely that the creditor beseeches the witness to testify on his behalf in court and the (so-called) witness refuses to respond while in court. Both the two requirements mentioned in our verse are mandatory in order for the witness to become guilty of the sin-offering. 1) The attempt to make the witness deny on oath must occur in court, whereas if the denial occurred outside the court it does not result in a sin-offering even if at a different time the same witness had denied this in court. 2) The denial has to take place while the party denying is in court. If that were not the case the liar would not even be guilty of the sin-offering if he had volunteered a false oath outside the court as we derive from the comparison with the שבועת פקדון and the words תחטא that he would not be guilty. In the event that the denial occurred in the court whereas the oath had been sworn outside the court, we derive from the comparison with שבועת בטוי that if the perjurer had uttered the words of the oath himself that he is culpable for swearing a false oath. Anyone studying this carefully will agree that Maimonides' ruling is most illuminating and is fully supported by the text of our paragraph.

'או נפש אשר תגע וגו‎‎ OR IF A SOUL TOUCH [ANY UNCLEAN THING] etc., and after acquiring this uncleanness eats holy things or enters the Sanctuary, this being something which if done willfully is subject to the penalty of excision — thus is it explained in Treatise Shevuot 14b.

AND IT IS HIDDEN FROM HIM³³⁷This is the second type of case for which the offering of higher or lower value is required. It is known as “the defilement of the Sanctuary or its hallowed things.” Thus if a person who has been made unclean by any of the primary sources of uncleanness, unintentionally enters the Sanctuary, or unintentionally eats meat that is holy, he must bring the above-mentioned offering. A third — and final — case is if one swears an oath of utterance [“I shall eat” or “I shall not eat” and the like], and unintentionally fails to keep it. In this case too he is required to bring this offering. — “that is, he had forgotten his state of uncleanness. AND HE INCURRED GUILT — by eating holy food or by entering the Sanctuary.” This is Rashi’s language. Now [Rashi’s] intent is not that the [requirement of] eating the holy food or entering the Sanctuary is derived from the word v’asheim (and he incurred guilt), for this word is used with reference to all the sin-offerings mentioned previously.³³⁸Above, Chapter 4, Verses 13, 22, and 27. But this section deals in a brief manner with those points which are self-understood. For there is no sin involved in touching a carcass of an unclean beast or swarming thing [which defiles the person]. Even the priests have not been warned against it. So it is impossible that Scripture should require a person to bring an offering just because he touched them and thereby became defiled. Rather, Scripture is stating that when a person becomes defiled and forgets his state of uncleanness, or when he swears [an “oath of utterance”]³³⁷This is the second type of case for which the offering of higher or lower value is required. It is known as “the defilement of the Sanctuary or its hallowed things.” Thus if a person who has been made unclean by any of the primary sources of uncleanness, unintentionally enters the Sanctuary, or unintentionally eats meat that is holy, he must bring the above-mentioned offering. A third — and final — case is if one swears an oath of utterance [“I shall eat” or “I shall not eat” and the like], and unintentionally fails to keep it. In this case too he is required to bring this offering. and forgets the oath, and he incurs guilt by violating it — for either of these sins committed through forgetfulness, he is required to bring an offering. Now it is self-understood that the mere forgetfulness of his state of uncleanness involves no sin, except [if in that state] he ate holy food or entered the Sanctuary. Nor is there any sin in the mere forgetfulness of an oath, except if he violated it. This is the literal explanation of the verses in this section. Our Rabbis have further interpretations on this section strengthening this explanation.

ונעלם ממנו והוא טמא אשם, he had forgotten that he was ritually impure and entered the holy domain, or he had eaten sacred meat while being in such a state of impurity, offences punishable by karet if perpetrated knowingly.

And after this impurity he eats. You should not err and say that only because of touching something impure which was concealed from him and was later became known to him does he bring an offering. Therefore, Rashi says: “After this impurity he eats holy [sacrificial food or enters the Temple]. His proof is since it is written, “And incurs guilt,” i.e., by eating holy [sacrificial] food or entering the Temple, which must be after touching this impurity, for otherwise, why would he incur guilt? [Could we say that] because he becomes impure he should bring an offering? We should not ask: How does Rashi know that he eats holy [sacrificial food] or enters the Temple? Perhaps he is obligated to bring the offering for another transgression! The answer is: Rashi’s proof is since it is written here (v. 3): “Whatever that impurity may be,” and in Parshas Chukas it is written (Bamidbar 19:13): “And his impurity remains upon him.” [We derive through a gezeirah shavah:] Just as there it deals with the impurity of the Temple, so too, here, it deals with the impurity of the Temple, i.e., that he enters the Temple. Furthermore, it is written here: “The impurities of man,” and it is written in Parshas Tzav (7:21): “The impurities of man,” just as there [it deals with] eating holy [sacrificial food], so too, here, [it deals with] eating holy.

עלם ממנו‎ונ AND IT WAS HIDDEN FROM HIM — the uncleanness was hidden from him (escaped his notice, not the fact that the things he ate were holy or that the place he entered was the Sanctuary. The translation therefore is “and it — the fact that he was unclean — escaped his notice, but he actually was unclean”) (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 13 7; cf. Shevuot 14b).

The impurity. Meaning: [The impurity was concealed from him] and not [the fact he entered] the Temple or [the awareness of] its holiness, since it is written: “And this was concealed from him and he is impure” — [from which we derive:] He is liable for concealment of impurity and not for concealment of the Temple.

‎ם‎‎‏ואש AND HE INCUR GUILT through eating sacred food or entering the Sanctuary.

בטמאת אדם [OR IF HE TOUCHES] THE UNCLEANNESS OF MAN — This refers to uncleanness resulting from a corpse (i. e. it implies both touching the corpse itself or touching anyone who has come in contact with the corpse) (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 13 8).

ונעלם ממנו והוא טמא, “but it was concealed from him,” the same applies when the party asked to swear had forgotten the occurrence which he was now asked to swear about Nachmanides writes that actually, the Torah abbreviated, meaning to tell us that the sin occurred due to the party having forgotten something of relevance. There was no need to spell out the nature of the sin, seeing it was well known (except to the party who had committed it) He would only become guilty of the “sin” of being ritually unclean if he were to enter the precincts of the Holy Temple, or he would attempt to eat sacrificial meat, before either being alerted to it, or undergoing ritual purification in order to be on the safe side. Forgetting an undertaking by an oath is culpable only if in addition to having forgotten about it he had violated the terms of the oath.

One who swallows the carcass. This causes a person to become impure in the place of swallowing [i.e., when the carcass that is swallowed touches the esophagus] to make garments [that he is wearing] impure; if he eats it and enters the Temple he is liable. You might ask: The word בה [“אשר יטמא בה (that causes impurity within)”] is an exclusion! They already answered in the Gemara (Shavuos 7b) that it is because there is an extra exclusion — for it is written [here] in the section of the sliding scale offering (i.e., a sacrifice whose worth varies in accordance with the financial ability of the person bringing it): “Or, if he touches the impurities of man.” Thus, something [which imparts impurity] through touching is included, but what is not [capable of making impure] through touching is not. The carcass of a kosher bird does not impart impurity through touching, if so, why does the Merciful One [in the Torah] write “within”? Hence, it is an “exclusion after an exclusion,” and “an exclusion after an exclusion” only comes to be inclusive.

והוא ידע ואשם, “it came to his attention some time after the event so that he now had become guilty;” according to Rashi he had known, but had forgotten that this contact had made him ritually impure, so that he considered himself ritually pure. According to Rashi, how could he have become guilty since he had not been warned that he had committed something that results in his becoming impure?

לכל טמאתו WHATSOEVER UNCLEANNESS OF HIM IT BE — This is intended to include in this law the uncleanness resulting from touching men or women who have a flux (and those in similar physical condition e. g. ‎'וכו‎ יולדת ‎ נדה‎) Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 13 8.

And he does not know, for he forgot. It seems that the text [“and he does not know,” which seems to be Rashi’s words] is a scribal error, and it should say: “And he realizes” [i.e., as a divrei hamaschil (s.v.)] — “that he forgot the impurity.” It is, in effect, a separate comment, meaning: “And he realizes” — this is to say that he now realizes that he forgot about the impurity when he ate the holy food or entered the Temple. (Nachalas Yaakov). Nachalas Yaakov corrected the text based on the difficulty he had in Rashi’s text: “And he does not know, for he forgot.” [The reason he changed Rashi’s text is that] this does not follow any view — for Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva disagree about the reason the Torah repeats twice the word ונעלם (and it was concealed): Rabbi Akiva holds the view that we require that the person [who ate in impurity unintentionally] knew it was prohibited before the transgression and afterwards, and Rabbi Yishmael holds that the first word ונעלם obligates for not knowing he was impure and the second word ונעלם is for not knowing he entered the Temple or that he ate holy food. But Rabbi Akiva establishes it for previous knowledge and not for being unaware he was impure. Therefore, Nachalas Yaakov corrected the text [to follow the view of Rabbi Akiva]: “It should say: And he knew.” However, Gur Aryeh explains: He is only liable if he forgot the impurity but beforehand knew about the impurity. But if he had no knowledge whatsoever of the impurity, he is not liable. This is derived from the second time the word ונעלם is written: “ונעלם והוא ידע (and this was concealed from him, and he realizes).” This did not need to be written, for it is already written (v. 2): “And this was concealed from him, and he is impure.” Rather, you should place the phrase, “And he realizes” between one ונעלם and the other, and derive from it: After he had knowledge, he forgot the impurity. Therefore, Rashi writes as a comment to “ונעלם” — “And he did not know,” which is to say: [He is liable] specifically in this type of not knowing — that he forgot about the impurity [of which he once knew]. However, if he never knew about the impurity in the first place he is not liable.

‎‏אשר יטמא‎ — these apparently redundant words are intended to include in this law one who touches a man who had intercourse with a ה‎‏נד and has not yet immersed himself (cf. Leviticus 15:24) (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 13 8).

Entering. [This is derived] from the gezeirah shavah mentioned above (see v. 2). However, this raises a difficulty. It is understandable over, for it is written: “And this [impurity] was concealed from him, and he incurs guilt,” i.e., because the impurity was concealed from him he entered the Temple. Here, though, it is written: “[And this was concealed from him,] and he realizes, he incurs guilt.” Could it be that because he knew he was impure he ate holy food or entered the Temple?! Perhaps the answer is: The verse is written out of order, and this is what is meant: “This was concealed from him and he incurs guilt” — because the impurity was concealed from him he entered the Temple and afterwards it was known to him that he was impure (Re”m). Furthermore, we can say: We derive a gezeirah shavah from the words ואשם ואשם, and we derive the later section from the previous section.

בה — is intended to include in this law one who swallows the carrion of a clean bird (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 13 8).

והוא ידע … ‎ונעלם AND IT WAS HIDDEN [FROM HIM], BUT HE KNOWETH afterwards) that he had forgotten his state of uncleanness,

ואשם AND HAD INCURRED GUILT by eating sacred food or by entering the Sanctuary in this state.

בשפתים [OR IF A SOUL SWEAR, PRONOUNCING] WITH HIS LIPS [FOR HARM, OR FOR GOOD] — with his lips but not merely in his heart (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Section 9 2; Shevuot 26b).

But not with his heart. I.e., if he decided in his heart by making an oath silently without verbalizing not to eat, and then he ate, he is not liable to bring an offering.

לאחת מאלה, “be guilty concerning one of these things.” Concerning this Rashi asks what the Torah means to tell us with these words? (Actually on verse 13, where the same expression occurs, not on this verse) he answers that the three different sins all involving oaths that are being mentioned here are being treated equally. He answers that I could have thought that the type of offering demanded would be determined by the relative severity of the sin, whereas theTorah reveals that it is determined by the economic status of the sinner concerned. For example: if the person concerned had by mistake eaten part of an offering, he basically has to atone for this by offering a sheep or female goat. If he had committed a less serious sin, by failing to testify to something he had been a witness of, he has to bring a bird offering. If his inadvertent sin consisted of swearing an oath concerning what he would or would not do, and had forgotten that he had expressed this by words that made it an oath, he will bring a meal offering as atonement consisting of about two kilos of flour.

להרע TO DO HARM to himself,

To himself. This excludes if he took an oath to harm others, for instance, [he said:] “I will hit Ploni,” but he forgot and did not hit him, he is not liable to bring an offering. Rashi’s proof is from what it is written: “To do harm or to do good” — we make a hekeish (comparison) between the two — just as to do good is optional, so too to do harm is optional, excluding harming others, which is not optional, as it is written (Devarim 25:3): “He shall flog him with forty [lashes]; he shall not exceed.” With regard [to an oath] to do good, however, he is liable [for failing to keep an oath] even towards others. [You might ask: If so,] why does Rashi write: “Do good” — for himself? [The answer is:] Since he said that doing harm is for himself, he said that doing good is also for himself, but in fact he is liable [even for failing to keep an oath] to do good for others, as it is explained in the third chapter of Shavuos (26b).

או להטיב OR TO DO GOOD to himself, — as for instance, if he swears: “I shall eat” (which is להטיב), or, “I shall not eat” (להרע), “I shall sleep” (להטיב) or, “I shall not sleep” (להרע) (cf. Shevuot 27a).

And he violated. Scripture is truncated; it should have written: “This was concealed from him and he violated.” Otherwise, for what would he bring an offering? Would he bring an offering because it was concealed from him? [You might ask:] Why does Rashi not explain here upon the word, “ואשם (and he incurs guilt)” as he does above, with regard to the word ואשם in the verse dealing with impurity (v. 2, 3)? The answer is: The word ואשם written here is followed by the phrase, “for any one of these,” which implies that it refers to all the aforementioned sins. Therefore, perforce we must say that the verse, “And it was concealed from him” is a truncated verse, and it is as if it says: “It was concealed from him and he violated his oath, when he realizes [his sin],” i.e., when he finds out afterwards. It then returns: “And he incurs guilt for any one of these... He shall bring his guilt-offering” (Re”m).

לכל אשר יבטא WHATSOEVER IT BE THAT A MAN PRONOUNCETH [WITH AN OATH] whatsoever it be: — this is intended to include the case where the oath refers to something that happened in the past (e.g., he swore, “I have eaten” etc. but he has not) (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Section 9 8; Shevuot 26a).

A sliding scale sacrifice. Meaning: If he is wealthy he brings a female lamb or she-goat; if he is poor he brings two turtledoves or two young pigeons; and if he is of the poorest of the poor he brings a tenth of an eiphah. Therefore, this offering is called the sliding scale sacrifice.

