Halakhah zu Wajikra 19:78

It is forbidden to speak demeaningly of one's friend, even if it be absolute truth. And this is termed everywhere by Chazal "lashon hara." (For if there were in his words an admixture of falsehood, by which his friend is demeaned even more, this is in the category of "motzi shem ra" [spreading a false report], in which his sin is far greater). And the speaker [of lashon hara] transgresses a negative commandment, viz. (Vayikra 19:16): "Do not go talebearing among your people." And this [lashon hara] is also in the category of rechiluth.

One who bears tales about his friend transgresses the negative commandment of (Vayikra 19:16): "You shall not go talebearing among your people." It is a great sin and leads to the killing of many souls in Israel, for which reason it is followed by "You shall not stand by the blood of your neighbor." (viz. Rambam, Hilchoth Deoth 8). Go and see what resulted from the rechiluth of Doeg the Edomite [viz. I Samuel 21], because of which there was wiped out the entire city of Nov, the city of Cohanim. And this negative commandment which we have adduced is that which the Torah wrote explicitly for this issur. But aside from this, there are many other [relevant] negative and positive commandments, as explained above in the introduction.

How great is the issur of lashon hara, which the Torah has forbidden even if true and in all modes. For not alone if he is careful to speak it only in private and to insist that it not be revealed to him [who is spoken about] is it forbidden, [for through this he also brings a curse upon himself, viz. (Devarim 27:24): "Cursed be he who smites his neighbor in secret"], but even if he knows that he would speak it even to his face, or actually speaks lashon hara to his face, even so it is forbidden and called "lashon hara." And in one respect, the issur is greater "to his face" than not to his face." For in his presence, aside from the issur of lashon hara, he [the speaker] clothes himself with the trait of brazenness and audacity, and arouses more strife thereby. And very often this leads also to the "whitening of (the other's) face (in shame)," as we have enlarged upon in the introduction concerning the negative commandment of (Vayikra 19:17): "Do not bear sin because of him."

Just as it is forbidden to shame one's friend in matters between man and his Maker, so is it forbidden to shame him in matters between man and his neighbor, even if what is said contains no admixture of falsehood. And I will not "conceal under my tongue" that there are in this [principle] many roots and branches, and that often this din changes [with the circumstances]. We shall speak about this at length, the L–rd willing, below in Principle X. But now we shall discuss one element that is forbidden beyond a doubt. That is, if one sees another asking his friend to lend him money (even though this [i.e., to lend] is a positive commandment of the Torah, viz. Shemoth 22:24: "When you lend money, etc.," as explained in the Book of the Mitzvoth of the Rambam, Positive Commandments 197), or [asking him] for some other favor, which he does not grant him; or [if he sees one transgressing] negative commandments between man and his neighbor, such as taking revenge and bearing a grudge, as is explained in Yoma (23a): "Which is revenge and which is bearing a grudge, etc.?" — since he [the object of the lashon hara] did not do him [the speaker] any evil (and there is also no benefit accruing to the affected party by his [the speaker's] recounting this to others), therefore, if he goes and recounts this to others, it is called "lashon hara" according to the din. And all this, even if it happened to [the speaker] himself, and it was also clear to him that he could have done him this favor, but refused to do so out of the perverseness of his nature. And there obtain here [also] all the elements of the issur which were explained in the preceding principle in section 3 concerning "between man and his Maker." And even if the withholding of the favor was to another, and the speaker's intent were only zeal for the truth (how much more so if the withholding of the favor were to the speaker himself!), it is certainly forbidden thereafter, to go and demean him for this. And one who transgresses this, aside from stumbling into the sin of lashon hara, also stumbles in this into the transgression of (Vayikra 19:18): "You shall not bear a grudge." And if he intends by what he says to take revenge of him for this, and to publicize the other's perverseness, he transgresses in addition (Ibid) "You shall not take revenge," aside from the issur of lashon hara.

A third blessing is “boray peri ha-gafen” – “Who created the fruit of the vine.” One cannot say that blessing the bread exempts one from saying it, because wine “attaches” a blessing to itself.⁷⁹An expression used by the Tosafot on b.Berakhot 44a. It would seem preferable for us to say “boray peri ha-etz” – “Who created the fruit of the tree” – but because of the high status of wine, they specified the name of the tree, that is, “the grapevine” [ha-gafen]. For had they not wanted to specify the name “the grapevine” because of wine’s importance, they could have fixed the blessing to say “boray peri ha-anavim” – “Who created the fruit of the grapes” because grapes themselves are the fruit of the grapevine, and wine is the fruit which comes from grapes, just as oil is the fruit that comes from olives. Accordingly, they fixed the blessing “boray peri ha-gafen” even though truthfully, grapes are the fruit of the vine, still, the drink which is pressed from the grapes is the fruit of the grapes themselves, and this is because it is considered more important than grapes, just as oil is considered more important than olives. And the Tosafists z”l went back and forth on this topic a lot, and they proved that wine is not called “fruit”, as it is taught in Massekhet Bikkurim:⁸⁰Chavel says this tradition appears in b.Hullin 102b, not in the Mishnah Bikkurim. “’from the first of every fruit of the earth:’ the fruit which you bring as first fruit offerings, and you do not bring drinks as first fruit offerings; therefore wine is not a fruit.” However, they brought these matters up again at the end, and said that wine is called “fruit” by gezerah shavah,⁸¹Verbal analogy, one of the classic forms of Talmudic hermeneutics. since in another context, the word “fruit,” namely “fruit of orlah”⁸²Orlah is the term for fruit that grows from a tree in the first three years after it was planted; it is forbidden to eat or profit from it (Lev.19:23). refers to wine, in Massekhet Orlah:⁸³Likewise Chavel found the source not here, but elsewhere in the Talmud. “They absorb the forty because of orlah only for what comes out of grapes and olives, namely, wine and oil.” And hear from this that just as in regard to orlah wine is called “fruit,” so in regard to blessings it is called “fruit.” The drinks that come from them are like them. And so from this one ought to say the blessing over wine with the expression “boray peri ha-gafen,” and thus to specify the name “gafen” by saying “peri ha-gafen.” And so our sages z”l explained it for us when they said in Massekhet Berakhot, “From where do we get that you only say a song over wine, as it is said, ‘But the vine replied, ‘Have I stopped yielding my new wine which gladdens God and men?’’⁸⁴Judges 9:13. If it gladdens men, how does it gladden God? From here you get that you only say a song over wine.⁸⁵In other words, since God does not actually drink wine, this tradition says that songs inevitably accompany wine-drinking, and must be what gladdens God. And thus an objection was raised among the Tosafists: “But surely it is over several things that we say Hallel, like when they came from battle, as it is said about Jehoshaphat in the Book of Chronicles,⁸⁶2 Chronicles 20:21. or on the Fourteenth of Nisan, when they slaughtered the paschal lamb!” They answered and explained thus, “From where do we get that a song is said over nothing that has to do with the sacrificial altar, such as the flinging of blood, the burning of incense, the water libation, and the rest of the activities of the altar – except for the wine libation, as it is said, ‘But the vine replied to them, ‘Have I stopped yielding my new wine [tiroshi]?’’⁸⁷Judges 9:13. And they said in the Aggadah: “Nine hundred twenty-six kinds of grapes were created in the world, the numerical equivalent of the letters of the word tiroshi – “my new wine,” but all of them were stricken when Adam sinned, and only one remained for us.”⁸⁸Chavel says he could not find the source for this midrash. The status of the grapevine is further enhanced in the way the prophets would always compare the community of Israel to a grapevine, and this is what Scripture meant when it said, “You plucked up a grapevine from Egypt.”⁸⁹Ps. 80:9. And there are still other weightier reasons, but it is not necessary to go into them at length here. Know that the point of human wine-drinking ought to be only in service of food for health reasons alone, so that the food and drink will be mixed internally in a moderate manner, and that one direct the way he conducts his drinking to overcome his hunger and thirst.

And another reason why they ruled that Ha-tov ve-ha-metiv should be the blessing for a change of wine, is that wine is a drink that comes from grapes that are in a vineyard, and our sages z”l already said “Seven years our enemies manured their vineyards with the blood of the martyrs of Beitar.”¹¹⁵B. Gittin 57a. So for that reason they ruled that Ha-tov ve-ha-metivshould be the blessing for a change of wine. And you need to know that it is the way of Torah for a person to be required to restrain his eating and drinking, and that he thus guard his mouth. This is why the Torah specifies which foods are permitted and prohibited, and afterwards connects to them the admonition: “You shall be holy,”¹¹⁶Lev 19:2. that is to say, be ascetic and restrain yourselves from even those foods that are pure and permitted, for if one don’t restrain himself from permitted food that is too pleasing to him, he’ll become one of those who “glut themselves on meat and guzzle wine.”¹¹⁷Prov 23:20. From this he profanes himself and his good qualities, and if a talmid hakham –a “disciple of the sages” – profanes his Torah. And already our rabbis taught us how a person should conduct himself when he’s drinking: he should sip the wine and let it linger in his throat, and by this be satisfied. And they brought proof from the altar where they used to close up the pits, which were holes under the hollow part of the altar from where the libations would flow down into the empty part, so that the wine would linger in the altar, which is what they were talking about in the chapter “Lulav and Willow”:¹¹⁸B.Sukkah 49b. “Resh Lakish said, ‘At the time when they poured the wine libation on Sukkot on top of the altar, they would cork the pits, as it is said, “to be poured in the sacred precinct as an offering of fermented drink to the Lord;”¹¹⁹Nu 28:7. That is, wine, according to traditional interpretation, and so the JSB. However, archaeological evidence has convinced some recent scholars that “fermented drink” (“shekhar”) means “beer.”’Fermented drink’ (shekhar) because it connotes “joy,” “satisfaction,” and “intoxication.” Raba replied, ‘Hear from this that wine satisfies a person; in his throat it satisfies him’ – meaning that if he lets it linger in his throat, he will be satisfied, for so they used to let the wine linger in the altar. And they said in tractate Yoma:¹²⁰B. Yoma 71a. “Whoever gives a drink of wine to a talmid hakham, it is as if they are making libation sacrifices on the altar, as it is said, ‘O men (‘ishim), I call you,’” and thus “ishim” is interpreted midrashically to connote both “wine flagon” as in the word “‘ashishah,” and “sacrifice,” as in the expression “isheh la-Shem” – “fire offering to the Lord.”¹²¹Ex 29:41: “like its libation offering (ki–niskah) you shall make it (lah), as a fragrant odor, a fire offering to the Lord.” However, by creative philology, it could be read “like a libation offering of Ha-Shem” – ke-nesekh Ha’ – you shall make it Lah, i.e., La-Shem, to the Lord.”

And know from what our sages z”l said: “It is forbidden to enjoy something from this world without a blessing, they were speaking about all pleasures in general, whether from something one tastes, from something one smells, or from something one sees and hears – for all four of these senses they fixed a blessing. The sense of taste: from what is written, “set aside [kidesh – lit., “make holy”] for jubilation [hilulim] before the Lord,”³⁵⁸Lev 19:24. it comes to teach you that every edible thing is forbidden to you as if it were hekdesh – “holy” food set aside to the priests and Temple – until one sings praises [yi-hallel], that is, says a blessing to the Holy One Blessed be He before and after over the same food, and this is why hilulim is plural, not the singular form hilul. For the sense of smell one has to say a blessing as well, and there is support for this in the verse, “See, the smell of my son is like the smell of the fields that the Lord has blessed.”³⁵⁹Gen 27:27. From here we get that the sense of smell is blessed. And it is also written, “’Let every soul praise [tehallel] the Lord!’³⁶⁰Ps 150:6. Which thing is it that gives joy to the soul but not to the body? You must say that this is smell!”³⁶¹B. Berakhot 43b. For the sense of sight there are many blessings such as one sees the sun at the summer solstice should say this blessing: “Blessed is He who makes Creation,”³⁶²Current practice is to recite this Birkat Ha-Hamah – “the Blessing of the Sun” – every 28 years at tekufat Nisan –the beginning of spring, rather than tekufat Tammuz – the beginning of summer, to which R. Bahya refers here. See b. Berachot 59b: “He who sees the sun at its turning point should say, ‘Blessed is He who makes the works of Creation.’ And when is this? Abaya said: every 28th year.” and similarly the blessing for moon in each month.³⁶³B. Sanhedrin 42a. And they said in the chapter Ha-Ro-eh – “He who sees”: ³⁶⁴B. Berakhot 59b. R. Bahya’s quotation differs slightly from its source in the Talmud. “He who sees the sun at its turning point,the moon in its purity, the planets in their courses, and the signs of the zodiac in their season, should say: ‘Blessed is He who makes the work of creation.’” And this is what you will find in the story of the making of Creation: “They shall serve as signs for the set times – the days and the years,” because the lights, besides giving light, also are signs by which the future is hinted at, what our rabbis z”l meant by saying:³⁶⁵B. Sukkah 29a. “When the lights are in eclipse, it is a bad sign for “the nations of the world.”³⁶⁶“The lights” – the moon and the stars; “the nations of the world” – a euphemism for Israel! And they are also a sign for Israel when to recite the Shma in the morning, because the mitzvah is to recite it at sunrise,³⁶⁷B. Berakhot 9b. and when to recite the Shma in the evening, because the mitzvah is to recite it “when the stars come out.”³⁶⁸B. Berakhot 2a. And this is the meaning of what is written in: “Lift high your eyes and see Who created these,”³⁶⁹Is 40:26. because through looking at this, a person is roused to see that the are creations, and to praise his Creator for them by either a blessing or some other expression of praise. And in the chapter Ha-Ro-eh, it also says, “Whoever goes out in the days of Nisan and sees the trees sprouting, he should say, ‘Blessed is He who has not left His world lacking in anything and has created in it goodly creatures and goodly trees for the enjoyment of humanity.”³⁷⁰B. Berakhot 43b. And likewise whoever sees their friend after not seeing them for twelve months, one says, “Blessed is He Who revives the dead,”³⁷¹Ibid., 58b. and after thirty days he says a Shehekheyanu blessing, ³⁷²Ibid. and likewise whoever sees a rainbow says, “Blessed is He Who remembers the covenant,³⁷³Ibid., 59a. and so with all the rest of the things for which they fixed a blessing for seeing them. And so that’s what the chapter Ha-Ro-eh talks about.³⁷⁴Ibid., 54a. For the sense of hearing they also fixed blessings. For good news, one recites the blessing Ha-Tov ve-Ha-Metiv; for bad news, “Barukh dayan ha-emet”- “Blessed is the true Judge.”³⁷⁵Ibid. However, they did not fix a blessing for when someone hears a sound [kol] of a lyre or pipe so sweet that it make their soul happy and it enjoys it, as it is written, “for your voice [kol] is sweet.”³⁷⁶S.S. 2:14. The reason why is because sound isn’t actually a thing. Now if you would say the same is true of smell, there is actually something in fruits that give off their smell. And if you would say that there is something in the instrument or singer that produces the sound, the smell that comes from fruits is not like the sound that comes from a person’s body or a musical instrument. For the smell of a fruit or a spice is from their body and essence, but the sound of a human being or musical instrument is not from their body and essence, but rather the result of air blowing through it. Nor did they fix a blessing for the sense of touch, because it is included in the sense of taste. And this is the reason why the Torah mentions these four senses explicitly. When it is written, “that cannot see or hear or eat or smell,”³⁷⁷Dt 4:28: “There you will serve man-made gods of wood and stone, that cannot see or hear or eat or smell,” is the whole verse. The original context, where this refers to the idolatry that the Israelites will eventually fall into, is certainly thought-provoking in light of R. Bahya’s discussion here of the significance of the senses. it does not mention the sense of touch, because it is included in “that cannot eat,” which is the sense of taste. And you must understand that it is among the wonders of the formation of the human body that these five senses in it are implanted in the five organs that are the tools and gateways of the intellectual soul, which derives its nobility from the Holy Spirit in it, and human being’s high rank and greatness is their result, because they are the basis for his activity in doing mitzvot, and likewise for committing sins, for by means of them he will be rewarded, and by means of them he will be punished, according to how he chooses to use them. Therefore Scripture faults avodah zarah for its lack of these senses in order to instruct us about their importance. Because idols are lacking in their ability to sense and are generally incomplete, they have no power to save. And if so, how could those who worship these other gods in times of distress call out, “Rise up and save us!?”³⁷⁸R. Bahya is referring back to Dt. 4:28 in its original context. See note above.

A difficult Halachah for some to observe is the prohibition to serve food to a Jew who will not recite a brachah or serve bread to a Jew who will not wash netilat yadayim (Shulchan Aruch O.C. 169:2 and Rama O.C. 163:2). The Rama (ad. loc.) explains that one who does so violates lifnei iveir lo titein michshol (Vayikra 19:14), the prohibition to cause another to sin. This Halachah has the potential to prevent interaction between observant and non-observant Jews.

In the Blessed One's love for His people Israel and His great desire for their good — to the point of calling them "sons," and "the portion of the L–rd," and "inheritance," along with many other terms of affection which show His great love for Israel, viz. (Malachi 1:2): "I have loved You, said the L–rd, etc.," He distanced them from all forms of evil, especially from lashon hara and rechiluth. For it is these which bring men to quarrels and contention and which very often can lead to the spilling of blood, as the Rambam wrote (Hilchoth Deoth 4:1): "Even though there are no malkoth [stripes] for transgression of this negative commandment, it is a great sin, which leads to the killing of many souls in Israel, for which reason it [i.e., 'Do not go tale bearing among your people' (Vayikra 19:16) is followed by: 'Do not stand (idly) by the blood of your brother' — as evidenced by [the episode of] Doeg Ha'adomi and Nov, the city of priests (viz. I Samuel 22:9)."

1) One who bears tales against his friend transgresses a negative commandment, viz. (Vayikra 19:16): "Do not go talebearing among your people." What is talebearing? "Loading oneself" with words and going from one to another, saying: "This is what ploni [so and so] said about you"; "This and this is what I heard ploni did to you." Although what he says may be true, it destroys the world. And there is a sin much greater than this — lashon hara, which is included in this negative commandment. And that is speaking disparagingly of one's friend, even if what is said is true. But one who speaks falsely [about his friend] is referred to as a "motzi shem ra" [one who spreads an evil report].

Recently, procedures have been developed to tattoo permanent or semi-permanent makeup on women. In the process of applying permanent makeup, also known as micropigmentation, dermapigmentation, or cosmetic tattooing, a needle deposits colored pigments made from iron oxide into the skin’s dermal layer (the layer between the permanent base layer and the constantly changing top layer). This procedure is performed on the lips or around the eyes under antiseptic conditions, with the patient under anesthesia. The tattooing can be either permanent or semi-permanent, with the latter form lasting up to three years and eventually disintegrating. These procedures are very tempting for observant women (especially those blessed with the task of caring for young children), as they save time and avoid the problem of applying makeup on Shabbat.¹We discuss the issue of applying makeup on Shabbat in a later chapter. However, there are serious halachic problems associated with such makeup. The consensus among contemporary poskim is that it violates the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka (tattooing; Vayikra 19:28). We will explore the prohibition of applying a tattoo and see how contemporary poskim relate it to the issue of permanent and semi-permanent makeup. As with countless other contemporary halachic issues, poskim are compelled to define the parameters of kitovet ka’aka very rigorously in order to arrive at a conclusion.

We have already explained in the introduction of our composition, in the Commentary on the Mishnah, that most laws of the Torah have come out from the thirteen hermeneutic principles through which the Torah is expounded; and that there is sometimes a disagreement about a law that comes out through one of these principles; but that there are also, among them, laws the explanation of which was received from Moshe about which there is no disagreement. Nevertheless, they bring proofs about them from one of these thirteen principles. For it is the brilliance of Scripture that it is possible to find a hint or a verbal analogy in it, that indicates the received explanation - and we have already explained this topic there. And since the matter is such, behold: We can not say about every matter that the Sages brought out by a principle from the thirteen principles, that it was stated to Moshe at Sinai; and likewise can we not say about everything found in the Talmud in which they [only] supported it with one of the thirteen principles that it is rabbinic. For sometimes it will [nevertheless] be the received explanation from Moshe at Sinai. What is appropriate here regarding anything that is not found written in the Torah, but it is found that it is something they learned in the Talmud through one of the thirteen principles - if they themselves explain and say that it is a part of the Torah and that it is [a law] from the Torah, it is surely appropriate to count it. For those through which it is received said it is from the Torah. But if they did not explain this and did not say this, it is rabbinic - for there is no verse here indicating it. And this is also a principle that someone besides us has already been confused about; and therefore he counted fear of the sages as a positive commandment. And that which appears to have brought him to this is the statement of Rabbi Akiva (Pesachim 22b), "'You shall fear et the Lord, your God' (Deuteronomy 6:13) - to include Torah scholars." So he thought that anything that is arrived at through the thirteen principles is in the category [of the 613 commandments]. But if the matter was as he thought it, why did he not count honoring a mother's husband or a father's wife; and likewise not count honoring an older brother? For we learned that we are obligated to honor these individuals by inclusions. They said (Ketubot 103a), "'You shall honor et your father' - to include your older brother and your mother's husband; 'and et your mother' - to include your father's wife." That is just like they said, "'You shall fear et the Lord, your God' - to include Torah scholars." If so, why did they count these and not those? But they have come to even greater foolishness than that in this matter. And that is when they found a teaching about a verse, in which the teaching obligates an action or the distancing from something - but they are rabbinic without a doubt - they counted them among the commandments, even though the simple meaning of the verse does not indicate any of these things at all. This is in spite of the principle that [the Sages], peace be upon them, taught us about it - a verse may not be taken out of its simple meaning. So the Talmud asks everywhere where a verse is found from which we learn many things by way of explanation and proof, "What was the simple understanding of the verse written about?" But those who relied on this [mistaken] thinking counted visiting the sick, comforting the mourners and burying the dead in the category of the commandments, because of the teaching that is found about His, may He be blessed, saying, "and make known to them the way in which they are to go and the practices that they must do" (Exodus 18:20). And [the Sages] said about this (Bava Kamma 100a), "'The way' - that is acts of kindness. 'They are to go' - that is visiting the sick. 'In which' - that is burial of the dead. 'The practices' - that is the laws. 'That they must do' - that is [conducting oneself] beyond the letter of the law." And [the ones mistaken about what can be counted] thought that each and every one of these actions was a separate commandment. And they did not know that all of these actions - and those that are similar to them - fall under one commandment written in the Torah, when it is explained. And that is His, may He be blessed, saying, "and you shall love your neighbor like yourself" (Leviticus 19:18). And in this exact same way, they counted the calculation of the seasons as a commandment because of the teaching from, "it is your wisdom and your understanding" (Deuteronomy 4:6). And that is their saying (Shabbat 75a), "Which is the wisdom and understanding that is in the eyes of the nations? You shall say, it is the calculation of the seasons and the constellations." And [even] if one would [only] count what is clearer than this and what is more appropriate to count - that being, to count everything that we learn in the Torah from the thirteen hermeneutic principles through which the Torah is expounded - the count of commandments would add up to many thousands. And if you might think that I am running from counting them because they are not true; whether the law that comes out of it is true or not - that is not the reason. Rather the reason is that any extension that a person, and even if it was Moshe himself, draws out from the root principles that were told to Moshe at Sinai with their explanation - and these are the 613 commandments - is not appropriate to count. And the proof of this all is their saying in the Gemara, Temurah (Temurah 16a), "One thousand and seven hundred a fortiori inferences, verbal analogies, and precise inferences of the Scribes were forgotten during the days of mourning for Moshe. Even so, Otniel, son of Kenaz, restored them through his sharpness, as it is stated (Joshua 15:16-17), '"To he who smites Kiryat Sefer, and takes it, etc." And Otniel, son of Kenaz took it.'" And if this was what was forgotten, what was the total from which this amount was forgotten?! For it would certainly be false to say that everything that was known was forgotten. So, without a doubt, those laws that were drawn out by a fortiori inferences and the other principles were many thousands - and they were all known at the time of Moshe. And yet they are called precise inferences of the Scribes, because anything that they did not hear explained at Sinai is certainly from the words of the Scribes. Behold it has now been shown that that which was learned out through the thirteen principles even during Moshe's time, peace be upon him, is not to be counted among the 613 commandments that were stated to him at Sinai. Hence all the more so should that which was derived in later times not be counted among them. However it is nevertheless true that what was an explanation received from him is counted. And that is what the transmitters explain, and say that this thing is something forbidden to do and its prohibition is from the Torah; or they say that it is a part of the Torah. Behold that we count this, since it is known from tradition and not through a verbal analogy. Indeed, their [possible] mention of a verbal analogy and their bringing a proof for it from one of the thirteen principles [in such a case] is only to show the brilliance of Scripture, as we explained in the Commentary on the Mishnah.

And know indeed that what kind of person one is, is determined at the table, for there his qualities are revealed and made known. And thus our rabbis z”l said, “By three things a person is known: through his purse, through his cup, and through his anger.”³⁴B. Erubin 68b. The clever wordplay of be-kiso, be-koso, be-ka’aso of the saying is lost in the translation. For being drawn to wine and other pleasures – surely these are “the drippings of the honeycomb”³⁵Psalm 19:11, that is, the flowing “honey, the drippings of the honeycomb” than which the “fear of the Lord” and “judgments of the Lord” (19:10) “are sweeter.” – is one drawn to the drug of death, and by his grasping this path he will die an everlasting death. But whoever wants to live ought to keep far from this path; “he will eat and live forever.”³⁶Gen 3:22, an allusion to the immortality that would have come from eating from the Tree of Life. In other words, unlike the way Adam and Eve chose, there is another way one can and should eat to gain eternal life. And thus our rabbis z”l said in tractate Gittin of the Talmud, “A meal for your own enjoyment – pull your hand away from it,”³⁷B.Gittin 70a. and similarly said, “‘You shall be holy,’ that is, ‘you shall be abstemious (perushim),'”³⁸Sifra on Lev. 19:2. and “Make yourself holy through what is appropriate for you.”³⁹B. Yebamot 20a: “Make yourself holy through what is permitted to you.” And the author of Ecclesiastes said, “I said to myself, ‘Come, I will treat you to merriment. Taste mirth!’ That too, I found was futile.”⁴⁰Eccl. 2:1. And after that, he said, “I ventured to tempt [limshokh] my flesh with wine.”⁴¹Ibid. 2:3. Limshokh here is from the root of the same verb R. Bahya used above to refer to being drawn to wine, i.e., “being drawn [he-hamshekh] to wine and other pleasures…is one drawn [nemshakh] to the drug of death.” Thus, R. Bahya is using Eccl. 2:3 as a sort of prooftext for his point about wine. And in tractate Sanhedrin of the Talmud:⁴²B.Sanhedrin 70a. “Thirteen woes are said about wine, and they are specified in Parshat Noah. It is written, ‘Noah, the tiller of the soil, was the first to plant a vineyard,’⁴³Gen 9:20. which means from the moment he began to plant, he made his holiness profane. That is the point of the expression va-yahel – “he began”- which includes both the connotations of “beginning” (tehilah) and “profanation” (hillul). And because of wine, one third of the world was cursed.⁴⁴That is, the descendents of Ham were condemned to serve the descendents of his brothers Shem and Japhet, because when Noah, after drinking his wine, fell asleep in a drunken stupor, Ham “saw his nakedness.” Normally this is a Biblical euphemism for having sexual relations, hence the severity of the curse. The curse was actually directed at Ham’s son Canaan, most likely to justify morally the Israelites’ subsequent subjugation of the Canaanites and their land. However, the whole account is ambiguous and full of apparent non-sequiturs, prompting a quite a fruitful growth of midrashic attempts to explain the story. One unfortunate stream of interpretation, that Ham’s curse not only involved eternal servitude but also the blackening of his skin color, was later adopted in Christian and Muslim traditions, and used to justify the enslavement of Black Africans well into the 19th century – the so-called “Curse of Ham.” And they also taught in a midrash, “Don’t eye the wine, as it reddens…,”⁴⁵Prov. 23:31. that is, it yearns for blood.⁴⁶B. Sanhedrin 70a. And likewise Bathsheba warned King Solomon not to tempt his flesh with wine,⁴⁷B. Sanhedrin 70b.when she said to him, “Wine is not for kings, O Lemuel; not for kings to drink, nor any beer for princes.”⁴⁸Prov. 31:4. The midrash above identifies “Lemuel’s mother” (Prov. 31:1) with Bathsheba, the mother of King Solomon. And so he said, “I ventured to tempt my flesh with wine,”⁴⁹Eccl. 2:3. and “for who eats, and who feels the pleasures of the senses but me?”⁵⁰Ibid., 2:25. and then remarks after that, “That too is futile.”⁵¹Ibid., 2:26. For it is well known that someone in whose heart reverence for HaShem and fear of Him is strong, will reject and separate himself from the pleasures of the world, and will scorn them to the utmost, for he knows and is familiar with their consequences, while others who are lesser or worthless will fill their bellies with what delights them, and their vessels will return empty; they’re empty because they lack sense “They neither know nor understand; they walk about in darkness.”⁵²Ps. 82:5. About this, Solomon said, “When you sit down to dine with a ruler, consider well who is before you.”⁵³Prov. 23:1. He said, “If the wrath of the ruler rises up against you”⁵⁴Eccl. 10:4. and you go out to eat “the king’s food or the wine he drank”⁵⁵Dan. 1:8. in the house of the king who rules the land, understand well and look at those who were before you who chose this way- “what they saw in that matter and what had befallen them.”⁵⁶Esth. 9:26. Doesn’t the high status and greatness of most of them end up in humiliation and submission, “wholly swept away by terrors”?⁵⁷Ps. 73:19. Just what is written right afterwards in Proverbs, “Thrust a knife in your gullet!”⁵⁸Prov. 23:2.And our rabbis z”l said, “Do not yearn for the tables of kings, for your table is greater than their table, your crown greater than their crown.”⁵⁹M. Avot 6:5. Therefore, a person should not seek excessive gains and pursue them, for if he does, his days will be painful and he will never be satisfied, because there is no end to these gains, and whoever pursues things that have no end – is he not sick, blinded by his stupidity? For “every fool is embroiled.”⁶⁰Prov. 20:3. It goes without saying that he has no share in the Torah, because if he were rich and used to eating and drinking with silver dishes, he would be liable to think little of them and become unsatisfied until he had utensils of “turquoise, sapphire, and diamond,”⁶¹Ex 28:18. and as soon as he obtained one of them, he’d want two or three, and this would go on without out end. And therefore a person with good qualities must not in his heart crave for excessive gains, and should be satisfied with a little.

After all, it is said in the Torah (Leviticus 19:17): "And you kept all my statutes and all my judgments and did them," and our sages said their remembrance of the blessing (Torah of the priests there): To give observance and doing to the laws as judgments. And the doing is known - that the laws will be done; And guarding - to beware of them, and not to seem to be inferior to the sentences, and the sentences - are the commandments whose taste is visible and the good of doing them in this world is known, such as robbery and bloodshed and honor of father and mother. And the laws - are commandments whose taste is not known. And our sages said their remembrance of the blessing (Shochar Tov Psalms IX): I have made laws for you and you have no permission to meditate on them, and the creation of man has been violated in them, and the nations of the world understand them, such as the prohibition of pork and meat in milk and decapitated cart

2. It is a positive commandment to believe in God's oneness, believing with complete faith that He is One, without contemporary. As it is said (Deuteronomy 6:4): "Hear, O Israel: the Lord is our God - the Lord is one!" This is the fundament of the faith. After the initial knowledge that there is one God who exists, one needs to belief with complete faith that He is one - in simple and ultimate unity, that He has no body, that the concepts which apply to a physical body do not apply to Him, that things which happen to a body cannot happen to Him, that he has no second, and that there is no power beside Him. This belief is obligatory upon us in all times and all places, to males and females.

After all, it is said in the Torah (Leviticus 19:17): "And you kept all my statutes and all my judgments and did them," and our sages said their remembrance of the blessing (Torah of the priests there): To give observance and doing to the laws as judgments. And the doing is known - that the laws will be done; And guarding - to beware of them, and not to seem to be inferior to the sentences, and the sentences - are the commandments whose taste is visible and the good of doing them in this world is known, such as robbery and bloodshed and honor of father and mother. And the laws - are commandments whose taste is not known. And our sages said their remembrance of the blessing (Shochar Tov Psalms IX): I have made laws for you and you have no permission to meditate on them, and the creation of man has been violated in them, and the nations of the world understand them, such as the prohibition of pork and meat in milk and decapitated cart

(2) He also transgresses (Devarim 27:18): "Cursed is he who misleads the blind man on the way," it being known that the intent of Scripture is to curse one who places a stumbling-block before another so that an issur be committed by him, as in the negative commandment (Vayikra 19:14): "And before the blind man do not place a stumbling-block," which we have already explained (Negative Commandments 4) as also falling into this category.

And there is yet another instance in which he must reveal it to him. If it is heard about the groom that there is apikorsuth [heresy] in him, G–d forbid, it must be revealed to him. And about this it is stated in juxtaposition (Vayikra 19:16): "You shall not go talebearing among your people," but "Do not stand [idly] by the blood of your friend."

(2) And he [the speaker of lashon hara] also transgresses (Vayikra 19:18): "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself," whereby we have been commanded to be as solicitous for our friend's money as we are for our own, and to be solicitous of his honor, and to speak in his praise, as we are solicitous for our own honor. And if one speaks or receives lashon hara and rechiluth against his friend, though it be true, it is apparent that he does not love him at all — how much more so is he in violation of "as yourself!"
And the great proof of this [that he is in violation of "as yourself"] is as follows: Does not every man know his own shortcomings? — in spite of which he would not want his friend to know, under any circumstances, even one thousandth of them! And even if it happens that a few of his faults become known to his friend, who goes and speaks of them to others — how he stands and waits, wishing the L–rd to grant that they not accept his words and not believe him! And all so that he not be seen in their eyes as unworthy — even though he knows himself to be guilty of very many sins, far more than his friend has revealed. In spite of this, in the access of his self-love, everything is swept away. Thus, exactly in this way must one conduct himself vis-à-vis his friend according to the Torah, to be solicitous of his honor in every respect.
And not in vain did the Torah relate to us the episode of Noach, viz. (Bereshith 9:21-23): "And he drank from the wine and he was inebriated and he uncovered himself in the midst of his tent. And Cham the father of Canaan saw the nakedness of his father and he told his two brothers outside. And Shem and Yefeth took the garment and placed it on the shoulders of both and they covered the nakedness of their father, and their faces were [kept] turned backwards [when they drew near him to cover him], and the nakedness of their father they did not see." And the Torah also relates to us the blessing by which Noach blessed them (viz. Ibid 26-27) and which was ultimately realized — to reveal to us the greatness of this attribute, that one must cover up any unseemliness in his friend with all of his power, just as he would for himself!

But this din is subject to various qualifications, as I shall explain. For if he [the object of the lashon hara] were a "mediocre" person, a plain man of Israel, who generally guarded himself against sin, and "stumbled" in this sin only occasionally, and it is possible to assume that he committed this sin unintentionally, or that he did not know this thing to be forbidden, or that he thought the ruling to be a stringent one [chumra], or conducing to a good trait in general, which saintly men are circumspect in — then, even if he saw him transgress this several times, he should certainly be given the benefit of the doubt, and it is forbidden to expose him, so that he not be an object of shame before his people, and so that he not be shamed even in his own eyes. And it is forbidden to hate him for this, for he must be judged in the scales of merit, this being a positive commandment of the Torah, according to many poskim, viz. (Vayikra 19:15): "In [the scales of] righteousness shall you judge your friend."

And if he suffered a business loss and did not know its cause, as when he held a lease from a landowner and was dismissed by him, and he did not know whether someone had slandered him or whether the landowner had dismissed him at his own initiative — it is forbidden to suspect a Jew (unless there are "indications" pointing to him [as will be explained below], in which instance he is permitted to believe the rechiluth in his heart; but he is not permitted to cause him [the suspect] any loss thereby [as will be explained below].) For it is forbidden to categorize a Jew as an "evildoer." And concerning this it is said (Vayikra 19:15): "In [the scales of] righteousness shall you judge your fellow."

It is a mitzva to act with reverence in a synagogue, for the Torah says: “Revere My  temple” (Vayikra 19:30), and the sanctity of the synagogue is a reflection of the sanctity of the Temple.

One does not look directly at the face of someone eating at the table, nor at the plate, nor at the portion set before him, so as not to embarrass anyone. The table server does not eat in the presence of the diners, but they give him some of each dish out of kindness, so that his heart won’t be ashamed. A host who has eaten before his guest – he’s a disgrace! When two are sitting at the table, the older gets to reach for the food first, then the younger. And whoever extends their hand before someone older than them – he’s a glutton! One leaves a “corner” of food uneaten in a kettle but not in a pot.¹⁵Derekh Eretz Rabba, 6. Corner in the Hebrew is “pe’ah.” Just as farmers are commanded to leave the corners (pe’ot) of their fields un-harvested for the poor to glean (in Lev. 19:9), so one should not scrape clean food served a cooking pot, but rather should leave leftovers for the servers to eat. On the other hand, it is okay not to leave leftovers from food served in a different kind of cooking pot. Chavel suggests that the difference between the “kettle” (lit., “something made in an ‘ilpas – one type of cooking pot”) and the “pot” (lit., something made in a kedrah – another type of cooking pot) is their size, and that one is only required to leave a “corner” of leftovers for the server from the bigger stew pot (ilpas), not the smaller cooking pot (kedrah). In other words, unlike the saying “That’s like the pot calling the kettle black,” what I’ve translated here as “kettle” and “pot” are significantly different types of cooking utensils. It happened to Rabbi Yehoshua when he was a guest at a widow’s home, that she brought him a stew pot, and he did not leave a “corner.” She brought him a second one, and he did not leave a “corner. The third time she ruined the dish with salt. He withdrew his hand and ate only bread. She said to him, “Why did you take so much bread when you took so little of the pounded beans?” Hence, Rabbi Yehoshua said, “Nobody has ever gotten the best of me except a woman who was a widow, a little boy, and a little girl.” For it happened to Rabbi Yehoshua when he was walking on a path through a field, that he found a girl who was sitting in the field. She said to him, “Why are you walking in the field?” He said, “I’m walking on a path.” She said, “If this is a path, it’s only because robbers like you have trampled it into one.” And again, it happened to Rabbi Yehoshua when he was walking on a path through a field, that he found a little boy sitting where the path split in two. He said to the boy, “My son, which path will take me into the city?” He said to him, “There are two paths in front of you: the one long and short; the other short and long.” Rabbi Yehoshua took the short and long path. When he got to the wall of the city, he saw gardens and orchards surrounding the city. R. Yehoshua turned back and saw the little boy sitting where he had been before. He said to him, “My son, didn’t I ask you which path would take me into the city?” He replied, “You’re the old sage; aren’t you wise enough to figure it out?” At that, Rabbi Yehoshua went to kiss him on his head and said, “Happy are you, O Israel, for all of you are wise, from your oldest to your youngest!¹⁶All these stories about Rabbi Yehoshua are taken almost verbatim from Derekh Eretz Rabba 6.”

The One be blessed and praised be the One⁴Following Rambam’s Mishneh Torah and the works of other authors, the text begins with the first letters of the first four words forming an acrostic that spells out God’s four-letter name, known as the Tetragrammaton. who created, by His wisdom and will, all of the host of the heavens, the earth and the seas – ‘the terebinth and the oak,’ ‘the beasts of the land’ and ‘the animals of the field.’ ‘And He created man upon the earth,’ ‘and He blew into his nostrils a living soul,’ and He made him rule over all the works of His hand, and He placed everything under his feet. And behold, all of these beings and creatures are all together one “man.” And this is a sign of His oneness, may His name be blessed. [For] it is like Rambam writes in the Guide for the Perplexed, Part 1:72, that the One has in fact created one. Hence it is fitting for each person to have intention before any good deed or any [Torah] study, [that it be] for the sake of the unification, etc.,⁵A popular kabbalistic formula, rooted in Tikkunei Zohar 133b:2. and for the sake of all Israel, and [also] to take upon himself the commandment of “you shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:18), as will be explained.

(3) And sometimes he also transgresses (Vayikra 19:15): "In righteousness shall you judge your neighbor." For example, if one sees his friend saying something or doing something, which may be perceived as righteous and meritorious or as the reverse, even if he [his friend] is a mediocre person, we are obligated by the Torah in this positive commandment to judge him in the scales of merit. (And if that man is G–d-fearing, we are obligated to judge him in the scales of merit even if they incline more to guilt than to merit.) And one who goes and speaks demeaningly of him because of this thing that he said or that he did, or the receiver [of these words], who perceives him negatively because of what he has heard about him, and does not judge him in the scales of merit, transgresses this positive commandment.

