Halakhah zu Bereschit 1:28

(Tet) [But even] ‘before they called,’ their disgrace was revealed, as it is written, (Num. 11:10), “And [Moshe] heard the people weeping, each family apart” – meaning, about the sexual prohibitions [of blood-relatives] that had been forbidden to them. And behold in Gur Aryeh on Parashat Vayigash,³⁹Gur Aryeh on Genesis 46:10. [its author] asks that since Israel had the status of converts with the receiving of the Torah – as it is found in Yevamot 46a-46b, that they required circumcision, sprinkling and immersing like the law for converts – and it is established for us that a convert [may] marry his sister, since “a convert that converts is like a newly born infant”;⁴⁰Yevamot 22a. if so, it should have been appropriate to permit sexual relations between relatives in that generation. And he answers that we only say “a convert that converts is like a newly born infant” about a convert who converted on his own, from his own will – then he is as a newly born infant. But at the time of the giving of the Torah when they were forced to receive it – in that He overturned the mountain above them like a tub – they were accordingly not as a newly born infant. See there. Therefore “they cried for their families,” because of the affairs of the sexual prohibitions [of blood-relatives], since the manna had forced them to accept the Torah [and not have the leniency of the convert in this regard] – as I wrote in Paragraph Chet. Hence they were forbidden with their relatives. However if it had not been by force – but rather from [their own] will and from [their] choice – they would have been permitted with their relatives, as we elucidated. Yet behold in Yevamot 62b, Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish disagree about a gentile who had children and [then] converted – as Rabbi Yochanan reasons that he fulfilled [the commandment of] “Be fruitful and multiply” (Gen. 1:28), as behold he has children; whereas Resh Lakish reasons that “a convert who converts is like a newly born infant,” and he [still] needs to fulfill “Be fruitful and multiply.” And at first glance you could ask [the following] difficulty: [In] that which they say there in the Talmud (Yevamot 61b-62a) in the argument between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel, the School of Shammai reasons [that the requirement is] two male [offspring], and the School of Hillel reasons [that it is] a male and a female. And the reason of the School of Shammai there is that they learn from Moshe, as he had two sons and [then] separated from [his] wife; whereas the School of Hillel learns from the creation of the world, “male and female” (Gen. 1:27). And [the Talmud asks], “Let the School of Hillel learn from Moshe”; and answers, “Moshe separated on his own [and was not commanded by God], and [only afterward] did the Holy One, blessed be He, agree with him.” See there. But if so, according to the School of Shammai that learns from Moshe – granted that he fulfilled “Be fruitful and multiply” with two males; but behold, at the time of the giving of the Torah, they had the status of converts! And [though this is not a problem for Rabbi Yochanan], for Resh Lakish, [Moshe would still have] needed to fulfill “Be fruitful and multiply,” as he was like a newly born infant. However according to what is written in Gur Aryeh – that [when the conversion] is by force, the convert is not as a newly born infant – it is fine, even according to Resh Lakish. And with this, the question of Tosafot (at the beginning of Paragraph Chet) is resolved: As Aharon and Miriam did not speak against Moshe until after [they had been at] Kivrot-Hataavah; since before then, they had reasoned that [the principle of] “a convert that converts is like a newly born infant” [applied to them] – and [so Moshe] needed to fulfill, “Be fruitful and multiply,” even if he had sons from before. And if so, Moshe certainly would not have negated the commandment [by separating from his wife] on his own; and so it was the Holy One, blessed be He, who commanded him. However when they saw that sexual prohibitions [with blood-relatives] were forbidden to them at Kivrot-Hataavah – and that is from the reason that a forced convert is not as a newly born infant, as it is written in Gur Aryeh; and Moshe [accordingly] fulfilled “Be fruitful and multiply” with his earlier children – they found an opening to suspect [the correctness of his decision]. As he separated on his own, since he was not negating a commandment with this – as he fulfilled “Be fruitful and multiply’ with [his] two sons, even according to the School of Hillel, who only add that it is even sufficient with one male and one female according to the opinion of the Talmud Yerushalmi Yevamot 6:6, 7c. And hence they quarreled (Num. 12:2), “Has He not spoken through us as well?” [This was] until the Holy One, blessed be He, answered them (Num. 12:8), “I speak to him mouth to mouth” – I agreed to his words.

I find it illuminating that neither Rav Moshe nor Rav Breisch shares Rav Waldenberg’s fundamental theological concerns about cosmetic surgery. Arguably, cosmetic surgery does not insult the work of the “Craftsman” because He also revealed to mankind the knowledge and ability to perform cosmetic surgery. Perhaps Rav Moshe and Rav Breisch view such surgery as part of our role as “junior partners” with Hashem in the ongoing creation of the world (see Shabbat 10a and Ramban to Bereishit 1:28).¹¹Rav Gidon Weitzman suggested to me that Rav Waldenberg might respond that we are considered partners with Hashem only when improving the world, such as when creating a child (see Niddah 31a) or when turning wheat into cake (see Tanchuma, Parashat Tazria, parashah 5). Rav Waldenberg could argue that because cosmetic surgery does not constitute a real “improvement” in the world, we are not considered partners with Hashem when performing such a procedure. As such, we are declaring Hashem’s work to be inferior when we attempt to alter it without any real improvement.