‎‏ונעלם ממנו AND IT BE HID FROM HIM (he forgot that he had taken such an oath) and consequently he violated his oath. — All these cases come under the law of “a sacrifice of higher or lesser value” (according to pecuniary conditions), as is set forth here (vv. 6—13): but an oath which involves the false repudiation of a claim to money does not come under the law of this sacrifice but under that of a guilt-offering (v. 25).

As is explained. Although Rashi does not need to say all this, for Scripture is clear about it, as it explicitly stated in this section, nevertheless, he says it so that he can say: “But [violation] of an oath...” as it says in the end of the parshah (v. 21): “If a person sins and wrongfully deviates...”

AND HE SHALL CONFESS THAT WHEREIN HE HATH SINNED. 6. AND HE SHALL BRING HIS GUILT-OFFERING. This was not the [order of the] procedure.³³⁹For the offering had to be brought first, then the laying of hands was performed during which [while his hands lay on the offering] he confessed his sin (see Note 64 above). Hence the expression and he shall bring his guilt-offering must mean “and he who comes to bring an offering to effect atonement for his guilt … ” Rather, he first brought the sin-offering and laid his hands upon it, and then confessed, similarly to that which is [explicitly] said further on, And Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel.³⁴⁰Further, 16:21. Here, however, Scripture does not state “and he shall lay his hand,” because He explained previously in the case of all sin-offerings³⁴¹Above, Chapter 4, Verses 4, 15, 24 and 29. that they require the laying of hands, and similarly, in the case of freewill offerings.³⁴²Ibid., Chapter 1, Verse 4; Chapter 3, Verses 2, 8 and 13. See also Note 11 above. But He did not explain [the duty of] confession above in the case of the other sin-offerings, [although it is required in those cases as well].
In line with the simple meaning of Scripture it would appear that here He said and he shall confess, because in the case of an “oath of testimony”³³²The section here discusses the offering of higher or lower value (see above, Note 15), the verse before us stating that this offering is required in the case of a false oath concerning testimony. Thus, if the person interested in the evidence called upon him by an oath, adjuring him that if he knows any evidence favorable to him he should testify before the court, and he swore that he knows of no testimony concerning him, when in fact he does know, in such a case, if he swore either unintentionally or wilfully, he must offer what is called an offering of higher or lower value. See “The Commandments,” Vol. I, pp. 82-83. In the following verse another transgression for which this offering is required is mentioned. — Ramban now proceeds to explain the sense of the triple expression, and he is a witness, or knows, or saw. the offering is to be brought even if the oath was taken wilfully. So also in the case of an “oath of deposit”³⁴³If Reuben says to Shimon, “Give me my deposit which you have,” and Shimon replies “I swear I have naught of yours,” or if Shimon said, “I have naught of yours,” and Reuben says, “I adjure thee” and he answers “Amen” — in this case too Shimon is liable to bring an offering [in addition to the restitution] even if he wilfully swore falsely. The offering, however, is not the one of higher or lower value mentioned in this section — but a guilt-offering, as explained further on (in Verses 23-26). Ramban mentions the “oath of deposit” here only to liken it to the “oath of testimony” in the sense that the offerings in each case are brought even if committed wilfully. This is a novel point in the law of offerings, for all other offerings brought for commission of a sin effect atonement only in case the transgression has been committed in error; otherwise, the offering of the wicked is an abomination (Proverbs 21:27). Ramban thus suggests [in line with the plain meaning of Scripture] that since the offerings in these two cases — that of the “oath of testimony” and the “oath of deposit” — are required to be brought even when committed wilfully, therefore the Torah mentions in their cases the subject of confession. But in the case of all other sin-offerings, since they are brought only when the transgression was committed in error, there is no need for confession of sin. However, Ramban will immediately refute this position, for the Rabbis have clearly interpreted that all sin-offerings require confession of sin. He mentioned, then they shall confess their sin which they have done.³⁴⁴Numbers 5:7. But in the case of the sin-offering brought for transgression in error, He did not mention confession.³⁴⁵“But [when bringing] the sin-offering for a sin committed in error he does not confess” (Tur in quoting the language of Ramban). But in the opinion of our Rabbis³⁴⁶Sifre Zuta 5:5. the expression, and he shall confess that wherein he hath sinned, refers to everything mentioned in this section, including the defiling of the Sanctuary and the holy food, and an “oath of utterance,”³³⁷This is the second type of case for which the offering of higher or lower value is required. It is known as “the defilement of the Sanctuary or its hallowed things.” Thus if a person who has been made unclean by any of the primary sources of uncleanness, unintentionally enters the Sanctuary, or unintentionally eats meat that is holy, he must bring the above-mentioned offering. A third — and final — case is if one swears an oath of utterance [“I shall eat” or “I shall not eat” and the like], and unintentionally fails to keep it. In this case too he is required to bring this offering. which offerings have to be brought [only] when [the sins are] committed in error, and [in the case of] all other sin-offerings [which are also brought only when the transgression was done in error, the need for confession when bringing them] is derived from here. He mentioned confession, however, [specifically] here because the “oath of testimony” and the “oath of utterance” do not make one liable to excision [if done wilfully, unlike the sin-offering which is brought only for those sins committed in error which, if committed wilfully, incur the punishment of excision], and yet He requires confession in these cases, and [thus it follows] all the more that in the case of the fixed³⁴⁷As distinct from the offering of higher or lower value, where the offering varies according to the means of the transgressor, a fixed sin-offering must be of an animal and is alike for poor and rich, so that if the poor cannot afford it he is not obligated to bring another offering in its stead, as is the case of the offering of higher or lower value. See “The Commandments,” Vol. I, pp. 78-79. sin-offerings mentioned above, he must confess [since his sin, were it to be committed wilfully, would incur] the penalty of excision. Our Rabbis have said³⁴⁸Sifre Naso 2. that the expression here, and he shall confess that wherein he hath sinned is a general principle in the case of all sin-offerings, that they require confession. The verses written in the section of Naso, stating, and that soul shall be guilty. Then they shall confess their sin which they have done,³⁴⁹Numbers 5:6-7. is to include all guilt-offerings [in the requirement of confession]. So it is explained in the Sifre.³⁴⁸Sifre Naso 2. There the Rabbis have interpreted: “And that soul shall be guilty. Then they shall confess.³⁴⁹Numbers 5:6-7. This establishes the general rule for all those executed [by the court] that they require confession” [to achieve full forgiveness of their sin].

והתודה אשר חטא עליה, “and he shall confess what he had sinned.” Nachmanides writes that the Torah does not report the correct sequence of the procedure involved here. The leaning on the animal prior to it being slaughtered has been omitted here. It was omitted as previously it has been made plain that before any sin offering is slaughtered the owner must lean his hands on the sacrificial animal and confess his sin. On the other hand, in the verses where the leaning is mentioned, no mention was made of the confession that accompanied this part of the procedure. According to the plain meaning of the text, the reason why the confession is made a part of the procedure here is because in both instances involving the oath the sin to be expiated had been committed deliberately, as opposed to the other instances when the sin offering is offered on account of inadvertently committed sins. According to this approach no confession accompanies the bringing of ordinary sin offerings. However, our sages claim that the word והתודה concerns all the examples of sin offerings mentioned up until now including entering holy precincts in a state of ritual impurity when it occurred unintentionally. The same applies to all other sin offerings, each one requiring a confession immediately prior to the animal being slaughtered. The reason why the confession was mentioned especially in this verse, is that the news is that the sin mentioned does not carry the karet penalty, as do the other sins for which a sin offering if they were committed only inadvertently. How much more so would a confession be required when the sin concerned would require a definitive sin offering when committed unintentionally!

והתודה אשר חטא עליה, “he will confess that wherein he has sinned.” We speak about someone who was in doubt if he had committed an error and upon closer examination finds that he has indeed committed that sin inadvertently. This is indicated by the choice of the word והתודה, “that he makes himself confess, attains certainty.”
Our sages (Sifri Nasso 2) say that the word teaches that every sin requires that it be confessed. The same explanation occurs elsewhere in the Sifri on Numbers 5,6 “this person has committed a sin etc.,” where the operative word is the repetition of the word נפש, meaning that by the sin he has forfeited his life. That verse is used as the classic verse demanding that every sinner is required to confess his sin in order that his guilt can be expiated. [Even sinners who are executed for their sins do not obtain atonement if they did not confess their guilt prior to execution. Achan, who was mentioned earlier, is a case in point. Ed.]

והביא את אשמו, “he shall bring as his guilt offering, etc;” this offering does not have to be accompanied by a libation, but it does require that the person bringing it places his weight through his hands upon it (when confessing his guilt). (Sifra)

AND IF HIS MEANS SUFFICE NOT FOR A LAMB. Scripture has been lenient towards these sinners by allowing them to bring an offering of either higher or lower value. It is possible that the reason for the leniency with regard to the offering in the case of oaths [i.e., the “oath of testimony” and the “oath of utterance”, as explained above] is because the punishment is not excision [were they to be done wilfully]. In the case of defilement of the Sanctuary and the holy food [He mitigated the obligation of the offering] because the person who did it erred whilst engaged in performing a religious duty, for the priest who eats the holy food or enters into the Sanctuary to prostrate himself or to bring an offering is engaged in performing a religious duty, and his intention is towards Heaven. Therefore even though he sinned on account of having forgotten his state of uncleanness, Scripture gave him more ways of atonement.
Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra commented that the reason why one [of the two birds brought by the poor man in the offering of higher or lower value] was a burnt-offering, is so that it should be offered on the altar in lieu of the fats of the animal sin-offering [brought by the affluent person].³⁵⁰I.e., in view of the fact that nothing of the bird sin-offering is burnt on the altar, while the fats of the animal sin-offering are burnt thereon, Scripture therefore required that the poor man who cannot afford the animal offering, should bring two birds, one for a sin-offering [which is the required offering in this case], and an additional bird as a burnt-offering, to take the place of the fats of the animal sin-offering. He has explained it well.

ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה, if he is unable to afford a lamb, etc. This means that the individual in question can afford to present more than the two turtle-doves which are the next cheaper sin-offering and burnt offering the Torah demands of him. As long as he is not able to afford a lamb as his sin-offering, he is allowed to offer the bird-offerings designated for a needy person.

ואם לא תגיע ידו, ”and if he cannot afford it, etc.” There are some sages who believe that the reason why the Torah showed a degree of leniency to financially strapped sinners by allowing them to bring an inexpensive guilt offering consisting of a bunt offering of one bird and a sin offering of another bird, is that in all of the examples concerned the sinner did not derive any meaningful personal advantage from the sin he had committed. On the other hand, someone eating chelev or eating ordinary food on the Day of Atonement, or someone performing work on the Sabbath, and a host of similar examples of sins, did derive personal satisfaction or financial benefit from them, not to mention people indulging in forbidden sexual relations, or people who have misappropriated property belonging to someone else, such sinners most certainly have to bring an offering that sets them back financially. Some of these have committed a twofold transgression, seeing that it occurred in holy precincts that were out of bounds to them. These offerings cost at least a shekel. As to the guilt offering designed to ward off punishment for transgressions of an indeterminate nature, the אשם תלוי, the conditional guilt offering, this must also be one that costs at least one shekel. It is relatively expensive, as people who are not sure they have committed a transgression are in the habit of giving themselves the benefit of the doubt. They must not think that they can do so with relative impunity. Nachmanides writes that the reason why the guilt offering for transgressions related to oaths is relatively inexpensive for people with restricted means, is that the transgressions in respect of which his offering is brought do not carry a type of death penalty such as karet even if they had been committed deliberately. The reason that this is so in ritual impurity related transgressions, is that the transgression itself was committed in the course of fulfilling a commandment. When reflecting on his words one has difficulty in reconciling them to a situation where a father was supposed to circumcise his son after the Sabbath, and he had forgotten the correct date, i.e. the 8th day, and circumcised his son on the Sabbath instead, who is guilty, and must bring the expensive sin offering according to the opinions of all our scholars. The reason might be that seeing that the performance of the commandment was not performed at the right time, and the father had not involved himself in as many preparations prior to fulfilling this commandments, he is not entitled to the leniency shown by the Torah in the other examples.

ואם לא תגיע ידו די שה, “if he is unable to afford the price of a lamb, etc.” seeing that people guilty of entering sacred grounds in a state of ritual impurity or swearing a futile oath, do not derive any benefit from committing that sin, the Torah made allowances for them if they found offering a lamb as sin offering a financial hardship, and offered two alternatives depending on their financial status. No such relief is granted to people who inadvertently ate forbidden fat, blood, or who ate on the day of Atonement, (thinking it was on a different date), or people performing forbidden activities on the Sabbath for their personal benefit. Anyone who had derived personal benefit by making use of sanctified animals or vessels has committed two sins simultaneously, and is also not qualified to avail himself of what is written in this verse. He is viewed as if had tried to steal from G–d. All these people have to pay for the value of the animal offered by the priest on their behalf.

ואם לא תגיע ידו, “if he is financially unable, etc.” the Torah does not demand that he must borrow money in order to be able to atone for his unintentional sin, and it does not require that he use the products of his special skill and bring this as an offering. But if he owns a lamb, which is what is basically required of him as an offering, but he does not have money to cover his basic expenses, he does have to bring this lamb as his offering. The sages derive this rule from the Torah having written: די שה. (Sifra on that verse)

שתי תורים, “two turtledoves;” the reason this person has to offer two sacrifices (two birds) is that between them the two birds correspond in some manner to the parallel offering brought by a wealthy person guilty of the same transgression, namely offerings which contain parts that are burned up on the altar, and meat consumed by the priests. In the case of the offerings consisting of the two turtledoves, the one that is called עולה, burnt offering, is all dedicated to heaven, whereas the one known as חטאת, sin offering, this is consumed by the priests. If only a burnt offering had been sacrificed, the priest performing the procedure would not have been compensated at all. On the other hand, if only a sin offering had been presented, the altar would not have received anything as no eymurim of birds are burnt up on the altar.

The word ידו is interpreted by Torat Kohanim to mean that the individual in question does not have to borrow money to enable him to purchase a lamb for his sin-offering. Neither do we tell such a person to work harder in order to earn the money necessary to purchase the lamb. The reason for this is the principle חביבה מצוה לשעתה, it is important to perform a commandment at the time it is due rather than to perform it somewhat later but in a more perfect manner (based on Pessachim 68). Torat Kohanim describes the alternatives as follows: "the meaning of the words "if his means do not suffice for a lamb" is that even if the individual in question owned a lamb but he did not have the wherewithal for his elementary needs, i.e. for clothing, food or shelter, he is considered as if he did not have a lamb to offer. Torat Kohanim derives this from the expression די שה, "sufficient to afford to offer a lamb."