But if it appeared to them [see Rabbeinu Yonah 215, 218, and 220] that the sinner knew of the issur itself, and committed the sin intentionally — such as illicit relations, the eating of forbidden foods, or the like — the knowledge of this issur having spread in Israel, the following must be taken into consideration: "If he is "mediocre" in other things, usually guarding himself from sin, and in this sin having been seen to transgress only once and in secret, it is forbidden to reveal his sin to others, even not in his [the sinner's] presence, and he who does reveal it is guilty in doing so. For perhaps that sinner has repented of his evil way and his mind has been in turmoil over that sin, and he has been forgiven by the L–rd. For the root of repentance is bitterness of heart, and if he [the viewer] makes this sin public, he [the sinner] will be an object of scorn and mockery in men's eyes — after having repented of his evil and having been forgiven for his sin! Therefore, the fool, who mentions his sin, will himself be sinful and guilty. And it is not to be revealed even to the judges of the city, even if he has with him a second witness to substantiate his claim (for if not, then even without this [possibility of his having repented] it is forbidden to reveal it; for [since he is only a single witness], the judges are forbidden to believe his words and can only confirm him as "a speaker of lashon hara," as we shall explain below), and there can be no benefit in his doing so [i.e., in revealing the sin]. But he must reprove him in private for having rebelled against his G–d by sinning, and [he must] tell him to take care to "fence himself off" from the factors that brought him to it, so that he not come to sin again. And his reprover must take care to speak to him gently, so as not to shame him, as it is written (Vayikra 19:17): "Reprove shall you reprove your neighbor, but do not bear sin because of him [in reproving him harshly]." And all of this that we have written applies even if he is only a mediocre person in other respects; how much more so if he is a Torah scholar and a fearer of sin, who was suddenly overpowered by his evil inclination, in which instance it is a great sin to publicize his sin. And it is forbidden even to bethink himself of it, for [it is to be assumed that] he certainly repented and that though his evil inclination overpowered him once, his spirit is bitter unto him and his heart is extremely fearful within him over his guilt. As Chazal have said (Berachoth 19a): "If you have seen a Torah scholar who transgressed at night, do not think evil of him in the daytime, for he has certainly repented."

Behold that there are commands and warnings that appear in the Torah that are not about a specific thing, but rather include all of the commandments. It is as if it says, "Do everything I have commanded you to do and be careful about anything from which I have prohibited you"; or "Do not transgress anything of what I have commanded you about." And there is no room to count this command on its own - as it does not command us to do a specific act, such that it should be a positive commandment; nor does it warn us from doing a specific act, such that it should be a negative commandment. And this is like its saying, "Be on guard concerning all that I have told you" (Exodus 23:13); and what is stated, "And you shall keep my statutes" (Leviticus 19:19); "And you shall keep my judgements" (Leviticus 18:4); "and you shall keep My covenant" (Exodus 19:5); "And you shall keep My charge" (Leviticus 18:30), and many like these. And [others] have already erred in this principle, such that they counted, "You shall be holy" (Leviticus 19:2), to be included among the positive commandments. And they did not know that "You shall be holy," and "you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy" (Leviticus 11:44) are commands to keep the whole Torah. It is as if it said, "Be holy by doing everything I have commanded you and being careful about anything I have prohibited to you." And the words of the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:1) are, "'You shall be holy' - you shall be separated - meaning to say, separate from all the disgraceful things that I have prohibited to you." And in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:30:1), "Issi ben Yehudah says, 'When the Holy One, Blessed be He, originates a commandment for Israel, He adds holiness to them'" - meaning to say this command is not a command in itself, but rather follows from the commands that they have been commanded. So one who fulfills this command will be called, holy. And there is no difference between it saying, "You shall be holy," or if it had said, "Do my commandments." Would you see that that which is being said [here] is a positive commandment, in addition to the commandments that it is referring back to, that we have been commanded? Likewise should we not say that "You shall be holy," and that which is similar to it, is a commandment - for it has not commanded us to do anything besides what we [already] know. And the words of the Sifrei (Sifrei Bamidbar 115:1): "'You shall be holy' - that is the holiness of the commandments.' Hence behold what we have been working around is clear. And also based on this principle is its saying, "Cut away the thickening about your hearts" (Deuteronomy 10:16) - meaning to say, that one accept and obey all of the commandments already mentioned. And so too, "and stiffen your necks no more" (Deuteronomy 10:16) - meaning to say, do not harden your heart and accept that which I commanded you, and do not transgress it.

Behold that there are commands and warnings that appear in the Torah that are not about a specific thing, but rather include all of the commandments. It is as if it says, "Do everything I have commanded you to do and be careful about anything from which I have prohibited you"; or "Do not transgress anything of what I have commanded you about." And there is no room to count this command on its own - as it does not command us to do a specific act, such that it should be a positive commandment; nor does it warn us from doing a specific act, such that it should be a negative commandment. And this is like its saying, "Be on guard concerning all that I have told you" (Exodus 23:13); and what is stated, "And you shall keep my statutes" (Leviticus 19:19); "And you shall keep my judgements" (Leviticus 18:4); "and you shall keep My covenant" (Exodus 19:5); "And you shall keep My charge" (Leviticus 18:30), and many like these. And [others] have already erred in this principle, such that they counted, "You shall be holy" (Leviticus 19:2), to be included among the positive commandments. And they did not know that "You shall be holy," and "you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy" (Leviticus 11:44) are commands to keep the whole Torah. It is as if it said, "Be holy by doing everything I have commanded you and being careful about anything I have prohibited to you." And the words of the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:1) are, "'You shall be holy' - you shall be separated - meaning to say, separate from all the disgraceful things that I have prohibited to you." And in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:30:1), "Issi ben Yehudah says, 'When the Holy One, Blessed be He, originates a commandment for Israel, He adds holiness to them'" - meaning to say this command is not a command in itself, but rather follows from the commands that they have been commanded. So one who fulfills this command will be called, holy. And there is no difference between it saying, "You shall be holy," or if it had said, "Do my commandments." Would you see that that which is being said [here] is a positive commandment, in addition to the commandments that it is referring back to, that we have been commanded? Likewise should we not say that "You shall be holy," and that which is similar to it, is a commandment - for it has not commanded us to do anything besides what we [already] know. And the words of the Sifrei (Sifrei Bamidbar 115:1): "'You shall be holy' - that is the holiness of the commandments.' Hence behold what we have been working around is clear. And also based on this principle is its saying, "Cut away the thickening about your hearts" (Deuteronomy 10:16) - meaning to say, that one accept and obey all of the commandments already mentioned. And so too, "and stiffen your necks no more" (Deuteronomy 10:16) - meaning to say, do not harden your heart and accept that which I commanded you, and do not transgress it.

Rav Akiva Eiger (Teshuvot 96, cited by Pitchei Teshuvah, E.H. 42:18) was asked about the validity of a wedding where the witnesses shaved with razors. At first glance, the wedding would appear not to be valid, as shaving with a razor is punishable by malkot and should disqualify the witnesses.²Shaving with a razor violates a biblical commandment (see Vayikra 19:27). Regarding electric shavers, there is much greater room for leniency (see Rav Shabtai Rappaport's essay in Techumin (13:200-208) and Aharon Frazer's article, available at http://www.yucs.org/~frazers/imshefer.html). Rav Eiger, however, forbade the woman to remarry without receiving a get, since "so many people violate the rule forbidding shaving with a razor that the parties in question do not think they are truly violating a serious prohibition."³Due to the current availability of electric shavers, Rav Eiger's ruling presumably no longer applies, as otherwise observant men rarely shave with razors.

4) And both the speaker and the receiver transgress (Vayikra 19:14): "And before the blind man do not place a stumbling-block"; for each one [i.e., both the speaker and the listener] places a stumbling-block before his friend to transgress explicit negative commandments in the Torah. But there is a difference between the speaker and the listener in this regard. For the speaker transgresses this negative commandment both whether the listeners are many or few. Even more so, the more the listeners, the more he [the speaker] transgresses this negative commandment, placing a stumbling-block before many people. Not so the receiver. It is possible that he does not transgress this negative commandment unless he himself hears the lashon hara or the rechiluth from him [the speaker] at the moment, so that if he had left him, he would have no one to relate his lashon hara to. But if there are, besides him, different listeners at the time, it is possible that the hearer does not transgress this negative commandment, but only others mentioned in this introduction [see Be'er Mayim Chayim]. And all this, if he came after the "recital" had started. But the first listener — even though others arrived afterwards — certainly transgresses in all eight modes, for the issur was initiated through him. In any event, one must take great heed of such companions, not to sit with them; for "above" they are all inscribed as "a company of wickedness." And thus is it found in the will of R. Eliezer Hagadol to Hyrcanus, his son: "My son, do not sit with the companies of those who speak ill of their friends, for when their words rise on high, they are inscribed in a book, and all who stand there are described as "a wicked company."

In 1953, Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvot Igrot Moshe O.C. 1:99) was asked by a Rav in Detroit as to whether it is permissible for him to encourage people to come to shul knowing that those who live far away will drive to shul on Shabbat. Rav Moshe strongly advocates not encouraging attendance. He argues that doing so would constitute a violation of the prohibition of lifnei iveir lo titein michshol (Vayikra 19:14), placing a stumbling block before the blind. Chazal (Avodah Zarah 6b) understand this prohibition to include facilitating others (analogous to the blind, as they are blinded by their passions) to sin (the stumbling block). Extending the invitation to shul facilitates their sinful behavior of driving on Shabbat, a serious violation of Torah law, as each time one presses on the accelerator pedal, he violates the prohibition of hav’ara (kindling a fire) on Shabbat.¹For an explanation why it is also forbidden to drive on Yom Tov even though kindling a fire is permitted in many circumstances, see Teshuvot Yechave Da’at 3:36.

The obligation to save the life of an endangered person is derived by the Talmud from the verse "Neither shall you stand idly by the blood of your neighbor" (Lev. 19:16). The Talmud and the various codes of Jewish law offer specific examples of situations in which a moral obligation exists with regard to rendering aid. These include the rescue of a person drowning in a river, assistance to one being mauled by wild beasts and aid to a person under attack by bandits.

The Torah commands us, “Do not stand aside while your fellow’s blood is shed” (Vayikra 19:16). The Gemara (Sanhedrin 73a) clarifies that this pasuk obligates us to expend all efforts and financial resources to save the life of another human. Rashi (ad. loc. s.v. Ka Mashma Lan) explains the phrase “do not stand” as meaning, “Do not stand by yourself (without taking action); rather, exhaust all possibilities in order that your fellow’s blood not be lost.” The Gemara and Rashi, however, do not state whether the efforts required to save another’s life include an obligation to risk one’s own life.

The Rishonim disagree about how long a tattoo must last in order to constitute a violation of the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka. While Rashi (commentary to Vayikra 19:28 and Gittin 20b s.v. Kitovet) and the Ritva (Makkot 21a s.v. Hakotev) describe kitovet ka’aka as something permanent, the Nimukei Yosef (Makkot 4b in the pages of the Rif s.v. Ad Sheyichtov) defines kitovet ka’aka as something that lasts “for a long time.”

“Thou shalt surely rebuke they neighbor” (Lev. 19:17). We are commanded to rebuke any Israelite who is resigned and careless of even one of the 248 positive commandments, or if he has violated one of the negative commands. And the sages tell us that he who has an opportunity to rebuke any Israelite concerning a positive or negative command and fails to do so is punished for all (the transgressions).¹Arakhin 16b. As we have studied (Talmud), “He who has the opportunity to rebuke and protest the actions of his household members and fails to do so is punished because of them. If it involves people of his city he is held responsible because of them, if it involves the entire world he is held responsible for the entire world.”²Shabbath 54b. Whence do we know that we must return a second time to reprove someone if he has failed to respond at first? It is stated, “Whence do we deduce (the command) that if one has rebuked a first time he must rebuke his neighbor once again.” It is stated, “Thou shalt surely rebuke.”³Baba Metzia 31a. He must do so in a manner commensurate with the qualities of the one who is being rebuked; if he be kindly let him reprove him benignly, if he be difficult let him rebuke him accordingly. Let him speak to him in parables and give proofs to enable him to restore his mind to his will. And he shall not favor an elder or superior if he wishes to avoid punishment because of (either of) them. He should warn them of their wicked deeds with impartiality, even when involving a teacher.⁴Ibid. For thus said the wise man, “Where there is a profanation of God’s name, one does not grant respect even to a teacher.”⁵Berakoth 19b. And they (the rabbis) said further, “Rebuke”; this implies a teacher towards his student. How do we know that a student may do similarly to his teacher? Read the text: “Thou shalt surely rebuke, in all cases.”⁶Baba Metzia 31b. We are obliged to rebuke transgressors and to shame them with their sins to the extent that they strike, insult and curse us. He who rebukes is obliged to reprove (purge) himself for that transgression and to rectify his (own) way before rebuking his neighbor. For if he fails to do so his neighbor will not accept his reproofs. Thus did they say, “Gather yourselves together, yea, gather together,” first adorn (correct) thyself and then adorn (correct) others.⁷Sanhedrin 18a. And let no man rest without exploring all means to cause his neighbor to walk the straight path, furthering him from (assisting him against) transgression in worldly and spiritual matters. He who restrains himself from rebuking is guilty of his neighbor’s punishment; for it is written, “Thou shalt not bear sin because of him”⁸Shabbath 54b. (Lev. 19:17). And if he has rebuked him and his neighbor has not responded the rebuker is exempt from punishment for the sin. The rebuker nevertheless receives merit because he has admonished him to walk the straight path and to shun wrong, as it is explained in the paragraph, “Therefore, O thou son of man, etc….” (Ezek. 23:9) “Nevertheless if thou warn the wicked of his way to turn from it and he turn not from his way he shall die in his iniquity, but thou hast delivered thy soul” (Ezek. 23:9). The root of this commandment “and not bear sin because of him” (Lev. 19:17), is that a man should not reprove his fellowman with anger or embarrassment,⁹Arakhin 16b. but first quietly and privately that he not become insolent and recalcitrant and add wrong to his transgression.¹⁰Shabbath 34a. Thus did they say, “I might conclude that he may rebuke him even if his neighbor suffers embarrassment”; read the text, “Thou shalt not bear sin because of him” (Lev. 19:17).¹¹Sifra, ed. Isaac H. Weiss (reprint of Vienna Edition of 1862; New York: OM Publishing Co., 1947), p. 89a.

And this entire issur of lashon hara applies only [when spoken] against the man who is in the category of "your neighbor" [amitecha], "am she'techa," "a people who is with you" in Torah and in mitzvoth. But those people whom he knows to have "apikorsoth" [heresy] among them, it is a mitzvah to demean and to shame, both in their presence and not in their presence, in everything that he sees or hears about them. For it is written (Vayikra 25:17): "And you shall not wrong, one man, his fellow [amito]" and (Vayikra 19:16): "You shall not go talebearing among your people [be'amecha]." And they are not in this category, for they do not act as Your people. And it is written (Tehillim 139:21): "Do I not hate your haters, O L–rd? And against those who rise up against You do I strive." And one who denies the Torah and prophecy of Israel, both the written and the oral Law, is called an apikoress [heretic], even if he says all the Torah is from Heaven, except for one verse, or one kal vachomer [a fortiori argument], or one gezeirah shavah [identity deduction], or one dikduk [inference].

But if they see that the sinner is one of the foolish scoffers who hate their reprovers, as it is written (Mishlei 9:8): "Do not reprove the scoffer, lest he hate you," and their words will certainly not be accepted, and men such as these readily return to their folly, so that he may very likely come to sin again — if so, it is better for them if they tell it to the judges of the city, so that they chastise him for his sin and keep him from future transgression. And it would seem that the same holds true for [telling] the relatives of the sinner if [we know that] their words [of reproof] will be accepted by him [see Be'er Mayim Chayim]. And the entire intent of the teller should be for the sake of Heaven and in zeal for the L–rd, and not because of their hatred of him for something else. And the judges, too, should chastise the sinner in secret and not "whiten his face" in public, as it is written (Vayikra 19:17): "Reprove shall you reprove your neighbor, but do not bear sin because of him." And all this if they saw him with [i.e., if they were] two witnesses, but if he were a single witness, he may not testify against his friend, for his testimony is in vain, the judges being unable to rely upon it, viz. (Devarim 19:15): "One witness shall not arise against a man for every transgression and for every sin." Therefore, [if he does so], he is considered a motzi shem ra [the spreader of an evil report], concerning which our Rabbis have said (Sha'arei Teshuvah 22): "One who testified singly against his friend receives stripes of rebellion." And our sages have said (Pesachim 113b): "Three are hated by the Holy One Blessed be He," one of them being "one who sees a thing of ervah [immorality] in his friend and testifies against him singly." But he can reveal the thing secretly to his [the sinner's] Rabbi and to his close confidant, if he knows that his words will be accepted as those of two witnesses. And his Rabbi is permitted to hate him for this and to distance himself from his company, until it becomes known to him that he has repented of his evil way. But his Rabbi may not tell this to others, it being no better than seeing it himself, as we have written above in section 4.

Sometimes the reasons for commandments are similar to negative commandments and are thought of as being included in that which should be counted by itself. And this is like its stating, "Then the first husband who sent her away shall not take her to wife again [...] you must not bring sin upon the land" (Deuteronomy 24:4): Its stating, "you must not bring sin upon the land," is the reason for the prohibition that preceded it. It is as if it is saying that if you do this, you will cause great loss to the land. An it is [also] like its stating, "Do not profane your daughter and make her a harlot, lest the land fall into harlotry" (Leviticus 19:29). For its stating, "lest the land fall into harlotry," is the reason. It as if it said that the reason of this prohibition is so that "the land not fall into harlotry." And so too, its stating, "you shall not make yourselves unclean therewith and become unclean with them" (Leviticus 11:43): After mentioning the prohibition of the various species that are forbidden to eat, it gave a reason for this and said, "you shall not make yourselves unclean" by eating them. It is as if it is saying that which caused this to be prohibited is the making of oneself impure. And to explain that which He, may He be blessed, said after He prefaced not taking ransom from a murderer, "You shall not defile the land" (Numbers 35:34) - they said in the Sifrei (Sifrei Bamidbar 160:13), "The verse is telling us that spilling blood defiles the land." Hence behold it is clear that this negative statement is the reason for the previous negative commandment, not something else. And likewise regarding that which is stated, "He shall not go outside the sanctuary and not profane" (Leviticus 21:12) - if he does go outside, he profanes. And someone besides us already erred about this principle as well, and counted all of these [as] negative commandments, without observation. However whoever counted them will be embarrassed when they ask him and say, "What thing does this negative commandment prohibit?" And he will not have anything to answer at all. So through this, it becomes clear that it is not be counted. And this is what we intended to clarify about this principle.

And because of the gravity of the evils found in this evil trait, the Torah exhorted us specifically against it by negative commandment, viz. (Vayikra 19:16): "Do not go talebearing among your people," as shall be explained below (as opposed to anger, cruelty, and levity and the other corrupt traits, which even though they undermine the majesty of the soul and its form, and they were alluded to in many places in the Torah, as explained in the words of Chazal — with all this, there is no explicit negative commandment against them [as there is against rechiluth] in the count of taryag [the 613 commandments] of the Torah.

Rambam, both in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Nedarim 4:4, and in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim 6:8, declares that the obligation to render medical assistance is encompassed within the scriptural exhortation "And you shall restore it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2). Although, in context, the verse refers explicitly to restoration of lost property, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, declares that this verse establishes an obligation to "restore" a fellow man's life as well as his property and, accordingly, posits an obligation to rescue a neighbor from danger such as drowning, mauling by an animal or being set upon by bandits. A number of latter-day authorities comment that the accompanying negative prohibition, "You may not hide yourself" (Deuteronomy 22:3) similarly applies to "restoration" of life as well as of property. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, also cites the admonition "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16) as requiring intervention in the aforementioned situations in order to preserve life.

(5) And sometimes, by accepting the lashon hara or the rechiluth, he also transgresses (Ibid 19:16): "Reprove shall you reprove your neighbor." As when he sees his friend beginning to speak demeaningly of another, and he knows that his words [of reproof] will be accepted by his friend (or even if there is a possibility that they will be accepted), the din is that he must reprove him so that the sin not be consummated. Therefore, if he allows him to consummate his lashon hara, he certainly transgresses this positive commandment.

And it seems to me also that if the man were accustomed to repeat his folly, then even if his Rabbi were not very discreet, so that his sin might become public knowledge, still, if his words of reproof would be accepted by the sinner, so that he would no more repeat his offense, it is possible that it is permitted to reveal it to him [the Rabbi], since the teller's intent is to benefit the sinner and not to demean him. And now we shall return to our previous point, that even if two saw him at the time of the sin, and he were a man who readily returned to his folly, still, it is permitted to reveal this only to the judges of the city and not to others. For, in any event, is it not true that we have seen him transgress this issur but once? Perhaps his evil inclination overpowered him, and then he repented, groaning over this in bitterness of heart — so that this sinner has not yet left the category of "your neighbor" because of this (see Vayikra 19:17).

And yet other evils stem from the bitter sin of lashon hara, such as the base trait of cruelty and that of anger, which is a grave sin, as Chazal dilate upon in Shabbath (105b). And very often it leads to levity and to other evil traits of the kind. Therefore, form all the words of this introduction, from which we can understand the greatness of the harm wrought by lashon hara and rechiluth, the Torah has explicitly delineated this issur, assigning to it a distinct negative commandment (viz. Vayikra 19:16): "Do not go talebearing among your people" more than any of the other evil traits, as we have written in the beginning of our introduction; and the Introduction is hereby completed.

An obligation requiring the physician to render assistance in nonlife-threatening situations may be established on the basis of other sources. Ramban, in his Torat ha-Adam, finds that an obligation on the part of the physician to heal is inherent in the commandment "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18). As a specific instance of the general obligation to manifest love and concern for one's neighbor, the obligation to heal encompasses not only situations posing a threat to life or limb, or demanding restoration of impaired health, but also situations of lesser gravity warranting medical attention for relief of pain and promotion of well-being.

Among Rav Malca’s objections is the fact that conducting demonstrations on Friday night causes journalists and police to violate Shabbat in order to record and protect the demonstrators. In addition, he notes that non-observant Jews will turn on their televisions on Friday night in order to view scenes from the action in Petach Tikvah. Rav Malca argues that this constitutes a violation of the prohibition to cause others to sin, lifnei iveir lo yitein michshol (Vayikra 19:18). Rav Malca even objects to the common practice in certain observant neighborhoods in Israel to close the streets in honor of Shabbat. He argues that this violates lifnei iveir, as drivers will drive their cars further in order to avoid the blocked-off neighborhoods. He notes that every time a driver presses the accelerator, he violates the prohibition to create fire on Shabbat.

Our perfect Torah gave principles for correcting man’s character and behavior in the world when it said, “Be holy” (Vayikra 19:2). This verse means, as the Rabbis taught, “Sanctify yourself with what is permitted to you,” that a person should not excessively pursue physical desires (even via permitted means). Similarly, the Torah commanded, “You should do the straight (yashar) and the good (tov) in the eyes of God” (Devarim 6:18), which means that one should act in a proper and honest manner towards other people. There was no purpose [for the Torah] to legislate details of these ideas, for the Torah’s mitzvot apply in every period of history. In every situation, a person must act accordingly, but the appropriate behavior can change, depending on the time and people involved. Nonetheless, the Rabbis wrote several worthwhile details that fall under these principles. The Rabbis enacted some of them as absolute law, while others are merely lechatchilah (ideal) or midat chasidut (especially pious behavior).

And know that just as we have written in the name of the poskim that according to the Torah it is forbidden to believe demeaning things that others say about their friends, so the din is that even if one knows that what was told him is true, but that they could incline [his judgment] in one direction or another, and the one who told him judged him in the scales of guilt, wherefore he demeaned him — and it is known that it is a mitzvah for the hearer to judge him in the scales of merit (and this is a din in the Gemara (Shevuoth 30a) and a positive commandment of the Torah according to several poskim) — and if one transgresses this and does not judge him in the scales of merit, and agrees with the speaker, who demeans him — not only does he transgress (Vayikra 19:15): "In righteousness shall you judge your neighbor," but he is also called "an accepter of lashon hara." For because he did not judge him in the scales of merit, the demeaning words came to be believed of him.

And know further a great principle and foundation in these things: If he sees a man who did something or said something — both in the area of what is between man and his Maker or in the area of what is between man and his neighbor — and his words or his deeds can be judged in the scales of good and merit — if that man [the sayer or doer] is G–d-fearing, he must be judged in the scales of merit, even if what he has done seems more inclined to the scales of guilt. And if he is one of the plain people, who guard themselves against sin, but occasionally stumble into it — if the doubt is balanced, he must incline it and judge him by the scales of merit, as Chazal have said: "If one judges his friend by the scales of merit, G–d will judge him by the scales of merit." And this is included in the Blessed One's behest (Vayikra 19:15): "In [the scales of] righteousness shall you judge your fellow." And even if the thing seems more inclined to the scales of guilt, it is very fitting that he regard it as a doubt and not judge it in the scales of guilt. And when the thing is inclined to the scales of merit, where it is certainly forbidden, according to the din to judge it in the scales of guilt, and he judges it in the scales of guilt, as a result of which he goes and demeans him — aside from transgressing "In righteousness shall you judge your fellow," he transgresses further the issur of speaking lashon hara.

However, regarding the matter of lashes, there is a difference between [the examples]. As all those [simply] specified in one negative commandment only receive one [set of] lashes - for example, "the wage of a harlot and the price of a dog"(Deuteronomy 23:19); and "leaven and [...] honey" (Leviticus 2:11); "the case of a stranger [or] an orphan" (Deuteronomy 24:17), and all that is similar to them. But the negative commandments that [also] have a general category and are specified at the beginning or end [of the category] - for example, this negative commandment that specified "uncooked and boiled" and is [then] generalized, "Do not eat [...] but only roasted with fire"; and so [too], with a nazerite (Numbers 6:4), "from anything that is obtained from the grapevine [...] may he not eat," and afterwards it specifies, "seeds [...] or skin," ('and grapes wet and dry,' Numbers 6:3) - with these and those similar to them, we give lashes for each and every one. [This is] because the inclusion of the specification that was not needed, indicates lashes for each one [of them], as we have said. And the teacher was prolific in his proofs about this in the ninth shoresh in his Book of the Commandments - that the calculation of commandments is not the same as the calculation of [which commandments require] lashes [independently]. And that which I have said that Ramban, may his memory be blessed, will count each of the ones specified by their names individually - each one by itself - only when they are separate in their content, as we have written; [it] is, for example, [in the case of] 'leaven and honey,' [and] 'the wage and the price.' But in a case where it is the same content - even if they are specified by different names - they are only counted as one commandment. For example, "All male first-borns that are born in your herd and in your flock" (Deuteronomy 15:19) is only one commandment to sanctify all of the first-borns; and the specification is [also] only one commandment. And so [too], "All tithes of the herd or flock" (Leviticus 27:32) is only one commandment to separate to give the tithes of these animals. And so [too], "Judges and officers" (Deuteronomy 16:18) is only that we should establish justice through these people and it is one commandment. And so [too], "An honest balance, honest weights, an honest ephah, and an honest hin" (Leviticus 19:36) is all one commandment, that we should not lie about measures.

Judaism, on the contrary, posits a clear and unequivocal obligation to preserve the life of another. The attitude reflected in that requirement is most eloquently captured in a talmudic passage regarding the creation of Adam: "Therefore, only a single human being was created in the world, to teach that if any person has caused a single soul of Israel to perish, Scripture regards him as if he had caused an entire world to perish; and if any human being saves a single soul in Israel, Scripture regards him as if he had saved an entire world" (Sanhedrin 37a). The normative obligation to save the life of an endangered person is formulated by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, on the basis of two separate biblical texts. The first is the scriptural exhortation with regard to restoration of lost property, "and you shall return it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2). On the basis of a pleonasm in the Hebrew text, the Gemara declares that this verse establishes an obligation to restore a fellow man's body as well as his property. A second source is the command "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). As indicated by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, the latter obligation mandates not only the rendering of personal assistance, as is the case with regard to the positive obligation applicable to restoration of lost property, but, by virtue of inclusion in the negative commandment, the obligation is expanded to encompass commitment of financial resources for the sake of preserving the life of a fellow man.⁵For sources elucidating the specific application of these obligations to medical intervention see this writer’s “The Obligation to Heal in the Judaic Tradition: A Comparative Analysis,” Jewish Bioethics (New York, 1981), ed. Fred Rosner and J. David Bleich, pp. 1–55; and J. David Bleich, Judaism and Healing (New York, 1981), pp. 1–10.

7) And sometimes the speaker transgresses (Leviticus 19:17): "You shall not hate your brother in your heart," as when he "speaks peace" with his friend in his presence, and denigrates him before others when he is not in his presence. And much more [does he transgress] if he explicitly charges them not to go and inform him, in which instance he, of a certainty, transgresses this negative commandment.

These sources, however, serve only to demonstrate that animal-directed conduct which is compassionate in nature constitutes a "good deed" but do not serve to establish a system of normative duties or responsibilities. Particularly in light of the strong nomistic element present in Judaism, the absence of normative regulations might well be regarded as indicative of the absence of serious ethical concern for the welfare of members of the animal kingdom. But this is demonstrably not the case, for, in Jewish teaching, there is no dearth of nomoi designed to protect and promote animal welfare. The most obvious example of a regulation having such an effect, and one which is clearly biblical in origin, is contained in the verse "If thou seest the ass of him that hateth thee lying under its burden, thou shalt forebear to pass by him; thou shalt surely release it with him" (Exodus 23:5). The selfsame concern is manifest in the prohibition against muzzling an ox while it threshes in order that the animal be free to eat of the produce while working (Deuteronomy 25:4). Similarly, Scripture provides that both domestic animals and wild beasts must be permitted to share in produce of the land which grows without cultivation during the sabbatical year.⁴See Me’iri, Baba Meẓi‘a 33a, and Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 596. The purpose of other biblical laws pertaining to animals in less clear-cut. The prohibition against plowing with animals of different species, recorded in Deuteronomy 22:10, is understood by Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 550, as well as by Da‘at Zekenim mi-Ba’alei ha-Tosafot and Ba’al ha-Turim in their respective commentaries on Deuteronomy 22:10, as rooted in considerations of prevention of cruelty to animals, but is understood in an entirely different manner by Rambam, Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 49, as well as by Ramban in his commentary on Deuteronomy 22:10. However, Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 48, regards the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day, recorded in Leviticus 22:28, as a precautionary measure designed to prevent the slaughter of the offspring in the presence of its parent. The underlying concern is to spare the mother the anguish of seeing her young killed before her eyes “for in these cases animals feel very great pain, there being no difference regarding this pain between man and the other animals. For the love and the tenderness of a mother for her child is not consequent upon reason, but upon the activity of the imaginative faculty, which is found in most animals just as it is found in man.” Here, Rambam speaks of concern for the welfare of the animal rather than for the moral character of the human agent; see below, notes 14-15 and accompanying text. This interpretation is reflected in the comments of R. Baḥya ben Asher, Leviticus 22:28, and, in part, in Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 294. Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh regards the commandment prohibiting the slaughter of an animal and its young on the same day as designed both to spare the parent from anguish and as a conservation measure as well. See also Abarbanel’s Commentary on the Bible, ad locum. Rambam’s analysis of the rationale underlying this precept is rejected by Ramban in his Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6. According to Ramban, the concern is not to avoid pain to the animal but to purge man of callousness, cruelty and savagery.
Although the Gemara, Baba Meẓi‘a 32a, declares that assistance in unloading a burden from an animal is mandated by reason of ẓa’ar ba’alei ḥayyim but that the obligation to assist in loading the burden upon the animal is not independently mandated by reason of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim, Ritva, cited by Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Meẓi‘a 31a, s.v. aval te’inah, asserts that the commandment requiring a person to render assistance to another who is engaged in loading an animal is predicated upon considerations of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. According to Ritva, a single person engaged in this task is likely to cause additional discomfort to the animal by applying the full force of his body weight whereas, when he is assisted by another, there is no need to apply similar pressure.
Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 186, is of the opinion that the prohibition against the slaughter of sanctified animals outside the Temple precincts is rooted in considerations of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. According to Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, such slaughter is forbidden because no purpose is served thereby and hence constitutes ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. See below, note 29.
Neither the prohibition against mating animals of different species, Leviticus 19:19, nor the prohibition against emasculation of animals, Leviticus 22:24, is understood by classical rabbinic scholars as rooted in considerations of animal welfare. For a discussion of animal welfare as a possible rationale associated with other commandments, see R. Joel Schwartz, Ve-Raḥamav al Kol Ma’asav (Jerusalem, 5744), pp. 11-16. Although the literal meaning of the biblical text may be somewhat obscure, talmudic exegesis understands Genesis 9:4 and Deuteronomy 12:23 as forbidding the eating of a limb severed from a living animal. Jewish law teaches that this prohibition, unlike most other commandments, is universally binding upon all peoples as one of the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah. Sabbath laws contained in both formulations of the Decalogue reflect a concern which goes beyond the mere elimination of pain and discomfort and serve to promote the welfare of animals in a positive manner by providing for their rest on the Sabbath day: "But the seventh day is a Sabbath unto the Lord thy God, on it thou shalt not do any manner of work … nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle …" (Deuteronomy 5:14). Even more explicit in expressing concern for the welfare of animals is the verse "… but on the seventh day thou shalt rest; that thine ox and thine ass may have rest" (Exodus 23:12).⁵The requirement that the parent bird be released before the young are taken and the concomitant prohibition against taking both the parent and the young, recorded in Deuteronomy 22:6-7, quite obviously have the effect of sparing the parent from anguish. The Mishnah, Berakhot 33b, however, does not view this desideratum, laudable as it may be, as the underlying purpose of the commandment. Cf., however, Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 48; Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6; and Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 545.

(7) And all this, even if not in the house of study. But if one speaks lashon hara and rechiluth in the house of study or in the house of prayer, he also transgresses (Vayikra 19:30): "And My sanctuary shall you fear." (Our house of study is included in the category of the sanctuary, as explained by the poskim.) And we have been commanded by this verse to fear the One who resides there, wherefore we may make there only reckonings of mitzvah, such as [those pertaining to] the tzedakah fund and the like. How much more so is it forbidden to engage there in laughter, joking, and idle converse. And this is a categorical prohibition, as explained in Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 151:11. And even more so is it forbidden to speak there lashon hara or rechiluth, out of fear of the Blessed L–rd who dwells there, aside from the grave issur in itself [of speaking lashon hara]. In speaking thus, one shows himself not to believe that the Holy One Blessed be He reposes His Shechinah in this house — whereby he has the audacity to speak in the house of the King against the will of the King.
And even those who study Torah regularly in the house of study, where they are permitted to eat and drink (as explained in the aforementioned Orach Chaim, section 1), in any event, if they go astray in the issur of laughing and joking or lashon hara and rechiluth in the house of study, they transgress the positive commandment of "My sanctuary shall you fear," aside from the issur itself. As the Magen Avraham wrote (151:2): "Are the Torah scholars not exhorted in respect to fear of the sanctuary? All that was permitted them, perforce, is eating and drinking because they learn in the house of study. If they had to eat and drink outside the house of study, their studies would be interrupted." (As far as converse in general which is not talk of levity for Torah scholars in the house of study, see what we have written with the help of the L–rd in Part Three.)

From the break of dawn, it is forbidden to eat or drink before praying. The Sages support their words (Berakhot 10b) on the verse (Vayikra 19:26), “Do not eat upon the blood,” which they interpret as, “Do not eat before praying for your ‘blood.’” Further, they teach, “Anyone who eats and drinks first and [only] afterwards prays, Scripture says of him (1 Melakhim 14:9), ‘You have thrown Me behind your body (“gavekha,” the word used for “your body,” alludes to “ga’avatekha” – your pride).’ God said, ‘After this person acts arrogantly he accepts upon himself the yoke of heaven?!’”

But this was already missed by someone besides us to the point that he counted, "she does not go out like the release of slaves" (Exodus 21:7) - and he did not know that this was a negation and not a prohibition. And the explanation of this is as I will explain. And that is that since God already determined about someone who struck his [gentile] slave or maidservant - and at the time of the strike, caused him to lack one of his main limbs - that [the slave or maidservant] goes out to freedom, it would enter our minds that if the matter is like this with a gentile slave, all the more so would it be the case with a Jewish maidservant and that she would go out to freedom if she loses one of her main limbs. And He negates this conception from us, by His saying, "she does not go out like the release of slaves" - as if to say, there is no obligation for her to be sent out to freedom with the loss of her limbs. So this is the negation of a law about her, and not a prohibition. And the masters of the tradition also explained it like this: And they said in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta DeRabbi Shimon Bar Yochai 21:7), "'She does not go out like the release of slaves' - she does not go out with the main limbs in the way that [gentile] slaves go out." Behold that it is hence already clear to you that it is the negation of another law, which He is negating from her - not that He prohibited anything to us. And there is no difference between His saying, "she does not go out like the release of slaves," and His saying (Leviticus 13:36), "the priest does not examine the yellow hair, he is impure" - it is only a negation, not a prohibition. And that is that it is explaining to us that he does not require quarantine because of this indication (of impurity), and that there is no doubt about him - he is impure. And likewise is His saying (Leviticus 19:20), "they are not put to death, since she has not been freed," a negation and not a prohibition. For He is saying that they are not liable for the death penalty, since [her] freedom is not complete. And it would be inappropriate to explain this as if it were stated, "you shall not put them to death" - such that it would go from a matter of negation to a matter of prohibition. For His saying, "they are not put to death, since she has not been freed," is like His saying (Deuteronomy 22:26), "the girl has no sin worthy of death" - which negates the death penalty from her because of the rape. And likewise [here], He negated the liability of death from them because of [her] slavery - as if to say, they have no sin worthy of death. And likewise is His saying (Numbers 17:5), "and not be like Korach and like his congregation," a negation. And the Sages clarified that it is a negation: They explained its content and said (Midrash Tanchuma, Tzav 13:1) that He, may He be exalted, was telling us that anyone who argues about and challenges the priesthood will not have what happened to Korach and his congregation happen to him with regards to being swallowing up or burned; but rather his punishment will truly be like that which the Lord said through Moshe - meaning to say, tsaraat. For He, may He be elevated, had said to him (Exodus 4:6), "Put your hand into your bosom." And they brought a proof [for this] from what happened to King Uzziah of Judah (II Chronicles 26:19). And even though we find a different expression in the Gemara in Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 110a) - and that is their saying, "Anyone who maintains an argument, transgresses a negative commandment, as it is stated, 'and not be like Korach and like his congregation" - this is by way of an asmakhta (homiletic support), and not that their intention in this is the simple meaning of the verse. However the prohibition about this is included in a different negative commandment, which I will explain in its place.

Although an individual is obligated to intervene in order to preserve the life of another, the existence of an obligation to do so when such intervention entails self-endangerment is fraught with controversy. The Palestinian Talmud, Terumot 8:4, reports that Rav Ami was abducted and faced imminent execution. A debate ensued with regard to whether or not an attempt should be made to use force in an attempt to secure his release. Rav Yonatan rejected the proposal declaring, "Let the corpse be wrapped in its shroud." Resh Lakish, however, insisted upon embarking upon an attempt at rescue and announced, "Either I will kill or I shall be killed."⁶This interpretation is reflected in the comments of Pnei Mosheh, ad locum, and is in accordance with the plain meaning of the text. Cf., however, R. Ovadiah Yosef, Dinei Yisra’el, VII (5737), 28, who suggests that Resh Lakish was merely expressing the foolhardiness of single-handed intervention and intended to indicate that he would organize a large party to assist him in that endeavor. Earlier, R. Chaim Heller, Sefer ha-Miẓvot (Jerusalem, 5706), p. 175, in a strained interpretation of the terminology employed by the Palestinian Talmud, explained Resh Lakish’s comment as expressing a plan to ransom Rav Ami. R. Joseph Karo, both in his commentary on the Mishneh Torah, Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:14, and in his commentary on Tur Shulḥan Arukh, Bet Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat 425, citing Hagahot Maimuniyot, rules that one must place one's own life in jeopardy in order to preserve the life of another. That ruling is apparently in accordance with the opinion of Resh Lakish.⁷See also the citation of Berakhot 33a by Torah Temimah, Leviticus 19:16, as a source for this ruling. Cf., however, R. Ovadiah Yosef, Dinei Yisra’el, VII, 41, and R. Pinchas Baruch Toledano, Barka’i, no. 3 (Fall, 5746), p. 28, note 3. In his Kesef Mishneh, R. Joseph Karo explains the rationale underlying this position, viz., that it is predicated upon the premise that if there is to be no intervention the victim will surely die, whereas the threat to the life of the rescuer is merely "doubtful." Consequently, the certainty of rescuing one life must be accorded precedence over the doubtful loss of another.⁸Hence, even according to this view, there is no obligation for a rescuer to expose himself to risk unless the likelihood of preserving a life is virtually a certainty; in situations in which the likelihood of success is less certain a potential rescuer need not intervene even if the probability of saving the life of another is significantly greater than the likelihood of losing his own life. See Agudat Ezov, Derushim, p. 38b; Teshuvot Amudei Or, no. 96, p. 80a; R. Meir Dan Plocki, Klei Ḥemdah, Parashat Ki Teẓei; R. Chaim Heller, Sefer ha-Miẓvot, p. 175; R. Yitzchak Ya‘akov Weisz, Teshuvot Minḥat Yiẓḥak, VI, no. 103; R. Ovadiah Yosef, Dinei Yisra’el, VII, 29; R. Moshe Hershler, Halakhah u-Refu’ah, II (Jerusalem, 5741), 125; and R. Meir Yosef Slutz, Halakhah u-Refu’ah, III (Jerusalem, 5743), 161–163. Cf., however, Teshuvot Ḥavot Ya’ir, no. 146, who adopts an opposing view. See also Bah, Shulḥan Arukh, Ḥoshen Mishpat 426:2. Nevertheless, as Sema comments ad locum, it is noteworthy that R. Joseph Karo did not incorporate this ruling in his Shulḥan Arukh and that no such ruling appears in the compendia of earlier authorities. That position is, however, espoused by R. Ya'ir Chaim Bacharach, Teshuvot Havot Ya'ir, no. 146, and R. Chaim David Abulafia, Teshuvot Nishmat Hayyim, Derushim, p. 11a.