Terumat ha-Deshen, Pesakim u-Ketavim, no. 105, regards the permissibility of causing suffering to animals for the benefit of mankind to be inherent in the biblical dispensation granting man the right to use animals for his needs.⁴⁰This concept is echoed in Psalms 8:7-9 which says of man: “Thou hast made him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet. Sheep and oxen, all of them, yea, and the beasts of the field. The fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea; whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas.”
As evidenced by numerous biblical verses, it is clear that man is granted license to utilize animals as beasts of burden, for agricultural purposes, as a means of transportation and the like. Judaism also accepts the view that animals were created for the benefit of mankind. Thus, the Gemara, Berakhot 6b, reports: R. Eleazar said, “The Holy One, blessed be He, declared, ‘The whole world in its entirety was not created other than on behalf of this [human species].’ ” Even more explicit is the statement of R. Simeon ben Eleazar, Kiddushin 82b, declaring, “… they [animals] were not created other than to serve me.” This view is not contradicted by the position espoused by Rambam in a celebrated dispute with Sa‘adia Ga’on in which Rambam denies the homocentric nature of the universe. The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise IV, introduction, asserts that man is the intended and ultimate purpose of creation; Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 13, challenges this view, pointing out that the human species has no need for a great part of the cosmos. Rambam maintains that all parts of the world are equally intended by the divine will but acknowledges that certain beings were created for the service of others. Thus, in Rambam’s view, there is no contradiction in acknowledging that service to other species is the instrumental purpose of some creatures while yet affirming their own existence as the final cause of those creatures. R. Moses Sofer, Hagahot Hatam Sofer, Baba Mezi'a 32b,⁴¹See also Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 185, s.v. ma she-katavata me-Rabad; cf., however, Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 314 s.v. omnam; and Teshuvot Imrei Shefer, no. 34, sec. 2. cites the divine declaration to Adam and Eve, "… and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth" (Genesis 1:28),⁴²Terumat ha-Deshen rules that, as a matter of law, it is permissible to cause pain to animals even for the esthetic pleasure of man, and, accordingly, permits clipping the ears and tail of a dog “in order to beautify it.” Cf., however, Sefer Ḥasidim (ed. Mekiẓei Nirdamim), no. 589, who forbids any attempt to effect a “change” in correcting a congenital anomaly in a limb or organ of an animal on grounds that such a procedure constitutes a violation of the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. In an even more general statement, Da‘at Kedoshim, Yoreh De‘ah 24:12, declares that acts which cause discomfort to animals are permissible in order to satisfy “any desire of man even if his desire in this regard is not in accordance with the weighing of need or benefit but only a desire without a proper reason.” The same authority permits such procedures even if there is only the mere possibility that the need or desire may be satisfied thereby. See also Da‘at Kedoshim, Yoreh De‘ah 23:28. A similar view is expressed by Ezer mi-Kodesh, Even ha-Ezer 5:14. Cf., however, below, note 67. as establishing man's absolute and unlimited mastery over the animal kingdom.⁴³Cf., however, Sefer Ḥasidim (ed. Reuben Margulies), no. 666, who applies Genesis 1:28 in a radically different manner. Sefer Ḥasidim remarks that Adam was forbidden to eat the flesh of animals but was granted dominion over them, whereas the sons of Noah were permitted to eat the flesh of animals but were not granted dominion over them. According to Sefer Ḥasidim, it is because the sons of Noah were not granted dominion over animals that the angel chastised Balaam in demanding, “Wherefore has thou smitten thine ass these three times?” (Numbers 22:32). As pointed out by R. Reuben Margulies in his commentary on Sefer Ḥasidim, Mekor Ḥesed 666:7, Sefer Ḥasidim obviously maintains that Noachides are forbidden to engage in acts involving ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. As indicated earlier, Rambam also cites Numbers 22:32 as the source of the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. Hence there is some reason to assume that Rambam also maintains that ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is prohibited to Noachides. Teshuvot Imrei Shefer, no. 34, sec. 2 and sec. 8, also suggests that Noachides may be bound by strictures concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim which, in his opinion, may be encompassed in the prohibition contained in the Noachide Code concerning the eating of a limb torn from a living animal. See, however, Pri Megadim, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, Mishbeẓot Zahav 467:2 and R. Shalom Mordecai Schwadron, Teshuvot Maharsham, II, no. 364, who apparently maintain that non-Jews are not bound by strictures concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. See also Toldot Ya‘akov, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 33. R. Judah Leib Graubart, Havalim ba-Ne'imim, I, no. 43, sec. 3, advances an identical argument on the basis of Genesis 9:1-2: "And God blessed Noah and his sons…. And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all wherewith the ground teemeth, and upon all the fishes of the sea: into your hand are they delivered."