אחד לחטאת ואחד לעולה, “one of which (the two birds) as a sin offering and the other as a burnt offering.” Only the blood of a bird offering that is a sin offering is brought to the altar, so that the altar has something that can be “eaten.” When a wealthy person has to bring a sin offering, the Torah is satisfied with either a female sheep or goat, seeing that there is enough meat on these animals to provide a meal for the officiating priest, and the entrails provide the ”meal” for the altar.

I have seen a comment by Rabbeynu Hillel who defines "his needs" as referring to the lamb for the offering which this individual does not possess. Halachah demands that the owner of the lamb personally bring it to the courtyard of the Temple, etc. This explanation seems rather forced seeing it does not take more effort or time to bring a lamb to the Temple than it takes to take two turtle-doves to the Temple. If the Rabbi referred to the effort to bring a relatively sizable lamb to the Temple, let him bring the money instead and purchase it from the Temple-treasury. If Rabbeynu Hilel referred to the need to perform סמיכה on the lamb, something that need not be performed on the birds, this too is no argument as the performance of סמיכה is an initial requirement only; the requirement is not mandatory so that failure to perform it would invalidate the offering. Why should such an individual rather not bring the offering required of him and instead bring the offering designated for a needy person? We have learned at the end of tractate Nega-im (14,12) that if a well-to-do person offered the sin-offering designated for a poor person he has not fulfilled his obligation. The same applies to all the offerings commonly known as קרבן עולה ויורד, offerings which vary in value with the economic situation that the person who has to offer a sin-offering finds himself in. Maimonides also rules this way in Hilchot Shega-got chapter 10. The requirement of placing one's weight on the lamb is only meant to enhance the commandment and does not in any way interfere with the atonement value of the offering for the sinner in question as we know from Zevachim 6.

Torat Kohanim interprets the words "if she cannot afford a lamb" in Leviticus 12,8 where the need for a woman who gave birth to bring a sin-offering is discussed, as follows: "If she owns a lamb but does not have her basic needs, how do I know that she need only bring the offering designated for a poor person?" Answer: "The Torah writes די שה, sufficient for a lamb." The reason Torat Kohanim had to use these words there in the same sense as in Leviticus 12,8 is that one of the offerings of a mother who has given birth is a burnt-offering and such burnt-offering requires to be accompanied by a drink-offering נסכים. This drink-offering is mandatory. Had the Torah not written די שה in that verse I could not have derived this meaning from our verse where we discussed an offering that is purely a sin-offering. As a result of such considerations, why did the Torah not merely write these words in Leviticus 12,8 and I would have applied them here also? There was no need to tell us that the sinner may forego the need for סמיכה, as we could have applied a קל וחומד, an inference from minor to major; if in the case of a sin-offering which does not involve a mandatory drink-offering, a person who owns a lamb but does not have money for his basic needs is allowed to bring the sin-offering applicable to a poor person in its place, then a mother who finds hereself in a similar economic situation and who would have to find the means for an additional drink-offering most certainly would be allowed to offer a poor person's offering instead, and I would not need additional superfluous words for such exegesis. I believe therefore that I was right. As long as the sinner has more than enough for two birds but not enough for a lamb, he is entitled to bring the offering designated for a poor person. Korban Aharon supports my interpretation.

והקריב את אשר לחטאת ראשונה AND HE SHALL OFFER THAT WHICH IS FOR A SIN-OFFERING FIRST — This verse establishes the general rule that the sin-offering is always sacrificed before the burnt-offering. — To what may this be compared? To the case of an advocate (in our case the חטאת) who went in to the king to obtain pardon for his client. When the advocate has gained that pardon, then the present (עולה) is brought in after him (Zevachim 7b).

ולא יבדיל; he only needs to perform the procedure on either the windpipe or the foodpipe.

One organ. In the first chapter of Chulin (21b) Rashi explains because it is written: “He does not separate,” and a bird is slaughtered with only one siman (gullet or windpipe). If he does anything more than what is necessary it is considered “separation.” A further consideration: the [severing of the] entire organ is included in the mitzvah of slaughtering a bird in the preferred way — therefore, regarding shearing [the head], when he nips the entire siman it is not “separation.” With regard to the second siman, however, there is not even a mitzvah [of slaughtering] in the preferred way, as [the Rabbis] taught [in a Baraisa] (ibid. 27b): To obligate him in two simanim is impossible, for a bird was already compared to fish.

והקריב את אשר לחטאת ראשונה, “he (the priest) is to present the offering serving as the sin offering, first;” the verse does not discuss what is offered first on the altar, but what is slaughtered (pinched) first. Any left over blood will be squeezed out on the altar.

ולא יבדיל [AND HE SHALL NIP ITS HEAD …] BUT SHALL NOT SEPARATE IT — i.e. he nips only one organ (either the gullet or the windpipe) (Chullin 21a).

ולא יבדיל, “he must not sever the head (of the bird) completely. Only one of the vital conduits of the bird, either the one for breathing, or the one for leading to the stomach needs to be pinched.

עורף is the surface of the head which slopes down towards the neck);

‎‏מול עורף is the part bordering on it which sees the עורף (the part next to the עורף and within sight of it) — that is, the length of the whole back of the throat (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 18 7: Chullin 19b).

והזה מדם החטאת AND HE SHALL SPRINKLE OF THE BLOOD OF THE SIN-OFFERING [… AND THE REMAINDER OF THE BLOOD SHALL BE WRUNG OUT] — In the case of a burnt-offering of a fowl Scripture requires only the wringing out of the blood (Leviticus 1:15), whilst in the case of the sin-offering it requires sprinkling and wringing out: standing quite near to the altar, he grasps the nape and makes the blood spurt out and thus the blood spurts forth in a jet and goes in the direction of the altar (cf. Zevachim 64b).

והזה מדם החטאת; he takes hold of the body of the bird and sprinkles from a distance, squeezing out the rest of the blood; if the offering is a total offering, there is no sprinkling of the blood; all of it is simply squeezed out. (Leviticus 1,15)

For its sake. This was explained above (Rashi 4:24) regarding the sin-offering of a leader. Rashi repeats it [here] because it is dealing with bird sinoffering and above it is dealing with an animal sin-offering, and [one cannot learn from the other because] they have dissimilar aspects. Therefore, he repeated the explanation here.

והנשאר בדם ימצה, “and the remainder of the blood shall be drained out;” the priest walks around the side of the altar and squeezes the bird against the wall of the altar so that the blood drains by itself. The word is spelled here with the letter א at the end [not in any of the editions of the chumash or training Torah scrolls at my disposal. According to one commentary I have seen the author had the same spelling in front of him as do we, but he means that the vowel tzeyre instead of the vowel segol the result is that the meaning is as if the letter ה had been written instead of the letter א. Ed.] It suggested that the blood ends up the same way as does the blood which had been sprinkled, namely at the base of the altar.

חטאת הוא IT IS A SIN-OFFERING — These apparently redundant words intimate: if the sprinkling and wringing of the blood are done for the purpose of (i.e. having in mind that it is) a sin-offering it is valid; if it is not done for this purpose (i.‎e. that the officiating priest has another sacrifice in mind) it is invalid (cf. Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 18 9 and Rashi on Leviticus 4:24).

כמשפט [AND THE SECOND HE SHALL OFFER FOR A BURNT-OFFERING] ACCORDING TO THE REGULATION — according to the law that is mentioned with regard to a free-will burnt-offering of fowls at the beginning of the section (Leviticus 1:14) (cf. Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 18 10; Chullin 21a).

מחטאתו אשר הטא, concerning the sin which he committed, etc. In connection with the offering by a rich man the Torah writes: מחטאתו, whereas when describing the parallel offering by a poor man the Torah writes: מחטאתו אשר חטא. Why the difference between these descriptions? Torat Kohanim item 343, elaborating on verse 13 which deals with the sin-offering to be brought by the poorest of the poor, claims that I might have thought that the value of the various sin-offerings was determined by the relative severity of the sin it was to atone for; in order to disabuse us of such thinking the Torah wrote מאחת מאלה, that either kind of sin-offering could atone for either kind of sin and that what determined the kind of sin-offering was only the economic situation of the sinner. The reason for this comment is the fact that this paragraph deals with three distinctly different kinds of sins for which sin-offerings have to be brought. We have the sin of someone who is ritually impure introducing impurity into the Temple precincts (5,2), a sin which carries the Karet penalty if committed intentionally. This is the most severe sin for which a sin-offering is acceptable. We have the sin (5,1) of perjury committed by someone who withholds relevant testimony on behalf of a fellow Jew, a sin which is punishable by a sin-offering either if committed inadvertently or if committed intentionally. This sin is less severe than the one which preceded it, though it is more severe than the one involving שבועת בטוי an undertaking accompanied by an oath to do or not to do something and the failure to honour one's undertaking. This sin is listed in the Torah (5,5) after the שבועת העדות as it is relatively minor. Violation of שבועת בטוי is punishable by a sin-offering only if it occurred inadvertently. As a result of these distinctions I could have thought that different sins require sin-offerings of different value in relation to the severity of the sin. Therefore the Torah tells us in verse 13 that the value of the sin-offering is not related to the nature of the sin but to the ability of the sinner to afford the offering in question.

וכפר עליו הכהן....ונסלח לו, “and the Priest will provide him atonement....and it shall be forgiven him.” Forgiveness will originate in heaven as the guilt will disappear together with the burning up of the sacrifice. The meaning of וכפר as making atonement occurs for the first time when Yaakov brought gifts (similar to sacrifices) to his brother Esau hoping that he would forgive him (ואכפרה פניו) for obtaining the birthright by trickery (Genesis 32,21). There is a difference between what is described as כפרה “atonement,” and סליחה, “forgiveness.” The latter means that the guilt has been totally forgiven, is now “non-existent” whereas the former is merely concerned with culpability for the sin committed. It is not within the capacity of human beings to grant forgiveness; only G’d Himself can wipe the slate clean completely. This is why David writes in Psalms 130,4: “forgiveness rests with You.” The High Priest, while initiating the process of forgiveness, cannot complete it, only G’d can. When someone was guilty of שבועת בטוי, (verse 4) “a false oath,” there is atonement only. The Torah does not add the words that “it will be forgiven him.” [Swearing a false oath is hardly an unintentional sin qualifying for total forgiveness. Ed.]

According to the rule. Meaning: Its head is sheared in both simanim (gullet and windpipe) and according to all the instructions outlined in the [free-will fowl burnt-offering]. Rashi interprets: “כמשפט” [literally, as the judgment,] as “according to the rule” because [the term] judgment or justice does not pertain to an offering.

The hypothesis that we could have misunderstood the intent of the Torah unless the Torah had written the words מאחת מאלה in verse 13 is baffling. After all, the Torah had spoken specifically of the sinner's inability to afford a certain kind of offering in our verse! This made it abundantly clear that the kind of sin-offering to be brought was not determined by the kind of sin but by the economic status of the sinner! Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi suggests in his commentary on verse 13, that the words מחטאתו אשר חטא were needed to prevent us from misinterpreting the words ואם לא תגיע ידו to mean that if the sinner's "hand" had not "touched" i.e. been guilty of committing a trespass involving the need to offer a sheep as a sin-offering, but had been guilty only of a minor trespass, that such a sinner has to bring the sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves. If the sinner had not even been guilty of a sin severe enough to require a sin-offering consisting of two turtle-doves, then he has to bring only a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering." The words מחטאתו אשר חטא were written after the Torah discussed a lesser of the three categories of sin mentioned in our paragraph i.e. שבועת העדות, so that we would not err and think that the sin-offering consisting of turtle-doves is applicable only for atonement of the sin of שבועת העדות, but not to any of the categories of sin dealt with in this paragraph. Rabbi Mizrachi elaborates with further examples which we need not repeat here. I believe that his approach is very forced, seeing it is hard to imagine someone misinterpreting the words ואם לא תשיג ידו as referring to a greater sin.

Perhaps Torat Kohanim was prompted by the following consideration: If the Torah had not written the words מאחת מאלה, I would have thought that if someone committed the most severe of the sins listed in this paragraph, the bringing of impurity into the precincts of the Tabernacle, the only kind of sin-offering acceptable from such a sinner would be a four-legged animal, a ewe. As to the line in verse 7: "if he cannot afford a lamb he should bring two turtle-doves, etc," this alternative does not apply except in the case where he was guilty of the lesser offence such as שבועת העדות which, because of the relatively milder nature of the sin, requires less in the way of atonement. If someone were to argue that the Torah's concession to the sinner extended even to a poor man guilty of bringing a sin-offering consisting of a sheep for a more serious offence, let him prove his case! Similarly, when the Torah wrote in verse 11 ואם לא תשיג ידו לשתי תורים, that if the sinner cannot afford two turtle-doves that he should bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering, I would have assumed that the Torah made this concession in a case where the sinner was guilty of only the least severe of the sins mentioned in this paragraph, the sin of שבועת בטוי. I would not have assumed that such a meal-offering could serve as a sin-offering for the sin of שבועת העדות which is more severe than שבועת בטוי. It would most certainly not suffice to achieve atonement for the severe sin of bringing impurity into the confines of the Holy Tabernacle. I would have been confirmed in this attitude by the fact that in all the sins listed by the Torah up to now where sin-offerings are called for the Torah never offered the concession of a bird or meal-offering replacing a sin-offering consisting of a four-legged animal. I would have reasoned "why should the Torah deal so leniently with someone guilty of a sin which carries the Karet penalty?" I would have assumed that the inexpensive sin-offering was certainly acceptable only for the lesser sins. I would have reasoned as follows: The wealthy person has to bring a four-legged animal as his sin-offering regardless of the relative severity or mildness of his sin. The Torah made a concession to the poor if he happened to have been guilty of the sin of שבועת העדות, in which case he could bring the turtle-doves. If he had been guilty of the sin of bringing impurity into the Tabernacle however, the Torah did not exempt him from the rule applicable to sin-offerings in נפש כי תחטא בשגגה, described in chapter four. If a person is destitute and committed only the sin of שבועת בטוי, the Torah relents and allows him to offer a sin-offering consisting only of a meal-offering. If that same destitute person was guilty of the sin of שבועת העדות, which is more severe, he cannot absolve his guilt by offering only a meal-offering as his sin-offering. This is the major error I could have made unless the Torah had written the words מאחת מאלה in verse 13. By means of these two words the Torah placed all the sins in the same category to teach us that the meal-offering as a sin-offering is acceptable to G'd provided the sinner is so destitute that he cannot even afford to bring two turtle-doves. This is what the author of Torat Kohanim had in mind when he wrote: "I could have thought, etc." When he wrote that "we would have made a division in comparing the mild sins to the severe sins," this is an error; the text there should have read: "the severe sins to the milder sins."