(8-9) Sometimes the speaker also transgresses (Vayikra 19:18): "You shall not take revenge and you shall not bear a grudge, as when he [the speaker] bears hatred towards him, having asked him to lend him something and having been denied; and, thereafter, seeing something demeaning in him, he publicizes it before others. From the beginning, he transgresses "You shall not bear a grudge," by bearing the grudge in his heart. And later, when he takes revenge and reveals the demeaning thing he has seen in him, he transgresses "You shall not take revenge." But he must wipe the thing from his heart!

8) And if the one before whom he spoke lashon hara or rechiluth were an elder and he demeaned him with this to his face, even if he were an elderly ignoramus, he also transgresses (Vayikra 19:32): "And you shall honor the face of the elder." (And even though the "elder" of the verse refers to one who is wise, Chazal have explained that "And you shall honor" also reverts to "the hoary head" (seivah) that precedes it), for "honor" refers to honoring with words, i.e., speaking to him with honor and respect. And if he demeans him, he certainly does not honor him. Likewise, if he is wise, even if he is not elderly, he also transgresses this positive commandment. For the "elder" [zaken] of the verse refers to a sage, as it is expounded: [zaken] "he who has acquired wisdom" (aside from his coming many times to transgress thereby the graver issur of shaming a Torah scholar, thereby entering the category of apikores [heretic] according to the din. We shall enlarge upon this, the L–rd willing.) And if he is an elder and also a sage, he transgresses "And you shall honor" doubly.

The Judge must be exceedingly¹Heb. מאד מאד is employed to emphasize the extreme care that the Judge must take not to be tempted to accept bribes since man is endowed with a natural desire to accept gifts. The same expression is used by Tur in Y.D. § 160 beg. regarding the prohibition to take usury; ibid. § 336 beg. ref. to the physician who heals; Tur E.H. § 21 ref. to incest. Cf. Ab. IV, 4: ‘Be exceedingly humble’ (מאד מאי הוי שפל רוח), because by nature man is haughty — M.E. For any matter that involves the possibility of a material loss (in our case the gift or bribe that is given to the Judge which is forbidden) requires urging on since it is contrary to human nature not to accept. Cf. Sifra to Lev. VI, 2. , supra § 7, n. 33. careful not to take a bribe even to acquit the innocent,²Ket. 105a: ‘Was it not taught: What was intimated by the text, And thou shalt take no gift? (Ex. XXIII, 8). If to teach that one must not acquit the guilty or that one must not condemn the innocent, (we may object because) it has already been stated in the Bible, Thou shalt not wrest judgment (Deut. XVI, 19). Hence, even if (the Judge wishes) to acquit the innocent or condemn the guilty, the Torah states, And thou shalt take no gift.’ Ibid. 105b: ‘Why is it called Shoḥad (שוחד taken as contraction of שהוא חד, it is one) ? — Because it is one.’ (the recipient and the donor become one person). Cf. also Sifre to Deut. XVI, 19. The prohibition against accepting bribes refers not only to Judges but to all persons who are entrusted with communal matters although no adjudication of law is involved — P.Tesh. Likewise is it forbidden to accept equal bribes from both litigants although the foregoing reason no longer applies — M.E. The Judge must not accept any gifts from the acquitted party even after the conclusion of the trial — Asheri to San. 27a in the case of Bar Ḥama. and if he accepted it, he must return it when the donor claims it.³Yad, Sanhedrin XXIII, Derived from Tem. 4b: ‘Abaye stated: Every act which the Divine Law prohibits, if it has been executed, the act has its legal effect; for if you were to entertain the opinion that the act does not have its legal effect why is one punished by lashes (on account thereof)? But Raba says that the act does not have its legal effect at all and the reason why one is punished by lashes is because he has transgressed a commandment of the Divine Law.’ After a number of texts are adduced according to which in some cases the transgression of a negative command has its legal effect while in others it does not,— concerning which Abaye and Raba agree, — the Talmud continues ibid. 6a-b: ‘R. Aḥa, the son of Raba said to R. Ashi . . In what respect do Abaye and Raba differ? — They differ with respect to direct usury (ריבית קצוצה i.e., lending four Denari in return for five) in accord with R. Eleazar. For R. Eleazar stated: Direct usury can be collected through the Judges, whereas indirect usury (אבק ריבית, lit. ‘dust of usury,’ e.g., if one sells his field and says to the buyer that if he pays him forthwith the price is one thousand Zuz, but if at a later date the price will be more. Consequently, if the buyer pays at the later date, the additional amount is regarded as indirect usury) cannot be collected through the Judges. R. Joḥanan states: Even direct usury is not collected through the Judges (Hence, Raba will conour with R. Eleazar and Abaye with R. Yoḥanan). But do they (Abaye and Raba) differ merely in logical reasoning? Do they not differ in the interpretation of Biblical texts? For R. Isaac said: He hath given forth upon usury and had taken increase: shall he than live? He shall not live (Ez. XVIII, 13), which teaches that the taking of usury is a matter that concerns life but is not liable to restoration (consequently, even Raba who holds that a prohibited act does not have its legal effect, here he will admit that the act is valid on account of the text). R. Aḥa b. Adda says: From here: Scripture states, But fear thy G-d (Lev. XXV, 36), teaching that the taking of usury is a matter of fearing G-d, but is not liable to restoration. Raba stated: From here: He hath done all these abominations: he shall surely die: his blood shall be upon him (Ez. XVIII, 13). Now, lo, if he begat a son that is a robber, a shedder of blood (ibid. XVIII, 10). Those who lend on interest are comparable to those who shed blood. Just as those who shed blood cannot make restoration (of the lost lives), so those who lend on interest are not liable to restoration (of interest). R. Naḥman b. Isaac stated: What is the reason of R. Eleazar? (who maintains that direct usury is collectible through the Judges), for the Biblical text says: That thy brother may live with thee (Lev. XXV, 36) thus teaching that he must restore the interest so that he (the borrower) may live with you.’ Consequently, since the law rests with Raba (excluding certain cases), bribes are equated to usury and are collectible through the Judges, which means that the donor claims it. M.E. writes that if the donor does not claim the return of the gift, the Judge is not obliged to return it, because the donor gave it willingly for the purpose of being acquitted contrary to usury concerning which it is written That thy brother may live with thee. TaZ disagrees with M.E. on the basis of Rashi to B.M. 61b, s.v. ע״כ ריבית קצוצה according to whom the Court may also compel him to return the usury only if he claimed it. Thus also TaZ to Y.D. § 161, 5, n. 3. Even if the donor claimed the bribe after a considerable time had elapsed, yet, as long as he did not renounce his rights to it, he may still make a claim. However, it is proper that the recipient of the bribe should return it of his own accord if he wishes to do his duty towards G-d and repent — P.Tesh. Just as the one who receives it transgresses a negative command, so does the donor transgress [the negative command], 'Thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind.'⁴Lev. XIX, 14. Thus Yad ibid., derived from the law of usury, for just as we deduce the law of returning bribes from the law of usury so too do we deduce from the law of usury that the one who gives bribes transgresses the negative injunction, And thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind, i.e., the one who offers a bribe tempts the Judge and thereby places a stumbling block before him. , Mishna B.M. 75b: ‘These transgress a negative injunction : the lender, the borrower, the surety and the witnesses. And the Sages add: the scribe too. They transgress the injunction, Thou shalt not give (him thy money upon usury) [Lev. XXV, 37] and Take thou (no usury) of him (Lev. XXV, 36) and Thou shalt not be to him as a usurer (Ex. XXII, 24) and Neither shall ye lay upon him usury (Ex. XXII, 25) and Thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind, but thou shalt fear thy G-d: I am the Lord (Lev. XIX, 14).’ Gemara ibid.: ‘Abaye said: The lender transgresses all (the injunctions); the borrower: Thou shalt not cause thy brother to take usury (Deut. XXIII, 20. Heb. תשיך is in the Hiph‘il which is causitive. Hence, it refers to the debtor), but unto thy brother thou shalt offer no usury (ibid. v. 21), and thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind. The surety and the witnesses: only, neither shall ye lay upon him usury.’ One is forbidden to give a bribe to a Gentile Judge on the basis of and thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind, for civil laws are also binding upon all Noaḥides. But if it is evident that the Gentile Judge desires to pervert justice in favour of one of the litigants, it is permissible (Ḥatam Sofer) — P.Tesh. And not only a bribe of money [is forbidden] but even a bribe of words [or acts].⁵Ket. 105b: ‘Our Rabbis taught: And thou shalt take no bribe. (Ex. XXIII, 8); it was not necessary to speak of a monetary bribe, but (the following was intimated) : Even a bribe of words (or acts) is also prohibited, for it is not written, And thou shalt take no GAIN (Heb. בצע which would refer to a monetary bribe only).’ Cf. the cases of Samuel and Amemar a.o. mentioned ibid., who refused to act as Judges for people who acted in a manner that would be tantamount to a bribe of words or acts. Cf. Y.D. § 161, where the same applies to usury. , supra § 7, n. 33. Every Judge who borrows aught is ineligible to adjudicate the lawsuit of the owner of the lent object. This applies only when the Judge possesses naught to lend [to the latter], but if he had things to lend [to him],⁶Even if he did not lend him anything as yet, for since he has things to lend him, the borrowing does not constitute a bribe — M.E. he is fit [to adjudicate his case], since the latter too may borrow from him.⁷Yad ibid. par. 4. Derived from Ket. 105b: ‘Rabbah b. R. Shilah said: Any Judge who is wont to borrow is ineligible to adjudicate a lawsuit (for the owner of the lent object). This applies only when he possessed naught to lend to others, but if he has things to lend it does not matter. But is this really so? Did not Raba borrow things from the household of Bar Merion though they borrowed naught from him? — There he desired to make them feel important (i.e., the borrowing was not for his own benefit). Gloss: [This, viz., that the Judge who borrows is forbidden to pronounce judgment for the owner of the lent objcet applies] only when he is in the habit of borrowing from him, but [if the borowing is merely] incidental, and it is not evident that he does [this] on account of the [lender's] lawsuit, it is not [forbidden].⁸MaHaRIK Rt. 16 — G. Since we compare the prohibition of bribes to that of usury, we likewise learn that a gift constitutes a bribe only when it is clearly evident that it was given for that purpose. , B.M. 75b: ‘It has been taught: R. Simeon b. Yoḥai stated: Whence is it derived that if one is his neighbour’s creditor for a Maneh, the latter must not extend a greeting to him if he was not in the habit of doing this? — From the Biblical verse, Usury of any word which may be usury (Deut. XXIII, 20), — even speech is prohibited.’ Thus we see that it is forbidden only when the debtor was not in the habit of extending a greeting to the creditor, for then it is clearly evident that the purpose of the greeting is on account of the loan he received. But if it was his usual practice to extend a greeting, we consider the debtor’s greeting as of a mere incidental nature. Cf. B.M. 64b, Tosaf. s.v. אבל חצר. Similarly in the present case. If the Judge was in the habit of borrowing, he is forbidden to adjudicate the case of the lender, but if he borrowed from him by mere chance, and it is not evident that the owner of the lent object does it on account of his lawsuit, the prohibition does not stand.

You should know that the commands of the Torah and its prohibitions are about four things: Beliefs, actions, traits and speech. And [beliefs] is that He commanded us to believe in the unity of the Lord, to love God and fear Him; and that He prohibited us from many beliefs, such as his prohibiting us from any divinity besides Him. And He also commanded us in certain actions, such as His commanding us to bring sacrifices and building the Temple; and prohibited us from certain actions, such as His prohibiting us from sacrificing to anyone besides Him, may He be blessed, or from bowing down to anything that is worshipped besides Him. And he also commanded us to act with a certain trait, like that which He commanded us about compassion, mercy, charity and kindness and His saying, "you shall love your neighbor like yourself" (Leviticus 19:18); and he prohibited us from acting with certain traits, like that which He prohibited us from hatred, vengeance, grudge-bearing, bloodlust and other bad traits, as I will explain. And He commanded us that we should say certain statements, like that which He commanded us to praise Him, to pray to Him, to confess our iniquities and our sins and that which is similar to this, as will be explained; and He prohibited us from certain speech, like that which He commanded and forbade us from swearing falsely, talebearing, evil speech, cursing and that which is similar to it. And once these matters that we have been commanded about, or prohibited from, have come to us - whether they be actions, speech, perspectives, or traits - we do not look at the amount of times we are commanded it, it if is a command; or that we are prohibited from it, if it is a prohibition. For they are all to strengthen it. As sometimes He comes back to the very same matter, with one prohibition after the other, to reinforce it. And likewise will one command come after the other to reinforce [a singular commandment]. This is unless you find some statement of the Sages to differentiate the matter, such that the commentators (meaning to say, the Sages of the Talmud) explain to you the positive commandment in it or the negative commandment in it that is not included in the [previous parallel] positive or negative commandment. For then, it would be appropriate to count it [as a separate commandment] without a doubt. As it would not still [just] be reinforcement, but rather additional content - even though what appears from Scripture is that it is about the same content. For we are only forced to say that a verse is repeated to reinforce it, and is not new content, if we do not come to a statement of the commentators - who are the receivers of its tradition - otherwise. However when we find that the tradition says that this command or this prohibition has such content and this command or prohibition that is repeated has different content, this [understanding] has priority and is better - such that the verse not be repeating, but rather [containing additional] content. And then it would be appropriate to count this one by itself and that one by itself. Nevertheless, when there is no new content there, you should know that it is only truly being repeated to reinforce it; and in order that it be known that this matter is a very great iniquity - given that one prohibition after another is coming about it; or to learn a law about the commandment; or to learn from it [one of the laws of another commandment. This is as it is explained in the Talmud, "it is statement exported for a verbal analogy," or to learn from it] a parallel. And behold we saw that they, peace be upon them, alluded to this matter in the Gemara, in the second chapter of Pesachim (Pesachim 24a). And this is what they intended about one of the negative commandments that appeared to be repeated - since the prohibition [already] came from another [verse] - and they sought to establish it to be about about additional content. And it was said about it as a difficulty, "Ravina said to Rav Ashi, 'And say that it comes to have one violate two negative commandments [for the same act]?'" This is meaning to say, "That which you want to establish this negative statement about a different matter than the matter that came as a result of the other negative statement - what is your need to toil about this; perhaps it was repeated about the exact same matter, in order that the person who does this matter be liable for two negative commandments?" But the answer was, "He said to him, 'Anywhere that it is possible to expound, we expound - and we do not establish the verse as containing an extra negative commandment [for the same act].'" Behold it is has been clarified to you that any negative statement that is not coming for additional content is surely called, extra - that is to say that it is repeated. And even if they will say it comes to have one violate two negative commandments, behold it is nevertheless an extra negative commandment - as is clear from this statement. Hence it is inappropriate to count it. Behold, it is already clear that the commandments are not multiplied by the multiplicity of positive or negative statements [about the same content].

Behold it is already been completely explained that it is inappropriate to count every negative or positive commandment that is found in the Torah, for it [may be] a repetition. Indeed it is appropriate to count [only] the content that we are commanded about or prohibited from. And it is impossible to have knowledge of a repeated negative or positive commandment that is coming to give additional content, without a teacher that instructs it. And [these teachers] are those that received the traditional explanation, peace be upon them. And do not err also because the prohibition is repeated with different words - like His, may He be exalted, saying (Leviticus 19:10), "You shall not pick (teollel) your vineyard bare," once He also said (Deuteronomy 24:19), "and overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it," and He said (Deuteronomy 24:20), "When you beat down the fruit of your olive trees, do not extract (tefaer) again." For these are not two negative commandments, but rather one prohibition about one matter - and that is that he not take that which he overlooked from the grain or the fruits when he gathers them. And He brought two examples about them - from grapes and from olives. And He called what is left of the grapes ollelot; and of the olives, "pe'erot. And the understanding of tefaer is do not remove that which you have overlooked in some of your pe'erot - and those are the branches. (See the glosses on this book.) And to this principle, it is appropriate to attach that which I will [now] say. And that is that when I say that it is appropriate that they count the content about which we are commanded or from which we are prohibited, it is on condition that the content that we are prohibited is a separate negative commandment for each and every matter; or that the transmitters [present] a proof that separates one matter from another and that each of them requires [its own] prohibition. However when there is one negative commandment that includes many matters, only that negative commandment is counted, and not all of the content that is included in that negative commandment. And this is a general prohibition, for which we do not give lashes - as we will now explain. And that is that they said (Sanhedrin 63a) in explanation of His saying, "You shall not eat upon the blood" (Leviticus 19:26), "From where [do we know] that one who eats from an animal before its soul departs is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? As it is stated, 'You shall not eat upon the blood.' Another matter: From where is it derived that one who eats the meat of an offering before the blood has been sprinkled [on the altar] is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? We learn to say,'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you shall not eat the meat when the blood is still in the bowl. Rabbi Dosa says, 'From where [do we know] that we do not provide a meal for mourners of those executed by the court? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Akiva says, 'From where [do we know] that a Sanhedrin that killed a soul (i.e., that sentenced a person to death) may not taste anything that entire day? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Yochanan says, 'From where [do we know] the prohibition against the behavior of a stubborn and rebellious son? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."'" Behold that we are prohibited from all of these five things, but they they are all included under one negative commandment. And they also said (Berakhot 10b), "From where [do we know] that a person should not taste anything until he prays? We learn to say, 'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you may not eat before you pray for your blood." And in explanation, they said in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 63a), "For all of [these specific prohibitions], he is not given lashes - as it is a general negative commandment." And they also explained that a general negative commandment is when two or three prohibitions come from one negative commandment. So it is inappropriate that they should count each and every prohibition it included as a separate negative commandment; but rather only the one negative commandment that includes all of them. And similar to this negative commandment - meaning, "You shall not eat upon the blood," - is His saying, "you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). As it also includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 299). And likewise, His saying, "You must not carry a false rumor" (Exodus 23:1) - behold, it too includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 281). And this is one of the types of general negative commandments.

Behold it is already been completely explained that it is inappropriate to count every negative or positive commandment that is found in the Torah, for it [may be] a repetition. Indeed it is appropriate to count [only] the content that we are commanded about or prohibited from. And it is impossible to have knowledge of a repeated negative or positive commandment that is coming to give additional content, without a teacher that instructs it. And [these teachers] are those that received the traditional explanation, peace be upon them. And do not err also because the prohibition is repeated with different words - like His, may He be exalted, saying (Leviticus 19:10), "You shall not pick (teollel) your vineyard bare," once He also said (Deuteronomy 24:19), "and overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it," and He said (Deuteronomy 24:20), "When you beat down the fruit of your olive trees, do not extract (tefaer) again." For these are not two negative commandments, but rather one prohibition about one matter - and that is that he not take that which he overlooked from the grain or the fruits when he gathers them. And He brought two examples about them - from grapes and from olives. And He called what is left of the grapes ollelot; and of the olives, "pe'erot. And the understanding of tefaer is do not remove that which you have overlooked in some of your pe'erot - and those are the branches. (See the glosses on this book.) And to this principle, it is appropriate to attach that which I will [now] say. And that is that when I say that it is appropriate that they count the content about which we are commanded or from which we are prohibited, it is on condition that the content that we are prohibited is a separate negative commandment for each and every matter; or that the transmitters [present] a proof that separates one matter from another and that each of them requires [its own] prohibition. However when there is one negative commandment that includes many matters, only that negative commandment is counted, and not all of the content that is included in that negative commandment. And this is a general prohibition, for which we do not give lashes - as we will now explain. And that is that they said (Sanhedrin 63a) in explanation of His saying, "You shall not eat upon the blood" (Leviticus 19:26), "From where [do we know] that one who eats from an animal before its soul departs is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? As it is stated, 'You shall not eat upon the blood.' Another matter: From where is it derived that one who eats the meat of an offering before the blood has been sprinkled [on the altar] is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? We learn to say,'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you shall not eat the meat when the blood is still in the bowl. Rabbi Dosa says, 'From where [do we know] that we do not provide a meal for mourners of those executed by the court? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Akiva says, 'From where [do we know] that a Sanhedrin that killed a soul (i.e., that sentenced a person to death) may not taste anything that entire day? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Yochanan says, 'From where [do we know] the prohibition against the behavior of a stubborn and rebellious son? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."'" Behold that we are prohibited from all of these five things, but they they are all included under one negative commandment. And they also said (Berakhot 10b), "From where [do we know] that a person should not taste anything until he prays? We learn to say, 'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you may not eat before you pray for your blood." And in explanation, they said in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 63a), "For all of [these specific prohibitions], he is not given lashes - as it is a general negative commandment." And they also explained that a general negative commandment is when two or three prohibitions come from one negative commandment. So it is inappropriate that they should count each and every prohibition it included as a separate negative commandment; but rather only the one negative commandment that includes all of them. And similar to this negative commandment - meaning, "You shall not eat upon the blood," - is His saying, "you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). As it also includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 299). And likewise, His saying, "You must not carry a false rumor" (Exodus 23:1) - behold, it too includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 281). And this is one of the types of general negative commandments.

And to add to the issue that overeating is harmful to health, it is forbidden for a person to overindulge in physical cravings. And the Ramban explained that therefore the Torah commanded "you shall be holy" (Lev. 19:2). If the Torah had not commanded us to be holy, a person could become "a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah", to gorge in meat with no limits, and to get drunk in wine and other strong drinks, all the while affirming that they are not doing any transgression, since the meat and wine are kosher to the best degree. Therefore the Torah commanded "you shall be holy", that one should not eat like an animal.

Behold it is already been completely explained that it is inappropriate to count every negative or positive commandment that is found in the Torah, for it [may be] a repetition. Indeed it is appropriate to count [only] the content that we are commanded about or prohibited from. And it is impossible to have knowledge of a repeated negative or positive commandment that is coming to give additional content, without a teacher that instructs it. And [these teachers] are those that received the traditional explanation, peace be upon them. And do not err also because the prohibition is repeated with different words - like His, may He be exalted, saying (Leviticus 19:10), "You shall not pick (teollel) your vineyard bare," once He also said (Deuteronomy 24:19), "and overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it," and He said (Deuteronomy 24:20), "When you beat down the fruit of your olive trees, do not extract (tefaer) again." For these are not two negative commandments, but rather one prohibition about one matter - and that is that he not take that which he overlooked from the grain or the fruits when he gathers them. And He brought two examples about them - from grapes and from olives. And He called what is left of the grapes ollelot; and of the olives, "pe'erot. And the understanding of tefaer is do not remove that which you have overlooked in some of your pe'erot - and those are the branches. (See the glosses on this book.) And to this principle, it is appropriate to attach that which I will [now] say. And that is that when I say that it is appropriate that they count the content about which we are commanded or from which we are prohibited, it is on condition that the content that we are prohibited is a separate negative commandment for each and every matter; or that the transmitters [present] a proof that separates one matter from another and that each of them requires [its own] prohibition. However when there is one negative commandment that includes many matters, only that negative commandment is counted, and not all of the content that is included in that negative commandment. And this is a general prohibition, for which we do not give lashes - as we will now explain. And that is that they said (Sanhedrin 63a) in explanation of His saying, "You shall not eat upon the blood" (Leviticus 19:26), "From where [do we know] that one who eats from an animal before its soul departs is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? As it is stated, 'You shall not eat upon the blood.' Another matter: From where is it derived that one who eats the meat of an offering before the blood has been sprinkled [on the altar] is in [transgression of] a negative commandment? We learn to say,'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you shall not eat the meat when the blood is still in the bowl. Rabbi Dosa says, 'From where [do we know] that we do not provide a meal for mourners of those executed by the court? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Akiva says, 'From where [do we know] that a Sanhedrin that killed a soul (i.e., that sentenced a person to death) may not taste anything that entire day? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."' Rabbi Yochanan says, 'From where [do we know] the prohibition against the behavior of a stubborn and rebellious son? We learn to say, "You shall not eat upon the blood."'" Behold that we are prohibited from all of these five things, but they they are all included under one negative commandment. And they also said (Berakhot 10b), "From where [do we know] that a person should not taste anything until he prays? We learn to say, 'You shall not eat upon the blood' - you may not eat before you pray for your blood." And in explanation, they said in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 63a), "For all of [these specific prohibitions], he is not given lashes - as it is a general negative commandment." And they also explained that a general negative commandment is when two or three prohibitions come from one negative commandment. So it is inappropriate that they should count each and every prohibition it included as a separate negative commandment; but rather only the one negative commandment that includes all of them. And similar to this negative commandment - meaning, "You shall not eat upon the blood," - is His saying, "you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). As it also includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 299). And likewise, His saying, "You must not carry a false rumor" (Exodus 23:1) - behold, it too includes many matters, as will be explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 281). And this is one of the types of general negative commandments.

Exactly parallel to this is His, may He be exalted, saying "Let no one be found among you who passes his son or daughter through the fire, or who is an augur, a soothsayer, a diviner, a sorcerer. One who casts spells, or one who consults ghosts or familiar spirits, or one who inquires of the dead" (Deuteronomy 18:10-11)." For each one of these things is counted as a separate negative commandment; and they have nothing to do with the first of the two divisions of the second type. The proof about this is His saying, "a soothsayer, a diviner," in the middle; whereas each of them was already clarified to be a separate negative commandment. And that was His saying [this verse], after a soothsayer and a diviner were each also mentioned separately in another verse - and that was His saying, "do not divine and do not soothsay" (Leviticus 19:26). And just like soothsayer and diviner are separated, so too do they separate those before them and after them (in the verses in Deuteronomy), [to be] like soothsayer and diviner - as we explained, about bread, parched grain and fresh stalks. And someone besides us already erred about this topic - whether because his mind did not comprehend all of these things, or whether [because] he forgot them. So he counted His saying, "A harlot or a profaned woman they shall not marry; a woman divorced from her husband they shall not marry" (Leviticus 21:7), as one commandment. And it was already clarified in the Gemara, Kiddushin (Kiddushin 77a), that he is liable for each and every one [separately], even if it is [all included] in one woman - as we will explain in its place (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 161). And we can grant him an excuse for counting a harlot and a profaned woman as one commandment - as he thought it to be a general negative commandment. And in his thinking, His saying, "A harlot or a profaned woman they shall not marry," was for him, like His saying, "Do not eat any of it raw or boiled in any way." And he did not know that the one was to be separated and the other was not to be separated. And likewise did he not distinguish between His saying, "you shall not eat bread, parched grain and fresh stalks," and His saying, "he may not diminish her food, her clothing or her conjugal rights." However I will not attack him about this. Yet [regarding] his counting a divorcee together with a harlot and a profaned woman as one commandment - he has no argument for this at all. For it's - meaning the divorcee - being separate is clear. And that is His saying, "a woman divorced from her husband they shall not marry." Behold we have explained this great principle - meaning to say, the general negative commandment - and its questions. And we have informed you of those that are separated and those that are [limited] only to the general negative commandment, such that we are only liable for it once; and that the content which is separated is counted as several commandments and that which is not separated is counted as one commandment. And always place this principle in front of your eyes; for it is a great key in verifying the count of the commandments.

However, we are distinguished by our regimen of pleasures [dat sha’ashu’im] from the nations who err, rebel, and sin. For we found our Rock in the desert in the land of souls, and there He set for us a table against the nations, and thus David, said, ‘Set before me a table against my enemies’ [Ps 23:5). There the Lord gave us an abundance of charity and good things. There He gave us a marvelous portion of the bread in our law, bread from heaven through no toil. There He showed us through great love something like the world to come—where the divisions of His marvelously formed angels are fed without toil, hewn from flames and awesome fires; and the planting of the Lord of Hosts. Our holy race is lovely because our heart was tested in the desert. We rose up like sweet-smelling incense to thank the Lord and said a blessing over the table. As it is written regarding the manna: “In the morning you shall have your fill of bread and you shall know that I the Lord am your God.”¹⁹Ex. 16:12. Even while we were in the land of our enemies bearing our punishment,the manna soothed our dry and shriveled gullets,²⁰Nu. 11:6. while the flowering vines of our enemies spread heavy on the ground. Even without temple or altar, no medicine-making; the Torah of the Lord with us will save us from breaking. Marked as we are by our circumcision, fringes, and shaving–– the food on our table will help us recognize and remind ourselves to respect His greatness. Let us bless over the table of Him whose food we have eaten.²¹An allusion to the wording of the grace after meals. It is not so with the wicked, whose sins have earned them aninextinguishable fire;²²Ps. 14:4. their table lies before them like mire. Rising early in the morning they devour food and they do not call to the Lord; their hearts and eyes they raise to what delights them, but toward the One above not even the slightest look. Such is the sentence of the nations, that they are a vile and foolish nation filled with folk devoid of sense. Unlike those other nations is Jacob, for he will bless the sacrifice and then eat it.²³Jer 10:16; I Sam 9:13. All his fruit shall also be set aside for jubilation before the Lord;²⁴Lev 19:24. he will withdraw his right hand until the blessing is drawn back into the ‘palace that is before Me.’²⁵I Kg 6:17 [heykhal lifnay], usually translated as ‘the front part of the House’ (i.e., the Temple). Bahya reads lifnay as “before Me,” in order to allude to the mystical idea that saying a blessing returns the vital energy in what is eaten back to its source in the heavenly realm. This is among the ways of wisdom to keep the heart of man straight upon the path of the Lord’sbright lights, to prevent one straying from the service of his God; so that the temptationsof pleasure would not draw our purpose away from being drawn to Him, nor our sinfulinstincts seduce us from serving our Creator,²⁶An untranslatable wordplay here on yetzer and yotzer. from waiting for Him at the doors of His gates.²⁷Prov. 8:34.

In the immediately following responsum, Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, I, no. 99, a responsum actually authored some two years prior to the preceding responsum, Rabbi Feinstein offers somewhat broader guidance. The question posed to him is whether it is permissible to invite people to attend synagogue services when it is known that they will travel by automobile in order to do so. He responds by ruling that it is forbidden to extend such invitations to people living at a distance from which it is impossible to come by foot on the grounds that the invitation constitutes a forbidden act of "placing a stumbling block before the blind" that is prohibited on the basis of Leviticus 19:14. He further advances a novel thesis in declaring that an invitation of such nature entails an additional transgression in the form of "enticement" (meisit). Deuteronomy 13:7-12 establishes successful enticement to commit an act of idolatry as a capital transgression. Citing the statement of the Gemara, Sanhedrin 29a, declaring the serpent that tempted Eve to partake of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge as having had the status of an "enticer," Rabbi Feinstein argues that enticement to commit any infraction constitutes a distinct sin, although only enticement to idolatry constitutes a capital transgression.²Iggerot Mosheh’s assertion that the prohibition against “enticement” is not limited to idolatry is not found in earlier sources and is directly contradicted by R. Meir Dan Plocki, Klei Ḥemdah, Parashat Re’eh, sec. 4. The serpent’s declaration, “You shall be as God, knowing good and evil” (Genesis 3:5), constituted enticement to deny a fundamental principle of faith. Denial of fundamental principles of faith constitutes heresy which, in turn, is tantamount to idolatry in other areas of Jewish law as well, as shown in this writer’s “Be-Bi’ur Shitat ha-Rambam be-Sheḥitat Akum u-Mumar,” Bet Yiẓḥak, XX (1989), 279-284.

Azei ha-Levanon further contends that failure to provide a medical remedy, when available, entails violation both of the commandment "You may not hide yourself" (Deuteronomy 22:3) which, in its biblical context, refers to a person who comes upon lost property belonging to another and of the admonition "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). Sifra, Kedoshim 41, declares that these commandments establish an obligation making it incumbent upon an individual to act, if he is capable of doing so, not only to preserve the life of another, but also in order to prevent his fellow from sustaining a financial loss. This obligation is recorded by Rambam, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:13; Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 237, and Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1. It similarly follows, argues Azei ha-Levanon, that a person is under the selfsame obligation to prevent deterioration of another person's health if he possesses the requisite knowledge and skill to be of assistance in providing medical care. Failure to do so, concludes Azei ha-Levanon, would constitute transgression of these two negative commandments as well as of the positive commandment "And you shall restore it to him." Furthermore, as noted earlier, according to Ramban, failure to render medical assistance entails abrogation of the positive commandment "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself." Thus, even in situations which pose no threat to life, a person in a position to do so is bound to render medical assistance by no less than four separate mizvot.

Noteworthy is not only Maimonides' extension of this concept to cover medical matters but also his failure to allude at all to the verse "and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed." It would appear that Maimonides is of the opinion that without the granting of specific permission one would not be permitted to tamper with physiological processes; obligations derived from Deuteronomy 22:2 would he limited to the prevention of accident or assault by man or beast. The dispensation to intervene in the natural order is derived from Exodus 21:20; but once such license is given, medical therapy is not simply elective but acquires the status of a positive obligation.³Cf. R. Baruch ha-Levi Epstein, Torah Temimah, Exod. 21:19 and Deut. 22:2. Cf., also, R. Abraham Danzig, Ḥokhmat Adam, 141:25. As indicated by Sanhedrin 73a, this obligation mandates not only the rendering of personal assistance, as is the case with regard to the restoration of lost property, but, by virtue of the negative commandment, "You shall not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor" (Lev. 19:16), the obligation is expanded to encompass expenditure of financial resources for the sake of preserving life of one's fellow man. This seems to have been the interpretation given to Maimonides' comments by R. Joseph Karo, who, in his code of Jewish law, combined both concepts in stating: "The Torah gave permission to the physician to heal; moreover, this is a religious precept and it is included in the category of saving life; and if the physician withholds his service it is considered as shedding blood."⁴Yoreh De‘ah 36:1. See R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Ramat Raḥel, no. 21, and idem, Ẓiẓ Eli‘ezer, X, no. 25, chap. 7.

That He prohibited us from inclining towards idolatry and occupying ourselves with its narratives - meaning to say, into this study of spirituality. [That] means, star x descends according to this description and [then] does such; and [when] they burn incense to y and stand before it according to this description, it does thing z - and that which goes in this way. For thought about these things and study with these [types of] expressions is what arouses a person to seek them and their worship. And the verse that prohibited us from this content is His saying, "Do not turn to the idols" (Leviticus 19:4). And the language of the [Sifra] (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 1:11) is, "If you turn to them, you make them gods." And there (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 1:10), they said, "Rabbi Yehudah says, 'Do not turn to see them'" - it is not even permissible to observe the appearance of the image's form and the thought of its construction, so that one not spend any time [involved with any] part of it. And in the chapter [entitled] Shoel Adam (Shabbat 149a), they said, "[Regarding] writing that is under a picture or under graven images (deyokenaot), it is prohibited to read it on Shabbat. And [regarding] the image itself, even on a weekday it is prohibited to look at it, because it it is stated, 'Do not turn to the idols.' What is the [derivation from this verse]? Rabbi Yochanan said, 'Do not make a god from your minds.'" And the prohibition about this very content - meaning about the prohibition of the thought of idolatry - has already been repeated. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "Take heed to yourselves, lest your heart be seduced" (Deuteronomy 11:16). [This] means to say [that] if you have your heart delve into it, it will bring you to veer from the [true] path, and to become involved in its [actual] worship. And He also said about this exact content, "And lest you lift your eyes to the sky" (Deuteronomy 4:19). For He did not come to forbid a person from seeing them with his eyes, but rather forbade the matter in which one relates to their worship with the interest of the heart. And likewise, His saying, "lest you inquire about their gods," is forbidding the inquiry about the nature of their worship, even though one does not worship them. For this all leads to erring about them. And you should know that one who transgresses this is liable for lashes. And this has already been made clear at the end of the first chapter of Eruvin (Eruvin 17b), regarding that which they said, [that] we give lashes for [going outside of] the mixing of perimeters (eruvei techumin). And they gave as a proof, His saying, "let no (al) man go out of his place" (Exodus 16:29); and someone asked and said, "But how can they give lashes for a prohibition, with the word, al, when the commandment did not come with the word, lo? And they answered him rhetorically, "And do we not give lashes for anything that comes with the word, al? But if so, we would also not give lashes for, 'Do not turn to the idols!'" Behold this indicates that we give lashes for this negative commandment. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 2.)

And know also that the entire heter of apei telata applies to the speaker. But, as far as the hearer is concerned — that is, if he knows the nature of the hearer to be such that as soon as he hears the report he will accept it as the truth against Shimon, and may even add some demeaning things against him — to a man like this it is forbidden to intimate anything demeaning about his friend in any form. And one who does so transgresses (Vayikra 19:14): "Before the blind man do not place a stumbling-block," as we expatiated above in the introduction in relation to this negative commandment. And all that we have written concerning this principle in the direction of issur applies even if this speaker did not mention the name of the first speaker, who spoke in the presence of three, but only stated that this and this was heard about Ploni. Even thus it is forbidden. And after all these things and this truth that we have explained, see, my brother, how much one must distance himself from this leniency [of apei telata], which has practically no place in reality; and, especially, even if all the conditions [for leniency] obtain, it is still to be determined whether the halachah is consistent with this opinion [of leniency], since, according to many poskim there is no source for this leniency in the Talmud (as we have written in section 4 in the Be'er Mayim Chayim). Therefore, one who guards his soul will distance himself from this.

Nachmanides finds that since the Torah gives permission to seek medical attention the physician's obligation to heal must also be deemed to be inherent in the commandment "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself" (Lev. 19:18).⁵Torat ha-Adam, Kitvei Ramban, ed. Bernard Chavel (Jerusalem, 5724), II, 43. The obligation to heal the sick is an instantiation of the general obligation to manifest love and concern for one's neighbor. As such, the obligation to heal encompasses not only situations posing a threat to life or limb or demanding restoration of impaired health but also situations of lesser gravity warranting medical attention for relief of pain and promotion of well-being.

I have also found it fitting to write of another thing explicitly, for I have found many people to be habituated to it. That is, when someone lectures in the house of study it is forbidden according to the din to mock him and to say that there is nothing to his lectures and there is nothing to hear. And in our many sins we see many people to be remiss in this, not considering this mockery as an issur at all. But according to the din it is absolute lashon hara. For through such speech it often happens that he causes monetary loss to his friend, and, sometimes, pain and shame, too. For even if it were true, lashon hara is forbidden even if true. For what benefit does this mocker and jester hope to gain by his levity? If he is a sincere person, to the contrary, he should counsel him [the lecturer] afterwards, in private, and suggest other ways to present his lecture. For in his present approach [mockery], his words are not attended to; and by this [the above] counsel [to the lecturer] he would also fulfill (Vayikra 19:18): "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself." In any event, he should not render him a mockery in the mouths of men. And the heter of apei telata is of no avail here as I have clearly explained in the Be'er Mayim Chayim.

It is good to give charity before praying, as it is said: "As for me, with righteousness I will behold Your Presence."²Psalms 17:15. The word בְּצֶדֶק is similar to צְדָקָה, charity. You should also resolve before each prayer to fulfill the mitzvah to "Love your neighbor as yourself."³Leviticus 19:18. You must determine to love every Jew as yourself, because if there is, God forbid, dissension within Israel in this world, there is no harmony in the world above. However, when there is unity in this world it causes spiritual unity of our souls in the world above, and as a result, our prayers are unified; and when our prayers are unified, they are accepted favorably before Him, Blessed is His Name.

Just as non-Jews are prohibited from studying Torah, so are Jews forbidden to teach Torah to gentiles. Tosafot, Haggigah 13a, declares that a Jew who causes a non-Jew to transgress in this manner is guilty of violating the commandment "You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14).⁴Cf., Teshuvot Emunat Shmu’el, no. 14, cited by Pitḥei Teshuvah, Yoreh De‘ah 62:2 and R. Ben-Zion Blum, Tel Talpiyot, Sivan 5690. Moreover, the Gemara, Haggigah 13a, states that teaching Torah to a non-Jew is a violation of an admonition inherent in the words of the Psalmist, "He declareth His word unto Jacob, His statutes and His ordinances unto Israel. He hath not done so with any nation; and as for His ordinances, they have not known them" (Psalms 147:19-20). This verse, according to Tosafot, serves to establish a prohibition against teaching Torah to a non-Jew which is independent of any infraction on the part of the non-Jew.⁵Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 232, states that Rambam records the prohibition forbidding a non-Jew to study Torah but not the prohibition against a Jew teaching Torah to a gentile because, for Rambam, as distinct from Tosafot, the sole prohibition devolving upon the Jew is the general prohibition against placing a stumbling block before the blind. See also R. Shlomoh Yitzchak Levine, Ha-Pardes, Kislev 5710. R. Yechiel Ya‘akov Weinberg, Seridei Esh, II, no. 92, opines that since in “our day” there exist numerous translations of Scripture and there are non-Jewish scholars “capable of reading the Bible and Talmud” teaching such material to non-Jews does not constitute placing a “stumbling block” before them; cf., however, Teshuvot Besamim Rosh, no. 327.