Another method of explaining the words of the Torat Kohanim is by remembering that the paragraph deals with three separate sins and I notice that the Torah also describes three different kinds of sin-offerings. I would assume that the Torah arranged the list of the sin-offerings in keeping with the type of sins they are to atone for. The Torah therefore commences with the sin-offering to be offered in respect of the most severe of these three sins by saying that the sinner has to offer a female sheep. In the event that the sinner in question could not afford that, he should bring the kind of offering that would be appropriate for the sin mentioned by the Torah prior to this one, i.e. the sin of שבועת העדות. The sin-offering should consist of two birds regardless of the sinner's economic situation, whereas the sin-offering consisting of such birds would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of bringing impurity into the Temple only if the sinner was poor. The words ואם לא תשיג ידו, "if he cannot afford even a bird-offering" in verse 11 apply to the sin-offering if one was guilty of שבועת העדות, for which the regular sin-offering consists of two turtle-doves. If the sinner could not afford this, he would be allowed to bring the sin-offering appropriate for the next milder sin, i.e. שבועת בטוי.

As a result of such reasoning the sin-offering appropriate to atone for שבועת בטוי would be the least expensive one, a meal-offering, even if the offender were a wealthy individual. Similarly, a wealthy individual would be allowed to bring only a bird-offering for the sin of שבועת העדות even if he were well to-do. If he were especially poor however, he would only have to bring the meal-offering. If someone were guilty of bringing impurity into the Tabernacle and he is well to-do, he will have to bring a sheep or goat; if he is poor he would bring turtle-doves but not a meal-offering. This is what the author of Torat Kohanim meant when he wrote that the serious ones would be atoned for by a sheep. He meant that only in respect of the serious sins were sheep required as the sin-offering. No sheep as a sin-offering would be called for in respect of minor sins such as the two types of oaths even if the people who had committed these offences were wealthy individuals. Torat Kohanim did not worry that you might misinterpret what the Torah wrote and think that only a sheep or goat would be acceptable as atonement for the sin of impurity seeing that the Torah had written in the verse following the requirement to offer a sheep: "if he is unable to afford a sheep, etc. (compare verses 6 and 7)." However, the Torah had to tell us that whereas the less serious offences (the oaths) did not require a sheep or goat as a sin-offering, they did require bird-offerings. The bird-offerings themselves are required only for the sin of שבועת העדות, whereas the sin of שבועת בטוי can be atoned for by a sin-offering consisting of a meal-offering. Torat Kohanim also did not worry that someone might think that it would not be acceptable under any circumstances to try and atone for the sin of שביעת העדות with a meal-offering, seeing the Torah wrote immediately following the requirement to offer the bird-offerings: "if he is unable to afford this he may bring a meal-offering as his sin-offering" (compare verses 10 and 11).

As a result of all these considerations you would have concluded that 1) a sheep is only called for if the most severe of the three sins mentioned in this paragraph had been committed; 2) a bird-offering is called for in case the sin was relatively mild, but not in case it was the mildest of the three; 3) the appropriate sin-offering for the mildest of the three offences is the meal-offering. The most severe sin could not be atoned for by a mere meal-offering under any circumstances.

[At this point the author devotes several pages to demonstrate why every line in the Torat Kohanim is justified. The interested reader is referred to the original somewhat tedious presentation. Ed.]

כי חטאת הוא [HE SHALL PUT NO OIL UPON IT, NEITHER SHALL HE PUT ANY FRANKINCENSE THEREON:] FOR IT IS A SIN-OFFERING — a sinner’s offering, and therefore it is not proper that his offering should be embellished by oil and frankincense (Menachot 6a).

What is left of the bird may be eaten by the officiating priest. A commandment performed at its proper time is more welcome to the Lord than at a later time, i.e. the sinner having expected some substantial money coming his way and therefore preferring to wait with the sin offering until he can present an animal of greater worth. The same rule applies to the person who, although not even having sinned, promises his own worth as a donation to G-d shortly before reaching the age of twenty, at which time he must give the Temple treasury 50 shekels in order to discharge his vow as opposed to only 20 shekels.

כי חטאת היא, “for it really should have had the rules pertaining to a sin offering, requiring libations so that the sinner would not emerge as having actually profited. The reason why the Torah decided to forego this requirement is so that the sinner would not be able to boast about what kind of costly sacrifice he had brought in order to atone for what was, after all, only an inadvertent sin. In the case of someone who offers a sin offering for having been healed from the affliction of tzoraat, seeing that [at least according to the written text of the Torah, Ed.] He had not been afflicted for a specific sin that he had been guilty of, This offering is required only in order to enable the person offering it to be able to eat of sacrificial meat when the occasion arises. Therefore these offerings require libations, as our sages have stated in the Talmud tractate Sotah folio 36.

חטאת הוא IT IS A SIN-OFFERING — Here, too, the apparently redundant words intimate: if the קמץ has been taken from it and has been burnt for the purpose of (i.e. having in mind that it is) a sin-offering it is valid; if, however, this was done not for its purpose (i. e. the priest had another offering in mind when officiating) it is invalid (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 19 9).

Not for its sake. Meaning: For example: He brought it at first for the sake of a pan-baked meal-offering and then at the time of taking a fistful he took it for the sake of a deep-pan meal offering, or vice versa. Rashi repeats this here [see v. 9] because this is a meal-offering and those above refer to an animal or bird, and [one cannot be learnt from the other because] they have dissimilar aspects.

‎אשר חטא על חטאתו [AND THE PRIEST SHALL MAKE EXPIATION ON HIS BEHALF] FOR THE SIN THAT HE HATH SINNED — Here Scripture varies the expression, for in the case of affluence (v. 6) and narrow means (v. 10) it is stated, “[and the priest shall make expiation for him] מחטאתו”, whilst here, in the case of utter destitution, it is stated מחטאתו) על חטאתו may mean: something from his sin-offering, i. e., a part of it, whilst על חטאתו implies something in addition to his sin-offering)! Our Rabbis from the niceties of the text derived from here the law that if one sinned whilst he was a rich man and set apart money for a she-lamb or a she-goat (the sacrifice prescribed for a well-to-do person; cf. v. 6), but then became impoverished somewhat, he has only to bring (purchase) from a part of it (the money) two turtledoves (or two young pigeons, the offering prescribed for the poor) and may retain the balance for his own use: if, being a poor mạn, he has set apart money for two turtledoves and then was reduced to even greater poverty, he has only to bring from a part of it a tenth of an ephah of flour; hence the use of the word מחטאתו in the sense explained above. If, on the other hand, being only of moderate means, he has set apart money only for a tenth of an ephah of flour, but became rich afterwards, he must add to it and bring the offering prescribed for a rich man. For this reason it is stated here על חטאתו — in addition to what was intended for his sin-offering (Keritot 27b).

מאחת מאלה, in respect of either of the three sins mentioned, i.e. ignoring a call to testify, false oaths, or violating the laws of ritual purity in connection with entering the holy domain or consuming sacred meat.

Of these three. One is a lamb or goat, the second is turtledoves or two young pigeons, and the third is a tenth of an eiphah of fine flour.

והיתה לכהן כמנחה, “and it (the remnant) will belong to the priests, just as a giftoffering. All male priests are allowed to partake of it within the sacred precincts of the Temple only.

מאחת מאלה [AND THE PRIEST SHALL MAKE EXPIATION FOR HIM] BY MEANS OF ONE OF THESE — i. e. by means of one of the three expiating sacrifices mentioned in this section: either by means of the offering prescribed for affluence or by that for poverty or by that for utter destitution (i. e., in the case of the offerings brought for each of the three sins mentioned above (vv. 1, 2—3 and 4) the offering must be brought according to the circumstances of the wrong-doer). But why is this stated? (i. e., why does it not merely state‎ אשר חטא ונסלח לו ‎ חטאתו הכהן על ‎וכפר עליו‎ since the different sacrifices have been mentioned previously)? But Scripture uses this term “by means of one of these”, because I might think that the most serious sins amongst them (i. e. those mentioned in vv. 2—3, which, if done wilfully, are subject to the penalty of כרת) should be atoned for by a she-lamb or a she-goat: the lighter ones (v. 1) by a fowl, and the lightest of all (v. 4) by a tenth part of an ephah of flour! Scripture, however, states, “[and he shall make expiation for him] by one of these” — in order to put on the same level the light sins with the most serious with regard to the duty of offering a she-lamb or a she-goat, if he (the offender) possesses the means. And, on the other hand, to put on the same level the most serious sins with the lighter in respect to the duty of bringing a tenth part of an ephah of flour as an offering in case of utter destitution (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 19 10).

And the less severe. Meaning: The most severe of them are [entering] the Temple or [eating] the holy [foods] in impurity (5:2), which is punished by koreis. And a less severe case is the one who took an oath to testify (5:1), which is not punishable by koreis if intentionally violated, but Scripture equates the intentional violator to the unintentional one. This is because with regard to all of them it is written, “and this was concealed from him,” but here [concerning the one who took an oath to testify] it does not say, “and it was concealed from him.” [This comes] to make him liable [to bring an offering] for the intentional violator as the unintentional one. The least severe is the oath expressed orally, which is not punished for intentional violation with koreis, and the intentional violator was not equated to the unintentional one. [You might ask:] It is written (v. 7): “If his means are not sufficient [for a sheep...” which implies that the poor person brings turtledoves or pigeons for the same sin the rich person brings a lamb. If so, why would you assume: “Perhaps the most severe of them (=sins)...”? We can answer:] This refers to the wrongdoing, as if to say: If he did not touch upon a wrongdoing that would be sufficient when violated to be liable to bring a lamb, rather, only a lesser transgression — he should bring two turtledoves. And if he did not touch upon a wrongdoing that requires two turtledoves, but only a lesser wrongdoing, he should bring a tenth of an eiphah. Therefore, it writes: “In one of these” to equate the least to the most severe [sin].

והיתה לכהן כמנחה AND IT SHALL BE THE PRIEST’S, JUST AS A MEAL-OFFERING — This is intended to teach with regard to the meal-offering of a sinner (i. e. a meal-offering brought as an expiation for the sins mentioned above) that what is left of it after the קמץ has been burnt may be eaten by the priests just as the remains of the free-will offering (cf. Leviticus 2:3). This is what the statement means according to its literal sense. Our Rabbis, however, explained והיתה לכהן to imply: that if this sinner be a priest, then it shall be as any other meal-offering brought as a free-will offering by a priest which comes under the law: (Leviticus 6:16) “[For every meal-offering of the priest] shall be wholly burnt; it shall not be eaten”. (The words are to be construed thus:והיתה לכהן, but if it be a priest’s, כמנחה then it shall be exactly like any voluntary meal-offering that he brings) (cf. Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 19 11; Menachot 73b).

Its remnants should be eaten. Accordingly, the meaning of “as a meal-offering” is: As the free-will meal-offering mentioned above, for all the remnants of all the free-will offerings are eaten by the kohanim.

Completely burnt. [According to this:] “To the kohein” is interpreted in conjunction with the preceding phrase and with the next phrase. I.e., [With the preceding phrase: “And it shall belong to the kohein” means:] If the meal-offering is from an [Israelite] sinner, [the remaining portion] shall belong to the kohein. [With the next phrase:] “To the kohein [as a meal-offering” means:] As the kohein’s free will offering, and any free-will meal-offering [of a kohein] — the remnants are eaten by the kohanim.

כי תמעל מעל — The term מעל everywhere in Scripture denotes “changing”. Similarly it stales, (I Chronicles 5:25) “And they committed a מעל against the God of their fathers; for they went a whoring after the gods of the people of the land” (i. e. they exchanged Him for their gods). And similarly it states of the faithless wife, (Numbers 5:12) “[If any man’s wife go aside] and commit a מעל in respect to him” (i. e. she changes her relationship to him for one to another man) (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Section 11 1; Meilah 18a).

AND HE SHALL BRING ‘ASHAMO’ (HIS GUILT-OFFERING) UNTO THE ETERNAL. This offering is called asham (“guilt-offering” — as distinguished from the sin-offering), just as He has said [here in the verse] after the shekel of the Sanctuary, for a guilt-offering. But he shall bring ‘ashamo’ unto the Eternal³⁵¹Above, Verse 6. In this case the word ‘ashamo’ [literally, “guilt”] is not the name of the offering, but merely indicates “the offering — i.e., a sin-offering — brought because of guilt.” mentioned above in the case of the offering of higher and lower value means, “and he shall bring his offering unto the Eternal,” for that offering was a sin-offering, as He said, a female from the flock, a lamb or a goat, for a sin-offering.³⁵¹Above, Verse 6. In this case the word ‘ashamo’ [literally, “guilt”] is not the name of the offering, but merely indicates “the offering — i.e., a sin-offering — brought because of guilt.”
Now it has not been explained why the name of one offering is “a sin-offering,” and that of the other, “a guilt-offering,” since they both come to effect atonement for sin! We cannot say that the reason is since the sin-offering is a female [unlike the guilt-offering which is male, and therefore the word asham which is masculine cannot be applied to the female sin-offering], for there are sin-offerings which are male — namely the goats [brought as sin-offerings in case of the public worshipping idols,³⁵²A male goat is brought as a sin-offering by the prince (above, 4:23), and by the public for worshipping idols (Numbers 15:24), as well as on the Day of Atonement (further, 16:5). Among the Additional Offerings brought by the public on the New Moon (Numbers 28:15) and the Festivals (ibid., Verse 22, etc.) is also a he-goat as a sin-offering. or the usual sin-offering of the prince],³⁵²A male goat is brought as a sin-offering by the prince (above, 4:23), and by the public for worshipping idols (Numbers 15:24), as well as on the Day of Atonement (further, 16:5). Among the Additional Offerings brought by the public on the New Moon (Numbers 28:15) and the Festivals (ibid., Verse 22, etc.) is also a he-goat as a sin-offering. and the bullocks [brought by the anointed priest as a sin-offering,³⁵³Bullocks are brought as sin-offerings by the anointed priest (above, 4:3), by the court (ibid., Verse 14), and by the High Priest on the Day of Atonement (further, 16:3). as well as his bullock on the Day of Atonement].³⁵³Bullocks are brought as sin-offerings by the anointed priest (above, 4:3), by the court (ibid., Verse 14), and by the High Priest on the Day of Atonement (further, 16:3). Again, it cannot be said that [the guilt-offering is so called] on account of the severity of the sin [for which it is brought], for behold, the leper brings two offerings — the name of one being “the sin-offering” and the name of the other, the “guilt-offering!”³⁵⁴Ibid., Chapter 14, Verses 12 and 19. How could one person have a simultaneous liability to bring these two offerings?
It appears to me that the term asham denotes some serious deeds for which the person who did it deserves to be shameim (ruined) and destroyed because of it, similar to the expressions: ‘ha’ashimeim’ (destroy them), O G-d;³⁵⁵Psalms 5:11. the pastures of the wilderness waste away.³⁵⁶I have found no such verse. Possibly it is a paraphrase of the verses in Jeremiah 9:9-10, where the prophet bewails the emptiness of the destroyed pastures of the wilderness, and predicts that the cities of Judah will be sh’mama (wasted away). Thus both phrases occur in juxtaposition, and Ramban deduces therefrom the underlying idea of the root shamam. Perhaps it is a combination of Isaiah 24:6 [where the word vaye’shmu — “and they wasted away”] and Joel 1:19 [where the pastures of the wilderness] are mentioned. So also: ‘Te’sham Shomron’ (Samaria shall be laid waste), for she hath rebelled against her G-d,³⁵⁷Hosea 14:1. and we are ‘asheimim³⁵⁸Genesis 42:21. Thus in place of the usual translation “we are guilty” [concerning our brother] Ramban interprets it to mean “we are being punished” on account of our brother. — means “we are being punished.” The word chatath (sin) denotes something which has turned aside off the way, this being of the expression, every one could sling stones at a hair-breadth and not ‘yachti’ (miss).³⁵⁹Judges 20:16. Now the guilt-offering for robberies,³⁶⁰Verses 21-25. and the guilt-offering for carnally knowing a handmaid already promised in marriage³⁶¹Further, 19:20-22. would then be called asham [indicating a serious sin] because they have to be brought even for wilful commission of the sin. So also the asham (guilt-offering) of the Nazirite [which he brings for becoming defiled by a dead body, even if his defilement was caused wilfully,³⁶²Numbers 6:12. Kerithoth 9a. and is therefore deserving to be shameim — destroyed]. The guilt-offering for misusing sanctified objects,³⁶³Verses 15-16. however, even though it is brought only when the sin was committed in error, yet because it concerns the holy things of the Eternal, it is called asham, because the great sin that he did makes him deserve to be shameim (destroyed) because of it, even as it is called me’ilah (treachery).³⁶⁴'Ki thim’ol ma’al’ (if any one commit a treachery) (in Verse 15). The reason for the name [asham] of the leper’s offering³⁶⁵The leper’s first offering [on the day he is cleansed] is the guilt-offering (further, 14:12). After that he brings a sin-offering (ibid., Verse 19). In the light of the above explanation of the term asham, Ramban suggests a reason why the leper brings the two offerings at the same time when both atone for sin, and why the guilt-offering first. There is indeed a third offering — namely, the burnt-offering — that the leper brought on that day (ibid., Verse 20). But since that presents no difficulty, Ramban does not refer to it. is because a leper is regarded as dead,³⁶⁶Nedarim 64b. and thus he is shameim (ruined) and destroyed. The leper’s first offering, then,³⁶⁵The leper’s first offering [on the day he is cleansed] is the guilt-offering (further, 14:12). After that he brings a sin-offering (ibid., Verse 19). In the light of the above explanation of the term asham, Ramban suggests a reason why the leper brings the two offerings at the same time when both atone for sin, and why the guilt-offering first. There is indeed a third offering — namely, the burnt-offering — that the leper brought on that day (ibid., Verse 20). But since that presents no difficulty, Ramban does not refer to it. is called asham in order to protect him from the guilt for which he is “ruined,” and the second is the sin-offering which effects atonement for his errors.
The reason for the suspensive guilt-offering³⁶⁷See Note 310 above. is because the owner thinks that he is not liable to be punished [since his sin has not been confirmed]; therefore Scripture was more severe with him in the case of his doubt than in that of certainty [of sin], requiring him to bring a ram of the value of shekels of silver,³⁶⁸Verse 15. — I.e., two s’laim. See also Rashi on Verse 18 [speaking of the suspensive guilt-offering]: “a ram … with thy valuation — according to the value stated above” [in Verse 15, i.e., at least two shekels]. whilst if the sin is confirmed, he brings a sin-offering which could be worth only a danka [a small Persian coin — the sixth of a denar]. Scripture calls it asham in order to say that it must be worth two s’laim just like the graver guilt-offerings [i.e., like the guilt-offering brought for appropriating sanctified objects, and that brought for carnally knowing a handmaid already promised in marriage, which must be worth at least two s’laim], thus indicating to the sinner [since he is in doubt as to whether he has sinned], that if he treats it lightly and will not bring his [offering for] atonement, he will be destroyed by his sin. This is the sense of the verse, ‘Asham hu, ashom asham lashem’ (It is a guilt-offering — he hath surely incurred guilt before the Eternal).³⁶⁹Verse 19. That is to say, although this offering is brought only on a doubtful sin, it is a guilt-offering, for he has surely incurred guilt before the Eternal Who knows all hidden things, and if indeed he did sin before Him, He will requite him. Similarly, that which He said above, and he shall bring his guilt-offering,³⁷⁰Above, Verse 6. The question arose (see Ramban at beginning of this verse), why the Torah calls it ashamo (his guilt-offering) when it is really a sin-offering — Ramban now proposes to answer that “it is because etc.” is because among those sins mentioned above are also those which require the bringing of an offering even when they are committed wilfully, such as for the “oath of testimony; ”³³²The section here discusses the offering of higher or lower value (see above, Note 15), the verse before us stating that this offering is required in the case of a false oath concerning testimony. Thus, if the person interested in the evidence called upon him by an oath, adjuring him that if he knows any evidence favorable to him he should testify before the court, and he swore that he knows of no testimony concerning him, when in fact he does know, in such a case, if he swore either unintentionally or wilfully, he must offer what is called an offering of higher or lower value. See “The Commandments,” Vol. I, pp. 82-83. In the following verse another transgression for which this offering is required is mentioned. — Ramban now proceeds to explain the sense of the triple expression, and he is a witness, or knows, or saw. therefore He mentions the term asham with reference to them although the offering is called a sin-offering.
Also by way of the Truth, [the mystic teachings of the Cabala], a female offering for a sin is called chatath (sin-offering), and the male offering is called asham.³⁷¹In other words, the determining factor for the difference in the names between the chatath and the asham is whether the offering is male or female. For the fuller mystical implication, see my Hebrew commentary, p. 26. The goats³⁵²A male goat is brought as a sin-offering by the prince (above, 4:23), and by the public for worshipping idols (Numbers 15:24), as well as on the Day of Atonement (further, 16:5). Among the Additional Offerings brought by the public on the New Moon (Numbers 28:15) and the Festivals (ibid., Verse 22, etc.) is also a he-goat as a sin-offering. and the bullocks³⁵³Bullocks are brought as sin-offerings by the anointed priest (above, 4:3), by the court (ibid., Verse 14), and by the High Priest on the Day of Atonement (further, 16:3). [even though they are male] are also called chatath (sin-offering), because they are brought [as an atonement] for sin.
Tzav

'מקדשי ה, deriving beneficial use from something belonging to the Temple treasury, i.e. אשם מעילות.

והביא את אשמו לה', “and he is to present his guilt offering to Hashem.” Nachmanides explains that the reason why this offering is called אשם, “guilt,” although it is not of the same type of animal (rather a female of the species of sheep or goats and only worth one shekel, or even less for the poor who bring birds) as the ones mentioned in our verse and worth at least 2 shekel, is that it is not the same as the sin-offering of which the Torah spoke in verse 6 and it is offered as expiation of guilt. The offering mentioned in verse 6 is actually a sin offering, and the word אשמו used by the Torah there does not refer to the name of the offering, but describes the reason, i.e. the guilt of the party who presents this offering. In trying to understand why one of these types of offerings is called חטאת whereas the other is called אשם, seeing that both are designed to atone for sins committed, Nachmanides speculates that the word אשם implies a major guilt, whereas the word חטאת, related as it is to the causative החטיא, suggests that the guilty party aimed at what he should have aimed at, but he missed the target through lack of concentration or through not taking proper aim. This would explain why a more expensive offering, without allowance for sinners who are in financial distress being made is required, whereas when the basic offering is described by the Torah as a חטאת, this involves a transgression which G’d views more leniently. Misappropriating Temple property, even when using it, does not diminish its value, disregarding laws of ritual purity involving either sacred locations or sanctified food is certainly not a simple carelessness, seeing that the nature of the sites or meats demand especial care. Nachmanides continues examining all the examples of a קרבן עולה ויורד, a sin offering in which the Torah makes allowance for the economic condition of the party required to offer it, using the yardstick of the degree of negligence that is involved in the transgression. The offerings brought by a person cured from the skin disorder known as tzoraat are both referred to as אשם and חטאת, seeing that the afflicted person was considered as if dead, being completely ostracized from human society. The first offering sort of acts as protective shield against retribution that would have awaited him, the second as a sin-offering expiating, and paving the way for re-admission to society. The latter is to be worth at least two “regular” shekels. This is why it is called אשם instead. [I have restated some of the foregoing after comparing text in our editions of Nachmanides. Ed.]

[Means] changing. I.e., He “changes” it from sacred property to not sacred, even though he did not drive benefit from it, for instance: If a Temple treasurer gave money of sacred property to another person who went and took it out of the domain of sacred property, the Temple treasurer has misappropriated the sacred funds, as the Mishnah states in Maseches Meilah. The correct text is: “אין מעילה אלא שנוי (מעילה always means ‘changing’),” and we should not use the text: “בכל מקום (wherever it occurs).” It means: This מעילה can only mean “changing,” etc. (Re”m). [This is because] Re”m raises the difficulty: The word מעילה written concerning the guilt-offering of thievery does not connote “changing,” because someone who withholds payment of a hired worker or denies owing a debt is not taking anything out of the owner’s domain, and yet it says there (v. 21): “ומעלה מעל (and wrongfully deviates).” This is no difficulty, however, for he certainly does take it out of the owner’s domain. This is because we have established the Halachah that the Sabbatical year will not release [the debt of] one who denies a loan and stands by his denial. But if there was no change of ownership, and it remained as it originally was [before his denial], the Sabbatical year should release him [from his debt]. Thus, this is [also] called “changing.” (Gur Aryeh). Divrei Dovid answers that it is also called a change of domain there, because the obligation [to bring a guilt-offering] is only if he swears falsely. If so, he turns away from Hashem in that he takes His Name in vain, and throws off His yoke. In this it resembles idolatry which is mentioned afterwards.

איל תמים, “an unblemished ram, according to Rashi, a two year old ram, fully mature.

‎'‎‎וחטאה כשגגה מקדשי ה‎‎ AND SIN IN ERROR, CONCERNING THE HOLY THINGS OF THE LORD — i. e. that one has derived some benefit from (made use of) a holy thing. And where is this prohibited, that Scripture should describe it here as sin? But the expression חטא is mentioned here and חטא is mentioned further on in the case of misuse of תרומה (Leviticus 22:9): “[They — the priests — shall therefore keep my charge] not to eat תרומה when they are in a state of uncleanness: (see Rashi thereon), lest they bear sin (חטא) for it”. How is it there? Scripture forbids it! (See Rashi on Leviticus 22:10). So here, too, by the term וחטאה it forbids it. (The translation is therefore: If a person commit a מעל, whereby it would be sinning even though it be in error). But if you should argue that the analogy may be put thus: How is it there? Scripture imposes the prohibition only upon one who would eat Terumah, so, too, here it imposes a prohibition only upon one who would eat of sacred things (‎וחטאה … ‎'מקדשי ה‎)! But Scripture uses here the double expression: תמעל מעל, and thereby it enlarges the scope of the prohibition to include a benefit (הנאה) of any description (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Section 11 2; Meilah 18b).

And where. Meaning: We derive through a gezeirah shavah [from the words] חטא חטא from terumah. It says here: “וחטאה בשגגה (and unwittingly sins)” and it says regarding terumah (22:9): “ולא ישאו עליו חטא וגו' (lest they bear sin...).” Just as חטא mentioned with regard to terumah is [referring to the case] where he benefited from it, as it is written (ibid. 14): “If a man inadvertently eats of sacred-offering,” where he benefits by eating, so too חטא mentioned here is where he benefits from the sacred property — even if he did not change it from the sacred domain to an ordinary domain and did not harm it — for instance, he drank from a gold cup or wore a sacred ring on his finger. Thus, the meaning of וחטאה is “or he unwittingly sins,” i.e. [“If a person wrongfully deviates”] — he changes it from one domain to another but does not have benefit, [“or he unwittingly sins”] — or he has benefit from it but does not change it, he has misappropriated “and shall bring his guilt-offering...”

מקדשי ה׳ CONCERNING THE HOLY THINGS OF THE LORD — i.e. those which are specially assigned to the Lord; therefore sacrifices holy in a minor degree are excluded from this law (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 20 1).

Against eating. Meaning: [Perhaps] the same applies as with the other benefits that are included in “consuming,” where the Merciful One [in His Torah] was not concerned that it be harmed, so too here the Merciful One warned only against eating and the like, but not that it must be harmed, [for example,] if he wore a sacred garment and had a copper coin’s worth of benefit from it, even though he did not harm it in the value of a copper coin, he has misappropriated? The verse says: תמעול מעל — it [thus] includes [even actions aside from eating]. I.e., if it is a thing which usually gets damaged, he has not misappropriated if he has benefit from it until he damages it. This is as [the Rabbis] taught [in a Mishnah] (Meilah 18a): One who derives benefit from sacred property, even though he has not damaged it the worth of a copper coin, he has misappropriated; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. But the Sages say: One does not misappropriate with something which is susceptible to damage until he damages it, but with something that is not susceptible to damage he misappropriates as soon as he derives benefit from it. How is this so? If he placed a gold necklace [of sacred property] on her neck or a ring on her finger, or drank from a golden cup, he has misappropriated.

איל is an expression for “strong”, “mighty”, as in (Ezekiel 17:13) “he hath also taken the mighty of (אילי) the land”.Here, too, איל means a ram which has grown strong, i. e. one two years old (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 20 6; cf. Rashi on Genesis 31:38).