This point may be illustrated by the following analogy: No one is obligated to invest funds in order to earn a profit. Many people have no spare cash to invest. Others have neither the inclination nor the desire to pursue investment opportunities. But consider the person who does have both the funds and the desire to invest. He or she is offered two separate investment opportunities. Each is entirely risk-free and open-ended in terms of potential profit. The second is tied to the first in the sense that it is guaranteed to yield no less a return then the first but carries the additional advantage of a guaranteed minimum return. Which offer should the investor choose? Since the first investment opportunity carries no advantage over the second, while the second bears the distinct advantage of a guaranteed return, the choice is obvious. An investment counselor who recommends the first investment over the second has not only offered poor advice but has transgressed the biblical commandment "and thou shalt not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). The Sages declare that this prohibition is directed against offering imprudent advice to a "blind" (i.e., an uninformed) person in need of guidance.

Minḥat Yizḥak, V, no. 14, suggests that utilization of an answering machine may be tantamount to "placing a stumbling block before the blind" since a non-observant Jew may leave a message on the Sabbath. Pri Megadim, Oraḥ Hayyim, Eshel Avraham 443:5, citing Mishneh le-Melekh, Hilkhot Kela'im 1:6, asserts that, according to Rambam, when removal of a stumbling block is feasible, even passive non-intervention constitutes a transgression of that prohibition.³See also Sedei Ḥemed, Kuntres ha-Kelalim, Ma‘arekhet Vav, klal 26, sec. 25. A recording directing the person telephoning to leave a message is an even more direct placement of a stumbling block. Nevertheless, Minḥat Yizḥak finds no reason to forbid use of an answering machine on that account. He regards the matter as comparable to a person who proffers a glass of wine while both he and the Nazarite are standing on the same bank of a river. Since the Nazarite could reach the wine himself if he so desired, the act of handing the wine to him is proscribed only by virtue of rabbinic edict. Similarly, Minḥat Yizḥak presumably reasons that since there is no actual facilitation of the performance of a forbidden act, any assistance rendered is only rabbinically prohibited.⁴Shakh, Yoreh De‘ah 151:6, asserts that the prohibition against rendering such assistance is rabbinically forbidden as an extension of the obligation regarding admonition (tokhaḥah) recorded in Leviticus 19:17. Since there is no obligation of admonition with regard to an apostate or a heretic, if present-day Sabbath violators are deemed to be in that category, the rabbinic prohibition against rendering indirect assistance is not applicable. Numerous authorities, including R. Jacob Ettlinger, Teshuvot Binyan Ẓion he-Ḥadashot, no. 23; R. David Zevi Hoffmann, Melammed le-Ho’il, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, no. 29; and R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Even ha-Ezer, II, no. 20, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, I, no. 37, and Yoreh De‘ah, II, no. 8, maintain that contemporary Sabbath desecrators cannot automatically be regarded in that light. See also R. Yechezkel Landau, Dagul me-Revavah, in a comment on Shakh, ad locum, who understands Shakh’s position as encompassing all willful transgressors. Cf., however, Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 347:4 and Mishnah Berurah 147:7, who disagree with Shakh’s ruling. Such assistance, argues Minḥat Yizḥak, is rabbinically proscribed only when it is a certainty that it will aid a transgressor.⁵See also Birkat Mosheh, Kuntres ha-Teshuvot, no. 21 and R. Shlomoh Kluger, Teshuvot Tuv Ta‘am va-Da‘at, Mahadura Telita’a, II, no. 50. Some authorities, including Ritva, Avodah Zarah 15b, maintain that even a biblically proscribed placement of a stumbling block is permitted when it is not certain that a transgression will result. See R. Yitzchak Eliyahu Adler, Lifnei Iver (Ofakim, 5749), chap. 13. See also R. Zevi Pesach Frank, Teshuvot Har Ẓevi, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, no. 125. Accordingly, since it is not at all clear that a Jew will telephone on Shabbat, Minḥat Yizḥak permits use of an answering machine to record telephone messages over the course of Shabbat. Shevet ha-Levi, V, no. 28 and Bet Avi, II, no. 54 and IV, no. 69, similarly find no problem with the use of an answering machine on Shabbat.

In all cases, it must be strongly emphasized that a will must not be used as a tool for revenge. The Torah explicitly forbids taking revenge (Vayikra 19:18), and this prohibition applies no less on the deathbed.

In defending his position Rabbi Auerbach establishes an interesting thesis according to which the commandment "You shall not stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Lev. 19:16) obligates an individual to (1) whatever personal action is necessary in order to preserve life, even though such action may involve transgression of other biblical ordinances, and (2) financial expenditures if preservation of the life of one's fellow is impossible otherwise. However, the commandment does not obligate financial expenditures in order to obviate the necessity for a physical act which itself constitutes a violation of Jewish law. Such expenditures, maintains Rabbi Auerbach, are mandated only if the patient is one's own young child or wife. One must incur financial loss in order to avoid desecration of the Sabbath only if one bears general financial responsibility for the care of the patient in question. Such general responsibility is recognized by Halakhah only with regard to one's wife and young children.

Moreover, as Rabbi Halperin himself concedes, the positions of Minḥat Hinnukh, Mahari Perla and Hokhmat Shlomoh are rejected by the consensus of rabbinic authorities. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, posits a further obligation to preserve the life of one's fellow based upon the verse "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). That negative commandment seems to be quite independent of the obligation regarding restoration of property—and the a fortiori obligation to rescue life—and, accordingly, does not admit of any of the exclusions attendant upon the obligation to restore lost property.⁴The notion that the negative commandment is not at all contingent upon the obligation of restoring lost property is developed by Rabbi Eliashiv, Sefer ha-Zikaron, p. 404, and invoked by him in explaining why a person involved in fulfilling a miẓvah is not thereby exempt from the obligation of rescuing a person whose life is endangered.

Hazon Ish, as were others before him, was troubled by the fact that Ben Petura's conflicting ruling is apparently refuted by R. Akiva's quite cogent inference drawn from the verse "that your brother may live with you" – but not at the expense of your life.³Cf., Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Leviticus 19:18, who observes that, according to R. Akiva, “and you shall love your neighbor as yourself” should be understood in a similar manner. Accordingly, Hazon Ish asserts that Ben Petura is actually in agreement with the basic principle enunciated by R. Akiva with the result that, in a situation in which only one person can receive any longevity benefit, one's own life takes precedence over that of another. Thus, for example, if two individuals have been poisoned and one of the two is in possession of a sufficient quantity of an antidote to save one person but, if divided, the quantity available will prolong the life of neither, Ben Petura would agree that the owner of the antidote must administer it to himself. Ben Petura would also concede that, if the antidote belongs to a third party, the halakhic rules of triage would apply. Ben Petura, asserts Hazon Ish, disagrees only in the case of the container of water because, if the water is shared, the life of each of the stranded persons will be prolonged at least minimally, whereas administering less than the requisite dose of the antidote would be entirely without purpose. Ben Petura, in disagreeing with R. Akiva, does so because he recognizes a duty of rescue with regard to even ḥayyei sha'ah. Since sharing the water serves to prolong the life of both at least minimally, such sharing is an act of loving one's fellow as oneself, i.e., both lives are rendered equal. Put in somewhat different terms, since every moment of life is of infinite value and all infinities are equal, the fact that if one person drinks the entire quantity of water he will survive and enjoy a normal life-span is of no consequence. R. Akiva disagrees in maintaining that loving one's fellow as oneself, but not more than oneself, requires preservation of one's own normal longevity anticipation even if such rescue precludes prolongation of the ḥayyei sha'ah of another.

The Torah (Vayikra 19:14) prohibits causing another to sin - lifnei iveir lo titein michshol. Perhaps a website runs afoul of this prohibition, since non-observant Jews might access the website and order an item on Shabbat. Dayan Weisz (Teshuvot Minchat Yitzchak 5:14), in the context of permitting a telephone answering machine that was not set specifically for Shabbat, rules that this does not pose a problem. One consideration is the fact that it is possible that no Jew will not visit the site on Shabbat, and some opinions believe that lifnei iveir lo titein michshol does not apply in case of only possible infraction.

(14) And if he demeans another thus, with such words and the like, before him [alone] and before others, to the extent that his face changes color [with shame], he transgresses also (Vayikra 19:17): ["Reprove, reprove, your fellow and] do not bear sin because of him." The Torah exhorted one hereby not to shame his fellow Jew, even for the sake of reproof and [even] between him and the other [alone]. That is, not to speak so sharply to him that he shames him — How much more so [i.e., should he not do so], if not for the sake of reproof and if he is in the presence of others. And all this, if it did not take place in public, but if he "whitens" his face [with shame] in public, Chazal have already "cut him off" from the world to come, saying (Bava Metzia 59a): "One who whitens his friend's face in public has no share in the world to come."

Rav Malca notes that the purpose of demonstrations in Israel today is to fulfill the mitzvah of offering words of reproof (tochachah) to one who sins (Vayikra 19:17) and that the parameters of this mitzvah must be explored to arrive at a proper decision regarding public protests. Rav Malca notes three points in the Rama and Bei’ur Halachah that he sees as rejecting such demonstrations in Israel today since they most likely will have little effect and serve only to heighten tensions between religious and observant Jews.

(6) In the past, in the case of a parent who hit their grown children, even if the parent's actions were completely righteous, the beit din would punish and ostracize the parent, since the parent transgressed the prohibition of "do not put a stumbling block in front of the blind" (Leviticus 19:14), since obviously the child will be angry and bear a grudge, and even return a double portion (see Shulchan Aruch Yoreh De'ah 240:20, see above 1:3 and 1:16 regarding the seriousness of not hitting parents).

Halachah does not make the fulfillment of mitzvot optional. It mandates coercion (Ketubot 86a), including by means of whipping, of those who refuse to abide by its rules (see, for example, Rambam Sefer Hamitzvot Mitzvah 176).⁴⁸See the interesting debate between the Ketzot and Netivot (C.M. 3:1) regarding who may coerce someone to perform a mitzvah. In fact, a hallmark of the Mashiach is that he will coerce everyone to abide by Torah law (Rambam Hilchot Melachim 11:4). Thus, if a man refuses to place tefillin on his arm and head, beit din is permitted him to force him to do so. Similarly, one may be coerced by any means possible to execute his obligation to rescue the lives of others (Vayikra 19:16).

In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour.'¹Lev. XIX, 15. What is considered righteousness of the Law? — It means to regard the two litigants as equals in every respect, [viz., that] one should not be permitted to speak as long as he needs and the other be told, 'Make your speech brief;'²Yad, Sanhedrin XXI, Derived from Sheb. 30a: ‘Our Rabbis taught: In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour (intimates) that one of the litigants should not sit and the other stand; that one be not permitted to speak as long as he needs and the other be told, Make your speech brief.’ In Y. San. III, 9(21c); Y. Sheb. IV, 1(35b) this is derived from Deut. XIX, 17: Then the two men, between whom the controversy is etc.,’ since men means at least two, consequently, two is superfluous (in addition to the fact that there are suits involving more than two litigants), but it teaches that the litigants be treated as two equals. It would likewise be forbidden even if the Judge were to say only to one of the litigants, ‘Make your speech brief,’ and not give the other litigant instructions to speak at length. However, he may say to both, ‘Make your speech brief or long — BaḤ, M.E., ShaK, A.H. [that] one should not be favourable to one [litigant] and speak soft words to him, and severe to the other [litigant] and speak harsh words to him.³Yad ibid. Derived from Tosef(Z). Sanhedrin VI, 2; Y. Sheb. IV, 1(35b); Y. Yoma VI, 1(43b): ‘He (the Judge) should not be forbearing (מאריך פנים) towards one of the litigants, nor severe (Tosef. has מעײן ‘investigative;’ Y. has מעיז פנים ‘insolent’) towards the other, for it is written, In righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbour.’ Cf. also Ket. 46a: ‘That text (Thou shalt not go up and down as a talebearer among thy people — Lev. XIX, 16) is a warning to the Court not to be lenient with one (litigant) and severe to the other.’ If one of them is wearing expensive garments and the other is wearing shabby garments, they [the Judges] should say to the one who is well dressed, 'Either dress him like you, or dress like him.'⁴Yad ,Sanhedrin XXI, 2. Derived from Sheb. 31a. , text supra § 14, n. 40. Nowadays we are not particular about this — RaShaL, M.E., ShaK a.o. Nor should one [litigant] sit and the other stand, but both should stand.⁵ supra n. 2. According to Tosef(Z). ibid.: ‘The Judge should not make one stand (מעמיד) and the other sit (מושיב),’ whence it follows that if one sits down and the other remains standing of their own accord, it would be permissible — BaḤ. This is however, rejected by Keneseth ha-Gedolah — P.Tesh. If, however, the Court of Law desires to permit them both to sit, they may do so.⁶Sheb. 30a: Tosef(Z). ibid. in accord with R. Judah: ‘Our Rabbis taught: And the two men shall stand (Deut. XIX, 17): it is a religious duty that the litigants stand. R. Judah stated: I heard that if they (the Judges) desire to permit them both to sit, they may do so.’ Although R. Judah represents an individual opinion and we would ordinarily rule in accordance with the Rabbis who represent the majority, nevertheless, since the second Baraitha (v. supra n. 2) and all the cases cited in Sheb. 30a,b harmonize with R. Judah’s view, the law rests with him. The litigants, however, are not permitted to sit down of their own accord, and if they did so, the Judge must ask them to rise, and subsequently, if they desire to permit them to sit, they may do so. According to this explanation it is understandable why King Jannai who was summoned to be present during the trial of his slave who killed a man (v. San. 19a) was told by Simeon b. Shetaḥ when the latter noticed that Jannai sat down after he arrived at Court, ‘Stand on your feet King Jannai and let the witnesses offer testimony against you’ (v. San. ibid., Tosaf. s.v. ינאי; Sheb. 30a, Tosaf. s.v. שאם who point out a difficulty which is removed by this explanation) — P.Tesh. Nor should one [litigant] sit on a higher level and the other on a lower level, but one next to the other.⁷Yad, Sanhedrin XXI, 3. Cf. Tanḥ(B). Shofetim VI to Deut. XVI, 19: Thou shalt not respect persons: ‘(This text) is a warning to the Nasi not to seat one who is worthy to be (only) on a lower level — on a higher level, and one who is worthy to be on a higher level — on a lower level.’ However, this text implies that it would be permissible to seat one on a higher level who is worthy of this honour and likewise one who only deserves to be seated on a lower level should not be seated higher than his position demands. Hence, this text contradicts our present ruling. Nevertheless, since we deal in our ruling with individuals who are considered equals, therefore our text does apply (v. ‘Eẓ Yosef in cur. edd. of Tanḥ.). Should, however, one litigant stand on a higher level and the other on a lower one, it does not matter — M.E. The underlying reason for regarding the litigants as equals is in order to avoid disheartening on the part of a litigant who is not treated as an equal and thereby forgets his pleas. When does this apply?⁸That if the Court desires to permit them both to sit, they may do so. — At the time of the discussion of the pleas,⁹Sheb. 30b: ‘R. Huna sated: The controversy of opinion is with respect to the time of the discussion (i.e., while the case is being debated), but at the time of the conclusion of the case (when the verdict is given) all agree that the Judges sit and the litigants stand, for it is written, And Moses sat to Judge the people; and the people stood (Ex. XVIII, 13).’ but at the time of the conclusion of the case, both litigants must stand in the first instance.¹⁰For in the case of witnesses it is only in the first instance that they must stand (v. infra n. 12), but if they gave their testimony while sitting, it is valid ex post facto. , Sheb. 30b: ‘Ulla stated: The controversy of opinion is with respect to the litigants, but with respect to witnesses all agree that they must stand, for it is written, And the two men shall stand … Another version (reads): The controversy of opinion is with respect to the time of discussion, but at the time of the conclusion of the case all agree that the Judges sit and the litigants stand, for witnesses are like the conclusion of the case (when they offer their testimony the case is completed), and it is written with respect to them: And the two men shall stand.’ Hence, the law that litigants must stand at the time of the conclusion of the case is derived from witnesses whose testimony is like the conclusion of the case, and therefore, the law should not be more stringent in the case of the litigants than in that of the witnesses. Consequently, as in the case of witnesses the law that testimony must be offered while standing is applicable in the first instance, but if the evidence was given while sitting it is considered valid ex post facto, so too, in the case of the litigants it is valid ex post facto if presented in a sitting position. What is considered the conclusion of the case? — [When the verdict is pronounced,] '[So-and-so, You are not guilty,' or 'So-and-so, you are guilty.'¹¹Mishna San. 29a. , infra § 19, 1 and cf. supra § 12, 2. [With respect to] the witnesses [the law is that] in the first instance they must always [testify] while standing.¹²Sheb. 30b in accord with ‘Ulla. , supra n. 10; Git. 71a (ref to Mishna ibid. 67b: ‘If one is struck dumb and they said to him, Shall we write a Get for your wife? and he nodded his head, they must test him three times. If for no he said no, and for yes he said yes, they write and deliver it’): ‘In the same manner as he (one who is struck dumb) is examined with reference to a Get, so too, is he tested regarding transactions, testimony and bequests’ (cited from Tosef(Z). VII(V), 1). Testimony is explained by R. Joḥanan in Y. Git. VII, 1(48d) to refer to ‘one who offers testimony while sitting.’ This according to W.G. refers to one who is sick, since one who is struck dumb must have become so as a result of sickness and yet, we see that his testimony is considered valid through the test of nodding the head. Hence, it follows that if one testified while sitting, his testimony is considered valid ex post facto (cf. Tosef. ibid. where חולה ומשותק is mentioned). , also Zeb. 16a and Tosaf. s.v. מיושב. Gloss: And standing by being supported is indeed regarded as standing with respect to this matter.¹³RIBaSh s. 266 — G. Meg. 21a (ref. to Mishna: ‘One who reads the Megillah may do so while standing or sitting’): ‘A Tanna stated: This (namely, that one may read the Megillah while standing or sitting) does not apply to the Torah (the reading of the Torah in public). Whence is this derived? — R. Abbahu said: Because the Scriptural verse states, But as for thee, stand thou here by me (Deut. V, 28) … One verse states, And I sat (ואשב) in the mount (Deut. IX, 9) and another verse states, And I stood (עמדתי) in the mount (ibid. X, 10) — Rab said: He (Moses) stood when he learnt and sat when he reviewed (his learning). R. Ḥanina said: He was neither standing nor sitting but stooping.’ Hence, we see that stooping is designated neither standing nor sitting and yet the verse (I stood) refers to it as standing. Consequently, standing while leaning against something (equivalent to stooping) is still called standing. Leaning would therefore, include both standing and sitting. It is designated standing where this would be the requirement of the law as in the present ruling, and sitting where the law requires it as infra § 28, 26 where standing (in the case of Judges) by being supported is not considered standing but rather sitting in accord with the First Tanna in Zeb. 19b. Cf. E.H. § 169, 45; Zeb. 19b, Tosaf. s.v. וליתיב; Yoma 25a and Tosaf. s.v. אין; Y. Meg. IV, 1(74d). Hence, if Judges who are required to sit, stood by means of some support, or if witnesses who are required to stand, did so only by means of support, we adopt a leniency in both cases and consider standing by means of support in the case of Judges as sitting and in the case of witnesses as standing. This however, would not be valid if in the same lawsuit that is being tried both the Judges and the witnesses stood by being supported — M.E. , however, infra § 28, [26].

That He prohibited an incited one from loving the inciter and from listening to his words. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "Do not esteem him" (Deuteronomy 13:9). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 89:1) is, "It is implied from its being stated, 'you shall love your neighbor like yourself' (Leviticus 19:18) [that] perhaps you should love this one. [Hence] we learn to say, 'Do not esteem him.'" (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 5.)

The Judge is obliged to issue the verdict forthwith, [i.e., immediately] after it becomes absolutely certain to him, for if he delays⁴⁸Lit. ‘oppresses.’ judgment and [unduly] prolongs [the examination of] established matters in order [thereby] to afflict one of the litigants, such a one falls into the category of 'Ye shall do no unrighteousness [in judgment].'⁴⁹Lev. XIX, 35. Thus Tur and Yad, Sanhedrin XX, 6. Derived from Aboth V, 8. , San. 35a and Rashi a.l. s.v. לדײניה.

The author of Helkat Yo'av asserts that neither of his predecessors had properly defined the focal issue. Incisively, he notes that the nature of tort damages must be examined in an analytic manner. Are such damages designed to redress the damage in order to make the victim whole? Or is liability simply a consequence of the tortious act?⁹If so, liability is presumably a form of punishment and the damages may be either compensatory and punitive at one and the same time or, in the absence of actual loss, merely punitive. For a brief argument demonstrating that torts are not merely actionable but that tortious acts are biblically forbidden see Ḥiddushei R. Ḥayyim ha-Levi al ha-Shas (mi-Pi ha-Shemu‘ah) (1953), p. 85; Ḥiddushei ha-Graḥ (bound stencil, n.d.), p. 226; and Ḥiddushei ha-Graḥ al ha-Shas (Jersualem, 5729), pp. 170–171. Rabbenu Yonah, commentary on Avot 1:1, regards the prohibition as subsumed in the prohibition against theft. Yad Ramah, Bava Batra 26a, declares that causing pecuniary damage to another is prohibited by virtue of “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18) and the commandment “You shall not place a stumbling-block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). See also Teshuvot ha-Rosh, no. 108; Bi’ur ha-Gra, Ḥoshen Mishpat 155:8; Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 261; Birkat Shmu’el, Bava Kamma, no. 2; and Kehillot Ya‘akov, Bava Kamma, no. 1. (Although, to be sure, if no damage occurs, there is no tort and hence no liability. As will be shown, the crucial difference is in a case of damage to the pecuniary value of an object but no resultant loss to the owner.)

(17) And sometimes there is yet another negative commandment which is found to be transgressed (in our many sins) — speaking lashon hara against someone in anger, and, at the same time, cursing him — sometimes even by the Name (even if in the vernacular). In doing so, one transgresses an absolute negative commandment viz. (Vayikra 19:14): "Do not curse a deaf man" (the meaning being "even" a deaf man — how much more so, one who is not deaf, as explained in Choshen Mishpat 27:1).
We have hereby enumerated seventeen negative commandments which are often attendant upon lashon hara and rechiluth — even if he speaks only to a Jew. (For if he slanders a Jew to a non-Jew, the issur is greater and graver, sometimes entering into the category of massur [informing], as we shall explain, G–d willing, in Hilchoth Lashon Hara, Principle VIII). And (transgression of) many of the aforementioned negative commandments are subject to death at the hands of Heaven — such as demeaning a widow or an orphan or profaning the Name. And many of them have implications for the world to come, such as "whitening" the face of one's friend in public or honoring oneself in the shame of his friend. This, in the instance of one who habituates himself to this grave transgression of lashon hara and rechiluth, all of which will be explained below, God willing.

The author of Helkat Yo'av asserts that neither of his predecessors had properly defined the focal issue. Incisively, he notes that the nature of tort damages must be examined in an analytic manner. Are such damages designed to redress the damage in order to make the victim whole? Or is liability simply a consequence of the tortious act?⁹If so, liability is presumably a form of punishment and the damages may be either compensatory and punitive at one and the same time or, in the absence of actual loss, merely punitive. For a brief argument demonstrating that torts are not merely actionable but that tortious acts are biblically forbidden see Ḥiddushei R. Ḥayyim ha-Levi al ha-Shas (mi-Pi ha-Shemu‘ah) (1953), p. 85; Ḥiddushei ha-Graḥ (bound stencil, n.d.), p. 226; and Ḥiddushei ha-Graḥ al ha-Shas (Jersualem, 5729), pp. 170–171. Rabbenu Yonah, commentary on Avot 1:1, regards the prohibition as subsumed in the prohibition against theft. Yad Ramah, Bava Batra 26a, declares that causing pecuniary damage to another is prohibited by virtue of “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18) and the commandment “You shall not place a stumbling-block before the blind” (Leviticus 19:14). See also Teshuvot ha-Rosh, no. 108; Bi’ur ha-Gra, Ḥoshen Mishpat 155:8; Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 261; Birkat Shmu’el, Bava Kamma, no. 2; and Kehillot Ya‘akov, Bava Kamma, no. 1. (Although, to be sure, if no damage occurs, there is no tort and hence no liability. As will be shown, the crucial difference is in a case of damage to the pecuniary value of an object but no resultant loss to the owner.)

That an incited one refrain from lightening the grudge against the inciter. Rather, he is obligated to begrudge the inciter no matter what. And so long as he does not begrudge him, he transgresses a negative commandment - and that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "and do not listen to him" (Deuteronomy 13:9). And it appears in the explanation (Sifrei Devarim 89:2), "It is implied from its being stated, 'you must surely unload with him' (Leviticus 19:18) [that] perhaps you should unload [with] this one. [Hence] we learn to say, 'and do not listen to him.'" (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 5.)

That He prohibited an incited one from saving the inciter when he sees him in a matter of death or distress. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "and you shall show him no pity" (Deuteronomy 13:9). And it appears in the explanation (Sifrei Devarim 89:3), "It is implied from its being stated, 'you shall not stand by the blood of your neighbor' (Leviticus 19:16) [that] perhaps you should not stand by the blood of this one. [Hence] we learn to say, 'you shall show him no pity.'" (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 5.)

(Ayin) And now let every man be enlightened and understand the need for the unity of the rich and the poor and give charity at all times – and especially to poor Torah scholars, to strengthen them in the Torah of the Lord. And they said in the Talmud (Makkot 22b), “How foolish are […] people who stand before a Torah scroll, and [yet] do not stand before a great man; as in a Torah scroll, it is written (Deut. 25:3), ‘[He shall strike him] forty,’ but the Sages came and subtracted one.” And it is asked from that which they said in Kiddushin 33b, “What is [the law] as to [whether one should] stand before a Torah scroll?” And they said, “One stands before those who study it;⁵³Based on Lev. 19:32. [is it] not all the more so [the case] before it?” And it is implied from this that the honor of the Torah is greater than that of those who study it. And it appears to me that [the solution to this apparent contradiction can be found] according to what is written in Tiferet Yisrael:⁵⁴54Maharal, Tiferet Yisrael, Chap. 89 (p. 216 in the 1955 London edition).
As when we contemplate the creation of the Creator, [we see that] all created things require refinement and a different making – as it is [found] in the Midrash (Bereishit Rabbah 11:6), “Everything that was created in the six days of creation requires refinement and another making – wheat needs to be ground, mustard needs to be sweetened.” And since the Torah was given from God, may He be blessed, to a prophet, and the level of the intellect is greater than that of prophecy – and as we say (Bava Batra 12a), “A sage is greater than a prophet” – and just as the acts of the intellect are greater than the acts of nature, so too is [the intellect] greater than prophecy; and so, the sages are the essence of the Torah and its refinement. And because of that, “the Sages came and subtracted one, etc.” And the Torah came to the world like all [natural] things that are not refined, but are only refined by man through his intellect. And [so] the intellect refines the prophecy, etc. And in the Midrash (Tanchuma, Tazria 5), it is written, “Turnus Rufus asked Rabbi Akiva, ‘Which are the greater works, [those of the Holy One Blessed be He, or those of flesh and blood?’ [R. Akiva answered] him, ‘Those of flesh and blood are greater.’]” Behold, that even the acts of God, may He be blessed, require refinement, etc. And let it not be a wonder in your eyes how man refines the words of prophecy with his wisdom, and likewise how wisdom can refine nature, which was created by God, may He be blessed. As everything is from God, may He be blessed – nature, wisdom, creation and refinement. [See there.]
And this was their intention, may their memory be blessed: “Foolish are the people who stand before a Torah scroll, and [yet] do not stand before the rabbis” – as the essential refinement and completion of the Torah is through the Sages, who “subtracted one.” And behold this is like one who has a vineyard [and] ‘planted a choice vine, ‘but there is no man to work its land.’ Behold his vineyard is as if it were not [in existence]. However, if he hires workers and they work on the ‘vineyard in the fruitful corner’ – then ‘the crushers will call out, “heidad, heidad”; they shall sing of it, “Vineyard of Delight.”’ And nevertheless, the workers will not be the best of his possessions. Rather the vineyard [remains] the main thing. Yet he needs the workers; and without them, it will not be established. So is it with the Torah: If there were no Torah scholars to clarify and refine [it], it would be like a ‘sealed book’ – as you do not have any commandment explained in the Torah. We would not know how many sections [to include] and what to write in tefillin; and so with fringes (tsitsit), mezuzah, forbidden mixtures of fabric (shaatnez) and many like these. And regarding lashes, they subtracted one. So without the Torah scholars, the Torah would be as if it were not [in existence]. But [in the case that] we have already strengthened the hands of those that strengthen [the Torah] – the Torah scholars that refine it – and we have already ‘eaten its bread and drank its wine,’ [the Torah] is the main thing and not its workers. This is like a pearl: At the beginning of its being found, it is sealed and covered and not worth anything. But when one has a servant that pierces pearls, he transforms it and gives it great value. Nevertheless, the servant is not the main thing, but rather the pearls. And so is it with Torah: “If we stand before those that study it” – who are its workers and have already refined it and completed it – “[is it] not all the more so [the case] before it,” as it is the main thing. And understand [this].

Rabbi Sternbuch responded with a short but novel analysis of the prohibition "nor shall you place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). Rabbinic tradition as recorded in Mekhilta, ad locum, teaches that this verse serves as a prohibition against counseling a person in a manner that does not serve that individual's best interests and, as stated by the Gemara, Pesaḥim 22b, as a prohibition forbidding a person to assist another in the commission of a transgression. Rabbi Sternbuch asserts that this interpretation does not yield an absolute prohibition with regard to facilitating a transgression. In light of the phraseology employed in this verse, Rabbi Sternbuch argues that the prohibition applies only in situations in which an act is designed to cause damage or harm in the form of a transgression but that any act intended to yield an ultimate benefit is, by definition, not a "stumbling block." The intention to benefit, argues Rabbi Sternbuch, is, in effect, exculpatory. Rabbi Sternbuch compares this prohibition to the prohibition against "wounding" which does not apply in the case of a physician who performs a surgical procedure designed to promote health and well-being. Accordingly, concludes Rabbi Sternbuch, an invitation designed to advance the spiritual well-being of the parents cannot be categorized as a "stumbling block" and hence is not forbidden.

a) Leviticus 19:16

Divulging personal information concerning another person is prohibited by Jewish law even when that information is not received in confidence. That prohibition is derived from the biblical verse "You shall not go as a bearer of tales among your people" (Leviticus 19:16). As formulated by Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De'ot 7:2: "Who is a talebearer? One who carries reports and goes from one person to another and says, 'So-and-so said this' or 'Such and such have I heard about so-and-so.' Even if he tells the truth, [the talebearer] destroys the world." Talebearing activity is forbidden even when it is not accompanied by malicious intent and even if the information is not derogatory in nature. That even non-malicious and non-derogatory talebearing is encompassed within the ambit of the prohibition is evident from the immediately following statement of Rambam: "There is a much more grievous sin than this that is included in their negative prohibition and that is 'evil speech' (lashon ha-ra), i.e., speaking derogatorily of one's fellow even though one speaks the truth." It is clear that, the phrase "such and such have I heard about so-and-so" does not refer to information divulged by "so-and-so" about himself whether in confidence or otherwise; the phrase connotes information communicated by a third party. Although disclosure of information revealed by a person concerning himself is certainly subsumed within the prohibition, Rambam's ruling makes it quite clear that disclosure is prohibited even though no breach of confidence is involved.

The most difficult moral dilemmas arise in situations in which moral imperatives come into conflict with one another. Judaism, unlike the common law system, posits a duty of rescue as a moral and halakhic imperative. "Do not stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16), in its more obvious applications, requires rendering life-saving assistance in rescuing a potential drowning victim, helping a person escape from a conflagration, rendering medical assistance and even administration of CPR. In such situations recognition of a duty of rescue is hardly exceptionable.

Rav Ovadia Yosef (Teshuvot Yechaveh Daat 2:63) bolsters the position of Rav Soloveitchik and Rav Kotler. He notes that the Rama (Orach Chaim 451:4) cites some Rishonim who believe that libun is accomplished (regarding Pesach, see Mishnah Berura 451:30) when the oven reaches the temperature at which straw burns (kash nisraf). Rav Hershel Schachter told me that it seems to him that common practice in America is to consider the temperature for libun kal to be 550 degrees Fahrenheit. Hence, this lighter form of libun (libun kal) can be accomplished even in most conventional ovens. Although the Rama himself requires libun until sparks fly (libun gamur) for utensils that truly need libun, he permits the more lenient libun kal for items that merely require hag’alah.¹⁶One might, for example, wish to perform libun kal on an item that merely requires hag’alah if it cannot come in contact with boiling water for practical reasons. While hag’alah does not normally suffice for kashering items that cook food without a liquid medium, the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 76a) permits kashering such items through mere hag’alah if they absorbed only kosher food (heteira bala), even though the food subsequently became non-kosher (see Rashi, Avodah Zarah 76a s.v. L'olam).¹⁷For example, when the meat of a korban (sacrificial offering) is cooked in a dish, the flavor of this meat remains in the dish past the time that the korban may be eaten. When this time expires, the meat becomes forbidden (notar; see Vayikra 19:5-8), so the dish now contains flavor that was absorbed from kosher food but is no longer kosher.

The latter precept, recorded in Leviticus 19:14, was understood by the Sages as an admonition designed to protect not only the physically blind but the intellectually and morally blind as well. A Jew is forbidden to take advantage of another person's lack of awareness in a way which results in physical, pecuniary or moral harm to that person. The prohibition is binding whether or not such advice or action is motivated by a desire for personal gain. Thus the prohibition encompasses three principal types of activity: (1) misleading the blind or infirm and causing physical harm; (2) offering misinformation or poor advice to the uninformed; and (3) preying upon or pandering to the predilections of the morally blind.⁷Whether or not the act ostensibly proscribed by the literal meaning of the verse, viz., placing a physical stumbling block before a blind person, is actually included in this prohibition is a matter of some dispute. See Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 232; R. Elchanan Wassermann, Koveẓ Bi’urim (Tel Aviv, 5726), Shev Shma‘tteta, sec. 13; R. Nathan Gestetner, Natan Piryo, Ḥullin 3a; Rashi, s.v. ve-afilu kuti. In prohibiting the placing of a stumbling block before the blind, Halakhah makes no distinction between Jew and gentile; all such actions are prohibited regardless of who is victimized thereby. The sale of weapons to persons who will misuse them clearly falls into the third category, and, accordingly, such activity was specifically banned by the Gemara. Rambam's use of the phrase "or any object which can cause harm to the public" may indicate that sale of such items may be encompassed within the first category as well.

Jewish law, by means of rabbinic legislation, has adopted certain specific measures in order to safeguard the individual's right to privacy. The most obvious example is the talmudic requirement that a wall be erected between adjacent courtyards in order to assure that the residents of each courtyard may enjoy unencumbered privacy. Another example is the well-known post-talmudic ban of Rabbenu Gershom forbidding the reading of another person's mail without permission. This edict is cited by Be'er ha-Golah, Yoreh De'ah 334:123. Sefer ha-Leket, I, no. 173, declares that Rabbenu Gershom's ban is based upon the admonition, "You shall not go as a talebearer among your people" (Leviticus 19:16). The prohibition against talebearing, argues Sefer ha-Leket, is equally applicable whether the bearing of tales is directed to another person or to oneself. Intercepting another person's private correspondence is, in effect, bearing tales, i.e., divulging another person's private affairs to oneself.

Rav Brisman presents a lengthy discussion of this topic and suggests many possible avenues of leniency. Among his points is that one may be lenient if he is unsure that a brachah will not be recited.²⁵Rav Eliashiv implies this as well, although the Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 169:2) might indicate otherwise. He also applies the principle that a positive mitzvah can override a negative prohibition if they both are presented at the same time (i.e. at the moment one violates the prohibition, he fulfills the mitzvah; see Tosafot Gittin 41a s.v. Lisa). Rav Brisman argues that if one serves a meal to someone who is not observant with the intention of trying to sway him to live a Torah life, then at the time that lifnei iveir is violated, the mitzvah of reproving one’s friend (Tochachah; Vayikra 19:17) is fulfilled, and thus the mitzvah of Tochachah overrides the prohibition of lifnei iveir. However, Rav Brisman permits serving food only in a buffet style, thereby reducing the direct connection between the presentation of the food and the recipient not reciting a brachah.

Azei ha-Levanon further argues that failure to provide an available medical remedy entails a violation both of the commandment "you may not hide yourself" (Deut. 22:3) and the admonition "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Lev. 19:16). Rambam, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ, 1:13, Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 237; and Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1, basing themselves upon Sifra, Kedoshim 41, view those commandments as encompassing an obligation to prevent not only loss of life but also to prevent financial loss from befalling one's fellow.²⁶See also Ḥafeẓ Ḥayyim, Be’er Mayim Ḥayyim, Hilkhot Issurei Rekhilut 9:1. If so, argues Azei ha-Levanon, it is similarly forbidden to allow a person to suffer loss of the use of a limb. Circumcision under such circumstances, concludes Azei ha-Levanon, would constitute a violation of these two negative commandments. This latter argument is applicable with regard to the circumcision of a child suffering from hypospadias. Although, chronologically, the mizvah of circumcision on the eighth day following the birth of a child presents itself prior to the opportunity for therapeutic remedy of this anomaly, performance of milah effectively makes it impossible to correct the condition at a subsequent time. Thus the act of circumcision entails a violation of both "you may not hide yourself" and of "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow." Although a single negative commandment is suspended under certain conditions in order to permit the discharge of a positive obligation, multiple negative commandments are not suspended for this purpose.

The Torah (Vayikra 19:2) exhorts us: "Kedoshim tih'yu" ("Be holy"). Many great rabbis have declared that gambling is incompatible with the Jewish people's goal of being a holy people. While it is highly unusual for the Aruch Hashulchan to strongly condemn a practice of the observant community, he does so regarding the practice of many Jews to gamble on Chanukah. Perhaps he reacted so harshly because he served as the rabbi of a city (Novaradok, in pre-World War I Lithuania), where he may have seen the devastating effects that gambling often has on individuals, their families, and society as a whole. In short, let us remember the words of the Mishnah Berurah regarding gambling, "Hashomer nafsho yirchak mizeh" ("He who values his soul will stay away from it").

(Alef) The Psalmist said in Ps. 50:18, 20, “When you see a thief, you fall in with him, and throw in your lot with adulterers. You are busy maligning your brother, defaming the son of your mother.” It appears to me [that this can be explained] according to that which is written in Netsach Israel, chapter 25:⁶⁸Maharal, Netsach Yisrael, pp. 126-127 in London edition.
We were asked, “How is it that Israelites are constantly yearning to [do] bad, etc.? As he seeks evil for the one who is his compatriot in Torah and in the commandments. And [yet] the Torah states (Lev. 19:18), ‘and you shall love your neighbor as yourself.’” And I answered him, etc. However this trait is not in Israel from the angle of ‘an evil soul desires evil.’ As from the angle of their essence, this holy people is deserving of all the importance and status, etc. And the one who is important based on his own nature will [naturally] seek status (and this is what causes the Jews to hurt each other). As you will not find a villager jealous of a great minister, but rather a sage of another sage, a wealthy man of a wealthy man and a strong man of a strong man, etc. Rather this thing comes from [their appropriate] sense of importance. And the proof to this is that it is perfectly obvious that when one of them is in distress, all of them step forward like ‘a brother for adversity.’ And that is because Israel is one nation, etc. And it is not like the traits of licentiousness, etc., as that thing would show great lowliness, etc. And they are stiff-necked from repenting, etc. Because they are far from physicality, they are not [easily] impacted, but rather hold on to their traits, etc. [See there.]
And for this reason, he said, “When you see a thief, you fall in with him, and throw in your lot with adulterers” – and that is from the side of crass physicality and it is lowliness. But, “You are busy maligning your brother, etc.,” is from the side of an elevated form, and as is written in Netsach Yisrael. And they are two opposites of one issue. And ‘there should not be [lowliness] like this in Israel’ – the holy people that comes from a good nature. And that which is in Parashat Netzaivm (Deut. 29:21-26) is elucidated by this:
And later generations will ask—the children who succeed you, and foreigners who come from distant lands and see the plagues and diseases that the Lord has inflicted upon that land. All its soil burnt by sulfur and salt, etc. And all the nations will say, “Why did the Lord do thus to this land; wherefore that awful wrath?” And they will be told, “Because they forsook the covenant that the Lord, etc. And they turned to the service of other gods and worshiped them – gods whom they had not known and whom He had not allotted to them. So the Lord was incensed at that land, etc.”
And Rashi explained [the phrase], “whom they had not known,” [as] they had not known the strength of divinity in them. And Onkelos translated [it as, these gods] did not do good to them – as the one they selected for a god did not give them any inheritance or portion. See there. And at first glance, [this needs] precision – as had it given them an inheritance and a portion, the ‘prohibition [against worshiping it] would still stand in its place. [It is] as we expound in the Gemara,⁶⁹See Bamidbar Rabbah 20:9. “He exalts (masgi, which can also be read as fools) nations, then destroys them” (Job 12:23); such that it appears to them that they are healed by idolatry, etc. And see that with the generation of the flood it is written (Gen. 6:13), “and behold I will destroy them with the earth.” And the Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, expounded [it as] (Bereishit Rabbah 31:7), “with the land” – three handbreadths of the depth of a plow were despoiled. And the sin of the land was that the Lord said (Gen. 1:11) that the land should give forth “trees of fruit” – that the taste of the tree be like the fruit; but it made “trees that made fruit” (Gen. 1:12).⁷⁰Bereishit Rabbah 5:9. [It did this] because [its] material was coarse; and this caused man to incline towards physicality. And [so] the Lord said (Gen. 3:17), “Cursed is the earth for the sake of man” – as the damage was evident in man. And for this reason, [people] in the generation of the flood also sinned in physicality – violent theft, sexual immorality and murder; and this was because of the sin of the land. And therefore it was punished. And in the Guide⁷¹Guide for the Perplexed 1:36., [Rambam] wrote that we only find [the terms], awful wrath and jealousy [attributed to God] with idolatry, [since it is understandable that] the Lord has awful wrath about this. See there. But the sin of idolatry is from the angle of the form (the spiritual side) – and that it is the loss of the intellect, as it is written in Gur Aryeh.⁷²Perhaps the reference is to Gur Aryeh on Exodus 22:30. That is why the verse stated, “And all the nations will say, ‘Why did the Lord do thus to this land’” – since if their sin was from the spiritual side, the land did not sin. But if we say that the sin was from the side of physicality; you would still ask, “‘wherefore that awful wrath,’” as this is only with idolatry – as is written in the Guide – and that is from the angle of the intellect. “And they will be told, ‘Because they forsook, etc. and worshiped other gods’” – and the awful wrath was for that. And “whom they had not known and whom He had not allotted to them” – meaning that they did not apportion them any good and they did not know them [to be] with divine powers, and this was not from a confused intellect, such that ‘He fools the nations.’ Rather it was from the side of crass physicality that [such] anarchy was pleasing to them. And that was the sin of the land, and hence, “all its soil was burnt.” However, if people do righteous deeds, ‘the desolate land will be worked.’