תמעול מעל — it [thus] includes [even actions aside from eating]. [Rashi does] not [mean] exactly that it includes, because we do not actually derive this through an “inclusion.” Rather, [it is derived] from a comparison (hekeish) to idolatry, in which it is written מעילה (Divrei Hayomim I, 5:25): “They deviated from the God of their fathers”: Just as regarding idolatry there is a change, for until now, before he bowed down to it, it was in his domain and benefit was permitted, but now its domain has changed and it has entered the domain of the idolatry, and deriving any benefit from it is prohibited; this is its damage. This is what is meant by: “It includes” — Scripture includes it through this hekeish. Here as well, if it is a matter that is usually damaged, even if he has benefit from it he has not misappropriated until it is damaged (Re”m).

בערכך כסף שקלים WITH THE VALUATION IN SHEKELS OF SILVER — This (the plural שקלים) implies that it must have the value of at least two shekels (cf. Keritot 10b).

Excluding sacrifices of lesser holiness. Meaning: Misappropriation is not applicable to the meat of sacrifices of lesser holiness both before the blood is sprinkled or after the blood is sprinkled, because they are not designated for the sake of Hashem alone; their only restriction is that they may be eaten only inside the walls [of Jerusalem], but they are permitted to an ordinary Jew who may eat them. The meat of sin-offerings and guiltofferings as well: misappropriation is applicable to them before the blood is sprinkled, but after sprinkling there is no misappropriation since they are permitted to be eaten by the kohanim.

Implying toughness. See above in Parshas Vayeitzei on the verse (Bereishis 31:38): “[And I did not eat any] rams of your flocks...”

Worth two selaim. Rashi informs us that בערכך means “they are worth,” and not an actual estimation, for the translation of estimation and appraisal is not applicable here. Rather: “they are worth.”

הקדש ישלם‎ מן ‎חטא‎‎ אשר‎ ואת‎ AND FOR THAT WHEREIN HE HATH SINNED IN THE HOLY THING HE SHALL PAY both the principal and the additional fifth to the Temple treasury (cf. Keritot 26b).

ונתן אותו לכהן, the ram of this אשם he has to give to the priest to atone for him by means of this animal

The principal and the fifth. Rashi informs us that the meaning of, “את אשר חטא (that which he sinned)” is the principal, as if it says: “The principal upon which he sinned he shall pay,” and not “the sin that he sinned,” as the apparent meaning of Scripture, for the concept of payment does not pertain to sin, and certainly that [it is not something that] he would give to the kohein (Re”m). We find in regard to terumah that he pays the principal to the owners and the fifth to any kohein he wishes, therefore, Rashi needed to explain that he gives the principal and the fifth to the kohein (Nachalas Yaakov).

ולא ידע ואשם … והביא [AND IF A SOUL SIN, AND DO ANY OF THESE THINGS WHICH SHOULD NOT BE DONE …] AND HE DOES NOT DISCOVER THAT HE IS GUILTY … HE SHALL BRING [A RAM … FOR A GUILT OFFERING] — This paragraph (vv. 17—19) is speaking of a person to whom there has occurred a כרת ‎ספק (i. e. it is speaking of a person who is doubtful whether he has inadvertently committed an act of such a character as to be punishable with כרת if done willfully), and he does not know whether he has actually committed a sinful act or not. For instance: חלב (fat forbidden to be eaten under the penalty of כרת) and permitted fat (שומן) lay before him, and he believed that both were permissible food (i. e. that both were שומן), and he ate one of them. Afterwards, however, people told him that one of these was חלב, but he does not know whether he had eaten that which was חלב. Then such a one has to bring an אשם תלוי (the guilt-offering for a doubtful sin, lit., the guilt-offering in suspense, from תלה to “be in suspense”); and this protects him against punishment so long as he does not become cognisant that he has undoubtedly sinned, and if he becomes cognisant of this after a time he has to bring a sin-offering (cf. Keritot 22b, 23a).

ואשם ונשא עונו, our sages have a tradition that the Torah here speaks of an asham taluy, a guilt offering offered while the exact nature of the guilt is unclear. The person offering it is not even sure that he is guilty of an offence. Considering this state of affairs the Torah writes ונשא עוונו, he carries (the burden) of his guilt. The guilt is not spelled out precisely as it is not yet known. He may not actually have committed a sin, but this does not mean that he is free from guilt as had he been careful he would never have been in the predicament of not knowing if he had committed the specific sin he is afraid he might have committed.

ולא ידע ואשם; the Torah discusses an אשם תלוי an offering pending clarification of the sin. This is why the Torah adds the rider על שגגתו אשר שגג והוא לא ידע, seeing that every שוגג, inadvertently committed sin, contains an element of being unaware of it, why would the Torah have to add the words “and he did not know?” [Had he known, the sin would have been deliberate and no sacrifice would exonerate him. Ed.] The error consisted of mistakenly eating something not kasher instead of picking up the similar looking kasher item next to it. At the time the person thought that both were kasher so that there was nod doubt in his mind. By the time he found out, the other piece had disappeared. If for some reason he becomes aware later that he had indeed eaten the forbidden piece of meat he will have to bring an additional sin-offering. The effect of the asham taluy protected him only until clarification of the true state of affairs.

ואם נפש כי תחטא וגו'...ולא ידע; this does not mean that the party concerned never became aware of this offence. If that were so, how could the Torah demand a sacrifice from him, etc.? The Torah describes the following scenario: someone had performed an activity which is definitely prohibited on the Sabbath. He does not know if at the hour he had performed this activity the Sabbath had already concluded or not. Or, he entertains a doubt of a different kind, such as having eaten one of two pieces of meat believing it to be kasher. In the meantime he has been made aware that one of the two pieces of meat had not been kasher. He has no means of finding out now which piece he had eaten, i.e. the doubt will forever remain unresolved. In such situations the offering he has to bring is the one known as אשם תלוי, a provisional guilt offering, i.e. pending clarification of what precisely if any his sin had been, this is all he can do in the meantime. Once he finds out that he has indeed committed the sin he was in doubt about, he has to bring (additionally) the regular sin-offering appropriate for the offence in question. וכפר עליו הכהן על שגגתו אשר שגג, which until this time had been an inadvertent sin.

‎ו אשם ונשא עונו‎‎ולא ידע AND HE DOES NOT DISCOVER THAT HE IS GUILTY, AND BEARETH HIS INIQUITY — R. José the Galilean said, “See, Scripture (God) punishes him who has no sure knowledge that he has sinned (in as much as it requires him to bring a guilt-offering); how much the more does it follow that He will punish him who does know that he is sinning and yet wilfully does it. — R. José said, “If you wish to know the reward prepared for the righteous, go and learn from the case of Adam Horishon, who was charged only with a negative command (not to eat from the עץ הדעת) and who transgressed it, — see how many kinds of death-penalties were on this account decreed as a punishment against himself and all his descendants! Now, which measure is greater, — that of good (of reward), or that of punishment? You must admit that it is that of reward (cf. Rashi on Exodus 20:6). If, then, the measure of punishment is the lesser, consider that if so many kinds of death-penalties were decreed as a punishment against himself and his descendants, surely, in the case of the measure of good which is the greater one, if a person refrains from eating sacrifices which have become abominable (פגול) or which have been left over beyond the prescribed time (נותר), or if he fasts on Yom Kippur, how much the more certain is it that he will acquire merit for himself and for his descendants and the descendants of his descendants until the end of all generations! — R. Akiba said, “See, it states, (Deuteronomy 19:15) “at the mouth of two witnesses, or, at the mouth of three witnesses [shall the matter be established]. — But if evidence can be established by two witnesses, why does Scripture afterwards specifically state that this may be done by three? But it is to bring the third witness under the law there stated — to be severe with him and to make his sentence exactly like that of these (the first two witnesses) in respect to punishment in case of “plotting” (evidence that is rebutted by proof that the witness was not present on the occasion to which he has testified; see Rashi on Deuteronomy 19:16). Now, if Scripture exacts punishment so severely from one who has only joined himself with sinners (he is so described because as a single witness he could not hope that his evidence would be effective), just as it does from the sinners themselves, how much the more certain is it that He will give a reward to him who attaches himself to those who practise meritorious deeds just as it does to those who themselves practise meritorious deeds! (Sanhedrin 9a; Makkot 5b). — R. Eleazar b. Azariah said: In Deuteronomy (24:19) Scripture states, “When thou reapest thy harvest in thy field, and hast forgotten a sheaf in the field, [thou shalt not return to take it; it shall be for the stranger, for the fatherless etc.]”, and, you see, it states immediately afterwards: “that the Lord thy God may bless thee etc.” Scripture (God) thus gives the assurance of a blessing to one through whom a meritorious deed came about (the feeding of the stranger, etc.), without himself knowing about it (since he forgot to remove the sheaf from the field)! You must now admit that if a Sela was tied up in the skirt of one’s garment and it fell from it and a poor man finds it and supports himself by it the Holy One, blessed be He gives the assurance of a blessing to him (to the man who has lost the Sela) (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Section 12 7-13).

‎ לאשם בערכך [HE SHALL BRING A RAM …] ACCORDING TO THE VALUATION FOR A GUILT OFFERING — i. e. according to the value stated above (v. 15, viz., at least 2 shekels).

This is why the Torah adds the rider על שגגתו אשר שגג והוא לא ידע, seeing that every שוגג, inadvertently committed sin, contains an element of being unaware of it, why would the Torah have to add the words “and he did not know?” [Had he known, the sin would have been deliberate and no sacrifice would exonerate him. Ed.] The error consisted of mistakenly eating something not kasher instead of picking up the similar looking kasher item next to it. At the time the person thought that both were kasher so that there was nod doubt in his mind. By the time he found out, the other piece had disappeared. If for some reason he becomes aware later that he had indeed eaten the forbidden piece of meat he will have to bring an additional sin-offering. The effect of the asham taluy protected him only until clarification of the true state of affairs.

In the value recorded. It is the value of two silver selaim (shekalim) of holy selaim. You might ask: Say that the guilt-offering of the nazir and the guilt-offering of the metzoro is two selaim, and the guilt-offering [brought by one who seduced] an engaged maidservant is even one sela. The Sages answered this question in Toras Kohanim: I include the guilt-offering of an engaged maidservant which is a [two-year old] ram, the same as the uncertain guilt-offering, and I exclude the guilt-offering of the nazir and metzoro which is a [one-year old] lamb and not a ram.

‎ידע‎ והוא לא‎‎ אשר שגג [AND THE PRIEST SHALL MAKE EXPIATION FOR HIM CONCERNING HIS ERROR] WHEREIN HE ERRED AND DISCOVERED IT NOT — Consequently if it came to his knowledge after a time that he has sinned, he is not atoned for by this guilt-offering which he has already bought, but remains unatoned until he brings a sin-offering. To what may this be compared? To the law of the Heifer whose neck was to be broken (as a kind of expiation when it was unknown who has committed the murder) when, on some particular occasion, its neck was actually broken and the murderer was afterwards found — when he surely has to be put to death (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 21 2).

אשם הוא אשם אשם — The first of these similar words is entirely (i. e. both syllables) punctuated with Kametz because it is a noun, whilst the last is punctuated half with Kametz and half with Patach, because it expresses the idea “he has done something” (i. e. it is a verb in the Kal, 3rd person masc. sing, perfect). — And if you say, surely this is a verse that is unnecessary, since it has stated in the previous verse, “he shall bring the ram for a guilt-offering”, then I reply that it has already been expounded in Torath Cohanim as follows; אשם אשם — this repetition is intended to include in the law of אשם תלוי also the אשם שפחה חרופה (the guilt-offering for dishonouring a maid-servant betrothed to another man; cf. Leviticus 19:12), viz., that it must be a ram of the value of two Sela’im. One might think that I include also the guilt-offering brought by a Nazarite (cf. Numbers 6:12) and the guilt-offering brought by a leper (cf. Leviticus 14:12)! Scripture, however, states “הוא” (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 21 7).

אשם הוא; even though sometimes this offering is brought when no offence has in fact been committed, the party bringing such an offering is not guilty of bringing secular meat into the holy precincts, for it is after all a קרבן, an approved offering. Even if the party concerned had not been guilty of the offence he thought he might have been guilty of, 'אשום אשם לה, he is certainly guilty before G’d for being careless enough for the doubt about his specific guilt in this instance to arise.

A guilt-offering two-years old. This is surely a scribal error, because why would Scripture need to write that the guilt-offering of the engaged maidservant should be two-years old, since it is written “ram” concerning the engaged maidservant (19:21), the same as here? What is the strength of “ram” written here over the word “ram” written concerning the engaged maidservant? Furthermore, Rashi says: Perhaps I should include the guilt offering for a nazir and the guilt offering of a metzoro? But why would you think that the guilt-offering of the nazir and metzoro should be a two-year old ram, when it is written “lamb” concerning them, and whenever it is written “lamb” or “calf” it refers to a one-year old? Rather, we have to correct the text: “that it should [consist] of a ram worth two Shekalim.” This is because it is not written regarding the engaged maidservant, “the valuation of two shekalim,” and so it lets us know here that we require two shekalim here as well (Gur Aryeh).

'אשם אשם לה, “he is most certainly guilty in the eyes of the Lord.” According to Rashi, the apparent repetition of the word אשם, [although the first one is a noun whereas the second one is a verb Ed.] is meant to add that also in the case of someone who had had sexual relations with a Canaanite slave whose process of being freed had not yet been completed, must offer a two year old animal [as opposed to a one year old one which is much cheaper. Ed. Whenever the Torah uses the word איל, “ram,” without adding the age of said animal, it refers to a two year old ram. (Torat Kohanim)

He certainly incurred guilt. Why does the Torah require a more expensive offering for a case of doubt than a case of certainty? Similarly, why is a guilt-offering more expensive than a sin-offering, and yet a guilt-offering is brought for a sin which is lighter than that of a sin-offering? This is because any sin subject to a light punishment in Heaven has its punishment meted out in this world instead, where punishment is much easier to bear than the World to Come. Thus, the offering for a lighter sin which is a candidate for punishment in this world will be more expensive since it comes to atone for a spiritual punishment. For example, someone who was in doubt about eating forbidden fat must bring an offering which protects from suffering, and thus, it is more expensive.

אשם, אשם, “a guilt offering, he is guilty;” according to Rashi, he has to bring the offering decreed for having sexual relations with a Canaanite servant woman who has not yet completed the procedure for becoming free; This offering consists if a two year old ram. This is clear, as only after having attained that age is this animal referred to as איל. We might have asked what special “power” does a 2 year old ram possess to have been selected by the Torah as atonement for the sin of treating Temple treasury money as if it were secular money? At that age this animal is valued at two shekels. This is why the Torah repeats the word אשם. We might have thought that a sheep, כבש בן שנתו, one year old, such as is required from someone healed from the affliction of tzoraat, would have sufficed. This is to teach us that this is not so, the Torah emphasized: אשם, he is guilty, as opposed to a person afflicted with tzoraat concerning whom no specific guilt has been spelled out. As to the question of how we could have made such a mistake seeing that in the case of the sin offering for a Nazarene or a person afflicted with tzoraat, the Torah had spelled out the word כבש, which if not stated otherwise, is a one year old sheep?This is why we need to correct the wording in Rashi, and add the words “worth two shekels,” an expression not used in the Torah accept in connection with the atonement offering or people guilty of abusing money belonging to the Temple treasury, i.e. the sin of מעילה(Compare Torat Kohanim on Leviticus 19,11, where this has been spelled out already.)

ונפש כי תחטא IF A SOUL SIN [AND COMMIT FAITHLESSNESS AGAINST THE LORD] — R. Akiba said, What is the force of ‎‎‎מעל בה׳‎‎ ומעלה here, where it does not speak of betraying “holy things of the Lord” as in v. 15, but of betraying one’s neighbour? Because whoever lends or borrows money or does business with another, does it as a rule only in the presence of witnesses or by a document, therefore when he repudiates the matter, he repudiates the witnesses or the document; but he who deposits something with his neighbour does not wish any living soul to know about it except the Third Being (God) who is between them; therefore when he repudiates the deposit, he is repudiating the Third Being who is between them (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 22 4).

נפש כי תחטא, ומעלה מעל בשם, If someone sin and commit a trespass against the Lord, etc. Why did the Torah have to write the words כי תחטא here? It cannot mean that the sin referred to is a denial of the sin by the sinner seeing that the Torah already wrote וכחש בעמיתו, that the sinner denied having committed the trespass, i.e. having exploited his labourer by failing to pay him. Besides, why does the Torah in this instance describe the sinner as מעל בשם, "having committed a trespass against the Lord," words which have not appeared in any of the previous examples of sins committed? Why did the Torah have to add the word בעמיתו when writing וכחש בעמיתו? The meaning of the word is not clear.

וכחש בעמיתו, a guilt offering concerning robbery, mentioned in this portion.

או בגזל או עשק את עמיתו, “or by robbery or by defrauding his fellow.” There is a difference between “robbery” and “defrauding.” This is why the Torah writes in Leviticus 19,13: “You shall not defraud your fellow. You shall not commit robbery.” Each of these actions is considered violation of a separate law, commandment. A person may be guilty of robbery even when he admits that he has committed this deed as long as he has not made restitution. “Defrauding” implies that the guilty party denies his guilt by claiming to have already made restitution or having paid the rent, as the case may be. The Talmud (Baba Metzia 111) determines that “robbery” means someone admitting having someone else’s property in his possession and refusing to give it back, while “defrauding” means that the accused party claims to have returned the object or money in question.

Acted faithlessly with Hashem. Toras Kohanim. This is the explanation: In the section regarding misappropriations it is written (v. 15): “If a person wrongfully deviates” and does not say, “from Hashem” [as it does here] (Nachalas Yaakov).

בתשומת יד A CHARGE — He denies that he has put (שָׂם) money into his (the neighbour’s) hand (יד, i. e. that he has put money at his disposal) for the purpose of doing business in partnership or as a loan (cf. Onkelos and Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 22 6).

With witnesses and a document. This raises a difficulty: What denial is there here of witnesses and a document, and [how is] taking a false oath [applicable]? For surely, when there are witnesses he does not take any oath, for he must pay. It seems that Rashi is referring to that which it says in Baba Metzia (3a): [Rabbi Chiya] taught [in a Baraisa]: One says to his fellow man: I have one-hundred gold pieces deposited by you, but he responds: I have nothing of yours, and witnesses testify that he has fifty. He must pay fifty and take an oath on the rest, as the law of one who admits to a partial amount [of the claim]. This is because his oral confession should not be greater than the testimony of witnesses, and the same law applies if the claimant later shows a document for fifty (Divrei Dovid).

Perhaps the Torah wanted to inform us of three distinct wrongs committed by the sinner in question. 1) He appropriated to himself something which did not belong to him, i.e. an aspect of the sin of robbery. 2) ומעלה מעל בשם, the meaning of the words "against G'd" may imply that by trying to re-arrange the allocation of wealth to people other than those decreed by G'd, the sinner interfered with G'd's scheme of things. Hence the Torah describes him as having committed a trespass against G'd. By doing so, the sinner creates the impression that he denied G'd's justice and fairness in allocating wealth to different people at different times. It is even possible that the reason that the Torah repeats the expression, i.e. ומעלה מעל instead of merely saying ומעל includes the victim's impression of G'd's sense of justice and fairness. By the sinner having done what he did, he produces a feeling in the heart of the victim that G'd has allowed him to be victimised. This is an additional sin committed by the person described as guilty of "trespass." 3) The meaning of the words וכחש בעמיתו is that the sinner, i.e. the recipient of a loan who now denies to the lender that he had received it, accuses the righteous of being wicked when he makes it appear as if the lender was the liar. The exact meaning of the word בעמיתו is, that he puts his opposite number in the position of appearing to have stolen from the dishonest accuser. He has the nerve to challenge the person who extended a loan to him, and, instead of being grateful to him he makes him appear as a criminal. All of these three sins occur either when 1) someone has either received some deposit on trust, פקדון, or בתשומת יד, when he had a loan extended to him, the depositor not wanting a third party to know about it; or 2) when there is outright robbery, גזל;, or 3) עשק בעמיתו, when the sinner is guilty of withholding wages from his labourer and the like. When someone has found some object lost by a third party and denies it, the definition כחש בעמיתו does not apply, seeing he does not know who has lost it. This is the reason that the Torah wrote a separate verse to describe this example of wrongdoing.

או בגזל OR A THING TAKEN AWAY BY VIOLENCE — He denies that he has violently taken something from his possession,

The Third between them. Meaning: Hashem, Who is the Third between them. What it says afterwards: “or a deposit, or theft, or oppressed his friend,” refers only to: “and [he] denies to his friend” but not to: “[he] deviates from Hashem.”

On the moral-ethical level, our paragraph also describes three negative effects on the soul of the sinner described here. 1) By accusing someone wrongly, the soul of the accuser loses some of its spiritual light; the expression נפש כי תחטא reflects this loss sustained by the soul itself. 2) the words ומעלה מעל בשם may be understood in kabbalistic terms. Every Jewish soul depends on continuous input from celestial forces called שפע נשמתו in order to sustain itself spiritually inside a body. The only soul which does not enjoy this continuous spiritual input is one whose נפש, the person it resides in, has become guilty of criminal sins which will result in its being deprived of the celestial spiritual input. This is what the Torah meant when it described the נפש being "cut off" in Genesis 17,14 as the consequence of a Jew ignoring the commandment to circumcise himself or be circumcised. The celestial spiritual input into our souls which we have described enters by means of two thin "threads" through a person's two nostrils as this is the area where the נפש is joined מקום דבקות, to its owner i.e. to G'd. This is what Moses meant when he said in Deut. 4,4: "all of you who have cleaved unto the Lord your G'd are alive as of this day."

או עשק OR HATH WRONGED [HIS NEIGHBOUR] — This refers to withholding the wages of a hired man (cf. Leviticus 19:13; see also Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Chapter 22 6 and Bava Kamma 103b).

That he stole something from him. Meaning: The phrase, “or theft” does not refer back to “and he denies to his friend,” that you should say “או בגזל” is the same as “פקדון,” which means: he gave his friend a deposit, money which he placed in his possession to invest, and we would [then] say “או בגזל” is also explained this way — that his friend gave him a stolen object he had stolen and he [the recipient] denied to his friend with regard to that deposit. [This cannot be,] for if so, “בגזל” would be the same thing as “פקדון.”

If man commits the sins described in this paragraph his soul comes under the domination of the forces of evil. If the spiritual input from celestial sources were to continue, it would actually strengthen the forces of evil which have taken over in that person. When the Torah speaks of ומעלה מעל בשם, this describes such a process of strengthening him who trespassed against G'd. This is the mystical dimension of Proverbs 28,24: "Whoever robs his father and mother and says: 'it is no sin,' is a companion of a destroyer." Solomon means that inasmuch as this person makes common cause with evil, otherwise known as איש משחית, a destroyer, he has himself become a destroyer.

3) The denial of the truth by the individual in our paragraph impacts also on the community of Israel seeing that all of Israel are branches of one soul. If any branch of that soul becomes involved in evil this has repercussions on the entire people. This is the deeper meaning of the words וכחש בעמיתו, his denial extends to the members of his עם, his people. His people become כחש, "weak," through his sinful behaviour. This is exactly what Solomon referred to in the verse from Proverbs we have just quoted. Berachot 35 describes the word אמו in that verse as referring to the כנסת ישראל, the spiritual concept of the Jewish people, "mother Israel." The Jewish nation increases in spiritual power by means of its men of valour who contribute to it peace and harmony and who thereby assure it of life itself.

וכחש בה AND DENIETH IT — i.e. that he denies על אחת מכל REGARDING ONE OF ALL these things (those mentioned above), אשר יעשה האדם לחטא THAT A MAN DOETH (is apt to do, cf. Numbers 5:7, said of a similar case ‎מכל חטאת האדם) TO SIN and to swear falsely with the object of repudiating a money claim.

Any of these. Rashi added the word “these” to say that the phrase “אשר יעשה וגו' (whatever [someone] will do...)” is not connected to the word “מכל (of all)” that appears before it. Rather, [מכל is connected to על אחת (in any), as if it says] “in any of all these aforementioned instances,” and it is a truncated verse. “Whatever [someone] will do” is an independent matter, for Scripture wishes to inform us that it is not unusual that someone will deny money to his fellow man, even though there is a Halachic presumption that a person is not brazen-faced in front of the one to whom he is indebted. This is because it is a common matter that someone swears falsely for the sake of denying his fellow man’s money.

יחטא ואשם‎‎ כי‎ means when he comes to a recognition of himself (recognises his duty) to repent of his sin and makes up his mind to confess that he has sinned and has incurred guilt).

והשיב את הגזלה..ואת אשמו יביא, the sacrifice does not achieve atonement until the guilty party has first satisfied the demands on him by the injured party.

והיה כי יחטא ואשם, “it will be when he has sinned and realises his guilt, etc.” The reason why the Torah repeats the words meaning “he has sinned,” using both the term יחטא and אשם is to bring home the point that in all these instances the sin is two-fold. The sinner committed a crime against his fellow man but he also sinned against G’d the Law giver. The sin discussed in this verse is an intentional one. This is why the paragraph commences with the words נפש כי תחטא instead of writing merely כי תחטא בשגגה, “if he sinned erroneously.” All the other instances in which the Torah has used the term חטא the word בשגגה, “inadvertently,” or words to that effect accompanied the term חטא (compare 4,2; 4,22; 4,27; 5,15). It is a well known fact that most sin-offerings are brought only in respect of unintentionally committed sins. There are only four instances when a guilt-offering is prescribed for sins committed knowingly; they are: 1) if someone slept with a Gentile servant girl (slave); 2) a Nazirite who defiled himself; 3) swearing a false oath as part of one’s testimony. 4) swearing a false oath concerning matters entrusted to him (compare Keritut 9).

To repent. Otherwise, who is forcing him to return the theft, since there were no witnesses here? Perhaps by himself? If so, what did he think originally when he denied and swore falsely? Rather, it must be: When he recognizes in himself [the need] to repent... This is a truncated verse, and it is as if it says: “It shall be that when he admits that he sinned and incurs guilt, he shall return the stolen property...”

It shall be that when he [realizes his] sin and incurs guilt. No sinner considers himself guilty, for every man thinks he is doing the right thing. This is because he rationalizes his actions, imagining that the other fellow owes him money for some reason, or has wronged him in some other dealings, and he decides he has a right to take what was deposited by him for safe-keeping. Therefore, the Torah calls it ואשם — meaning, when he realizes his error and that he has wronged his fellow man and now recognizes he is guilty. He will then certainly set his heart on repentance and return the stolen object. He should not simply pay for the object, but rather should return the object itself.

והשיב את הגזלה אשר גזל, “he has to return the object which he had obtained through robbery;” It would have been sufficient for the Torah to write: “he shall give back the object obtained by robbery.” Why did the Torah add the words “which he has robbed?” The Torah taught that it is not sufficient to return the value of the object but that the actual object which has been obtained by robbery must be returned. (assuming it is still in existence and in its original condition). If, assuming we are speaking about coins, it had already become mixed with other coins so that it cannot be identified with certainty, the guilty party has to make restitution in kind (Baba Kama 66). The text of the Talmud, (omitting mentioning the divergent views expressed by some scholars) is: “if he stole (robbed) a beam and has used it in building an upper floor in his house and he now tears down the entire upper floor and restores the beam to the owner he has done more than the law requires of him.” [The school of Hillel decreed this so that the guilty party would not be discouraged from making restitution.]
The type of repentance which the people of Nineveh (whom the prophet Jonah had threatened with destruction) performed was of that nature. We are told in Jonah 3,8 that the king of Nineveh issued orders to his countrymen that “they shall turn back from his evil ways and from the injustice of which he is guilty.” Our sages in Baba Kama 11 commenting on the apparently redundant words אשר גזל, “which he obtained through robbery,” read the words as if they meant “which are similar to having been obtained through robbery.” They mean that assuming the original object has become worth less by the time the guilty party is willing to make restitution, he has to base the restitution on the value at the time he committed the crime. The same rule also applies in the case of deposits or wages withheld that someone is accused of and has first denied. The Torah also repeated the unnecessary words אשר עשק in order to make this point quite clear.

בראשו — This means the principal — the capital (ראש) money.

ביום אשמתו, when he confessed and promised not to sin again in respect to any or several of the above mentioned offences, i.e. denial of things given to him in trust, open robbery, abusing his position of authority unfairly, or appropriating things lost by another Jew when he was aware of the owner of the item in question.

לאשר הוא לו יתננו, “he shall give it to its owner.” This means that the party who had first been guilty of denial has to give both principal and premium to the injured party. Restitution is not effected through the good offices of the court but directly by the guilty party to the injured party. It is also possible that the words לאשר הוא לו mean that the money is to be returned to the party entitled to it, i.e. the heirs of the person from whom it has been taken against his will, if that person had died in the interval.