One who curses an Israelite,¹Mishna Sheb. 35a and Gemara ibid. 36a. and even [if] he curses himself,²Tur — G. Mishna and Gemara ibid.: ‘For it is written, Only take heed to thyself, and keep thy soul (life) diligently (Deut. IV, 9. In Ber. 32a this verse is taken to mean that one should take good care of the body and its needs and not subject himself to dangers whence it is implied that it is forbidden to curse oneself) and … wherever it is said, take heed, lest, or not, it is nothing but a negative precept (Hence, in this verse take heed to thyself also means ‘do not invoke any curse upon thyself’).’ — by the [Divine] Name or by a substitute,³Mishna ibid.: ‘(If one said to witnesses, I adjure you) by Alef-Daleth (the first two letters of Adonai, the Lord) or by Yod-He (the Tetragrammaton) or by Shaddai (the Almighty) or by Ẓebaoth ([Lord] of Hosts) or by the Merciful and Gracious One, or by Him that is long-suffering and of great kindness, or by any of the substitutes of the Name, they are liable … If a man cursed himself or his fellow by any of them, he transgresses a negative precept.’ Gemara ibid. 36a: ‘R. Jannai said: This is the view of both (i.e., R. Meir and the Sages both agree that one who curses himself or his neighbour not merely by the Name, but even by any of the substitutes, transgresses a negative precept).’ or by one of the names that the heathens call the Holy One, Blessed be He,⁴ San. 60a whence it is derived that substitutes for the Divine Name employed by heathens are considered valid substitutes. Cf. also Ned. 3a, 10a where substitutes regarding vows are considered the foreign equivalents of the Hebrew. Thus Yad, Sanhedrin XXVI, 3 and Tur a.l. — if this took place in the presence of witnesses⁵ Deut. XIX, 15. and [was preceded by] warning,⁶ Ket. 33a. he receives lashes⁷Thus was the procedure in Temple days. Derived from Tem. 3a-b, 4a: ‘R. Iddi b. Abin stated on the authority of R. Amram, R. Isaac and R. Joḥanan: R. Jose the Galilean reported: With regards to every negative precept laid down in the Torah, if one performs an act (in violating it) he is punished with lashes, but if he does not perform an act (in violating it) he is exempt, save in the case of one who takes an oath, exchanges (an unconsecrated animal for one that is consecrated), and curses his fellow with the Name, in which cases, although he performed no act, he is punished (with lashes) … And he who curses his neighbour with the Name: Whence is this derived? — R. Eleazar stated on the authority of R. Oshaia: The text reads, If thou wilt not observe to do etc. (Deut. XXVIII, 58. The verse continues: That thou mayest fear this glorious and fearful name, the Lord thy God, which intimates that one should not utter the Divine Name in vain and likewise one who curses his neighbour with the Divine Name is included in the same category). And it is written, Then the Lord will make thy plagues wonderful (v. 59). Now I do not know what is the nature of this wonder (peculiarity of punishment). But when it says (ibid. XXV, 2): That the judge cause him to lie down to be beaten (והפילו which is similar to the expression והפלא He will make … wonderful), this indicates that the wonderful (punishment) refers to punishment with lashes … Why not say … since he transgresses two things, first in uttering the Lord’s Name in vain and then in irritating his fellow, consequently, punishment with lashes should not suffice? — You cannot say thus, for it is written, Thou shalt not curse the deaf (Lev. XIX, 14 whether with or without the Divine Name).’ Thus also in Y. Sheb. IV, 10(35d) in accord with R. Jose contra the Colleagues. , however, RaBaD to Yad ibid. who on the basis of Y. ibid. deduces that if one cursed with a substitute he is not punished by lashes. It is only when he curses with the Tetragrammaton, although no act is performed, yet lashes are administered. , Kes. Mish. to Yad ibid. who defends Maim. against RaBaD’s stricture. on account of [the negative precept] 'Thou shalt not curse the deaf,'⁸Lev. XIX, 14. Actually the negative precept Thou shalt not curse the deaf includes all persons. The deaf was singled out, although he does not hear and is not subjected to any suffering, so that people should not take advantage of his infirmity. Thus Yad, Sanhedrin XXVI, 1 and Tur a.l. — M.E. Cf. also Sifra to Lev. ibid. and if [the cursed person] was a Judge, he receives additional lashes on account of [the negative precept] 'Thou shalt not curse the Judges.'⁹Ex. XXII, 27. Thus San. 66a. This, however, refers to a permanent Judge — P.Tesh. And [if one cursed by] Arur it is considered a form of curse.¹⁰Sheb. 36a. It must, however, contain the Name or its substitutes — M.E.

To not make a statue: To not make statues that will be worshiped; even if the one that makes them does not worship them, the making is itself forbidden, [so as] to push off the stumbling block. And there is no difference between his making it with his hand or commanding someone else to make it, as it is stated (Exodus 20:4), "You shall not make for yourself a statue or any depiction." And the one who commands to make it is the one who causes its making - that is the opinion of Rambam, may his memory be blessed (Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 4). And the opinion of Ramban, may his memory be blessed, (on that entry in Sefer HaMitzvot) it that there is no prohibition here except for not making idols with the intention of worshiping them. He also wrote that this negative commandment should not be counted from this scripture, as this verse only warns about the prohibition of idolatry which comes with the death penalty; but with the making of idols, the whole time that he does not worship them, the only thing he is liable for is lashes. And he, may his memory be blessed, wrote that this whole verse of "You shall have no," is considered one negative commandment [that] warns not to concede the divinity of anything besides Him; whether he accepts it as a god - meaning to say that he says to it, "You are my god" - or bows down to it, or worships it in one the four forbidden worships or worships it with the worship that is particular to it. Rather, he wrote that the [prohibition] of making idols and their preservation is extrapolated from the verse (Leviticus 19:4) of "Do not turn to idols or make molten gods for yourselves." And I wonder about that which Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote that there is no difference if he made it with his hand or if he commanded to make it - as behold, the one who commands is a dispatcher, and it is an established [principle] for us that a dispatcher is exempt.

Whoever can save another individual [from an assailant] and fails to do so violates the Torah’s prohibition, “Do not stand idly by while your brother’s blood is being shed” (“Lo ta’amod al dam rei’echa;” Vayikra 19:16). Similarly, if one sees someone drowning in the sea or sees that robbers are attacking him or a wild animal is pouncing on him, and one can save him... but fails to do so... one violates the prohibition of lo ta’amod al dam rei’echa.

The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 426:1) cites this passage from the Rambam almost verbatim. Consequently, as we shall discuss, one must balance the prohibitions of rechilut and standing by idly, by not revealing insignificant flaws while also not remaining silent about major flaws. The Netziv (Ha’ameik Davar, Vayikra 19:16) explains that God placed the prohibitions of rechilut and standing by idly in the same verse in order to clarify when one should not speak rechilut. Their juxtaposition indicates that despite the prohibition to gossip, one nevertheless may not remain silent about information that can save another person from danger.²³This insight is also attributed to the Netziv’s grandfather-in-law, Rav Chaim of Volozhin (cited in Teshuvot Vehanhagot 1:879).

It is incumbent upon every Jew to love every fellow Jew as he loves himself, as it is said: "Love your neighbor as [you love] yourself."³⁸Leviticus 19:18. Therefore, you should relate [his] virtues³⁹You should not praise him to his adversaries as this would only prompt them to enumerate his faults. They would thus be violating the prohibition against lashon hara, telling malicious gossip. (Mishnah Berurah 156:4). and treat his property with [the same] concern as you have for your own property, or for your own honor. The person who glorifies himself in his neighbor's shame, even though his neighbor is not present and the humiliation has not reached him, and even if he has not actually insulted him, but only compared his own good deeds and his own wisdom with the good deeds or wisdom of his neighbor, so that from his statement he will be rated an honorable man and his neighbor as a despicable person, [this person] has no share in the World to Come unless he repents with perfect repentance.

Anyone who hates a fellow-Jew in his heart, transgresses a negative commandment, as it is said: "Do not hate your brother in your heart."⁴⁰Leviticus 19:17. (See Chapter 189: 5) If anyone has sinned against you, you should not hate him inwardly, and keep quiet about it, as it is written concerning the wicked, "And Avshalom did not speak to Amnon either bad or good because Avshalom hated Amnon,"⁴¹II Samuel 13:22. but it is your duty to let him know [what you think of him] and to say to him,⁴²You should not denounce him publicly and thereby embarrass him, rather chide him in private in a calm and gentle tone of voice. (Mishnah Berurah 156:4). "Why have you done this to me, why have you sinned against me in this matter?", for it is said: "You must admonish your neighbor."⁴³Leviticus 19:17. If the offender regrets it and asks you to forgive him, you should forgive him and not be harsh, for it is said:⁴⁴Genesis 20:17. "And Avraham prayed to God."⁴⁵Asking God to heal Avimelech. Avimelech had taken away Sarah, but returned her to Avraham, expressing sincere remorse. In Avos de Rabbi Nasan (end of Chapter 16) [it is stated] "What is meant by 'hatred of people'?" It conveys this thought: "A person should not think of saying "I will love the scholars but hate the students, I will love the students but hate the unlearned." Rather, you should love them all, but hate the heretics, and those who mislead and entice people, [to abandon the Torah and follow false doctrines], and also [hate] the informers. And thus David said,⁴⁶Psalms 139:22. "Behold, those who hate You Hashem, I hate, and with those who rise up against You, I contend. With utmost hatred do I hate them, they have come to be my enemies." But didn't God say; "Love your neighbor as [you love] yourself, I am Hashem?" For what reason? Because I (God) have created him. And if he keeps the laws of your people you must love him, if not, you should not love him.

If you see someone committing a sin or following a wrongful course, it is a mitzvah to bring him back to the good path and make him aware that he is acting sinfully by committing his wrongful deeds, for it is said: "You must admonish your neighbor."⁴⁷Leviticus 19:17. And when you admonish someone, whether it concerns his personal relationships, or something that concerns his relationship with God, you should admonish him privately⁴⁸If he commits the sin publicly, you should reproach him on the spot in order to prevent any further desecration of God’s Name. (Mishnah Berurah 608:10). speaking to him gently with soothing words, letting him know that you are speaking to him only for his own good, to help him merit the life of the World to Come. Anyone who has the opportunity to protest [against a sinful act] and does not speak out in protest, will be held responsible for that very sin, because he could have protested.

It is forbidden to humiliate anyone either by word or by deed, especially in public. And our Rabbis of blessed memory said,⁵²Bava Metzia 58b. "A person who humiliates someone in public will have no share in the World to Come." Our Rabbis of blessed memory said furthermore,⁵³Ibid, 59a. "It is better for a man to throw himself into a fiery furnace than to put his fellow man to shame," for it is said:⁵⁴Genesis 38:25. This refers to the incident of Tamar and Yehudah. "When she was being taken out [to be executed] she sent word to her father-in-law, saying: "By the man who is the owner of these articles I am pregnant." She did not say to him openly [that it was of him that she conceived] she merely hinted, [thinking] if he admits it, fine, if not, I will not expose him publicly." Therefore, you should be very careful not to humiliate anyone in public, whether he is a minor or an adult, nor to call anyone by a name of which he is ashamed, and do not relate in his presence anything of which he is ashamed. And if anyone sinned against you and it is necessary for you to admonish him [for it], do not humiliate him, for it is said:⁵⁵Leviticus 19:17. "Do not sin through him."⁵⁶Do not embarass him publicly. (Rashi) This law applies only to a case where he [sinned] against his fellow man, but if he [sinned] against God, and does not retract [and repent] when you admonish him privately, you may disgrace him publicly, and publicize his transgression, and you may revile him to his face, you may insult him and curse him until he returns to the good [path], as all the prophets in Israel have done. Regarding such a person [the law prohibiting] the making of disparaging remarks does not apply for it is said:⁵⁷Leviticus 25:17. "Do not speak slightingly to one another,"⁵⁸Alternately translated “Do not cheat one another.” Rashi explains that this verse contains the prohibition against verbal abuse, i.e. not to taunt anyone, nor give bad or unsuitable advice. and the Rabbis of blessed memory explain, that the word amiso [to your fellow man], applies to those who are of one mind with you in their observance of the Torah and the mitzvos. The Torah forbids you to abuse them verbally, but you are not [prohibited from verbally abusing] those persons who violate [the Torah] and do not repent [even] after they have been admonished privately, and with gentle words.

The obligation to divulge information that may preserve a life is not limited to situations involving a "pursuer" but extends to all situations in which lack of such information would lead to possible loss of life. Apart from the general principle that preservation of life takes precedence over other religious and personal obligations, failure to disclose such information would constitute a violation of "You shall not stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16).

Surprisingly, there is one source which appears to rule that destruction of the fetus by Noachides, at least under some circumstances, does not constitute a moral offense. Maharit³⁶Teshuvot Maharit, I, no. 99. writes: "I remember having seen in a responsum of the Rashba that he bears witness that Ramban rendered medical aid to a gentile woman in return for compensation in order that she might conceive and aided her in aborting the fruit of her womb."³⁷The authenticity of this quotation is highly questionable. R. Unterman (p. 8) notes that he searched Teshuvot ha-Rashba in an unsuccessful attempt to locate this responsum. It seems probable that Maharit’s quotation is culled from responsum no. 120 of vol. I in the published text (B’nei Brak, 5718). This responsum deals with the permissibility of rendering medical assistance to Noachide women so that they may be enabled to conceive. In language similar to that quoted by Maharit, mention is made of Ramban’s actually having done so in return for financial compensation. However, no mention whatsoever is made of Ramban’s having assisted in medical abortion. Maharit apparently had a variant textual version. Cf., also, R. Samuel Hubner, Ha-Darom, Tishri 5729, p. 33, who attempts to resolve the issue by suggesting an alternate punctuation of this quotation. It is of course inconceivable that an individual of Nachmanides' piety and erudition would have violated the injunction "Thou shalt not place a stumbling block before a blind person" (Lev. 19:4) or that he would have actively assisted transgressors. Applying the line of reasoning adduced above, Rabbi Unterman draws the conclusion that there is a fundamental distinction between Jewish law and Noachide law with regard to the assessment of potential life. According to many authorities, Noachides are under no obligation to preserve the lives of their fellows, to "be fruitful and multiply" or to refrain from wasting the male seed.³⁸See above, n. 14. They are forbidden to commit homicide and to take the life of "a man within a man" but bear no responsibility for the safeguarding and preservation of seminal life. It would appear, then; that Halakhah holds them accountable only for actual, in contradistinction to potential, life.³⁹R. Unterman fails, however, to note the comments of R. Jacob Zevi Jalish in his Melo ha-Ro‘im, Sanhedrin 57b, who expresses a contrary view. Examination of the phraseology of Ḥemdat Yisra’el, Part I, p. 108, indicates that R. Plocki also had such a distinction in mind. In cases of danger to the mother he permits abortion of embryos of less than forty days without further qualification and adds that there are grounds for permitting abortion at subsequent stages of development provided this procedure is performed by a Jewish physician. Accordingly, there is no objection to Noachides aborting, or to a Jew giving advice and rendering indirect assistance to Noachides in aborting, a fetus within the first forty days of gestation. Since Halakhah considers that during this initial period the embryo has not as yet developed distinctly recognizable organs or an independent circulatory system it cannot be considered "a man within a man" and hence its destruction does not constitute murder under the Noachide dispensation. Nachmanides, Rabbi Unterman avers, sanctioned the performance of abortions by Noachides only within this forty-day period.⁴⁰The absence, in the Noachide Code, of a ban on feticide during the first forty days of gestation would, in the opinion of this writer, provide insight into what is otherwise considered an erroneous translation by the Septuagint of Exodus 21:22–23: “And if two men strive together and hurt a woman with a child so that her children depart and yet no harm (ason) follow, he shall surely be fined. … But if any harm follows, then thou shalt give life for life.” Rabbinic exegesis regards the term “harm” as having reference to the death of the mother. Compensation is payable to the husband for the loss of his offspring only if the mother survives. Should the mother die as a result of this assault, the attacker is absolved from the payment of this fine. From these provisions the Gemara derives the principle that the commission of a capital crime, even if unintentional and hence not leading to the invocation of the statutory penalty, absolves the offender from the payment of any other compensation. The Septuagint, however, renders these verses as follows:
This reading understands the death penalty to which reference is made as being incurred for the killing of the fetus in cases where the fetus is formed, i.e., has already reached the fortieth day of gestation. It is clearly on the basis of this passage in the Septuagint that such a distinction is drawn by Philo (De Spec. Legibus, III, 108–10) and it was this reading of the Septuagint which influenced the attitude of the Church. Cf. Jakobovits, op. cit., pp. 174, 179, 328, n. 43, and 333, n. 152. Samuel Poznanski, “Jakob ben Ephraim ein Antikaraischer Polemiker des X Jahrhunderts,” Gedenkbuch zur Erinnerung an David Kaufmann, ed. M. Brann and F. Rosenthal (Breslau, 1900), p. 186, suggests that the mistranslation is based on reading ẓurah for ason. On the basis of R. Unterman’s thesis, the entire matter is quite readily resolved, particularly in light of the rabbinic tradition which states that modifications were intentionally introduced by the Jewish translators (see Megillah 9a). Addressed to gentiles, the translation may have been intended to incorporate ramifications of Noachide law. Since a Noachide incurs capital punishment for the destruction of a fetus, provided it is formed, he would be absolved from further punishment even in cases where the mother survives. An exhaustive interpretation of ason, then, signifies death of the mother if the attacker is a Jew, and either death of the mother or of a formed fetus if the attacker is a Noachide. The word ason as applied to a Noachide thus includes the death of a formed fetus and is rendered accordingly by the Septuagint. This interpretation is, of course, founded on the premise that the principle of absolution from the lesser of two simultaneously incurred punishments extends to Noachide law as well —a matter which bears further investigation. R. Joseph Babad is of the opinion that the principle “kim leh be-de-rabbah mineh” (imposition of the greater of two punishments to the exclusion of the lesser) does not apply to Noachides. See Minḥat Ḥinukh, no. 34. However, there is basis for assuming that the question is the subject of controversy between Rashi and Tosafot, Eruvin 62a. Cf. Encyclopedia Talmudit (Tel Aviv, 5711), III, 354.

It is written,¹Leviticus 19:16. "Do not be a talebearer among your people."²Rabbeinu Gershon’s edict which prohibits, on penalty of excommunication the reading of someone else’s mail is derived from this verse. (Be’er Hagolah on Yoreh Dei’ah 334) What constitutes talebearing? It is carrying gossip and going from one to the other saying, "So and so said this…," "I have heard such and such about so and so." Even if [the tale he tells] is true, and it brings no disgrace to anyone it is, still, a violation of a negative commandment,³For a comprehensive analysis of the halachos of lashon hara refer to the Seifer Chafetz Chayim. and it is a grave sin, which causes the death of Jewish people. Because of this [the law against talebearing] is followed by: [the verse] "Do not stand by the blood of your neighbor."⁴Leviticus 19:17. Think about what happened in the case of Do'eg the Edomite,⁵I Samuel 22:10. Chapter 22 relates that David, relentlessly pursued by Shaul came to Nov, the city where the Sanctuary was situated, to obtain bread for his men. Achimelech, the kohein gadol, gave him bread and also the sword of Goliath that was kept there. Do’eg, the Edomite reported this to Shaul, whereupon the king ordered the slaying of the kohanim in the city of Nov. who told Shaul, that Achimelech gave David food and a sword. Even though the thing [he told] was true, and it did not reflect dishonor on Achimelech, for he had not done anything wrong, and even if Shaul himself had asked Achimelech he would have told him what he had done, for he had no intention to sin against Shaul. Despite this, the talebearing of Do'eg caused many kohanim to be killed.

It is written,¹Leviticus 19:16. "Do not be a talebearer among your people."²Rabbeinu Gershon’s edict which prohibits, on penalty of excommunication the reading of someone else’s mail is derived from this verse. (Be’er Hagolah on Yoreh Dei’ah 334) What constitutes talebearing? It is carrying gossip and going from one to the other saying, "So and so said this…," "I have heard such and such about so and so." Even if [the tale he tells] is true, and it brings no disgrace to anyone it is, still, a violation of a negative commandment,³For a comprehensive analysis of the halachos of lashon hara refer to the Seifer Chafetz Chayim. and it is a grave sin, which causes the death of Jewish people. Because of this [the law against talebearing] is followed by: [the verse] "Do not stand by the blood of your neighbor."⁴Leviticus 19:17. Think about what happened in the case of Do'eg the Edomite,⁵I Samuel 22:10. Chapter 22 relates that David, relentlessly pursued by Shaul came to Nov, the city where the Sanctuary was situated, to obtain bread for his men. Achimelech, the kohein gadol, gave him bread and also the sword of Goliath that was kept there. Do’eg, the Edomite reported this to Shaul, whereupon the king ordered the slaying of the kohanim in the city of Nov. who told Shaul, that Achimelech gave David food and a sword. Even though the thing [he told] was true, and it did not reflect dishonor on Achimelech, for he had not done anything wrong, and even if Shaul himself had asked Achimelech he would have told him what he had done, for he had no intention to sin against Shaul. Despite this, the talebearing of Do'eg caused many kohanim to be killed.

Whoever takes revenge on someone, violates a negative commandment, for it is written, "Do not take revenge."²⁶Leviticus 19:18. And what constitutes vengeance? Reuvein says to Shimon, "Lend me your spade!"²⁷The prohibition against vengeance is not limited to the loaning of tangible articles, it also includes requests for monetary loans, favors or charity. (Mishnah Berurah 156:4) [Shimon] replies, "No, I will not lend it to you." The next day [Shimon] has to borrow something and he says [to Reuvein]: "Lend me your spade." [Reuvein] says: "No, I will not lend it to you, just as you did not lend me [yours] when I asked you for it." This constitutes taking revenge, and he [Reuvein] has violated a negative commandment. Rather when [Shimon] comes to borrow something, he should give it to him wholeheartedly and not pay him back for what he did to him. It is becoming for a person to show forebearance in all mundane matters, for in the eyes of understanding people, they are all nothing but vanity and futility, and not worth taking revenge because of them. And thus said King David, peace be upon him,²⁸Psalms 7:5. "If I have repaid my friends with evil,²⁹The meaning of this passage becomes clear when it is read in conjuction with the next verse, “If I have repaid others with evil—then let the enemy pursue my soul.” I who released my unprovoked adversary. (For the prohibition against uttering curses, see Chapter 6: 3).

He who bears a grudge against a fellow Jew, violates a negative commandment, for it is said, "Don't bear a grudge against the children of your people."³⁰Leviticus 19:18. What constitutes bearing a grudge? [For example.] Reuvein said to Shimon: "Lend me that thing," and Shimon refused to lend it. After a while Shimon came to borrow something from Reuvein, and Reuvein said take it, "I will lend it to you for I am not like you, I will not repay you for what you did [to me]." He who does so violates the prohibition against bearing a grudge. He should blot it out of his heart and think no more of it.³¹Literally, “Do not remember it at all, “or” Do not mention it at all.” And this is the proper frame of mind by which society can survive and economic order between people [can be maintained].

Concern for preservation of life is by no means the sole legitimate motive for violation of confidentiality. Even information that is derogatory and personal, and hence subsumed within the prohibition against gossip mongering, must be disclosed if it is necessary to do so in order to prevent serious harm. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:14, followed by Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1, rules that if an individual "hears that gentiles or apostates are plotting misfortune" for another person, he must bring the matter to that person's attention. Failure to do so, declares Rambam, constitutes a violation of the commandment "You shall not stand idly by the blood of your fellow." The "misfortune" of which Rambam speaks includes financial loss as well as bodily harm. This is evident from Rambam's comments in his Sefer ha-Mizvot, lo ta'aseh, no. 297, in which he indicates that the commandment applies in all situations in which an individual is "in danger of death or loss." The "loss" to which Rambam refers is loss of money or profit as reflected in the ensuing discussion in which Rambam cites a statement of the Sifra, Leviticus 19:16, declaring that withholding of testimony in a financial dispute constitutes a violation of the commandment "You shall not stand idly by the blood of your fellow."

Rashi’s opinion may be based on the Torah’s dictum (Vayikra 19:18) to love one’s neighbor as oneself. The Gemara (Shabbat 31a) extends this principle to forbid doing to others that which one would not like done to oneself. Thus, since one would not want to be deprived of the opportunity to buy an object he pursues, one should not put another in that situation. Kesef Kedoshim (to Shulchan Aruch ad. loc.) explains that according to Rabbeinu Tam’s view, even though the Torah commands to love one’s neighbor as one loves himself, the Gemara (Bava Metzia 62a) states that one’s own interests enjoy priority above another’s interests. Kesef Kedoshim thus explains that the dictum to avoid doing to others what one would not like done to himself applies only when one does not sustain a loss. Thus, one may not intrude on another’s efforts to obtain an item that he can easily acquire elsewhere for the same price, as Rabbeinu Tam explains, “Let him go and obtain it elsewhere.” However, with regard to an item not readily available elsewhere for the same price, explains Rabbeinu Tam, “There is no prohibition, for if he (the intruder) does not obtain the specific item, he will not find another one.”

At all times you should love your Creator with all your heart and all your soul and take counsel with your heart and a lesson from man who is but worms; if a person gives you ten gold pieces or more, how deeply engraved would his love be in your heart. And if he provides your support and the support of your children and of your household you would certainly think, “This man which I have never seen and who has extended to me such kindness I would not be able to repay for all the goodness he has shown me should I live a thousand years. I would love him with all my heart and with all my soul; he could not command me to do anything that I would not do for him, because both my wealth and my being are his.” As with the love of man so with the love of the Holy One, blessed be He, raised and exalted be His fame. It is He who gives sustenance to all, how much better that we should cleave to the love of the Creator, fear Him, nor transgress His commands whether great or small. For we do not know the reward of each commandment,¹Aboth 2:1. and the punishment for transgressions though they appear light in our eyes, as it is written, “When the iniquity of my supplanters compasseth me about” (Ps. 49:6). The transgressions to which a man becomes habituated in this world will encompass him on the Day of Judgement.²Abodah Zarah 18a. If he is deserving his good deeds will bear witness for him.³Ibid., 2a. True and firm it is that we are not to transgress the commandments of our Creator even one of the small ones for a house full of gold and silver. If an individual says, “I will transgress a commandment and with the gold and silver they give me I will fulfill the difficult commandments. With this I will support the poor, invite wayfarers, I will do very many favors.” These are all futile thoughts, for perhaps soon after the transgression he will die and not succeed to the gift. Moreover, if he should not die the money would soon be dissipated so that he dies in his sin. Come and see how much you should love your Creator who does wonderful kindnesses with you, He creates you from a decayed drop, He gives you a soul, draws you forth from the belly, then gives you a mouth with which to speak, a heart to understand, ears to hear the pure words of His mouth, which are refined as silver and pure gold. It is He who leads you on the face of earth, who gives sustenance to all, who causes death and gives life to all. In His hand are the souls of all the living. It is He who distributes your share of bread. What is there to say? for the mouth is unable to speak, the ear unable to hear, for to Him all praise is as silence, there is no end to the length of His days, His years will have no end, He is the King of kings, the Holy One, blessed be His name and His fame. It is He who has created the heavens and earth, sea, and all that is therein. He is the provider of all, for His eyes are open upon all men’s paths recompensing each according to his ways and the fruit of his deeds, whether good or bad. Behold it is He who sets forth before men two paths, the path of life and the path of death and says to you, “Choose life” (Deut. 30:19). In spite of all this, we who are filled with worms do not think and do not set our hearts but to fill our appetites freely. We do not think that man’s days are numbered,⁴Job 7:1. today he is here, tomorrow in the grave,⁵Berakoth 28b. that suddenly he dies. For no man rules over his spirit⁶This refers to the breath of life, actual breathing. retaining it (forever). Therefore it is good for man to remove himself from all appetites and direct his heart to love and fear the Lord with all his heart at all times and to revile the life of vanity. For we will not be able to humble ourselves and subdue our passion which thrusts us from the land of the living, except through subduing our heart and returning to our Maker in complete repentance, to serve Him and to do His will with a whole heart. Our sages have said, “Bread and salt shalt thou eat and water in measurement shall you drink ⁷Aboth 6:4. and beware of gazing at women which drives a person from the world.⁸Ibid., 4:28. Love humans⁹Ibid., 1:12. and judge all people in the scale of merit.”¹⁰Ibid., 1:6. And this is what the Torah has said, “ But in righteousness shalt thou judge thy neighbor” (Lev. 19:15). Be humble before all, busy yourself with Torah, which is whole, pure and upright and do not praise yourself for it, because for this were you created.¹¹Ibid., 2:9.

When R. Phinehas ben Yair arrived at the home of R. Judah he happened to enter by a gate near which were some mules. He [R. Phinehas] exclaimed, "The angel of death is in this house! Shall I dine with him?" Rabbi [Judah] heard and went out to meet him. He said to him [R. Phinehas], "I will sell them." He [R. Phinehas] said to him [R. Judah], "Thou shalt not put a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). "I shall abandon them." "You would be spreading danger." "I shall hamstring them." "That would cause suffering to animals." "I shall kill them." "There is a prohibition against wanton destruction" (Deuteronomy 20:19).

Nevertheless, Rabbi Zilberstein's ruling is not as far-reaching as it might appear to be. Granted that a person may act as he wishes with his own possessions, nevertheless, unlike common law, the commandment "You shall not stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16) serves to impose a duty of rescue and mandates that a person not allow the life of another to become forfeit. As codified by Rambam, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 4:12, and Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:5, Leviticus 19:16 imposes a duty of rescue even with regard to a person who sins in the course of seeking to gratify lust or appetite. Certainly, one may not create a danger and allow a person to succumb if there is an obligation to rescue the victim from that danger. That consideration would seem to preclude any attempt to poison a putative thief.

Precisely how does one violate the prohibition of kitovet ka’aka – by actually inscribing the tattoo, or even by having it inscribed on his body? Which does the Torah intend when it commands (Vayikra 19:28), “Uchtovet ka’aka lo titenu bachem,” “You shall not put a tattoo on yourselves?” The Tosefta (Makkot 3:9) states that both aspects are included – both one who inscribes a tattoo and one who allows a tattoo to be made on his body violate the biblical prohibition.

R. Ya'akov Breisch, Teshuvot Helkat Ya'akov, III, no. 136, argues that, under such circumstances, disclosure is mandated, at least according to some authorities, by virtue of another commandment as well. "Thou shalt not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14) is understood in rabbinic sources as prohibiting an individual from causing another person to "stumble" by committing a transgression and also as an admonition against giving detrimental advice in mundane matters. Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 12:4, extends the concept not only to providing direct aid in committing a sin but also to "strengthening the hands of transgressors." R. Judah Rozanes, Mishneh le-Melekh, Hilkhot Kelayim 1:6, maintains that even a passive stance may constitute "strengthening the hands of transgressors" and hence is forbidden by Rambam as placing a "stumbling block before the blind." Mishneh le-Melekh employs this thesis in explaining an otherwise difficult ruling of Rambam. Rambam rules that a Jew may not permit a gentile to make use of a tree belonging to a Jew for purposes of grafting a branch of one species upon a tree of another species. Even passive acquiescence constitutes a violation of the prohibition against "placing a stumbling block." Helkat Ya'akov argues that since not only assistance in transgression but also offering poor counsel is prohibited by this commandment, "passive" counsel that is deleterious in nature is also forbidden. Advice designed to cause unhappiness or financial loss is clearly forbidden. Hence, according to Mishneh le-Melekh, failure to provide information and advice for the purpose of averting such unfortunate results is also a form of "placing a stumbling block before the blind." Accordingly, concludes Helkat Ya'akov, a person is not at all justified in maintaining his own counsel in circumstances in which circumspection would result in grief or financial loss to others.

(Hay-Nun) ‘Behold man is the one’ in which there is one shrine, as we have elucidated in most of the sections of this introduction of ours. And [it is] as it is [found] in the Zohar, Parashat Korach 94 (3:176a-b), “The One only dwells among the one.” See there. And the unity that [comes] as a result of the commandments permitted the Divine Presence to dwell among Israel through the twenty-two letters of the Torah. As included in it are the six hundred and thirteen commandments – the three hundred sixty-five positive commandments and the two hundred and forty-eight negative commandments – corresponding to the sinews and limbs of a man.⁹⁷Targum Yonatan on Genesis 1:27; Zohar 1:170b. And so was it explained in Paragraph Tzaddi in explanation of the verse (Isaiah 59:2) “But your iniquities have been a barrier between you,” that [the Jews] are united through the commandments and divided one from another through sins.⁹⁸This specific verse is not explained in our text. However the topic is broached in Paragraph Tsadi, and it is possible that this is the reference here, and not Paragraph Bet, as appears in the printed editions. However, it is even more likely that the reference is to Binah Le’Etim (Drash 48) of Rabbi Azariah Figo, as per the correction found in the New York Shivelei David edition, as both the verse and the idea are found there. (Hence the notation Si. Bet, which was understood as a reference to Siman Bet, should have been S. Bet, which could mean Sefer Binah Le’Etim.) And this was the intention of Hillel who said to the convert, “[‘And you shall love your neighbor as yourself’ (Lev. 19:18)] – that is the entire Torah, and the rest is its explanation. Go study.”⁹⁹Shabbat 31a. [Its] explanation is that the other commandments are explanations of the unity through which Israel joins together and becomes one. And this is also elucidated in the midrash (Vayikra Rabbah 13:3) that says, “What does the Holy One, blessed be He care if he slaughters, etc.? Behold, [the commandments] were only given to refine (letsaref, which can also mean, unite) the creatures, as it is stated (Prov. 30:5), ‘the word of God is refined.’” [Its] explanation is that through the commandments, the Children of Israel will be unified. And also there in Midrash Rabbah on Parashat Vayechi,¹⁰⁰The reference seems to be to Bereishit Rabbah 98:3. Differing versions of the midrash are brought in several other places such as Midrash Tanchuma, Vayehi 8:2. “Yaakov said to his sons, ‘Maybe because you come from four mothers, you have a tinge of idolatry?’ They said to him, ‘It is written (Num. 1:20), “according to the house of their fathers” – just like there is only One in your heart.’” And the author of the Yafeh Toar¹⁰¹A commentary on Bereishit Rabbah by Rabbi Shmuel Yafeh Ashkenazi (Turkey, 16th century). did not know its explanation. But it appears to me that [it can be explained] according to what [Maharal] writes in Netsach Yisrael¹⁰²See Netsach Yisrael, Chapter 32 (p. 153 in London edition). – [that the] reason that Rachel gave the signs to Leah¹⁰³In Bava Batra 123a, the rabbis write that Yaakov had given Rachel a type of code (signs) in case an impostor be sent to his tent in her place on their wedding night. When Rachel found out the plot to have Leah be that impostor, she gave Leah the signs to prevent her from being embarrassed. was because she knew that it was not fitting for Yaakov to father all twelve of the tribes from one woman. And had it been so, they would have all been one, whereas that is not fitting for this lowly [world] – as its nature inclines away from the way of oneness. And this causes sin in Israel until the future to come (messianic times) speedily in our days. See there. And this is [the meaning of that which Yaakov said to his sons, “Maybe because you come from four mothers, it is impossible that you will be unified; and sin caused it, as the One can only dwell among one.” But they answered him, “It is written, ‘according to the house of their fathers’ – and there is one Father to all of us and there is One in our hearts. And God, may He be blessed, will be unified through us.” And it is as our teacher Rabbi Yitschak Abarbanel writes in explanation of the verse (Gen. 2:24), “and they shall become one flesh,” like Rashi explained – through the embryo that is created from both of them. And the portion of each one is in the many limbs. Even though the embryo loves itself; yet through this the father and the mother [also] love each other, as a branch produces love in [its] roots. And this is the intention of the statement of [the Sages], may their memory be blessed, “‘And you shall love [the Lord your God], etc.’ (Deut. 6:5) – [that the name of the Heavens be loved through you¹⁰⁴This is the text found in the Talmud, and it is possibly what was written by the author. However, most versions of the Shev Shmat’ta have, “both of them will be beloved through the Torah scholar,” possibly relating to the mother and father.]” (Yoma 86a). And that means that the higher forces become unified, as all of them gave their portion to man and he is a branch from them – and love will sprout from the roots. And hence one should have intention for this unification before every [Torah] study [session] and good deed, as a fulfillment of the commandment of “and you shall love your neighbor, etc.” And [then] all of Israel will be one, and also all of the ones that gave birth to them will love each other and be unified.¹⁰⁵The author returns here to the theme with which he began this essay in the introductory paragraph and Paragraph Gimmel. And with what I have elucidated, their statement at the end of Tractate Eduyot is understood, “[Eliyahu] will not come to make distant or to bring close, but to make peace [among them], as it is stated (Mal. 3:23-24), ‘Behold, I will send, etc. [He shall bring back the hearts of the children to their fathers’” (Mishnah Eduyot 8:7). [This is] meaning that [the children] will be called by the name of their fathers, but there is [only] one Father to us all. And the world will then be fit for it. And then we shall see the joy of Zion and the building of Jerusalem, speedily in our days. Amen, Selah.

Withdrawing the offer or admonishing the invitee regarding the infraction might nevertheless be required as a form of tokhaḥah or admonition in fulfillment of the command "you shall admonish your fellow" (Leviticus 19:17). Rabbi Auerbach presumably maintains that, because of the prevalent lack of awareness of the nature and severity of the infraction, it is permitted and indeed preferable to refrain from admonishing the transgressor until such time as a receptive relationship is established. In that manner the prospects for success and acceptance of admonition and instruction will be enhanced.¹²For an examination of sources discussing the miẓvah of tokhaḥah see Lifnei Iver, part 4 and Jewish Outreach, pp. 1-30.

Rav Lichtenstein writes that serving in the Israeli army constitutes an act of great kindness. It also fulfills the Torah's command, "Do not to stand idly by your brother's blood" ("Lo ta'amod al dam rei'echa" - Vayikra 19:16). In addition, these students are performing the great mitzvah of yishuv Eretz Yisrael - settling and developing the Land of Israel. On the other hand, those who opt to learn in Yeshivah and avoid military service believe that they contribute toward the spiritual development of the Land of Israel. They also feel that their Torah study helps ensure that God protects the people of Israel physically. Furthermore, Rav Avraham Sherman (Techumin 7:336-350) reports that, during his tenure as an army chaplain, he witnessed many observant Jews who abandoned Torah and mitzvot after their experiences in the IDF influenced them negatively.¹⁵Rav Sherman's printed his article in 1986. It should be noted that much progress has been made since that time to improve the situation of religious soldiers. Nonetheless, units still exist where it is difficult to remain religious.

In another tragic example, an observant doctor asked Rav Yaakov Breisch whether he should inform a young woman that her groom, a twenty-year-old man, was suffering from cancer and most likely would not live more than a year or two. Rav Breisch (Teshuvot Chelkat Ya’akov 3:136) ruled that the doctor must inform the bride of her groom’s illness, adding that failure to inform her would violate both lo ta’amod al dam rei’echa and placing an obstacle in front of a blind person (see Vayikra 19:14).²⁸It must be noted that revealing this information might potentially harm or ruin a doctor’s career. Indeed, Alan Blumenfeld, Esq., of Brooklyn, NY has informed me that a doctor could face a lawsuit for revealing confidential medical information. Accordingly, a doctor’s obligation to inform the prospective spouse must be weighed against his need to earn a livelihood. For discussion of how a doctor should act in situations where revealing information might jeopardize his own career, see Nishmat Avraham, Choshen Mishpat 426:1 (vol. 5 p. 152) and Teshuvot Vehanhagot (1:869). Also see Nishmat Avraham (4:96-98), where Rav Eliezer Waldenberg, Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, and Rav Yosef Shalom Eliashiv all rule that a doctor may honor a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) order that violates Halachah, if disobeying the order would cost the doctor his license. Of course, if practical situations arise, a doctor should first clarify all legal and financial ramifications of revealing the information and then present this data to a competent halachic authority.

That He prohibited us from making a laceration for the dead in our flesh, like the idol worshippers do. And this is His, may He be exalted, saying, "you shall not gash yourselves (titgodedu)" (Deuteronomy 14:1). And the prohibition about this was already repeated with His saying, "You shall not make any lacerations in your flesh for the dead" (Leviticus 19:28). And it has already been explained in the Gemara, Yevamot (Yevamot 13b), that the essence of the verse, "you shall not gash yourselves," is, you shall not make a wound. And there it also says, "'You shall not gash yourselves,' is required for itself, as [the Torah] is saying, 'Do not make a wound for a corpse." And in the Gemara, Makkot (Makkot 21a), they said, "A laceration and a gash are the same." And there it is explained [that] one who makes a gash for a corpse is liable whether it was [done] with the hand or with a tool; but for idolatry, one is liable with a tool, but by hand, one is exempt - as appears explicitly in prophecy, "and they gashed themselves according to their practice with knives" (I Kings 18:28). And they have already said (Yevamot 13b) that included in this is the prohibition of disunity in the religious practices of a city and division [into] groups. And they said, "'You shall not titgodedu' - you shall not make agudot, agudot (many groups)." But the essence of the verse is as we explained - do not make a wound for a corpse - whereas this is like a homily (drash). And likewise that which they said in Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 110a) - "One who maintains a disagreement transgresses a negative commandment, as it is stated, 'and not be like Korach and his congregation' (Number 17:5)" - is also from a homiletic angle. However the essence of [that] verse is [simply] to deter [from this]. And according to what the Sages explained, it is surely a negation, not a prohibition. For they explained that the content of this statement is that God, may He be exalted, is saying that one who will disagree and challenge the priesthood at some future time will not be punished with that which Korach was punished. Indeed he will be [punished], "Like the Lord spoke through Moshe to him" - meaning, tzaraat - as that which He said to Moshe, "Place your hand in your bosom," (Exodus 4:6) and as is made clear with King Uzziah (II Chronicles 26). And I will [now] return to the [primary] intention of the commandment and say that the regulations of this commandment have already been explained at the end of Makkot and that one who transgresses this negative commandment is lashed. (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 12.)

Leviticus 19:23 stipulates that the fruit of newly planted saplings is forbidden for the first three years of the tree's growth. The three-year period is counted not from the date of planting but from the fifteenth of Shevat, the "New Year of Trees." Those fruits which are formed and show a distinct shape before the fifteenth of Shevat of the fourth year are forbidden as orlah; those formed afterwards are permitted. The question posed by the interlocutor is whether, in view of the reversed seasons in the Southern Hemisphere, the fifteenth of Shevat marks the termination of the period of orlah in those lands as well.

The Beit Lechem Yehudah (commenting on Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 240:15) and Aruch Hashulchan (Y.D. 240:41) address a similar situation. Doctors ordered someone not to drink water or eat a certain food. This individual subsequently asked his son to bring him water and the specified food, and he threatened that he would not forgive his son either in this world or in the next if he failed to obey. The Beit Lechem Yehudah and Aruch Hashulchan rule (based on Bava Metzia 32a) that the son is not obligated to obey his father’s command. Rav Halevi explains that bringing very unhealthy food to someone to eat would violate the prohibition of assisting another to sin (“Lifnei iveir lo titein michshol” [Vayikra 19:14]). Rav Halevi argues that it follows from this ruling that one should not give his father cigarettes if he requests them. Rather, he should politely and gently explain to his father (in accordance with Shulchan Aruch Y.D. 240:11) that smoking is very dangerous and that the Torah obligates us to preserve our bodies.

On the basis of the earlier formulated line of reasoning, an adult can be compelled to cooperate in the donations of replenishable tissue because he is bound by the commandment "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). Not so a minor. Minors differ from adults in that they are not bound by any of the biblical commandments. The Gemara, Arakhin 22a, reports that

The obligation to pay an exorbitant amount in order to assure burial of the remains of one's father should, logically, be similar to the obligation to pay an exorbitant amount for the purchase of a lulav and etrog or of mazot to fulfill those biblical commandments. The extent of the obligation to pay an extortionist in order to avoid transgression of halanat ha-met should, logically, be no different from the extent a person is obligated to expend even his entire fortune in order to avoid transgression of the negative commandment "Thou shalt not stand idly by the blood of thy fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). The general rule with regard to the expenditure of resources in order to avoid transgression as recorded by Rema, Oraḥ Hayyim 656:1, is that a person is not obligated to expend more than twenty percent of his net worth in order to fulfill, or to avoid transgressing, a positive commandment¹⁵Cf., Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 656:7, who cites the variant opinion of Rabbenu Yeruḥam who maintains that a person should not expend more than one-fifth of his fortune for this purpose but that the obligatory expenditure is limited to ten percent. See also Mishnah Berurah 656:8 and Bi’ur Halakhah 656:1. but is obligated to expend even his entire fortune in order to avoid transgressing a negative precept.¹⁶Cf., however, Bi’ur ha-Gra, Yoreh De’ah 157:5.

For example, R. David ibn Zimra, Teshuvot Radvaz, IV, no. 1,223, (152) addresses a situation involving a defendant who was ordered to swear a solemn oath affirming that he did not owe a sum of money and who was quite prepared to swear to that effect. The claimant, knowing that the oath would be false, queried whether he should allow the defendant to swear falsely or whether he should withdraw his claim. Radvaz responded that the claimant was under no obligation²⁵Cf., the concluding statement in Teshuvot Radvaz, I, no. 354, in which Radvaz reports that, when he had reason to suspect that a defendant would swear falsely, it was his practice to effect a compromise between the litigants and recommends that other judges adopt a similar policy. to absolve the defendant from the required oath.²⁶In this responsum Radvaz focuses upon the financial loss that would be incurred in preventing a false oath and remarks that one who assumes such loss is a “pious fool.” Cf., however, Rashi, Shevu’ot 39b, s.v. halah, and Tosafot, Shevu’ot 47b, s.v. halah, who aver that a plaintiff who has entrusted his funds to an unworthy person is not without blame. See also R. Chaim Palaggi, Nishmat kol Ḥai, II, no. 9, who declares that there is no obligation to accept financial loss in order to prevent transgression on the part of another. Cf., however, R. Chaim Hizkiyahu Medini, Sedei Ḥemed, Kelalim, ma’arekhet ha-heh, sec. 45 and ma’arekhet vav, sec. 30. See also, Teivat Goma, ḥakirah daled, cited by Pitḥei Teshuvah, Yoreh De’ah 157:5. Accepting that premise, R. Shimon ben Gamliel may well be understood as announcing the principle hal’itehu la-rasha only as justification for avoidance of a financial burden such as is entailed in redemption of kerem reva’i. See R. Shimon ha-Levi Gottlieb, Ateret Mordekhai, no. 8, sec. 2. See also infra, note 31.
Cf., R. Aaron Halberstam, Teshuvot Muẓal me-Esh, no. 45, who poses the question more generally in querying how it is ever possible to demand an oath since doing so is, in effect, “placing a stumbling block before the blind” and a person is obligated to sacrifice his entire fortune rather than transgress a negative commandment. Muẓal me-Esh responds cryptically by invoking the principle hal’itehu la-rasha. See also R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach, Teshuvot Minḥat Shlomoh, I, no. 7. That comment, however, begs the question in that it fails to spell out why hal’itehu la-rasha supersedes other halakhic principles. Cf. also, R. David Shlomoh Frankel, Teshuvot Be’er David, no. 24, who argues rather tenuously that, because of the general nature of the prohibition, avoidance of lifnei iver requires an outlay of funds no greater than required for fulfillment of a positive commandment. Cf., ibid., no. 3. The issue is also addressed by R. Amram Bloom, Teshuvot Bet She’arim, Yoreh De’ah, no. 17. R. Chaim Halberstam, Teshuvot Divrei Ḥayyim, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 8, asserts that it is permissible to demand an oath because of a statutory presumption that the defendant will not swear falsely. See also the comments of Imrei Barukh on Turei Even, Megillah 28a. Cf., the comments of R. Chaim ibn Attar, Or ha-Ḥayyim, Leviticus 19:11, to the effect that the plaintiff is forbidden to cause the defendant to swear if he knows that the latter is swearing falsely. Cf., Sedei Ḥemed, Kelalim, ma’arekhet ha-heh, sec. 45 and ma’arekhet vav, sec. 30.
For a discussion of the propriety of, and punishment for, causing a person to swear even a truthful oath see Midrash Rabbah, Leviticus 6:5; Tosafot, Shevu’ot 47b, s.v. halah; Sema, Ḥoshen Mishpat 87:1; and R. Moses Sofer, Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, nos. 73 and 90.

The problem presented in abetting non-observant Jews in engaging in forbidden financial transactions on the Sabbath is whether such action constitutes a violation of the biblical prohibition "You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). The paradigm discussed by the Gemara is the act of extending a cup of wine to a Nazarite. The Gemara, Avodah Zarah 6b, indicates that the biblical prohibition is operative only if the Nazarite and the wine are on opposite sides of a river. In such a situation it is impossible for the Nazarite to drink the wine without the assistance of the person placing the "stumbling block" before him. When both the Nazarite and the wine are on the same side of the river no biblical transgression is incurred in handing the wine to the Nazarite since he could readily have taken it himself. Rabbi Goren asserts that making banking machines available to non-observant Jews on the Sabbath is comparable to the situation in which both the Nazarite and the wine are on the same side of the river. Since the identical machines are provided by other banks, and presumably by non-Jewish banks as well, in allowing its machines to operate on Sabbath, the Jewish bank does not make possible a transgression which could not otherwise be committed. Nevertheless, Tosafot, Shabbat 3a, followed by other authorities including Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 347:4, rule that, even when the transgression could have been performed without assistance, it is forbidden by virtue of rabbinic edict for a Jew actively to aid and abet a transgressor. Although there is disagreement among the authorities with regard to whether or not this rabbinic prohibition extends to rendering assistance to a non-Jew in violating Noachide prohibitions, Shakh, Yoreh De'ah 151:6, declares that all are in agreement that the prohibition includes rendering such assistance even to an apostate Jew.

Under Jewish law the treatment of a patient is not merely a matter of private contract but constitutes a religious obligation. Refusal to treat a patient in need of medical assistance is a clear violation of Jewish law. Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 336:1, declares, "If the physician withholds his services it is considered as shedding blood." The obligation to render assistance in life-threatening situations is predicated upon the verse, "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). A further obligation is predicated upon the scriptual exhortation with regard to restoration of lost property, "and you shall restore it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2). On the basis of a pleonasm in the Hebrew text, the Gemara declares that this verse includes an obligation to restore a fellow man's body as well as his property. Hence, there is created an obligation to come to the aid of one's fellow man in a life-threatening situation. Every individual, insofar as he is able, is obligated to restore the health of a fellow man no less than he is obligated to restore his property.

Azei ha-Levanon further demonstrates that failure to provide a medical remedy, when available, entails violation both of the commandment "you may not hide yourself" (Deuteronomy 22:3), which, in its biblical context, refers to a person who comes upon lost property belonging to another and of the admonition "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). Sifra, Kedoshim 41, declares that these commandments establish an obligation making it incumbent upon an individual to act, if he is capable of doing so, in order to prevent his fellow from sustaining a financial loss. This obligation is recorded by Rambam. Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:13; Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 237; and Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1. It similarly follows that a person is bound by the selfsame commandments to prevent loss or deterioration of health if he possesses the requisite knowledge and skill to be of assistance in providing medical care. Failure to do so, concludes Azei ha-Levanon, would constitute transgression of these two negative commandments as well as of the positive commandment "and you shall restore it to him." Furthermore, Ramban, in Torat ha-Adam, observes that failure to render medical assistance entails abrogation of the positive commandment "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself." Thus, even in situations which pose no threat to life, a person in a position to do so is bound by no less than four separate mizvot to render medical assistance.

“For there is no enchantment with Jacob” (Num. 23:23). Our Creator commanded us, “neither shall ye practice divination” (Lev. 19:26). With our wrongs that are multiplied as of this day, they are divining in Israel.¹Jonah Gerondi, Sefer ha-Yirah, ed. Benjamin Silber (Jerusalem: Horeb Publishers, 1952), Chapter CCXXVIII, p. 25a. They search their perversions and recall at the conclusion of the Sabbath not to eat eggs, nor take fire twice²In the event that the fire does not kindle the first time, he is not permitted to go back and take fire a second time. Not eating eggs refers to the rest of the week. if someone is sick in the house or gave birth within nine days, and many such things that the mouth cannot speak of wherein they transgress the commands of our King. And there is another form of divination quite prevalently practised. Standing and looking into the fire and seeing burning coals, they say, “We will have a guest,³Toseftah, Shabbath 7:2. however, if you extinguish it with water the guest will fall into the water,” and there is no divination graver than this. And the contention that this is true and firm and that numerous people have proven it, is but Satan’s doing, it is he who leads them astray. When Satan sees this one divining, and saying, “The guest will fall into the water,” then Satan says, “I will go and throw the guest into the water in order to deceive him that this be a sign to him to divine for ever.”⁴Abodah Zarah 55a. And woe unto those who do so, for they transgress numerous prohibitions such as, “Neither shall ye practice divination” (Lev. 19:26).⁵These are negative commandments. “There shall not be found among you etc…. one that useth divination” (Deut. 18:10). “Neither shall ye walk in their statutes” (Lev. 18:3). Moreover, they render false the testimony of the Torah, “For there is no enchantment with Jacob” (Num. 23:23). Those who vow when a headache occurs never to eat from the head of an animal, or when they suffer with their intestines never to eat intestines, follow the customs of the Amorite.⁶Daath Zekenim Baale Tosafoth, Genesis 32:33. Trust only in the Holy One, blessed be He, and He will cure you. Also we need not be apprehensive about a sign, except in the way our scholars intended (directed us) as in the case where they said, “On New Year’s let them eat of the head of a ram, because of the thought, ‛Let it be the head of a good year,’ also of various sweets because of ‛a sweet year,’ ‛let him raise a cock,’ also let him ‛kindle a light in the house that the wind does not extinguish.’”⁷Horayoth 12a. Those people that need to fulfill a command such as start the studies of their children, or some such other command, but say, “let us wait until the new month,” even though this is not divining it is not good, for who knows whether he will live or die within the month, with the result that he may die and not fulfill the command. The best procedure is to perform a meritorious deed when it presents itself and not postpone it, thus our scholars expounded,⁸Rashi, Yoma 33b. “And ye shall observe the feast of unleavened bread” (Exod. 12:17). Do not say matzos, unleavened bread, but mitzvos, commandments, which is to say, if a meritorious deed presents itself to you, do not allow it to become sour but perform it immediately.⁹The two words share five letters in common. Adding a vav to the word matzos (unleavened bread) gives us a new Hebrew word meaning “commandments.” And if he intended to perform a meritorious deed but was accidentally prevented from doing so Scripture credits him as if he had performed¹⁰Kiddushin 48a. it, for it is said, “And that thought upon His name” (Mal. 3:16). The Holy One, blessed be He, equates a good thought with action.

R. Ze'ev Wolf Leiter, Teshuvot Bet David, no. 96, suggests that the ban against teaching Torah to non-Jews may not apply to young children. Minḥat Hinnukh, no. 232, states that the sole prohibition devolving upon a Jew who teaches Torah to a non-Jew is that of "Thou shalt not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14).⁴⁵See above, note 5. Since, however, a non-Jewish child who has as yet not reached the age of legal capacity⁴⁶Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 317, states that although a Jewish boy reaches majority at 13 years of age and a Jewish girl at 12 years of age, provided that hair has developed in the pubic region, Noachides may be culpable at whatever age their intellect becomes developed. Sho’el u-Meshiv, Mahadurah Tinyana, I, no. 14, states clearly that this occurs at a much younger age. [In light of the principle which establishes that there is no commandment binding upon Noachides from which Jews are exempt (Sanhedrin 55a and 59a) some scholars aver that mentally mature Jewish minors below the age of halakhic majority are obligated to abide by the provisions of the Seven Commandments no less than are non-Jews of similar maturity; see R. Chaim Auerbach, Divrei Ḥayyim, Nizkei Mammon, no. 11, and R. Shlomoh Zalman Auerbach, Moriah, Elul 5742. Divrei Ḥayyim asserts that although he is bound by the Seven Commandments, a Jewish minor who has attained intellectual maturity is not liable to punishment for infraction of those commandments.] incurs no punishment,⁴⁷See, however, R. Joseph Saul Nathanson, Sho’el u-Meshiv, Mahadurah Tinyana, I, no. 14, who declares that under the Noachide Code even minors are culpable. the Jew who provides instruction has not placed a stumbling block before him. However, in an earlier responsum, no. 57, the same author states that the prohibition derived from the verse "He hath not done so with any nation" (Psalms 147:20) applies to the teaching of minors as well.⁴⁸See also R. Isaac Liebes, Teshuvot Bet Avi, I, no. 96, who similarly forbids enrollment of the child of a non-Jewish mother in a Talmud Torah. Moreover, contends Rabbi Leiter, a non-Jew taught Torah as a child may well review what he has studied after reaching the age of majority. The Jew, in providing instruction to a child, would thus be assisting in the latter's transgression at a later time.⁴⁹See Teshuvot Tashbaẓ, III, no. 133; Teshuvot Radbaz, nos. 741 and 796; Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 347:4; Shakh and Dagul me-Revavah, Yoreh De‘ah 151:6; and Pitḥei Teshuvah, Yoreh De‘ah 151:3.

The question with regard to federal funding of fetal research is further complicated by virtue of the moral responsibility devolving upon Noahides to prevent acts of feticide. In defining the commandment of "dinin, " the last of the Seven Commandments of the Noahide Code, Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:14, states that the essence of the commandment is to establish courts for the purpose of punishing those who transgress the first six of the seven commandments "and to admonish the populace." Admonition, exhortation and prior restraint are intrinsic to fulfillment of this commandment Since Noahides are not normatively bound to engage in acts of rescue by virtue of the commandment "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16) the principle of pikuaḥ nefesh does not function as a countervailing consideration. Thus it follows that any action or policy that would lead to an increment in the number of abortions performed is antithetical to the obligation to "admonish the populace" which, according to Rambam, is normatively binding upon all non-Jews.

That He prohibited us from desecrating [God's] name. And that is the opposite of the sanctification of [God's] name, the explanation of which preceded in the ninth of the Positive Commandments. And that is His, may He be blessed, saying, "And you shall not desecrate My holy name" (Leviticus 22:32). And this sin is divided into three parts - two that are general (for all) and one which is specific. Indeed the first of the general ones is anyone who it was demanded of him that he transgress one of the commandments at the time of a religious persecution (shemad) - and the persecutor had in mind to make him sin - whether one of the light commandment or [one] of the weighty commandments; or one who it was demanded of him that he transgress with regards to idolatry, sexual immorality or murder, even if it was not at the time of a religious persecution. Behold [such a one] is obligated to release himself and be killed, and not to transgress - as we explained in the ninth of the Positive Commandments. But if he transgressed and was not killed, he has already desecrated [God's] name and violated this negative commandment. And if the transgressor was in a public place - meaning [in front of] ten Israelites - he has already desecrated [God's] name in public. And he has violated the negative commandment of, "And you shall not desecrate My holy name," and his sin is very great. However he is not lashed, as he was under duress. For a court may only administer the punishment of lashes or a death penalty when volitional - willingly, with witnesses and a warning. And the language of the [Sifra] (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 4:5) about the one who gives of his offspring to Molekh - "And I will set My face against that man" (Leviticus 20:3): They said, "'That [man],' and not one under duress, and not one inadvertent and not one mistaken." Behold it has already been made clear to you that one who worships an idol under duress is not liable for excision nor - all the more so - a death penalty of the court. But he has transgressed [the prohibition of] desecration of [God's] name. And the second part that is also general is when a man does a sin for which he has no desire and no benefit, but rather intends [to show] rebellion or the removal of the yoke of the kingdom of Heaven with his action. Behold this one also desecrates [God's name] and is lashed. And hence He said, "[You shall not swear falsely by My name,] and desecrate the name of your God" (Leviticus 19:12). For this one intends to anger [God] with this matter, and he has no physical benefit with it. And the specific part is when a man known for his virtue and goodness does a certain action that appears like a transgression in the eyes of the masses; such that it is not appropriate for someone esteemed to do this type of action, even though the action is permissible. And that is their saying (Yoma 86a), "What are the circumstances of the desecration of [God’s]name? [Rav said,] 'For example, [someone like] me, if I take meat from a butcher and do not give him money immediately.' [...] Rabbi Yochanan said, 'For example, [someone like] me, if I would walk four cubits without Torah and without tefillin.'" And this command was already repeated, when He said, "and do not desecrate the name of the Lord." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Pesachim, in Sukkah and in Yoma. (See Parashat Emor; Mishneh Torah, Foundations of the Torah.)

To not oppress the convert with words: That we have been prevented from oppressing converts, even [only] with words - and that is one from the [other] nations who converted and entered our religion - such that is forbidden for [one] to disgrace him even with words, as it is stated (Exodus 22:20), "and you shall not oppress a convert." And even though we are warned about this with [Jews] and since this one entered our religion, behold is like [any other Jew], Scripture added a warning to us and also redoubled the prohibition for him, as it is written (Leviticus 19:33), "do not oppress" another time; because the issue of oppression is more relevant to a convert than it is to [another Jew], as [another Jew] has redeemers who will redress his insult. And there is another reason, [and that is] because there is a concern that [the convert] might return to his deviance out of anger over the disgraces. And they said in the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:2) that one shouldn't say, "Yesterday you were an idolater and now you entered under the wings of the Divine Presence."

1. The question may hinge on the nature of the prohibition against feticide as formulated in the Noahide Code. If, in extending the death penalty to the killing of the fetus in the Noahide Code, the Torah intends to indicate that insofar as Noahides are concerned fetal life is to be considered on a par with other human life, then it follows that a Noahide may not sacrifice a fetal life in order to rescue the mother. The law of pursuit cannot be invoked if, under the Noahide Code, the fetus is considered to be a "nefesh" just as the law of pursuit does not apply in Jewish law after the emergence of the fetal head in the birth canal at which juncture the fetus is deemed a "nefesh" according to the Sinaitic code. On the other hand, the Torah may not deem the fetus to be a "nefesh" even with regard to Noahides, but nevertheless have ordained feticide as a capital crime under the Noahide Code as a transgression totally unrelated to the concept of taking human life. If the Noahide prohibition is extraneous to the exhortation against homicide, it follows that the life of the mother would take precedence over that of the fetus. Since feticide is not encompassed within the prohibition against homicide, the prohibition against feticide, no less than other prohibitions, may be set aside in order to preserve human life.
2. Homicide constitutes one of the exceptions to the general rule that prohibitions of law are suspended for purposes of preserving human life. The rationale is expressed by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 74a, as reflecting the principle "Why do you deem your blood to be sweeter than the blood of your fellow?" Although feticide is a capital offense in the Noahide Code, it remains the case that it is a lesser offense under the Sinaitic covenant. Since, under Jewish law as applied to Jews, feticide is not a capital crime, it may be deduced that fetal life is intrinsically not equal in worth to maternal life. On the contrary, the life of the mother is "sweeter" than the life of the fetus, as is manifest in the comparable provisions of the Sinaitic Code. If so, the life of the fetus may be sacrificed in order to preserve the life of the mother even though it is regarded as a nefesh in the Noahide Code.
3. Assuming that, even in the Noahide Code, the taking of a fetal life is not entirely comparable to murder, it is clear that a Noahide would be permitted to commit this infraction in order to save his own life. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 74b, states that a Noahide may commit any transgression, including idolatry, at least in private, in order to save his own life. Nevertheless, Minḥat Hinnukh, no. 296, asserts that a Noahide may not transgress any provision of the Noahide Code in order to preserve the life of his fellow since he is not bound by the biblical commandment "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). Teshuvot Koaḥ Shor, no. 20, p. 33a, espouses an opposing view and asserts that a Noahide may transgress any commandment, including the three cardinal sins, in order to save the life of his fellow. The doubt expressed by Tosafot may reflect these two opposing views.
4. Minḥat Hinnukh, no. 296, opines that the license granted a Noahide to transgress prohibitions of the Noahide Code in order to preserve his own life, as indicated by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 74b, is limited to situations in which the Noahide is presented with a choice between transgression and martyrdom but does not include situations in which there exists no force majeure, e.g., situations involving life-threatening illness. A similar distinction is made by Rambam, Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 5:4 and 5:6, with regard to transgression of the three cardinal sins. A person is required to sacrifice his life rather than transgress one of those commandments regardless of whether the threat to his life is in the form of force majeure or illness. Nevertheless, in instances in which the individual has acted incorrectly and has transgressed in order to save his life, Rambam draws a distinction post factum between force majeure and therapeutic violation. Rambam rules that, although his action is not sanctionable, the individual in question is not subject to capital punishment if his act was compelled by force majeure. However, if the individual transgressed in order to save his life in the absence of external coercive force he is fully culpable and is to be punished in accordance with his act.
5. Assuming that, under the Noahide Code, a fetus is not a nefesh, and assuming that in the Noahide Code the prohibition against feticide is not suspended for the purpose of saving human life, the issue of whether the taking of a fetal life is warranted when the fetus is an aggressor remains an open question. Teshuvot Ben Yehudah, no. 21, and Sedei Hemed, Kelalim, Ma'arekhet ha-Gimel, no. 44, maintain that the law of pursuit is not operative in the Noahide Code. However, Minḥat Hinnukh, no. 296, and Teshuvot Koaḥ Shor, no. 20, p. 32b, maintain that the law of pursuit extends to Noahides as well. This position seems to be reflected in the language of Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:4. See also R. Chaim Soloveichik, Hiddushei Rabbeinu Hayyim ha-Levi al ha-Rambam, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:9. See also Teshuvot Bet Yizḥak, Yoreh De'ah, II, no. 162, sec. 4; and R. Meir Dan Plocki, Hemdat Yisra'el (New York, 5725), p. 178. These conflicting views may be reflected in the doubt expressed by Tosafot, i.e., Tosafot may subscribe to a view identical to that of Rambam, viz., that the fetus may be sacrificed in order to save the live of the mother only by operation of the law of pursuit, but be in doubt with regard to whether the law of pursuit is incorporated in the Noahide Code.
6. Koaḥ Shor notes that the Gemara, Sanhedrin 74b, states that a Noahide may commit any transgression including idolatry in order to preserve his own life and contends that the extension of this provision to encompass homicide as well is the subject of the doubt expressed by Tosafot. R. Samuel Yaffe-Ashkenazi, Yefeh To'ar (Furth, 5452), Bereishit 44:5, argues that this dispensation extends to murder as well. However, Mishneh le-Melekh, Hilkhot Melakhim 10:2, states explicitly that the taking of another's life in order to save one's own is forbidden even to Noahides since with regard to homicide this injunction is not derived from the commandment to "sanctify the Name" but is based upon the a priori principle, "Why do you deem your blood to be sweeter than that of your fellow?" See also R. Meir Simchah ha-Kohen of Dvinsk, Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 5:6. See also Pitḥei Teshuvah, Yoreh De'ah 155:4, who discusses the question of whether or not the principle "and you shall live by them" applies to Noahides. See also Minḥat Hinnukh, no. 286 and Parashat Derakhim, Derush 2. The grandson of the author of Koaḥ Shor raises this point in a note appended to this responsum, p. 35a, but fails to cite Mishneh le-Melekh.

The prohibition against divulging personal information concerning another person is derived from the biblical verse "Thou shalt not go as a bearer of tales among your people" (Leviticus 19:16). Such activity is forbidden even when it is not accompanied by malicious intent and even if the information is not derogatory in nature. As formulated by Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De'ot 7:2, "Who is a tale-bearer? One who carries reports and goes from one person to another and says, 'So-and-so said this' or 'Such and such have I heard about so-and-so.' Even if he tells the truth, [the tale-bearer] destroys the world.¹³Although not in the category of talebearing and hence not the object of a negative commandment, the Gemara, Yoma 4b, declares disclosure of even a non-personal communication to be improper unless prior permission has been granted for such disclosure. See also commentary of Oraḥ Ḥayyim on Ex. 25:2. Sefer Miẓvot Gadol, lavin, no. 9, interprets Yoma 4b as establishing a negative prohibition (interpreting the word “lamor” as “lo emor”) forbidding disclosure of such information; see, however, Torah Temimah, Lev. 1:1, who understands Sefer Miẓvot Gadol as positing a rabbinic rather than a biblical prohibition. Cf., Bet ha-Beḥirah, Yoma 4b, who describes the stricture against disclosure of a non-personal communication which has not been imparted in a confidential manner as a matter of derekh ereẓ or seemly behavior.

In contradistinction, the injunction "And you shall reverence My sanctuary" (Lev. 19:30) applies to the entire area of the Temple Mount. The Gemara, Yevamot 6a, and Rambam, Bet haBeḥirah 7:1–10, define this commandment as enjoining reverential behavior and deportment and, accordingly, specifically forbid an individual to enter the Temple Mount while bearing a staff, wearing shoes, carrying a purse, or with dust upon his feet. Noting that efficient performance of their duties requires the guards to be properly shod, Rabbi Rafael permits the wearing of shoes by soldiers on the grounds that failure to patrol the area properly would present an imminent danger.

The obligations of Jews, individually and collectively, with regard to converts are not limited to concern for their spiritual welfare and essential temporal needs. Mahari Perla, in his commentary to Sa'adia Ga'on's Sefer ha-Mizvot (Aseh, no. 82), writes that Sa'adia viewed the passage "And if there would dwell among you a proselyte in your land … as the home-born among you shall the proselyte who dwells among you be unto you, and you shall love him as yourself …" (Lev. 19:33–34) as constituting a positive precept. In commanding that the treatment accorded a proselyte be identical with that accorded the native-born Jew, the Torah expressly forbids any type of discrimination whatsoever. Any form of prejudice, whether expressed in word or deed, constitutes a violation of this precept. The Torah does not countenance discrimination against converts; nor does it tolerate discrimination among righteous proselytes on the basis of color.

From the laws of the commandments - what they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shevuot 35b), that the only one who is liable is one who curses with a name or with an appellation [of God]; that the one who curses him is lashed three [sets] of lashes, because of "Elohim shall you not curse," because of "and a chieftain among your people shall you not malign," and because of "You shall not curse a deaf person" (Leviticus 19:14), which is a negative commandment that includes all of Israel; and the rest of its details - are elucidated in Sanhedrin (see Tur, Choshen Mishpat 27).

The same line of reasoning yields an identical result even in cases in which the terrorist was not at all complicit in constructing or arming the bomb but merely possesses detailed knowledge of the actions of others. To be sure, in such a situation the terrorist has performed no illicit act that he must be compelled to frustrate and thereby render innocuous. Although the terrorist may himself have done no harm and have caused no danger, he nevertheless has an obligation of rescue. The terrorist, no less so than other persons, has a duty to save endangered lives. He, too, is commanded "Thou shalt not stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). And Jewish law provides that people can be compelled to discharge biblically mandated duties.

Rabbi Breisch argues that it is not merely permissible but obligatory to reveal information designed to avert personal tragedy or financial loss. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:13, followed by Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1 rules that if an individual "hears that gentiles or apostates are plotting misfortune" for another person, he must bring the matter to that person's attention. Failure to do so, declares Maimonides, constitutes a violation of the commandment "You shall not stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). Hafez Hayyim, Be'er Mayim Hayyim, Hilkhot Issurei Rekhilut 9:1, demonstrates that this admonition applies not only to preservation of the life of another person but also to preservation of money or property.

Rabbi Breisch argues that disclosure under such circumstances is mandated, at least according to some authorities, by virtue of another commandment as well. "Thou shalt not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14) is understood in rabbinic sources as prohibiting an individual from causing another person to "stumble" by committing a transgression and also prohibits giving detrimental advice in mundane matters. Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 12:4, extends the concept not only to providing direct aid in committing a sin but also to "strengthening the hands of transgressors." R. Judah Rozanes, Mishneh le-Melekh, Hilkhot Kelayim 1:6, maintains that even a passive stance may constitute "strengthening the hands of transgressors" and hence is forbidden by Maimonides as a "stumbling block before the blind." Mishneh le-Melekh employs this thesis in explaining an otherwise difficult ruling of Maimonides. Maimonides rules that a Jew may not permit a gentile to utilize a tree belonging to a Jew for purposes of grafting a branch of one species to another. Even passive acquiescence constitutes a violation of the prohibition against "placing a stumbling block."¹⁴This is also the view of Bi’ur ha-Gra, Yoreh De‘ah 295:2 and Pri Megadim Oraḥ Ḥayyim 443:5 and 444:6, although R. Joshua Falk, Derishah, Yoreh De‘ah 297, avers that the prohibition against “placing a stumbling block” encompasses only an overt action but does not extend to passive nonfeasance. Rabbi Breisch argues that since not only assistance in transgression but also offering poor counsel is prohibited by this commandment, "passive" counsel which is deleterious in nature is also forbidden. Advice designed to bring unhappiness or financial loss is clearly forbidden. Hence, according to Mishneh le-Melekh, failure to provide information and advice for the purpose of averting such unfortunate results is also a form of "placing a stumbling block before the blind." Accordingly, concludes Rabbi Breisch, a physician is not at all justified in maintaining his own counsel in circumstances which would result in grief or financial loss to others.

To not have mercy upon a poor person in his case: To not have pity in judgment upon the weak and impoverished at the time of the judgment, but rather one must judge the case truthfully. [It should not be] from the angle of pity upon him, but rather [the judge] must treat [all] the same - whether he is rich or impoverished - to force him to pay what he is obligated; as it is stated (Exodus 23:3), "And you shall not favor an impoverished man in his dispute." And this matter is repeated in another place (Leviticus 19:15), "do not lift up the face of the impoverished." And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4:2 is "Do not say, 'He is a poor man and since I and this rich man are obliged to sustain him, I shall vindicate him in judgment, so that he can support himself honorably.' [Hence,] we learn to say, 'do not lift up the face of the impoverished.'"

Noachides are specifically enjoined from destroying fetal life upon penalty of death (Sanhedrin 57b) on the basis of Genesis 9:6. This prohibition is recorded by Maimonides in his Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:4. Consequently, any aid extended to a gentile in the performance of an abortion is a violation of the precept "Thou shalt not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Lev. 19:14). This prohibition is clearly enunciated with regard to abortion of a fetus by R. Joseph Trani (Teshuvot Maharit, I, no. 97) and confirmed by his pupil, Rabbi Chaim Benevisti (Sheyarei Kenesset ha-Gedolah, Tur, Hoshen Mishpat, 425, no. 6). Maharit, however, notes that the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 6b) states that aid rendered to one transgressing a commandment is proscribed only if the sinner could not otherwise have fulfilled his desire. It is, for example, forbidden to bring a cup of wine to a Nazarite who is on the opposite side of the river and could not otherwise reach the wine; but if both the wine and the Nazarite are on the same side of the river and the Nazarite is capable of reaching the wine without assistance, any help extended does not fall under this prohibition. Such an act, while biblically permitted, is banned by rabbinic edict legislating against "aiding transgressors." Maharit denies the applicability of the edict to aid rendered non-Jewish transgressors. Accordingly, Maharit rules that assistance in the performance of an abortion under these circumstances is forbidden only if no other physician is available; if others are available it is to be considered analagous to the case of both the Nazarite and the wine standing "on the same side of the river." There are nevertheless many authorities who agree that the rabbinic prohibition against "aiding transgressors" which applies even when both are "on the same side of the river" extends to aiding Noachide transgressors as well.⁹⁰Cf. Sedei Ḥemed, II, 298. Furthermore, the author of Mishneh le-Melekh (Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh 4:2) argues that the availability and readiness of another individual to transport the wine over the river does not relieve the one who actually does so from culpability. The prohibition is deemed inoperative only if the transgression could be committed without "the placing of a stumbling block" by anyone else; when the transgression requires aid, the one who renders it is liable, according to this view, no matter how many others would have been willing to render similar aid.⁹¹Cf. Sedei Ḥemed, II, 303–304.

The Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, attempts to derive the "law of the pursuer" from the commandment "You shalt not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor" (Leviticus 19:16). This commandment establishes a general obligation to come to the aid of a person whose life is endangered. Ultimately the Gemara derives an obligation to preserve the life of the victim even if it is necessary to sacrifice the life of the pursuer in order to accomplish this end from the verse "For … the betrothed damsel cried and there was none to save her" (Deuteronomy 22:27). From this statement the Gemara infers that were a bystander to be present he would be obligated to preserve the betrothed damsel from violation by any means possible, including summary execution of the would-be rapist. By virtue of the juxtaposition (hekesh) of homicide and rape of a "betrothed damsel" in the immediately prior verse the Gemara derives a binding obligation requiring any and all bystanders to intervene and to preserve the life of the intended homicide victim by any means possible.

The commandment of removing a burden: To remove a burden from upon the donkey that is weary from its burden upon the way, as it is stated (Exodus 23:5), "If you see the donkey of your enemy, etc." - and the understanding of this enemy, is [another Jew]. And even though it is written (Leviticus 19:17), "Do not hate your brother in your heart," which [refers to a Jew] - the Sages said (Pesachim 113b) that this matter is for example that he saw him commit a sin privately, and he warned [the one sinning] but he did not yield, such that he is [then] permitted to hate him. And that which it states, "donkey," is not specifically a donkey, but rather that the Scripture expressed that which is common - as donkeys are [used for carrying] a burden. And it is written, "you must certainly relieve with him" - meaning to say, help him, from the usage (Nehemiah 3:8), "and they relieved Jerusalem," which is an expression of strengthening.

Minḥat Hinnukh cogently argues that the commandments expressed in Leviticus 19:16 and Deuteronomy 22:27 are incumbent only upon Jews and hence cannot establish obligations upon non-Jews who are bound only by the provisions of the Noachide Code. Minḥat Hinnukh does, however, adduce another source which serves as a basis for derivation of the "law of the pursuer" and which is applicable to Noachides as well. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 72b, cites the verse "Whosoever sheddeth the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" (Genesis 9:6) as granting dispensation to preserve the intended victim by eliminating the pursuer. The phrase "by man" is understood as calling for the shedding of blood "by any man," i.e., by persons witnessing the act, rather than as a reference to punitive measures to be undertaken subsequent to the act. Thus the Gemara understands the verse as referring, not to an act of homicide which has already been committed, but to the prevention of a would-be homicide. The verse, which was addressed to Noah, establishes a law not only for Jews, but for Noachides as well. The general principle is that any commandment given prior to Sinai is binding upon Noachides even subsequent to the Sinaitic revelation provided it has been reiterated at Sinai. The law of the pursuer is indeed repeated in Exodus 22:1. In the course of the same discussion, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 72b, states that the statute formulated in this passage, which provides that a thief who breaks into a dwelling during the night may be smitten without penalty, is based upon the assumption that the thief is intent not only upon larceny but will commit homicide as well if he meets resistance. Hence the thief is in effect a pursuer and may be put to death if necessary by virtue of the "law of the pursuit." Tosafot, Sanhedrin 72a, commenting on the redundancy of the multiple scriptural sources for the "law of pursuit" states that Exodus 22:1 serves only to establish a license for execution of the pursuer but does not make such a course of action obligatory. The obligation, according to Tosafot, is expressed solely in Deuteronomy 22:27. Minḥat Hinnukh assumes that Tosafot intends this comment to apply as well to the interpretation of Genesis 9:6, which presents the same difficulty. The phrase ba-adam damo yishafekh, according to Minḥat Hinnukh's understanding should thus be translated "by man may his blood be shed" and serves to grant permission to put the aggressor to death when necessary to preserve the life of the victim, but does not mandate such action.¹³R. Shlomoh Zevin, Le-Or ha-Halakhah, p. 17, argues against Minḥat Ḥin nukh’s position and maintains that Noachides are not merely permitted, but are obligated, to execute the pursuer in order to preserve the pursued. He argues that this is evident from the phrase “domo yishafekh” which he maintains must be translated “by man shall his blood be spilled.” It would, however, appear that the question raised by Tosafot, Sanhedrin 73a, s.v. af, with regard to the earlier cited verse which speaks of the ba ba-maḥteret applies with equal validity to this verse. It would appear that Tosafot’s statement that the verse establishes permission rather than obligation applies to the subsequently cited verse “ba-adam damo yishafekh” as well. Accordingly, concludes Minḥat Hinnukh, Noachides are justified not only in acting in self-defense but may eliminate a threat to the lives of others as well, even though, in contradistinction to Jews who are bound by Sinaitic revelation, they are under no obligation to do so.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Mishneh Torah, Laws of The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 23:1, 3) that the one who gives and the one who takes it [both] transgress a negative commandment - the one who gives it because of (Leviticus 19:14), "before the blind," and the one who takes it is included in the curse (Deuteronomy 27:25). And [that] he is obligated to return it; and that it is forbidden for a judge to raise his stature on purpose in order to provide more pay for his scribes. And that it is even forbidden to take an oral bribe - but rather if maybe the litigants honor him with words, he should show himself as if he does not pay attention at all to the words. The general principle of the thing is that it is forbidden for the judge to accept any benefit from the litigants at all for his judgments. But if the judge is a craftsman, the Sages allowed him to take a wage while he is involved in their case, for his idleness from his craft - and that is when the matter is recognizable that it is only a wage for idleness, but not more; and he takes equally from both of them. And the rest of its details - are in Sanhedrin (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 23).