The principal. Meaning: The principal is called the head because it is the head of the money, since it is the main source and the root of all profit that results from it, just as the head of a living creature which is the main source and root of all its limbs.

ישבע עליו לשקר ושלם, “about which he has sworn falsely,” the Torah here tells us of the penalty for this sin, but where did the warning not to commit this sin which we expect, appear? Answer: compare Leviticus 19,11: לא תשקרו, “do not lie!”

וחמשתיו [AND HE SHALL ADD] THE FIFTH PART [MORE THERETO) — By using the plural וחמשתיו the Torah includes in this law of restitution the many additional fifths possible in respect to one principal — that if he denies the fifth (i. e. he asserts that he has repaid both capital and fifth, but has not really paid the latter, for which a claim is now made against him) and takes an oath that he has paid it, but afterwards admits the claim, then he must now bring (pay) a fifth in addition to this fifth (a fifth of the original fifth which now has become the קרן in addition to it), and so he keeps on adding a fifth to the original fifth until the principal about which he takes an oath becomes less in value than a P’rutah (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Section 13 12; Bava Kamma 103a).

The money belongs. To exclude someone who is the relative or friend of [the one to] whom the money belongs. This is the same as: “Everyone’s holy things shall belong to him” (Bamidbar 5:10), upon which the Sages derived that it is his prerogative to give them to whichever kohein he wants, because the pleasure of giving to whom he chooses is the right of the owners. See later in Parshas Naso (ibid.).

ושלם אותו בראשו, “he shall repay the victim in full;” he does not have to pay twice the full amount, as in the case of a thief who has stolen tangible chattels. Neither does he have to repay the victim four or five times the value as in the case of a thief who has destroyed the evidence by selling the stolen goods or consuming them. An alternate explanation of this verse: “he has to repay the stolen object, and in the event that the stolen goods have already passed to other hands so that we cannot determine its value, his sin offering would not be acceptable.

לאשר הוא לו [AND HE SHALL ADD THE FIFTH PART MORE THERETO AND GIVE IT] UNTO HIM TO WHOM IT APPERTAINETH — i. e. to him whose is the money (Sifra, Vayikra Dibbura d'Chovah, Section 13 12; Bava Kamma 108; also Bava Kamma 103a).

וחמשיתיו, “plus twice an additional 25%, i.e. 20% when counted after adding the full amount of the fine, if he had only owned up to his sin after witnesses have testified to his being guiltyIf he admitted his guilt without our having independent proof of it, it suffices if he adds 25% to the value of the goods in question.י

יתננו ביום אשמתו, “the robber has to make restitution on the day when he had been declared guilty, in order for his guilt offering to become acceptable to the Lord.

או מכל אשר ישבע עליו לשקר, “or from anything concerning which he had sworn falsely;” this additional detail is meant to include תשומת יד, intangibles, such as pledges or loans which no longer can be collected from the sinner. It also includes false oaths as witness, or intangible damage caused by a non priest entering sacred precincts, which did not cause measurable damage to the Temple. In some of these examples the sinner did not enjoy a tangible or even intangible profit from having committed this sin. In such instances the Torah took this fact into consideration when assessing the penalty to be applied. This is why financially hard up people, guilty of either of these sins may attain atonement by low cost offerings, depending on how hard up they are. The reason the sages have tagged these sacrifices with the expression: עולה ויורד, “ascending or descending,” is that if a poor man delayed bringing the inexpensive offering he was entitled to due to his economic status, and he became wealthy in the interval, he cannot plead poverty as a reason for offering the low priced offering. On the other hand, if the sinner before having a chance to offer the higher priced offering became impoverished, G-d will accept the offering of a pair of birds instead of a sheep or goat, or in extreme cases even a meal offering. If someone ate (inadvertently, of course) forbidden fat from a sacrifice, or he ate any kind of blood, or he ate on the Day of Atonement, or he performed biblically prohibited kind of work on the Sabbath, or he indulged in sexual intercourse forbidden under the heading of “incest,” all sins from which he derived physical pleasure, he must bring the standard type of sacrifice prescribed by the Torah. Someone who ate from sacrificial meat that he was not entitled to eat from has actually enjoyed a dual benefit from his sin, so that he must bring a sin offering worth two shekels. Similarly, if he swore falsely not to have stolen what he has been accused of. If he is guilty of what is called: “a guilt offering valid while we are in doubt if he had committed a sin,” he first has to offer a sacrifice worth two shekels, and if it is eventually determined that he had indeed been guilty of having committed that sin, he offers an additional sacrifice worth one shekel. Although at first glance we may be puzzled by this, the reason is that the only reason why he had not known that he had indeed committed the sin in question, is because he chose to give himself the benefit of the doubt. Next time, hopefully, he will be more careful not to develop such a doubt.

לאשמה בה, “to become guilty thereby.” The only exception to this rule is if the sinfully acquired property is less than the lowest valued coin, called prutah (Compare Torah sh’leymah on this item 236 on our verse).

That is that He commanded us that anyone who erred in a sin and is an individual offer a sin-offering sacrifice. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "And if a person sins in error." And that is a fixed sin-offering - meaning that is always an animal sin-offering. And we have already explained that sins for which we are liable for a sin-offering when inadvertent, we are liable for excision when volitional - and that is on condition that they are negative commandments and that they involve an action, as it is explained at the beginning of Keritot (Keritot 2). And the regulations of this commandment are explained in Tractate Menachot and Keritot, and in Tractate Shabbat, Shevuot and Zevachim. (See Parashat Vayikra; Mishneh Torah, Offerings for Unintentional Transgressions 1.)

And that is that He commanded us that one who does certain sins must offer a guilt-offering sacrifice. And that is what is called a definite guilt-offering. And the sins for which one is liable for this sacrifice are misappropriation; theft; one who has sexual intercourse with a designated maidservant; and one who swears falsely with an oath over a deposit. And that is one who misappropriated in error and derived benefit worth a perutah (a small coin) from sanctified property - whether sanctified for Temple upkeep or whether sanctified for the altar; one who robbed the value of a perutah or more from his fellow and took an oath; one who had sexual intercourse with a designated maidservant, whether inadvertent or volitional. [In these cases,] he is obligated to offer a sacrifice for his sin, and it is not a sin-offering sacrifice; indeed, it is a guilt-offering, and it is called a definite guilt-offering. And He said regarding misappropriation, "and he sinned in error, etc. and he shall bring his guilt offering" (Leviticus 5:15). He [also] said, "and he denied his countryman [...] and swore falsely, etc. his guilt offering shall he bring." (Leviticus 5:21-25). And He said, "and she is a designated maidservant for a man [...]. And he shall bring his guilt offering" (Leviticus 19:20-21). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Keritot. (See Parashat Vayikra; Mishneh Torah, Offerings for Unintentional Transgressions 9.)

And that is that He commanded us that one who does certain sins must offer a guilt-offering sacrifice. And that is what is called a definite guilt-offering. And the sins for which one is liable for this sacrifice are misappropriation; theft; one who has sexual intercourse with a designated maidservant; and one who swears falsely with an oath over a deposit. And that is one who misappropriated in error and derived benefit worth a perutah (a small coin) from sanctified property - whether sanctified for Temple upkeep or whether sanctified for the altar; one who robbed the value of a perutah or more from his fellow and took an oath; one who had sexual intercourse with a designated maidservant, whether inadvertent or volitional. [In these cases,] he is obligated to offer a sacrifice for his sin, and it is not a sin-offering sacrifice; indeed, it is a guilt-offering, and it is called a definite guilt-offering. And He said regarding misappropriation, "and he sinned in error, etc. and he shall bring his guilt offering" (Leviticus 5:15). He [also] said, "and he denied his countryman [...] and swore falsely, etc. his guilt offering shall he bring." (Leviticus 5:21-25). And He said, "and she is a designated maidservant for a man [...]. And he shall bring his guilt offering" (Leviticus 19:20-21). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Keritot. (See Parashat Vayikra; Mishneh Torah, Offerings for Unintentional Transgressions 9.)

That is that He also commanded us to bring a variable burnt-sacrifice for certain specific sins. And the sins for which one is liable for this sacrifice are impurification of the Temple and its sanctified objects; an oath of speech; and an oath of testimony. And that is one who is impure from one of the primary sources of impurity - as we set out in the introduction to the Order of Purities (Commentary on the Mishnah) - and entered the Temple or ate consecrated [food] inadvertently; and that is impurification of the Temple and its consecrated objects. Or that he swore falsely, as with an oath of speech that he inadvertently transgressed; or if he swore falsely with an oath of testimony - whether inadvertently or volitionally. Behold for any of these actions, he must bring a sacrifice that is called a variable burnt-offering. And that is His saying, "And if a person sin, and hear the voice of adjuration [... Or when a person touches any unclean thing...] and it be hid from him [and he come to know of it, and be guilty]. Or if a person swear, speaking with his lips [...] And it shall be, when he shall be guilty [...]. And he shall bring his guilt offering [...]. But if his means do not suffice" (Leviticus 5:1-7). And for this reason is it called a variable burnt-offering - because it does not remain one type; but rather he will once bring this type, and another time that type. Everything is according to what the means of the sinner, who is obligated to offer the sacrifice, suffice. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Keritot and in Shevuot. (See Parashat Vayikra; Mishneh Torah, Offerings for Unintentional Transgressions 10.)

That is that He also commanded us to bring a variable burnt-sacrifice for certain specific sins. And the sins for which one is liable for this sacrifice are impurification of the Temple and its sanctified objects; an oath of speech; and an oath of testimony. And that is one who is impure from one of the primary sources of impurity - as we set out in the introduction to the Order of Purities (Commentary on the Mishnah) - and entered the Temple or ate consecrated [food] inadvertently; and that is impurification of the Temple and its consecrated objects. Or that he swore falsely, as with an oath of speech that he inadvertently transgressed; or if he swore falsely with an oath of testimony - whether inadvertently or volitionally. Behold for any of these actions, he must bring a sacrifice that is called a variable burnt-offering. And that is His saying, "And if a person sin, and hear the voice of adjuration [... Or when a person touches any unclean thing...] and it be hid from him [and he come to know of it, and be guilty]. Or if a person swear, speaking with his lips [...] And it shall be, when he shall be guilty [...]. And he shall bring his guilt offering [...]. But if his means do not suffice" (Leviticus 5:1-7). And for this reason is it called a variable burnt-offering - because it does not remain one type; but rather he will once bring this type, and another time that type. Everything is according to what the means of the sinner, who is obligated to offer the sacrifice, suffice. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Keritot and in Shevuot. (See Parashat Vayikra; Mishneh Torah, Offerings for Unintentional Transgressions 10.)

And that is that He commanded us to confess the transgressions and sins that we have done before God and to say them together with [our] repentance. And that is confession. And its intent is that one say, "Please, Lord, I have sinned, I have transgressed, I have rebelled and I have done such and such." And he should prolong the statement and request forgiveness about this matter according to the polish of his speech. And you should know that even the sins for which one is liable for the types of sacrifices that are mentioned - that He said that one offer them and it atones for him - do not suffice with the sacrifice when it is without confession. And that is His saying, "Speak to the children of Israel [saying], a man or woman who commits from any of the sins of man [...]. And they shall confess the sins that they did" (Numbers 5:6-7). And the language of the Mekhilta is, "Since it is stated (Leviticus 5:5), 'and he shall confess that which he has sinned upon it' - it is to be upon the sin-offering when it is in existence, not after it has been slaughtered. It is only understood that an individual confesses for entering the Temple [impure]" - for this verse appears in Parashat Vayikra about one who renders the Temple and its sanctified objects impure, and that which is mentioned with it, as we explained; and so the Mekhilta there raises the possibility that we would only learn the obligation for confession from Scripture about one who renders the Temple impure. "From where are you to include all the other commandments? [Hence] we learn to say, 'Speak to the children of Israel [...]. And they shall confess.' And from where [do we know] even [sins that bring punishments of] excision and death penalties of the court? It states, 'the sins,' to include negative commandments; 'that they did,' to include positive commandments." And there it says, "'From any of the sins of man' - for theft, for robbery, for evil speech; 'to commit a trespass' - to include one who swears falsely and a blasphemer; 'and be guilty' - to include all those guilty of death penalties. It might be even those who are killed according to the testimony of colluding ones. I only said, 'and that man be guilty.'" That means to say that he is not obligated to confess when he knows that he has not sinned, but rather what was testified against him was false. Behold it has been made clear to you that we are obligated to confess for all types of transgressions, big and small - and even [for] positive commandments. But because this command - that is, "And they shall confess" - appeared with an obligation for a sacrifice, it could have entered our mind that confession is not a commandment by itself, but is rather from those things that are an extension of the sacrifice. [Hence] they needed to clarify this in the Mekhilta with this language - "It might be that when they bring their sacrifices, they confess; when they do not bring their sacrifices, they do not confess. [Hence] we learn to say, 'Speak to the children of Israel [...]. And they shall confess.' But still, the understanding of confession is only in the Land [of Israel]. From where [do we know], also in the diaspora? [Hence] we learn to say, 'their iniquities [...] and the iniquities of their fathers' (Leviticus 26:40)." And likewise did Daniel say, "To You, Lord, is justice, etc." (Daniel 9:7). Behold that which we have mentioned has been made clear to you - that confession is a separate obligation; and that it is an obligation for the sinner for every sin that he did. Whether in the Land or outside of the Land; whether he brought a sacrifice or did not bring a sacrifice - he is obligated to confess, as it is stated, "And they shall confess for their iniquities." And the language of the [Sifra] is, "'And he shall confess' - that is confession of words." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Yoma. (See Parashat Nasso; Mishneh Torah, Repentance 1).

That is that He commanded us to administer the nullification of vows - meaning the precept that He instructed us about these laws. However the content is not that we are obligated to annul vows no matter what. And you should understand this issue itself from me - any time you hear me counting one of the laws [as a commandment], it [need] not be a command of a specific compulsory action. Rather it is a commandment by virtue of our being commanded to administer this law for this thing (when it arises). That the husband and the father can annul them is, behold, already explained in Scripture (Numbers 30). But the tradition comes [and informs us] that a sage can also annul a vow, as well as an oath. And the hint to this is in His saying, "he may not void his word" (Numbers 30:3) - he may not void his word, but others may void it for him. More generally, there is certainly no proof to this from Scripture; and they say (Chagigah 10a), "The annulment of vows floats in the air." So it does not have any [bona fide] support, but it is rather [known] from the true tradition. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Nedarim. (See Parashat Matot; Mishneh Torah, Vows 12.)