Rabbi Gestetner argues that, since the conversions in question are null and void, any person assisting in such a conversion ceremony transgresses the prohibition "and before a blind man you shall not place a stumbling-block" (Leviticus 19:14). It might well be assumed that the "stumbling-block" in the situation under discussion lies in the fact that the non-Jew will be inadvertently accepted by the community at large as a Jew for all halakhic purposes, including eligibility to marry a person of Jewish birth. According to such an analysis, it is the members of the community at large who are "blind" and who may stumble. Rabbi Gestetner, however, argues that the "stumbling" is of a nature which is both immediate and certain, viz., making the mikveh available for the act of immersion constitutes a stumbling-block placed before the officiants at the conversion. Rambam, Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 41, states that every transgression which assumes the form of a denial of the veracity of the Torah constitutes a transgression of a prohibition couched in the words "the Lord does he blaspheme" (Numbers 15:30). Acceptance of converts without proper commitment on their part to observance of the commandments, argues Rabbi Gestetner, constitutes denial of one of the principles of the Oral Law. Since immersion of such a candidate by the Bet Din is ipso facto a denial of a principle of the Oral Law involving a transgression of "the Lord does he blaspheme" any assistance rendered in performing such an act, rules Rabbi Gestetner, constitutes the placing of a stumbling-block before the blind.

Jewish participation in a war between non-Jews is a complex problem. According to the authorities who maintain that Noachides are forbidden to wage wars of aggression it would follow that Jews are forbidden to participate in such wars. To aid and abet a non-Jew in commission of a transgression of the Noachide Code is a violation of the prohibition "Thou shalt not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). Moreover, it is clear that if the war is illicit for non-Jewish combatants there is no operative principle which conveys upon Jews the right to engage in battle. It is perhaps for this reason that Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 18b, cites the opinion of Rabbenu Elchanan who rules that Jews may not participate in such wars.

Rabbi Soloveichik further argues that permitting the use of a mikveh for invalid conversions constitutes the violation of yet other biblical prohibitions. Ramban, in his Commentary on the Bible, Leviticus 19:29 and Deuteronomy 23:18, as well as in his glosses on Rambam's Sefer ha-Mizvot, shoresh 5, and mizvot lo ta'aseh, no. 355, declares that the verse, "There shall not be a prostitute from among the daughters of Israel, nor shall there be a prostitute from among the sons of Israel" (Deuteronomy 23:18), and the verse, "and the land shall not be filled with licentiousness" (Leviticus 19:29), constitute admonitions to the Bet Din forbidding it to allow liaisons between persons who cannot contract a valid marriage. Rabbi Soloveichik asserts that, according to Ramban, the prohibitions are not addressed solely to the members of the Bet Din, but devolve upon any person capable of preventing the acts in question. Hence, any person who facilitates a forbidden liaison of such nature is guilty of violating these two prohibitions. Permitting use of a mikveh for an invalid conversion serves to provide sanction for a conjugal relationship between a Jew and a person who, in reality, is a non-Jew and hence, concludes Rabbi Soloveichik, constitutes a violation of these prohibitions.

That is that He commanded us to leave over the corner of the produce, the trees and that which is similar to them. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "you shall leave them" (Leviticus 19:10), after His mentioning, the corner. And it is explained in Tractate Makkot (Makkot 15b) that the [law of the] corner is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment. Indeed, the negative commandment is His saying, "you shall not wholly reap" (Leviticus 19:9); and the positive commandment is His saying, "you shall leave them." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Peah. But by Torah law, it is only practiced in the Land [of Israel]. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Gifts to the Poor 1.)

And the Torah further also obligated this sacrifice for one who has sexual relations with a designated maidservant; and as it is written in the Order of Kedoshim Tehiyu, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:20-21), "If a man lays with a woman, etc. and she is a maidservant designated (charufah) for a man, but has not been redeemed with redemption, etc. there shall be an investigation, etc. And he shall bring his guilt-offering[, etc.] a ram of guilt." And this is from those that come whether for inadvertent transgression or volitional (Keritot 9a). It comes out that with all of them, there are five definite guilt-offerings. And so did the Sages, may their memory be blessed, count in the Mishnah, such that they said (Mishnah Zevachim 5:5), "These are the guilt-offerings: 1) The guilt-offering of thefts; 2) the guilt-offering of misappropriations; 3) the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant; 4) the guilt-offering of the nazirite; 5) the guilt offering of the metsora." And [regarding] the undetermined guilt-offering which is counted there, its name is upon it [to show] that it is not from the group of definite guilt-offerings. And from these five, three of them come whether they are inadvertent or volitional - and they are the guilt-offering of thefts, the guilt-offering of the designated maidservant and the guilt-offering of the nazirite; and one of them only comes for inadvertent transgression and not for volitional transgression - and that is the guilt-offering of misappropriations; and [for] the fifth - which is the guilt offering of the metsora - the expression, inadvertent and volitional, is not relevant, as we said.

And nonetheless the maidservant is liable for lashes, as we cannot say about her that she is light in her [own] eyes - and that because of that, she did not guard herself from licentiousness. But still, she also is not liable for lashes unless she has intercourse in the regular fashion, is an adult and volitional. And about her is it said, "there shall be an investigation (bikoret tehiyeh)" - as our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Keritot 22a), "bikrai tehe (she shall be with verses)," meaning to say with lashes. And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Keritot 22a), "She is lashed, and not he." And because of this did the Scripture express the lashes with this language of 'reading' - since they would read verses of rebuke over the one lashed while they were still lashing him, so that he understand and take instruction. And [these verses] are "And the Lord will make wondrous, etc." (Deuteronomy 28:59).

That He prohibited us from eating notar - and that is what is left over from the meat of consecrated items after the time assigned for their eating. But the prohibition about this is not explicit in the Torah. [However the punishment is explicit.] And that is His, may He be exalted, saying in Parashat Kedoshim about the sacrifice of the peace-offerings, "what is left over by the third day must be consumed with fire. If it should be eaten on the third day, etc. that person shall be excised" (Leviticus 19:6-8). Behold it is explicit that it is [punished] with excision if it was volitional. And if it was inadvertent, he is liable for a fixed sin-offering. So the punishment is written. However the prohibition is His statement about the inauguration-offerings - "it shall not be eaten because it is holy" (Exodus 29:33). And this reference, "it," is also including everything that was disqualified, such as notar - that it is not permissible to eat [it]. And one who transgressed and ate [it] is lashed. And in Meilah (Meilah 17b), they said about the language of the Mishnah, "Piggul (a sacrifice disqualified by its intention) and notar do not join together, on account of their being two separate categories" - they said, "That was only learned with regards to the ritual impurity of the hands, which is rabbinic. But with regards to the matter of eating, they do join together. As it is taught, 'Rabbi Eliezer says, "'It shall not be eaten because it is holy' - [this teaches that regarding] any consecrated food that has been disqualified, the verse comes to apply a negative commandment about its eating."'" And piggul and notar are among the disqualifications of consecrated foods. So therefore each one of them was forbidden from being eaten by His saying, "It shall not be eaten because it is holy." And it has already been explained that the punishment for notar is excision. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit 18.)

That He prohibited us from eating piggul. And piggul is a sacrifice that was spoiled by the inention at the time of its slaughter or the time of its being offered - [in that] the man who was occupied with its being offered thought that he would eat it after its time. And it is explained completely in the second [chapter] of Zevachim (Zevachim 27). Indeed, the prohibition about eating piggul is from, "it shall not be eaten because it is holy" (Exodus 29:34) - as we explained with the previous commandment. However we have learned the punishment from His saying about piggul in [Parashat Tzav], "And if any of the flesh of the sacrifice of [his] peace-offering be eaten at all on the third day, [etc.]" (Leviticus 7:18). And the tradition about this verse appeared [and taught] that it was speaking about a sacrifice that was spoiled by intention at the time of its offering; and that is called piggul. And in His saying, "be eaten," He indeed meant that he intended to eat it on the third day. They said (Zevachim 29a), "Open your ear to hear that the verse is speaking about one who intends to eat from his sacrifice on the third day" - that it is disqualified with that intention. And one who eats from it after that intention is liable for excision, due to His saying, "and the person who eats of it shall bear his iniquity." [As] He had said about notar, "So everyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity" (Leviticus 19:8). And in the Gemara, Keritot (Keritot 5a), they said, "A verbal analogy should never be regarded lightly in your eyes, as piggul is one of the essential laws of the Torah, and Scripture taught it only through a verbal analogy. [... It is learned from notar, by way of the common use of the word, iniquity.] It is written there, 'So everyone who eats it shall bear his iniquity,' and it is written here, 'and the person who eats of it shall bear his iniquity.' Just as there, it is excision; here too, it is excision." And also one who eats piggul inadvertently must bring a fixed sin-offering. And the regulations of piggul and notar have already been explained in many places in the Order of Kodashim. (See Parashat Tetzaveh; Mishneh Torah, Sacrifices Rendered Unfit 18.)

And yet its warning – meaning to say, the explicit negative commandment, besides the punishment that is mentioned here – is from that which is written in the inauguration [of the tabernacle], "it shall not be eaten, as it is holy" (Exodus 29:34). And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Pesachim 24a) that this verse includes in its warning all that which has been spoiled of the [sacrifices] and is not fitting to eat, like notar and piggul. And likewise did they, may their memory be blessed, say (Avodah Zarah 66a) that they are included in the warnings, "You shall not eat any abomination" (Deuteronomy 14:3) – which they expounded (Chullin 114b), "Anything that is abominable for me, is forbidden to eat." And since this is so, we shall say that [that warning (negative commandment) is to make one liable for] additional negative commandments; and the verse here is speaking about the punishment of the one who eats it, as so did the explanation come about it. And that which it stated (Leviticus 7:18), "If it shall surely be eaten on the third day," is meaning to say that he thought about it to eat it on the third day. As so did they, may their memory be blessed, expound (Zevachim 29a), "'And if it shall surely be eaten, etc.' – that is piggul." Bend your ear to hear that the verse is speaking about one who thinks to eat his sacrifice on the third day, that it is spoiled with this thought. And one who eats it is liable for excision, as it is stated about it, "and the soul that eats from it will carry his iniquity." And it is stated about notar (Leviticus 19:8), "And the one who eats it will carry his iniquity, as he has profaned the holy of the Lord, and he shall be excised." And we learned [about] it in Keritot 5a, "Let not an inferential comparison (gezara shava) be light in your eyes; as behold piggul is one of the [important] bodies of Torah, and Scripture only taught it through a gezara shava." As we learn it] from notar, from [the use of] ‘iniquity’ [in both cases] – "just like there it is excision, here too it is excision."

The Arrangement of Buying and Selling (ie. How One Should Conduct Themselves in Business). Containing 1 Se'if:
Afterwards he should go to his work because any Torah that does not have work with it will end up becoming null and will cause sin because the poverty will remove from him knowledge of his Creator. Nevertheless, he should not make his work primary, but rather temporary, and his Torah permanent; and [through this] both will be sustained. He should do business honestly and be careful not to mention the name of Heaven in vain, because in every place where the mention of God's name [in vain] is found, death is found. And he should be careful not to take an oath, even in truth, because 1,000 cities belonged to King Yannai and all of them were destroyed because they took oaths, even though they kept them. And he should be careful from partnering with the gentiles, for perhaps [the gentile] will be obligated to take an oath and [the Jew] will violate [the transgression of] "[The names of other gods] should not be heard on your lips." Rem"a: And some are lenient with partnering with gentiles these days because the gentiles nowadays do not take an oath by idols. And even though they mention their foreign god, nevertheless their intention is to the Creator of heaven and earth, except that they associate the name of Heaven with other forces. And we do not find that there is in this [a violation by the Jew of] "Before a blind person you shall not place a stumbling block," because the gentiles are not warned regarding partnership [of God with other forces]. (Ra"n - the end of the first chapter of Avodah Zarah; Rabbeinu Yerucham - netiv 17, chelek 5; Tosafot - beginning of the first chapter of Bechorot). And to do business with them without partnering, all agree is permitted, except on the day of their festivals. (Hagahot Maimoni - first chapter of the Laws of Idol Worship). And see Yoreh Deah on the Laws of Idol Worship chapter 147.)

One who feeds others does not need to wash their hands; but the one eating does need to wash their hands, even though the [other] is putting it into his mouth and he is not touching the food. And the law is the same for one eating with a magrefah (the meaning of which is an instrument with prongs, a fork in the vernacular), that they need to wash their hands. And it is forbidden to feed someone who does not wash their hands, on account of, "you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind." (Rabbenu Yonah at the end of the chapter [entitled] Elu HaDevarim)

Our Rabbis, of blessed memory, also said, "What is meant by meonein? It refers to one who deceives the eyes. [a magician] In other words, it is as though he holds peoples eyes and closes them, for he deceives them. It seems to them as though he is performing wondrous, supernatural feats, while in reality he is doing nothing, but with slight of hand and cunning, he deceives them. The entertainers who perform these things at weddings, are violating a negative command. He who engages them, is guilty of transgressing (the negative command), "Before the blind you shall not place a stumbling block."⁸Leviticus 19:14. Therefore whoever is able to prevent this, is obligated to prevent it. And it is certainly forbidden to view these things but if a non-Jew performs these things, it is permitted to view it.

It is the prohibition that the entire tribe of Levi was also prohibited from taking a portion in the booty, when [the Jews] conquered the Land [of Israel]. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "The priests the Levites, all the tribe of Levi, shall have no part or inheritance" (Deuteronomy 18:1). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 163:2-3) is, "'No part' - in the booty. 'Or inheritance' - in the land." Yet you are able to challenge me and ask, "Why did you list these matters as two commandments, for they are a prohibition about taking a portion in the spoil and the territory of the land, and both of them are within one negative statement?" You, the questioner, should know that this negative statement has already been divided by His saying, "The priests the Levites, all the tribe of Levi, shall have no part" - and that is the prohibition about the taking of the booty of the city. Whereas the second is, "And they shall have no inheritance" (Deuteronomy 18:2) - and that is the prohibition about the taking of a portion in the land. And the prohibition of these very two matters has already been repeated to the priests - and that is His saying to Aharon, "You will have no inheritance in their land," at the time of division of the land; "and you will not have a share among them," in the booty. And maybe you would think that these two laws of the priests are two [additional] commandments, such that it is fitting to count them. [However] know that when the prohibition comes to the whole tribe of Levi, the priests have surely already been included. Rather it was repeated with the priests to strengthen [it]. And likewise [with] anything similar to this of general categories and specific items - it is indeed repeated to strengthen [it] or to round out the law when it would not have been complete from [only] one prohibition. However if we were to count His saying to Aharon, "You will have no inheritance in their land," as an addition to that which He said, "The priests the Levites, all the tribe of Levi, shall have no" - you would surely be obligated according to this very comparison to count the divorcee, the desecrated woman and the zonah to the high priest as three negative commandments besides the three negative commandments that came from the general category of priests, whether a high [priest] or an ordinary [one]. And if one would say that those are also appropriate to be counted - behold we would say to him that perforce the high priest with a divorcee would be liable twice: Once on account of [being] a priest, and a divorcee is forbidden to him; and secondly on account of [being] a high priest, since she is also forbidden to him with a different negative statement. Yet it has already been explained in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 77a) that he is only liable once. Behold it has been confirmed that a prohibition that is within a general category is the only one to be counted; and that a prohibition which appears about that very content for the individual item - it is in fact only to teach one of the regulations or to round out the law, as I explained in Commandment 165 of these (positive) commandments. And from this very category is the prohibition in which He prohibited the priests, "They shall not make baldness on their heads [...]" (Leviticus 21:5). And all of Israel as a general category had already been prohibited with these three negative commandments already when He said, "You shall not round off the corners of your head" (Leviticus 19:27); "you shall not gash yourselves" (Deuteronomy 14:1); and "lacerations for the dead" (Leviticus 19:28). So it was actually repeated for the priests just to round out the law - as it is explained at the end of Makkot (Makkot 20a), when they explained the regulations of these three commandments. But were they negative commandments specifically for the priests and were not to round out the law - but rather commandments themselves - the priest would have been liable two [sets of] lashes for each such act, due to his being an Israelite, and due to his being a priest (respectively). But the matter is not like this. Rather there is one [set of] lashes, like [for] other Israelites, as is explained in its place. And understand this. (See Parashat Shoftim; Mishneh Torah, Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee 13.)

It is the prohibition that the entire tribe of Levi was also prohibited from taking a portion in the booty, when [the Jews] conquered the Land [of Israel]. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "The priests the Levites, all the tribe of Levi, shall have no part or inheritance" (Deuteronomy 18:1). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 163:2-3) is, "'No part' - in the booty. 'Or inheritance' - in the land." Yet you are able to challenge me and ask, "Why did you list these matters as two commandments, for they are a prohibition about taking a portion in the spoil and the territory of the land, and both of them are within one negative statement?" You, the questioner, should know that this negative statement has already been divided by His saying, "The priests the Levites, all the tribe of Levi, shall have no part" - and that is the prohibition about the taking of the booty of the city. Whereas the second is, "And they shall have no inheritance" (Deuteronomy 18:2) - and that is the prohibition about the taking of a portion in the land. And the prohibition of these very two matters has already been repeated to the priests - and that is His saying to Aharon, "You will have no inheritance in their land," at the time of division of the land; "and you will not have a share among them," in the booty. And maybe you would think that these two laws of the priests are two [additional] commandments, such that it is fitting to count them. [However] know that when the prohibition comes to the whole tribe of Levi, the priests have surely already been included. Rather it was repeated with the priests to strengthen [it]. And likewise [with] anything similar to this of general categories and specific items - it is indeed repeated to strengthen [it] or to round out the law when it would not have been complete from [only] one prohibition. However if we were to count His saying to Aharon, "You will have no inheritance in their land," as an addition to that which He said, "The priests the Levites, all the tribe of Levi, shall have no" - you would surely be obligated according to this very comparison to count the divorcee, the desecrated woman and the zonah to the high priest as three negative commandments besides the three negative commandments that came from the general category of priests, whether a high [priest] or an ordinary [one]. And if one would say that those are also appropriate to be counted - behold we would say to him that perforce the high priest with a divorcee would be liable twice: Once on account of [being] a priest, and a divorcee is forbidden to him; and secondly on account of [being] a high priest, since she is also forbidden to him with a different negative statement. Yet it has already been explained in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 77a) that he is only liable once. Behold it has been confirmed that a prohibition that is within a general category is the only one to be counted; and that a prohibition which appears about that very content for the individual item - it is in fact only to teach one of the regulations or to round out the law, as I explained in Commandment 165 of these (positive) commandments. And from this very category is the prohibition in which He prohibited the priests, "They shall not make baldness on their heads [...]" (Leviticus 21:5). And all of Israel as a general category had already been prohibited with these three negative commandments already when He said, "You shall not round off the corners of your head" (Leviticus 19:27); "you shall not gash yourselves" (Deuteronomy 14:1); and "lacerations for the dead" (Leviticus 19:28). So it was actually repeated for the priests just to round out the law - as it is explained at the end of Makkot (Makkot 20a), when they explained the regulations of these three commandments. But were they negative commandments specifically for the priests and were not to round out the law - but rather commandments themselves - the priest would have been liable two [sets of] lashes for each such act, due to his being an Israelite, and due to his being a priest (respectively). But the matter is not like this. Rather there is one [set of] lashes, like [for] other Israelites, as is explained in its place. And understand this. (See Parashat Shoftim; Mishneh Torah, Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee 13.)

There are two "corners" of the head,¹See Leviticus 19:27. located at the base of the (sides of) the head, at the juncture of the temple and the cheek, on both right and left sides near the ears. Even shaving [cutting these corners] with a scissors close to the skin as with a razor, so that nothing remains of the hair close to the skin, is forbidden according to some Poskim. Therefore, if it is necessary to shave them for medical reasons, you should be careful not to shave close to the skin. The area of the corners that are forbidden to shave includes the hair from the top of the forehead to below the ear, at the point where the bottom jaw widens and spreads outward.

One about whom it has been claimed [that he had relations] with an unmarried woman, there are those who say that he shouldn't marry her because of the bad talk [that will result] for it looks like they are confirming the rumor. But there are those that say it is a mitzvah to marry her. Hagah: The first reasoning is the main one. And if there is fear that she will go out to an "evil culture" (i.e. marry out of Judaism), he may marry her. And all of this refers to a simple rumor, but if he certainly had relations with her, it is a mitzvah to marry her, but we don't enforce that (ibid). But if a rumor went out concerning that she had relations with two men, the first only a rumor and the second added to her insult, the second has a mitzvah to marry her. But if the rumor is of equal strength with regard to both, one is married and one is not married, the second has a mitzvah to marry her (ibid). See above siman 22, whether she is trustworthy in this matter. A prostitute that was requested of one who promised to pay her a price and he denies it, he must take an oath as is true in other suits (Ribash, siman 41). This is what the Torah obligated the rapist and the seducer to pay money, when it just happened. But a father is not allowed to give his daughter to be a harlot, and about this it is written, "Do not defile your daughter to make her a harlot" (Leviticus 19:29). And anyone who prepares herself to be a harlot, whether on her own accord or her father's is considered a "kedeshah" and there is no distinction in this matter between a virgin and a non-virgin. And a court may fine prostitutes in order to erect a fence. And it happened with one who fornicated with a non-Jew, that they cut her nose off, in order to disfigure her (Responsa of the Rosh 18).

That is that He commanded us to return the stolen item itself, if it is still remaining as itself - with the addition of a fifth if he swore [about it] - or to give its value, if it was transformed. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "and he shall return the stolen item" (Leviticus 5:3). And they already explained in Tractate Makkot (Makkot 16a) that the negative commandment of robbery is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment. And they said [about this] that Scripture said, "you shall not rob" (Leviticus 19:13), "and he shall return the stolen item." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Bava Kamma. (See Parashat Vayikra; Mishneh Torah, Robbery and Lost Property 1.)

That is that He commanded us to love converts. And that is His saying, "And you shall love the stranger" (Deuteronomy 10:19). And even though he was included regarding this with [all of] Israel, in His saying, "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself (Leviticus 19:18) - since this stranger is a convert (and a full member of Israel) - however because he entered into our Torah, God added love upon love and designated an additional commandment for him. [This is] as He did with the prohibition of, "And you shall not oppress" (Leviticus 25:17); He [also] said, "And you shall not oppress a stranger" (Exodus 22:20). And it is explained from the language of the Gemara (Bava Metzia 59b) that we are liable by oppressing the convert on account of, "And you shall not oppress," and on account of, "And you shall not oppress a stranger." [So] we are also obligated to love him on account of, "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself," and on account of, "And you shall love the stranger." And this is clear - there is no doubt about it. And I do not know a [single] man from whoever counted the commandments that botched this. And in most [books of] Midrash, they explained that God commanded about the convert, just like He commanded us about Himself - He said, "And you shall love the Lord, your God" (Deuteronomy 6:5), and He said, "And you shall love the stranger." (See Parashat Ekev; Mishneh Torah, Human Dispositions 6.)

The commandment of the reverence of father and mother: To be in reverence from parents - meaning to say that a person act with his mother and his father as he would with someone for whom he has reverence, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:3), "His mother and father shall a man revere." And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:10 (also Kiddushin 31b) is "Which is reverence? He shall not sit in his place, and he shall not speak in his place, and he shall not contradict his words."

To not turn after the worship of idols - not in thought, not in speech and not in vision To not turn after idolatry with thought or speech and not even only with sight; so that he not come from this to serve it, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:4), "You shall not turn to the idols." And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:11, "If you turn after them, you make them gods"; meaning to say, if you involve yourself with their matters - meaning to ponder after the follies that those that believe in them say about it, that constellation x or star y does this action, and so [too,] incense x or service y; or you constantly observe the forms that their worshipers make in order to know the manner of its worship. All of this [can cause] you to be seduced after it and that you would worship it.

He prohibited us from taking the forgotten sheaves. And that is His saying, "and you forget a sheaf in the field, you may not return to take it" (Deuteronomy 24:19). And [the commandment of leaving what is forgotten] is practiced both with produce and with [fruit] trees; and is rectified by a positive commandment. For if one transgressed and took it, he is obligated to return it to the poor. And that is His saying, "it shall be for the stranger, the orphan and the widow." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Peah. And know that the principle with us is that any negative commandment that has a positive commandment [attached to it] - if he fulfills the positive commandment in it, he is not lashed; but if he does not fulfill it, he is lashed. An example of this is that if he harvested the corner, he is not liable for lashes immediately when he harvested. Rather he must return the sheaves. And likewise if he threshed them, ground the wheat and kneaded the dough, he must give what was fit for him for [his obligation of] the corner, from the dough. But if it happened that the wheat got totally lost or it was burnt, he is lashed - as he did not fulfill the positive commandment in it. And all the more so if he negated [the positive commandment] actively - as when he ate all of the wheat. But do not think that that which they said, in the Gemara, Makkot (Makkot 16a) - "For us, we only have this and one other one," and it is explained that this other one is the corner - requires that this law is in fact only exclusively regarding the corner. Rather the matter of the "other one," is meaning to say, the corner and everything, the law of which is like the law of the corner - the single grapes, what was forgotten, the gleanings and the ollalot. Each one of them is a negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment and has the possibility within it - that is possible with the corner - of 'he fulfilled it or he did not fulfill it,' and 'he nullified it or did not nullify it.' For the verse from which we learned that there is a positive commandment with the corner is His, may He be exalted, saying, "you shall leave them for the poor and the stranger" (Leviticus 19:9-10); and that appears about the corner, the gleanings, [the single grapes,] and the ollalot. He said [there], "you shall not completely cut the corner of your field, [you shall not gather] the gleaning of your harvest. You shall not pick your vineyard bare; neither shall you gather the single grapes of your vineyard." And He likewise said about the forgotten sheave, "you may not return to take it." And once we have found the language in the Gemara, that the corner is a negative commandment rectified by a positive commandment and they brought a proof about the positive commandment in it from His saying, "you shall leave them for the poor and the stranger, etc." - it is a proof that these five commandments are [all] negative commandments that are rectified by a positive commandment. So - as we mentioned - as long as he fulfills the positive commandment in it, he is not lashed; but if the fulfillment of the positive commandment is no longer possible, he is lashed. However so long as it is possible to fulfill it - even though he has not fulfilled it - he is not yet lashed. Rather we only command him to fulfill it, until we know that he has already transgressed the negative commandment and there is no possible way for him to fulfill the positive commandment in it. Then he is lashed. And heed this content and understand it. (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Gifts to the Poor 1.)

To not make [idols] not for himself and not for those besides him: To not make [idols] for one that will worship it, not for himself and not for those besides him, and even if the one who orders that it be made is an idolater - as it is stated (Leviticus 19:4), "and molten gods do not make for yourselves." And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:12, even for others. And there is it said, "One who makes [an idol] for himself, transgresses on account of two warnings" - meaning to say, on account of "do not make," and on account of "for yourselves, etc."

To not eat notar: To not eat notar - and that is what remains from the meat of consecrated animals, from a sacrifice that was brought according to its commanded [specifications] after the time that it is fit to eat from it, as it is stated about the inauguratory sacrifices (Exodus 29:33), "it shall not be eaten, they are holy." And the explanation came about this (Meilah 17b), "[It refers to] anything that is consecrated [that is] disqualified, to give a negative commandment on its eating." And this is hinted to by the verse, in its stating, "they are holy": This third person, which is "they," includes all that which is disqualified of the consecrated animals. But we should not learn from this that notar and pigul (sacrifices disqualified by the wrong thought) are considered one negative commandment, as they are two topics - as I have written above on the prohibition of pigul in the Order of Tsav (Sefer HaChinukh 144). And we found about them that two [different] verses came concerning the punishments, as it is written (Leviticus 7:18), "And if it is surely eaten, etc."; and it is written, after it, "and the soul that eats it will carry its iniquity" - and this carrying of iniquity is excision, as we learn from a comparison with notar. As here, it is written concerning notar (Leviticus 19:6-8), "and that which remains to the third day[...] is piggul, it is not acceptable. And one who eats them will carry his iniquity, since he profaned the holy of God, and excised, etc." And hence, even if the warning for both of them is from one verse, it is not made impossible because of this to consider them two [separate] negative commandments. And so did they say in Meilah 17b, "Pigul and notar do not combine because they are two topics, etc." - as it is explained there that there are things that do not combine and there are things that combine.

To leave over the corner of the field: To leave over a corner from the produce, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:10), "to the poor and to the stranger shall you leave them," after it mentioned, "you shall not finish the corner of your field" (Leviticus 19:9). And the understanding of stranger [here] is a righteous convert (see Sifra Kedoshim 3:4). And so [too], any "stranger" stated in [the context of] gifts to the poor - as behold, it is written about the second tithe (Deuteronomy 26:12), "to the stranger, to the orphan and to the widow." And that is certainly the righteous convert - when undifferentiated - as its witnesses (the orphan and the widow) are by its side. And the same is the case for all of the gifts to the poor. And nonetheless they, may their memory be blessed, said (Gittin 59b) that we do not prevent them from the poor of the idolaters, due to the ways of peace. And the content of the corner, is that a person leaves a little of his produce at the end of his field at the time that he reaps. And there is no measure to this remnant by Torah writ, but the Sages gave a measurement to the thing (Mishnah Peah 1:2), and it is one in sixty parts.

He prohibited us from planting grain - as well as other vegetables - in a vineyard. And this type of forbidden mixture is called forbidden mixtures of the vineyard. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "Do not plant your vineyard with mingled seed" (Deuteronomy 22:9). And the language of the [Sifrei] (Sifrei Devarim 230:1) is, "'Do not plant your vineyard' - why do I need it? And is it not already stated (Leviticus 19:19), 'you shall not sow your field?'" And this would without a doubt include a vineyard and seeds. [In answer,] they said, "It teaches that one who has a forbidden mixture in a vineyard transgresses two negative commandments." And know that a forbidden mixture of the vineyard is only forbidden by Torah law in the Land [of Israel] - [and] on condition that he sows wheat, barley and grape seeds with a single hand motion. However one is lashed for the [forbidden] grafting of trees everywhere. And its prohibition comes under His saying, "you shall not sow your field with mingled seed." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Kilayim. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Diverse Species 1.)

To leave over the corner of the field: To leave over a corner from the produce, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:10), "to the poor and to the stranger shall you leave them," after it mentioned, "you shall not finish the corner of your field" (Leviticus 19:9). And the understanding of stranger [here] is a righteous convert (see Sifra Kedoshim 3:4). And so [too], any "stranger" stated in [the context of] gifts to the poor - as behold, it is written about the second tithe (Deuteronomy 26:12), "to the stranger, to the orphan and to the widow." And that is certainly the righteous convert - when undifferentiated - as its witnesses (the orphan and the widow) are by its side. And the same is the case for all of the gifts to the poor. And nonetheless they, may their memory be blessed, said (Gittin 59b) that we do not prevent them from the poor of the idolaters, due to the ways of peace. And the content of the corner, is that a person leaves a little of his produce at the end of his field at the time that he reaps. And there is no measure to this remnant by Torah writ, but the Sages gave a measurement to the thing (Mishnah Peah 1:2), and it is one in sixty parts.

To not finish the corner in the field: Not to harvest all of what is planted, but rather to leave a remnant from it to the poor in the edge of the field, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:9), "you shall not finish the corner of your field in your harvesting." And this negative commandment is rectified by a positive commandment, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:10), "to the poor and to the stranger shall you leave them, etc." - meaning to say, that if he transgressed and harvested all of the field, that he give the measure of the corner to the poor from that which is harvested. And that is rabbinically one in sixty parts, as they obligated us so; but from the Torah, it has no measure, as we learned in Mishnah Peah 1:1, "These are the things that do not have a measure: the corner, etc."

To not finish the corner in the field: Not to harvest all of what is planted, but rather to leave a remnant from it to the poor in the edge of the field, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:9), "you shall not finish the corner of your field in your harvesting." And this negative commandment is rectified by a positive commandment, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:10), "to the poor and to the stranger shall you leave them, etc." - meaning to say, that if he transgressed and harvested all of the field, that he give the measure of the corner to the poor from that which is harvested. And that is rabbinically one in sixty parts, as they obligated us so; but from the Torah, it has no measure, as we learned in Mishnah Peah 1:1, "These are the things that do not have a measure: the corner, etc."

To leave the gleanings in the field: To leave the gleanings to the poor - and that is what falls from the sickle at the time of the harvesting, or from the hand at the time of the plucking, as it is stated with the gleanings (Leviticus 19:10), "to the poor and to the stranger shall you leave them."

To not take the sheaves that fall at the time of the harvesting: To not take the sheaves that fall at the time of the harvesting, but [rather] we leave them them for the poor, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:9), "and the gleanings of your harvest you shall not glean." And that is also rectified by a positive commandment, as we have elucidated about the corner (Sefer HaChinukh 217). And all of the content of this commandment you will also find above in the positive commandment of gleanings (Sefer HaChinukh 218).

The commandment of leaving over the corner of the vineyard: To leave over the corner of the vineyard. And this corner of the vineyard, the verse [chose to convey] with the expression of bunchless grapes (ollalot) - meaning to say that we were commanded that we leave over all of the bunchless grapes of the vineyard as the corner. And this is [the meaning of] that which it is written (Leviticus 19:10), "to the poor and to the stranger shall you leave them," after it mentioned, "And [in] your vineyard, you shall not take the bunchless grapes." This is the opinion of Rambam, may his memory be blessed, about the bunchless grapes of the vineyard, that they are in place of the corner that is with the other trees. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, did not explain like this. And I will write the essence of their disagreement at length in the negative commandment of "And [in] your vineyard, you shall not take the bunchless grapes" (Sefer HaChinukh 221). And there I will further explain from where [is] the obligation of the corner with all trees, and all of the matters of the commandment, as is my custom, with God's help.

To not finish the corner of the vineyard: To not finish all of the fruit of the vineyard at the time of the grape harvest, but [rather, one] leaves a corner from them to the poor, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:10), "And [in] your vineyard, you shall not take the bunchless grapes" - this is the corner of the vineyard. So wrote Rambam, may his memory be blessed. And he said further that, that which is written (Deuteronomy 24:20), "you shall not take from the branchlets after you" with olives, also instructs about the corner of the olive tree. As the corner of the olive trees is called branchlets (porot), and the corner of the vineyard is called bunchless grapes (ollalot). And from the both of them we learn [this] for all the trees. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, argued against him about this and said (in his introduction to the details of the commandments) that it is all a mistake. And he said that the negative commandment of "And [in] your vineyard," is unique specifically to the vineyard - and it is that we leave over all of the small grapes in it that do no have a katef or a natef. And the understanding of katef is sprigs one over the other (clusters); [of] natef is that they all hang and descend. And it comes out according to this that the ollalot are the small grapes sometimes found in the vineyard that are called gatimas in the vernacular. And this is certainly a small thing, according to that which we see in our vineyards. And so did they, may their memory be blessed say (Mishnah Peah 7:4), "Which are ollalot? All that do not have a katef nor a natef."

The commandment of leaving the peret of the vineyard: To leave the peret of the vineyard to the poor. And that is that which separates and falls from the grapes at the time of the grape harvest, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:10), "to the poor and to the stranger shall you leave them," after it mentioned, "and the fallen grapes of your vineyard, you shall not gather."

To not gather the peret of the vineyard: To not gather the peret of the vineyard, but [rather] to leave them over to the poor, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:10), "and the peret of your vineyard, you shall not gather." And that is the berries that shed at the time of the reaping of the grapes. And the law is the same for other trees that are similar to a vineyard - that we are obligated not to gather the berries that shed.

To not steal any money: To not steal any money, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:11), "You shall not steal." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 86a) that this is the warning [about] stealing money. And the content of theft is like I explained in the Order of Mishpatim (Sefer HaChinukh 54).

That we do not disavow money that is in our hand from another: That we not disavow that which is deposited into our hand, and about anything that is to us of someone else's, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:11), "you shall not disavow." And the explanation came (Shevuot 37b) that the verse is referring to money. And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:3 is: "Since it is stated (Leviticus 5:22), 'and he disavows it and swears falsely,' we have learned the punishment. From where is the warning? [Hence,] we learn to say, 'and you shall not disavow.'" This is also from the commandments about which the intellect testifies.

To not swear about the denial of money: To not swear about the disavowal, as it stated (Leviticus 19:11), "and you shall not lie" - meaning to say that if a man denied a deposit, he transgressed, "you shall not disavow"; and if he swore about the denial afterwards, he transgressed, "and you shall not lie." As so has the understanding of this verse come to us, that it is to warn about one who swears about the denial of money. And [it is] like it appears in Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:3, "'And you shall not lie' - what do we learn to say? Since it is stated (Leviticus 5:22), 'and he swears falsely,' we have learned the punishment. From where is the warning? [Hence,] we learn to say, 'and you shall not lie.'" And it is elucidated in Tractate Shevuot 49b that anyone who swears an oath about the denial of money, transgresses two negative commandments - on account of "And you shall not swear in My name falsely" (Leviticus 19:12), and on account of "and you shall not lie towards your compatriot."

To not swear about the denial of money: To not swear about the disavowal, as it stated (Leviticus 19:11), "and you shall not lie" - meaning to say that if a man denied a deposit, he transgressed, "you shall not disavow"; and if he swore about the denial afterwards, he transgressed, "and you shall not lie." As so has the understanding of this verse come to us, that it is to warn about one who swears about the denial of money. And [it is] like it appears in Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:3, "'And you shall not lie' - what do we learn to say? Since it is stated (Leviticus 5:22), 'and he swears falsely,' we have learned the punishment. From where is the warning? [Hence,] we learn to say, 'and you shall not lie.'" And it is elucidated in Tractate Shevuot 49b that anyone who swears an oath about the denial of money, transgresses two negative commandments - on account of "And you shall not swear in My name falsely" (Leviticus 19:12), and on account of "and you shall not lie towards your compatriot."

To not swear falsely: To not swear falsely, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:12), "And you shall not swear in My name falsely." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Shevout 21a) that this verse warns about an oath of speech. And an oath of speech is what is stated in the Torah (Leviticus 5:4), "Or a soul that swears to express with the lips to do bad or to do good." And it is divided into four parts - two of the future and two of the past, such as swearing on something that was done or not done, and on something that in the future he will do or will not do. And an oath of speech is only practiced with things that it is possible for a person to do, whether in the past or in the future. How is of the past? "I ate," or "I did not eat"; and so [too,] "I threw," or "I did not throw a stone into the sea." And how is of the future? "I will eat," or "I will not eat"; or "I will throw," or "I will not throw." But with things that have a prevention from the Torah, an oath of speech is not practiced. As an oath only rests upon an optional matter - that if he wants, he does it and if he wants, he does not do it - as it is stated, "to do bad or to do good." But with any matter of a commandment, there is an obligation upon him to do it. Therefore an oath of speech does not rest upon him, whether in the past or in the future - in the case that he swears to perform a commandment, and he did not perform it; and so [too,] if he swears that he performed a commandment, and he did not perform it. As [just] like a liability [for punishment for a false oath] does not rest upon the matter of a commandment in the future, so too does it not rest upon it in the past. And so is the matter elucidated in its place in Shevuot 27a.

To not oppress: To not hold on to that which is in our hand of someone else's by way of force or delay or deception - like delinquents who delay people, saying, "Go and return," so as to cause that what is in their hand of someone else's to remain with them. And this is an extremely bad trait, and [so] our perfect Torah distanced us from it and warned us about it in this place, as it is written (Leviticus 19:13), "You shall not oppress your neighbor" - as one who holds the money of someone else in this manner that we said is called an oppressor. And also included in oppression is anyone who is liable specific money to his fellow and he oppresses him, such as one who suppresses the wage of a wage worker and similar to it. As we do not require that the money actually come from the hand of the oppressed to the hand of the oppressor; but rather anyone that has a claim of specific money against him and he delays it as a result of his violence or any angle of deception is called an oppressor. And even though oppression, robbery and theft are one matter even if the act of one is different from the another, as the intention of the three of them is that a man not take that which is someone else's in any way; since people pilfer each other in these three ways, Scripture specified all of them and warned about each one on its own. And similar to this is what they, may their memory be blessed, said in Metzia (Bava Metzia 111a), "Rava said, 'This is oppression, this is [also] robbery. And [so] why did Scripture divide them [and specify each one]? To [have one who commits it] transgress two negative commandments.'"

To not rob: To not rob - meaning to say, to not take with strength and force and publicity that to which we do not have a right, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:13), "and you shall not rob." And the explanation came about it (Bava Kamma 79b), that the expression, "robbery (gezelah)" relates to one that grabs something from the hand of his fellow or takes it out of his domain against his will by way of force and in the open, like the matter that is stated (II Samuel 23:21), "and he robbed the spear from the hand of the Egyptian."

To not delay the wage of a wage worker: That we not delay the wage of a wage worker, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:13), "you shall not lay over the salary of a wage worker with you until the morning." And they, may their memory be blessed, said that this verse is referring to a day wage worker (Bava Metzia 110b). And the Torah extended the time of his payment the entire night, as it is stated, "until morning." And we learned about a night wage worker from another place, that the time of his payment is the whole day, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 24:15), "On its day you shall give his wage, and the sun should not set upon it." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Bava Metzia 110b) that this verse is referring to a night wage worker. And the language of the Mishnah is "A day wage worker collects the whole night, and a night wage worker collects the whole day. And even though two verses came about this commandment, they are only one commandment; and the one is stated to complete the law of the commandment. And we should not count that which the Torah has come to complete the law of a commandment [to be a commandment] on its own. And the content of this commandment - that we not delay payment to the wage worker, but rather we pay him at a set time - that is the principle of the commandment. And with the two negative statements mentioned about it, we knew when is the time of the payment of wage workers - whether a day wage worker or a night wage worker. And remember this principle [mentioned above] for all of the commandments; as it is a great principle in the calculation of the commandments. And it is a principle that two of the pillars of the world agreed about - Rambam, may his memory be blessed (Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 238), and Ramban, may his memory be blessed.

To not curse an Israelite, whether a man or a woman: To not curse an Israelite, whether a man or a woman; and even though he does not hear the curse, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:14), "You shall not curse the deaf" - and the explanation comes about this [that it is] one who does not hear your curse. And so did Onkelos translate [it]. And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:13 [is] "I only have a deaf person, from where do I include every man? [Hence] we learn to say (Exodus 22:27), 'among your people, you shall not maledict.' If so, why does it state, 'deaf?' Just like a deaf person is unique that he is alive - to exclude the dead that is not alive." Even thought we do not have the power to know in which way a curse impacts upon the one cursed, and with what power within speech there is to bring [that impact] upon him, we know more generally that people are concerned about curses - whether Israel or other nations - and say that curses of people, and even curses of commoners, have an impact on the one cursed and attaches malediction and distress to him. And since we know this thing from the mouth of the creatures, we will say that it is from the roots of the commandment that God prevented us from injuring others with our mouths, [just] like he prevented us from injuring them with action. And similar to this did they, may their memory be blessed, say (Moed Katan 18a), "A covenant is made with the lips" - meaning to say that there is power in the words of a person's mouth.

To not make an innocent one stumble on the way: To not make the Children of Israel stumble, to give them bad advice; but rather we right them when they ask advice, with that which we believe to be right and good advice, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:14), "and you shall not put a stumbling block in front of the blind." And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:14 [is] "In front of one who is blind about a thing and he takes advice from you, do not give him advice that is not appropriate for him." And they, may their memory be blessed, said [there also], "A man should not say to his fellow, 'Sell your field, and buy a donkey,' and he stalks him and takes it from him." And this negative commandment also includes one who helps one who commits a sin, since he brings him to being seduced to also transgress other times besides this. And from this angle, they, may their memory be blessed, said that the both the lender and the borrower with interest transgress with regards to "in front of the blind, etc."

To not vitiate justice: That the judge not cause vitiation in a decision. And vitiation is with anything where he deviates from that which the Torah commanded us regarding the law, unless he did so with the consent of the litigants. And about this is it stated (Leviticus 19:15), "You shall not vitiate judgement."

To not honor a great person in judgement: That the judge not honor one of the litigants at the time of the dispute - and even if he was great, honored and esteemed - as it is stated (Leviticus 19: 15), "and do not dignify the face of a great man." And they said in Sifra Kedoshim, Chapter 4:3, "That you not say, 'This one is a wealthy man, he is the son of great ones. How can I shame him?'" - meaning to say that I should not honor him more than his opponent who is not great like him. "Hence it is stated, 'and do not dignify the face of a great man.'"

And it is practiced in every place and at all times by males, since judgement is for them. And one who transgresses it and honors one litigant more than his fellow volitionally has violated this negative commandment and violated a positive commandment, as it is written (Leviticus 19:15), "you shall judge your people with righteousness." And [regarding] that which, they may their memory be blessed, permitted an advantage for the sage over the ignoramus in a few of the commandments, we will write later on the next commandment adjacently (Sefer HaChinukh 235).

The commandment to judge with righteousness: To judge with righteousness, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:15), "you shall judge your people with righteousness." And the explanation of it comes that the judges were commanded to treat the parties to the dispute equally - meaning to say that the judge not honor one of the litigants more than the other. And so they said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4:4 that one not speak all that he needs, and [the judge] say to the other, "Speak briefly." And so [too,] in the chapter [entitled] Shevuot HaEdut (Shevuot 30a), "Our Rabbis learned, '"You shall judge your people with righteousness" - that it not be that one stand and one sit; one not speak all that he needs, and [the judge] say to the other, "Speak briefly."'" And so [too,] included in this commandment is that every man that is wise in the laws of the Torah and righteous in his ways is commanded to judge the law of the Torah between parties of a dispute, if he has the power in his hand [to do so]. And even an individual can judge from Torah writ - and like they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 3a), "One can judge his fellow from Torah writ, as it is stated, 'You shall judge your people with righteousness.'" But the sages warned (Mishnah Avot 4:8), that a man not judge alone. And also included in this commandment is that it is fit for every person to judge his fellow favorably, and only to understand his deeds and his words favorably.

He prohibited the borrower - that he should not borrow with interest. And the analogy could have been that [only] the lender transgresses, as he is the sinner; whereas the borrower does not transgress, as the does not want his own robbery - such that it would be similar to fraud, that only the one committing fraud would transgress, not the one who is defrauded. Hence the prohibition came also to [specify] borrowing with interest. And that is His saying, "You shall not charge interest to your brother" (Deuteronomy 23:20). And its explanation came: You shall not have interest taken. And in the explanation, they said in the Gemara, Metzia (Bava Metzia 75b), "The borrower transgresses on account of, 'You shall not charge interest; and on account of 'and you shall not put a stumbling block in front of the blind' (Leviticus 19:14)" - as we will explain, when we mention this commandment (Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandments 299). (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Creditor and Debtor 4.)

To not spy: That we have been prevented from talebearing, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:16), "You shall not go talebearing (rachil)." And the matter is that if a person hears something bad about his fellow, that he should not go to him and tell him "x" is saying so and so, unless his intention is to remove damages or to stop a quarrel. And our sages, may their memory be blessed, said (Ketuvot 46a) about the meaning of rachil, rach la'zeh ve kashe la'zeh (soft to this one and hard to that one). A different explanation: Do not be like a rochel (peddler), who picks up things and goes [with them to others].

He prohibited being involved with a loan with interest between a borrow and a lender - not to be a guarantor for one of them, not to be a witness for them and not to write a contract about what they agreed upon about the interest. And that is His saying, "you shall not lay upon him interest" (Exodus 22:24). And the language of the Gemara, Metzia (Bava Metzia 75b), is "The guarantor and the witnesses only transgress on account of, 'you shall not lay.'" And there, it is explained that the scribe, the witnesses and the guarantor also transgress. And there, it is also explained that this negative statement, which is 'you shall not lay' - even with its coming about the middlemen, meaning those [tangentially] involved in that matter - also includes the lender. And therefore the lender transgresses six negative statements: The first is, "do not be to him as a creditor" (Exodus 22:24); the second is, "Your money you shall not give him on interest" (Leviticus 25:37); the third is, "and on increase you shall not give your food" (Leviticus 25:37); the fourth is, "Do not take from him" (Leviticus 25:36); the fifth is, "you shall not lay upon him"; and the sixth is, "and you shall not put a stumbling block in front of the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). And there, they said, "These transgress a negative commandment: The lender; the borrower; the guarantor; and the witnesses. And the Sages say, 'Even the scribe.' They transgress, 'you shall not give him'; 'Do not take'; 'do not be to him as a creditor'; 'you shall not lay'; and 'you shall not put in front of the blind.'" And in the Gemara: "Abbaye says, 'The lender transgresses them all; the borrower transgresses, "You shall not charge interest" (Deuteronomy 23:3) and "and you shall not put a stumbling block in front of the blind"; the guarantor and the witnesses only [transgress] on account of "you shall not lay."'" And one who transgresses this negative commandment: If the interest was fixed, we take it away from him and return it to the one from whom it was taken. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Creditor and Debtor 4.)

To not stand over the blood of neighbors: That we not refrain from saving the soul of an Israelite when we see him in danger of death and destruction and we have the ability to save him from any side, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:16), "you shall not stand over the blood of your neighbor." And we say in Sanhedrin 73a, "We learn, 'From where [do we know] about one who sees his fellow drowning in a river, or being dragged away by a wild animal, or [that there are] bandits coming against him, that he is obligated to save him with his life? As it is stated, "you shall not stand over the blood of your neighbor."' It is not needed that he is obligated with his life, but he is also obligated to tarry and hire [others to do so]." And our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed also included in this warning (negative commandment) not to suppress testimony so that his fellow not lose money. And so is it in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4:8, "From where [do we know] that if testimony is known to him that he is not permitted to remain silent about it? As it is stated, 'you shall not stand over the blood of your neighbor.' And from where [do we know] if you see someone drowning in the river, etc. And from where [do we know about] one pursuing his fellow to kill him, that you are obligated to rescue him with [the soul of the pursuer]? As it is stated, 'you shall not stand, etc.'"

To not hate brothers: To not hate with hatred of the heart any Israelite, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:17), "You shall not hate your brother in your heart." And the language of Sifra Kedoshim, Chapter 4:8 is "I have only said hatred that is in the heart." And likewise in Arakhin 16b, "The verse is speaking about hatred in the heart." But when he shows him hatred, and [the other] knows that he is his enemy, he does not violate this negative commandment. However he does violate "You shall not take vengeance and not bear a grudge." And he likewise violates a positive commandment, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:18), "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself." And nonetheless hatred of the heart is worse than all revealed hatred, and [so] the Torah especially warns about it.

To not hate brothers: To not hate with hatred of the heart any Israelite, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:17), "You shall not hate your brother in your heart." And the language of Sifra Kedoshim, Chapter 4:8 is "I have only said hatred that is in the heart." And likewise in Arakhin 16b, "The verse is speaking about hatred in the heart." But when he shows him hatred, and [the other] knows that he is his enemy, he does not violate this negative commandment. However he does violate "You shall not take vengeance and not bear a grudge." And he likewise violates a positive commandment, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:18), "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself." And nonetheless hatred of the heart is worse than all revealed hatred, and [so] the Torah especially warns about it.

The commandment of rebuke to an Israelite who does not behave properly: To rebuke an Israelite who does not behave properly - whether about things that are between a man and his fellow or between a man and the Omnipresent - as it is stated (Leviticus 19:17), "you shall surely rebuke your compatriot, and you shall not bear a sin for him." And they said in Sifra, Kedoshim 4:8, "From where [do we know] that if you rebuked him four or five times and he did not return, that you are obligated to go back and rebuke [him again]? [Hence] we learn to say, 'you shall surely rebuke.'" And they, may their memory be blessed, also said in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 31a), "'You shall surely rebuke' - even a hundred times." And they said in the Sifra, "Perhaps, he should rebuke and his face change [color]? [Hence] we learn to say, 'and you shall not bear a sin for him.'" And this teaches that at the beginning of the rebuke it is fitting for a person to rebuke privately, with soft expressions and calm words, so that he not be embarrassed. But there is no doubt that if he does not return with this, that we shame the sinner in public and publicize his sin and insult him, until he returns to the better.

Laws of Honoring Father and Mother It is a positive commandment that a person should honor his father and his mother and fear them. And he must be very careful about their honor and about their fear, since their honor is compared to the honor of the Omnipresent: As it is written (Exodus 20:11), "Honor your father and your mother"; and it is written (Proverbs 3:9), "Honor the Lord with your wealth." And regarding their fear, it is written (Leviticus 19:3), "A man shall fear his mother and his father"; and regarding the fear of the Omnipresent, it is stated (Deuteronomy 6:13), "You shall fear the Lord, your God." And the Sages said (Kiddushin 30b), "There are three partners in a person: The Holy One, blessed be He, his father and his mother [...] When a person honors his father and mother, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says, 'I ascribe credit to them as if I dwelt between them and they honored Me as well.'" With honor, He had the father precede the mother, as it is written, "Honor your father and your mother'; but with fear, He had the mother precede the father, as it is written, "A man shall fear his mother and his father" - to teach that both of them are the same, both for honor and for fear. And what is fear and what is honor? Fear: One may not stand in his place and one may not sit in his place - the explanation is in his particular place to stand amidst the council of elders with his colleagues in counsel. But the Ramah (R. Meir HaLevi Abulafia) wrote that the same is the law regarding his particular place to sit in his house. And he may not contradict his words, nor may he determine his words. And Rashi explained [that] if [his father] was disagreeing about a matter of law with someone else, he may not say, "The words of x appear [correct]." But the Ramah wrote that this is not necessary [to say], as that is contradicting his words. Rather even if the words of his father appear [correct] to him, he may not say, "The words of my father appear [correct]" - as it appears as if he is determining [the correctness of] the words of his father. However, if he has an answer to answer those that are arguing [with his father], he may answer [them]. And the Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:3): He should not call him by his name - not in his lifetime and not in his death - but he should rather say, "Father, my teacher." If his name is the same as the name of others, he should [also] change their names. And it appears to me that one only needs to be careful about this with a name that is unusual, such that not everyone uses it. But with names that all of the people call [their offspring], such as Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, Moshe and Aharon and that which is similar to them, one can use them to call others in any language and at any time and there is no [problem] with this. To here [are his words]. And that which he wrote that he should not call others whose names are the same as his father with their names is a wonder! And up to where (how extensive) is their fear? Even if one was dressed in fine clothing and sitting at the head of the community, and his father and mother came and tore his clothes, struck him on his head and spit in front of him - he should not embarrass them but rather be quiet and fear the King of the kings of kings, who commanded him about this. As if flesh and blood had decreed something that is more distressing than this upon him, he would not have [even] twitched about the matter; all the mores so, with the King of the kings of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He. And what is honor? One gives [his parent] food and he gives him drink, and he gives it with a pleasant countenance, and he does not show him an angry face. As even if he feeds him fattened fowl every day, but he shows him an angry face, he is punished for it. And that which he gives him food and he gives him drink - that is from [the resources of] the father, if he has; but the son is not obligated to give him from his [own resources]. However if the father does not have and the son does have, we force him and he sustains the father according to what he can [afford]. But if the son does not have, he is not obligated to [knock on] doors to feed his father. But he is obligated to honor him with his body, even though through this, he [becomes] idle from his work and [then] become required to [knock on] doors. And the Ramah wrote [that this is] specifically when the son has sustenance that will sustain [himself] that day. But if he does not have [it], he is not obligated to be idle from his work and to [knock] on doors. And he should serve him in other things with which a servant serves his master. And he is obligated to honor him in the rest of his ways - in his buying and selling, and the doing of his wants. How is this? If he needs to request anything in the city and he knows that they would fulfill his request for the sake of his father - even though he knows that they would also fulfill the thing for his sake, nevertheless, he should not say, "Do this one thing for my sake," but rather, "for the sake of Father," in order to attach the honor to his father. And likewise with anything that is like this, he should include [him] in all of his words, such that he is concerned about the honor of his father and his fear. However if he knows that they will not fulfill his [request] for the sake of his father, he should request [it] for his own sake and not for the sake of his father, as it would only be a disgrace for him - since they will not do it for his sake. And one is obligated to stand before him. The Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:3) [that] a father who is the student of his son - the father does not stand before the son. And not only that, but the son must stand before his father, even though he is his student. And my master, my father the Rosh, may his memory blessed, wrote that each one must stand before the other. And up to where (how extensive) is honor? Even if [the parent] takes his purse full of coins and throws it to the sea in front of him, he should not embarrass him. And the Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:7) [that it is] even if he threw the purse of the son to the sea. But RI explained that according to that which we decide that he need not honor him from his [own resources], if he throws the son's purse, he may prevent him. Rather [the Talmud's case] is saying with the purse of his father, he may not embarrass him in order to prevent him, even though he will inherit it. The Ramah wrote that which the son can embarrass the father with his [own] purse is only before he threw it to the sea, as it is possible that he will be prevented and not throw it. But after he throws it, it is forbidden to embarrass him; as what has happened, has happened. So now when he is silent, it is honor that does not involve financial loss, so he is obligated about it. But it is permissible to make a claim against him in court. He is obligated to honor him even after his death. How is that? If he says a matter he heard from his mouth, he should not say, "So said Father, my teacher." Rather, he should say, "So said Father, my teacher, may I be an atonement for his resting." To what does this apply? Within twelve months [of his death]. But after twelve months, when he mentions him, he says: May his memory be for a blessing." The Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:10), "If one's father or mother has become mentally insane, he should make an effort to behave toward them according to their state of mind until they will be shown mercy. But if it is impossible for him to stand [it], because they have become utterly insane, he may leave them and go away, charging others to take proper care of them." But the Ravaad wrote, "This is not a correct ruling - if he leaves them and goes away, who will he command to watch them?" If one saw that his father was transgressing a Torah matter, he should not say to him, "You transgressed a Torah matter." Rather, he should say to him, "Father, such and such is written in the Torah." And from his reminding him, he will understand on his own and will not be embarrassed. If his father said to him, "Give me water to drink," and there was another commandment before him to do: If it is possible for the commandment to be done by others, he leaves it for others to do and occupies himself with the honor of his father. But if there are not others there to do it, he should occupy himself with the commandment and leave the honor of his father, since he and his father are obligated by the commandment. Torah study is greater than honoring father and mother. If his father said to him, "Give me water to drink"; and his mother said to him, "Give me water to drink," he leaves the honor of his mother and occupies himself with the honor of his father, since his mother is also obligated in honoring his father. But if they are divorced - such that she is not obligated in his honor - then both of them are the same, to honor them one like the other. If his father said to him to transgress a Torah matter - whether he says to him to transgress a negative commandment or he says to him to negate (not do) a positive commandment, even a [rabbinic] commandment - he should not listen to him. And my master, my father the Rosh wrote in a responsum [that] if the father commands his son not to speak with x, such the he should not forgive him for what he did to him until a set time; whereas the son wants to appease him, except that he is concerned about his father's command, he should not be concerned about his father's command. As it is forbidden to hate any person unless he saw him sinning. And [that] the father commanded him to hate; it is not in his power to make him transgress a Torah matter! And it is the same with a man or a woman - they are the same regarding the honor and fear of father and mother. However a man has [the wherewithal] in his hands to do [it], whereas a woman does not have [the wherewithal] in her hands to do [it], since the authority of others (her husband) is upon her. Therefore if she is divorced or widowed, they are both the same. The Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:11) [that] a mamzer (someone born of a forbidden union) is obligated in honoring his father and his mother and in their fear, even though he is exempt about hitting them and cursing them until they repent. Even if one's father is wicked and sinful, he must honor him and fear him. But it appears to me that since he is wicked, he is not obligated to honor him. [It is] as we say (Bava Kamma 94b) concerning [those] whose father left them a stolen cow, [that] they are obligated to return [it] for the honor of their father. And it asked, "Behold, he does not do the deeds of your people" - its explanation is, so they are [for that reason] not obligated to honor him. And it answers, "When he repented." Therefore the whole time he has not repented, they are not obligated to honor him. Even though a person is obligated to fear his father and his mother greatly, it is forbidden [for the parent] to make his yoke heavy upon his children and to be exacting with them about his honor, so as not to bring them to an obstacle. Rather he should forgive and avert his eyes from them; since when a father foregoes his honor, his honor is forgiven. And they would excommunicate someone who strikes his adult son; as behold, he is transgressing, "you shall not put an obstacle in front of the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). A person is obligated to honor the wife of his father - even though she is not his mother - so long as his father is alive; and he is obligated to honor his mother's wife, so long as his mother is alive. But after [the blood relative's death], he is not obligated in their honor. Nevertheless, it is a commandment to honor them, even after the death. A person is obligated in the honor of his older brother like the honor of his father. And he is obligated to honor his father in law, as it is written (that David said to Shaul in I Samuel 24:12), "My father, my father, see and see."

To not whiten the face of an Israelite: To not embarrass an Israelite; and our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, called this sin (Avot 3:15), "whitening the face of his fellow in public. And the negative commandment that comes about this [in the Torah] is that which is written (Leviticus 19:17), "you shall surely rebuke your compatriot, and you shall not bear a sin for him." And they said in Sifra, Kedoshim 4:8, "From where [do we know] that if you rebuked him four or five times [...] go back and rebuke [him again]? [Hence] we learn to say, 'you shall surely rebuke.' Perhaps, he should rebuke and his face change [color]? [Hence] we learn to say, 'and you shall not bear a sin for him.'"

Laws of Honoring Father and Mother It is a positive commandment that a person should honor his father and his mother and fear them. And he must be very careful about their honor and about their fear, since their honor is compared to the honor of the Omnipresent: As it is written (Exodus 20:11), "Honor your father and your mother"; and it is written (Proverbs 3:9), "Honor the Lord with your wealth." And regarding their fear, it is written (Leviticus 19:3), "A man shall fear his mother and his father"; and regarding the fear of the Omnipresent, it is stated (Deuteronomy 6:13), "You shall fear the Lord, your God." And the Sages said (Kiddushin 30b), "There are three partners in a person: The Holy One, blessed be He, his father and his mother [...] When a person honors his father and mother, the Holy One, Blessed be He, says, 'I ascribe credit to them as if I dwelt between them and they honored Me as well.'" With honor, He had the father precede the mother, as it is written, "Honor your father and your mother'; but with fear, He had the mother precede the father, as it is written, "A man shall fear his mother and his father" - to teach that both of them are the same, both for honor and for fear. And what is fear and what is honor? Fear: One may not stand in his place and one may not sit in his place - the explanation is in his particular place to stand amidst the council of elders with his colleagues in counsel. But the Ramah (R. Meir HaLevi Abulafia) wrote that the same is the law regarding his particular place to sit in his house. And he may not contradict his words, nor may he determine his words. And Rashi explained [that] if [his father] was disagreeing about a matter of law with someone else, he may not say, "The words of x appear [correct]." But the Ramah wrote that this is not necessary [to say], as that is contradicting his words. Rather even if the words of his father appear [correct] to him, he may not say, "The words of my father appear [correct]" - as it appears as if he is determining [the correctness of] the words of his father. However, if he has an answer to answer those that are arguing [with his father], he may answer [them]. And the Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:3): He should not call him by his name - not in his lifetime and not in his death - but he should rather say, "Father, my teacher." If his name is the same as the name of others, he should [also] change their names. And it appears to me that one only needs to be careful about this with a name that is unusual, such that not everyone uses it. But with names that all of the people call [their offspring], such as Avraham, Yitzchak, Yaakov, Moshe and Aharon and that which is similar to them, one can use them to call others in any language and at any time and there is no [problem] with this. To here [are his words]. And that which he wrote that he should not call others whose names are the same as his father with their names is a wonder! And up to where (how extensive) is their fear? Even if one was dressed in fine clothing and sitting at the head of the community, and his father and mother came and tore his clothes, struck him on his head and spit in front of him - he should not embarrass them but rather be quiet and fear the King of the kings of kings, who commanded him about this. As if flesh and blood had decreed something that is more distressing than this upon him, he would not have [even] twitched about the matter; all the mores so, with the King of the kings of kings, the Holy One, blessed be He. And what is honor? One gives [his parent] food and he gives him drink, and he gives it with a pleasant countenance, and he does not show him an angry face. As even if he feeds him fattened fowl every day, but he shows him an angry face, he is punished for it. And that which he gives him food and he gives him drink - that is from [the resources of] the father, if he has; but the son is not obligated to give him from his [own resources]. However if the father does not have and the son does have, we force him and he sustains the father according to what he can [afford]. But if the son does not have, he is not obligated to [knock on] doors to feed his father. But he is obligated to honor him with his body, even though through this, he [becomes] idle from his work and [then] become required to [knock on] doors. And the Ramah wrote [that this is] specifically when the son has sustenance that will sustain [himself] that day. But if he does not have [it], he is not obligated to be idle from his work and to [knock] on doors. And he should serve him in other things with which a servant serves his master. And he is obligated to honor him in the rest of his ways - in his buying and selling, and the doing of his wants. How is this? If he needs to request anything in the city and he knows that they would fulfill his request for the sake of his father - even though he knows that they would also fulfill the thing for his sake, nevertheless, he should not say, "Do this one thing for my sake," but rather, "for the sake of Father," in order to attach the honor to his father. And likewise with anything that is like this, he should include [him] in all of his words, such that he is concerned about the honor of his father and his fear. However if he knows that they will not fulfill his [request] for the sake of his father, he should request [it] for his own sake and not for the sake of his father, as it would only be a disgrace for him - since they will not do it for his sake. And one is obligated to stand before him. The Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:3) [that] a father who is the student of his son - the father does not stand before the son. And not only that, but the son must stand before his father, even though he is his student. And my master, my father the Rosh, may his memory blessed, wrote that each one must stand before the other. And up to where (how extensive) is honor? Even if [the parent] takes his purse full of coins and throws it to the sea in front of him, he should not embarrass him. And the Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:7) [that it is] even if he threw the purse of the son to the sea. But RI explained that according to that which we decide that he need not honor him from his [own resources], if he throws the son's purse, he may prevent him. Rather [the Talmud's case] is saying with the purse of his father, he may not embarrass him in order to prevent him, even though he will inherit it. The Ramah wrote that which the son can embarrass the father with his [own] purse is only before he threw it to the sea, as it is possible that he will be prevented and not throw it. But after he throws it, it is forbidden to embarrass him; as what has happened, has happened. So now when he is silent, it is honor that does not involve financial loss, so he is obligated about it. But it is permissible to make a claim against him in court. He is obligated to honor him even after his death. How is that? If he says a matter he heard from his mouth, he should not say, "So said Father, my teacher." Rather, he should say, "So said Father, my teacher, may I be an atonement for his resting." To what does this apply? Within twelve months [of his death]. But after twelve months, when he mentions him, he says: May his memory be for a blessing." The Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:10), "If one's father or mother has become mentally insane, he should make an effort to behave toward them according to their state of mind until they will be shown mercy. But if it is impossible for him to stand [it], because they have become utterly insane, he may leave them and go away, charging others to take proper care of them." But the Ravaad wrote, "This is not a correct ruling - if he leaves them and goes away, who will he command to watch them?" If one saw that his father was transgressing a Torah matter, he should not say to him, "You transgressed a Torah matter." Rather, he should say to him, "Father, such and such is written in the Torah." And from his reminding him, he will understand on his own and will not be embarrassed. If his father said to him, "Give me water to drink," and there was another commandment before him to do: If it is possible for the commandment to be done by others, he leaves it for others to do and occupies himself with the honor of his father. But if there are not others there to do it, he should occupy himself with the commandment and leave the honor of his father, since he and his father are obligated by the commandment. Torah study is greater than honoring father and mother. If his father said to him, "Give me water to drink"; and his mother said to him, "Give me water to drink," he leaves the honor of his mother and occupies himself with the honor of his father, since his mother is also obligated in honoring his father. But if they are divorced - such that she is not obligated in his honor - then both of them are the same, to honor them one like the other. If his father said to him to transgress a Torah matter - whether he says to him to transgress a negative commandment or he says to him to negate (not do) a positive commandment, even a [rabbinic] commandment - he should not listen to him. And my master, my father the Rosh wrote in a responsum [that] if the father commands his son not to speak with x, such the he should not forgive him for what he did to him until a set time; whereas the son wants to appease him, except that he is concerned about his father's command, he should not be concerned about his father's command. As it is forbidden to hate any person unless he saw him sinning. And [that] the father commanded him to hate; it is not in his power to make him transgress a Torah matter! And it is the same with a man or a woman - they are the same regarding the honor and fear of father and mother. However a man has [the wherewithal] in his hands to do [it], whereas a woman does not have [the wherewithal] in her hands to do [it], since the authority of others (her husband) is upon her. Therefore if she is divorced or widowed, they are both the same. The Rambam wrote (Mishneh Torah, Rebels 6:11) [that] a mamzer (someone born of a forbidden union) is obligated in honoring his father and his mother and in their fear, even though he is exempt about hitting them and cursing them until they repent. Even if one's father is wicked and sinful, he must honor him and fear him. But it appears to me that since he is wicked, he is not obligated to honor him. [It is] as we say (Bava Kamma 94b) concerning [those] whose father left them a stolen cow, [that] they are obligated to return [it] for the honor of their father. And it asked, "Behold, he does not do the deeds of your people" - its explanation is, so they are [for that reason] not obligated to honor him. And it answers, "When he repented." Therefore the whole time he has not repented, they are not obligated to honor him. Even though a person is obligated to fear his father and his mother greatly, it is forbidden [for the parent] to make his yoke heavy upon his children and to be exacting with them about his honor, so as not to bring them to an obstacle. Rather he should forgive and avert his eyes from them; since when a father foregoes his honor, his honor is forgiven. And they would excommunicate someone who strikes his adult son; as behold, he is transgressing, "you shall not put an obstacle in front of the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). A person is obligated to honor the wife of his father - even though she is not his mother - so long as his father is alive; and he is obligated to honor his mother's wife, so long as his mother is alive. But after [the blood relative's death], he is not obligated in their honor. Nevertheless, it is a commandment to honor them, even after the death. A person is obligated in the honor of his older brother like the honor of his father. And he is obligated to honor his father in law, as it is written (that David said to Shaul in I Samuel 24:12), "My father, my father, see and see."

They would excommunicate someone who strikes his adult son; as behold, he is transgressing, "you shall not put an obstacle in front of the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). But regarding this, he is only called adult after he is twenty-two or twenty-four years old (In the Kuntrass, Kiddushin, Chapter 4; and Beit Yosef 334 at the end).

To not avenge: To not avenge, meaning to say that we have been prevented form taking revenge from an Israelite. And the content is, for example, that an Israelite did evil or caused pain to his fellow in one of the things that it is customary among most people to not veer from searching for the one who did evil do them until they pay him back like his evil deed, or they hurt him like he hurt them. And God, may He be blessed, has prevented us from this matter, by His stating (Leviticus 19:18), "You shall not avenge." And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4:10 [is] "How far is the power of revenge? If [one] said to [another], 'Lend me your sickle,' and he did not lend him. The next day [the other] said to him, 'Lend me your spade.' [So] he said [back], 'I will not lend you [it], just as you did not lend me your sickle.' Hence, it is written, 'You shall not avenge.'" And compare like this to all things.

To not begrudge: To not begrudge, meaning to say that we have been prevented from bearing a grudge in our hearts [about] an Israelite having done evil to us. And even though we have consented in our souls not to pay him back for his deeds, we have even been prevented from just remembering his sin in the heart. And about this is it stated, (Leviticus 19:18), "you shall not begrudge." And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4:11 is "How far is the power of begrudging? If [one] said to [another], 'Lend me your sickle,' and he did not lend him. The next day, the [other] said to him, 'Lend me your spade.' [So] he said [back] to him, 'Here it is; I am not like you, who did not lend me your sickle.' Hence, it is written, 'you shall not begrudge.'"

The commandment of love of Israel: To love [with] love of the soul each one of Israel - meaning to say that we have compassion for an Israelite and for his money, [just] like a person has compassion for himself and for his [own] money; as it stated (Leviticus 19:18), "you shall love your neighbor as yourself." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shabbat 31a), "What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow." And they said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4:12, "Rabbi Akiva said, 'This is a great principle in the Torah'" - meaning to say that many commandments are dependent upon it. As one that loves his fellow like himself will not steal his money, have adultery with his wife, cheat his money from him nor hurt him from any angle. And so [too,] are there several other commandments dependent on this - the thing is well-known [revealed] to all who have intellect.

To not mate a beast, a specie with not its specie: To not mate a beast [in a] forbidden mixture - meaning to say that we not graft a male with any specie of [domesticated] beast or [wild] animal which is not its specie - as it is stated (Leviticus 19:19), "your beast shall you not mate [in a] forbidden mixture." And in its explanation, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 91a) that the obligation is from when he inserts like 'the brush into the tube' - and then is he lashed.

To not sow seeds of forbidden mixtures and not graft in any place in the Land: To not sow two species of seed, such as wheat and barley or fava beans and peas, together - only in the Land of Israel - as it is stated (Leviticus 19:19), "your field shall you not sow [with] a forbidden mixture." And the explanation comes about it (Kiddushin 39a) that the verse is speaking about a field that we have in the Land.

He prohibited us - that we not steal the boundary of the land. And that is that we change the boundary and the border that is between us and others, such that it would be possible for a lier to say that the land that is someone else's is his. And that is His saying, ["Do not move back the boundary of your neighbor" (Deuteronomy 19:14). And in the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 188:1-2), they said,] "Is it not already stated (Leviticus 19:13), 'you shall not rob?' What do we learn to say [with], 'Do not move back?' It teaches that one who removes his fellow's boundary transgresses two negative commandments. Perhaps [the same holds true] also outside of the Land [of Israel]? [Hence] we learn to say, 'in your inheritance that you shall inherit in the land' - to teach that in the Land, one transgresses two negative commandments; but outside the Land, he only transgresses on account of one." Behold it has been made clear that this commandment is specific to the Land of Israel. (See Parashat Shoftim; Mishneh Torah, Theft 10.)

To not eat orlah: That we not eat from the fruits of a tree during the time of its orlah, which is the first three years from its being planted. And it is the same if one planted a sapling or a sprig from a tree, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:23) "three years shall it be orlah for you, it shall not be eaten."

He prohibited us - regarding that which is found with us that we owe, not to withhold it and not give it. And that is His saying, "You shall not exploit" (Leviticus 19:13). And that is that theft is taking something that is with someone else by ruses and in secret; and we have been prohibited this action with His saying, "You shall not steal" (Leviticus 19:11), as we explained. And robbery is the taking of something that is with another by force, duress and fighting, like the robbers in the cities do; and we were prohibited this action by His saying, "and you shall not rob." Whereas exploitation is that someone else has something of value - meaning money that is coming to him - that one is holding and not giving to him; either by force or not by force, but [always] through deception. And He prohibited this action also, with His saying, "You shall not exploit." And in the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 2:9): "'You shall not exploit' - monetary exploitation. And which is that? One who retains the wage of a wage-worker" - and all that is similar to it. However the example is that of a wage-worker, because it is a full obligation upon you - even though he did not give you money from himself and money did not come to you from him; nevertheless since he came to you with a well-known obligatory arrangement, [you are] obligated. And this prohibition about this matter has already been repeated, and He took the example of this matter itself and said, "Do not exploit the worker, who is poor and destitute" (Deuteronomy 24:14). His intention with this is, do not exploit a worker, since he is poor and destitute - as He said about him, "neither shall the sun set upon it, etc." (Deuteronomy 24:15). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 278:1) is, "'Do not exploit the laborer, who is poor and destitute' - is it not already stated, 'you shall not rob?' It [hence] teaches that anyone who retains the wage of a wage-worker transgresses, 'You shall not exploit,' 'you shall not rob,' 'there shall not abide,' and on account of, 'You must pay him his wage on the same day' (Deuteronomy 24:15)." And there (Sifrei Devarim 278:2), they said in explanation of, "poor and destitute": "'Poor and destitute' - I hasten to exact payment for one who is poor and destitute." And the one who transgresses exploitation has the same law as a robber. [This is from] His saying, "and denies to his kinsman, a deposit or a pledge or robbery or exploitation from his countryman" (Leviticus 5:21). (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Robbery and Lost Property 1)

The commandment of the fourth year plant: That the fourth year plant be completely holy - the explanation [of which] is that all fruits that come out of the tree in the fourth year from its planting are holy; meaning to say, that they are eaten by the owners in Jerusalem, like the second tithe, and that is their holiness - as it is stated (Leviticus 19:23-24), "and you shall plant any food tree[...] And in the fourth year all of its fruit shall be holy, for praising to the Lord." And the explanation comes about it that it is for the owners - and the explanation of praising is that the owners should eat it in Jerusalem, and that is rejoicing. And the Sages called it the fourth year plant, in every place. And in Sifrei Bamidbar 6:1, it expounds that the fourth year plant is for the owners, from that which is written (Numbers 5:10), "And a man's consecrated things shall be his." As they said there, "'A man's consecrated things, etc.' - it pulled back all of the consecrated things and gave them to the priests; and there is nothing remaining for them except for the thanksgiving-offering, the peace offering, the Pesach offering, the animal tithe, the second tithe and the fourth year plant, which are for the owners.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Berakhot 35a) that one who wants to redeem the fourth year plant, redeems it like the second tithe, which [can be] redeemed - meaning to say, that he redeems it with money and brings [that] up to Jerusalem. And if he redeems it himself, he adds a fifth. As so is the law with the second tithe, from that which it is written about it (Leviticus 27:31), "And if a man surely redeems his tithes." But one who redeems the second tithe for others, does not add a fifth. And he does not redeem [the fourth year plant] until it reaches the season of the tithe; as it is stated about it (Leviticus 19:25), "to increase its produce for yourselves" - and they, may their memory be blessed, expounded (Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 3:10), "Until it becomes produce" - meaning to say that it reaches the season of the tithe, and that is a third of its ripeness. And according to Rambam (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Second Tithes and Fourth Year's Fruit 9:2), may his memory be blessed, we do not redeem it when it is attached [to the tree], like the tithe. But others explain (Rash on Orlah 5:5) that we redeem it even attached. And it is called money of the Higher Realm, like the tithe. And therefore it cannot be acquired as a gift - unless he gave it when it is still unripe fruit, as the obligation has not yet rested upon it, as we said. And its law in the other things - such as eating, drinking and anointment - is like the tithe. And on the commandment of the second tithe in Parshat Reeh Anochi (Sefer HaChinukh 473), we will write more about it at length with God's help.

To not eat or to drink in the way of a glutton and a drunkard: To not indulge in much eating and drinking in the days of youth, according to the conditions described with a rebellious son (ben sorrer oumoreh) in Scripture, with what the Sages, may their memory be blessed, explained about it in Tractate Sanhedrin. And the warning to us about this is from that it is written (Leviticus 19:26), "You shall not eat upon the blood." As so did they say explicitly in Sanhedrin 63a, "From where is the warning for a rebellious son? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall not eat upon the blood'" - meaning to say, do not eat an eating that leads to shedding blood, and that is the eating of the rebellious son, such that he is liable the death penalty for such a bad eating. And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 195), "And even though this is a general negative commandment as we have explained in the ninth principle, it is not distant [to say] that when the punishment is explicit - meaning to say the punishment of the rebellious son, the statute of which is stoning, being explicit in Scripture - we are not concerned about whether the warning is from the general negative commandments." And he gave a reason for his words, as it is written in his book, Negative Commandment 195, and in the ninth principle. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, wrangled with him greatly about this. However they both concede that the negative commandment of "You shall not eat upon the blood," and anything similar to it that includes many things - as we will write here - and their content and the reason for their prohibition is not the same, except that Scripture forbids them all in one negative commandment and in one category (literally, with one name), is called a general negative commandment. And it a law that we do not administer lashes for a general negative commandment. But Rambam, may his memory be blessed, would say that because of this is the rebellious son punished with the death penalty for this eating - since Scripture explicitly revealed that his punishment is stoning in another place. And he elucidated at the the introduction to his book (Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Root 14 at the end) that anything about which Scripture makes liable for excision or the death penalty of the court is a negative commandment, except for the Pesach sacrifice and circumcision - as they have excision but they are positive commandments. And from this principle was it derived by the Rabbi that the law of the warning of the rebellious son - even though it is learned from a general negative commandment - is like the law of other warnings, since Scripture made the punishment of the death penalty about it explicit.

He prohibited us from swearing [falsely] about the denial of money that is incumbent upon us [to pay]. And that is His saying, "and do not lie to your kinsman" (Leviticus 19:11). The example about this is that when he denies the deposit, he transgresses, "you shall not deny"; and when he swears falsely about his denial, he transgresses, "do not lie." And in the Sifra: "'And do not lie ' - what do we learn to say [from it]? Since it states, 'and swears falsely about it' (Leviticus 5:22), we have learned the punishment. From where [do we know] the prohibition? [Hence] we learn to say, 'and do not lie.'" And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the fifth [chapter] of Shevuot. And there (Shevuot 20b), it is explained that one who swore falsely about the denial of money, transgresses two negative commandments - on account of, "You shall not swear falsely by My name" (Leviticus 19:12); and on account of, "do not lie." (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Oaths 1.)

To not divine: That we not follow divinations, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:26), "you shall not divine." And it is repeated in another place, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 18:10), "There shall not be found in you, etc. or a diviner." And they said in Sifrei Devarim (Shoftim), "'A diviner' - such as one who says, 'My bread fell from my mouth, the stick fell from my hand, a snake passed on my right and a fox on my left,' and he refrains from some act because of it." And in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 6:2 they said, "'You shall not divine' - such as those that divine with weasels, birds, stars and what is similar to them." To here [are the words of the Sifra]. And such as that which the silly masses among the nations say: Since he came back from his path that he was walking, a deer passed in front of him, or a yelling crow passed over his head or if he saw thing x at the beginning of the day - he will not have profit today or any [other] bad event will come to him. And all of these acts and similar to them are included in this negative commandment.

To not soothsay: To not soothsay, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:26), "and you shall not soothsay (teonenu)." And the understanding of the matter is like they said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 6:2, that it is an expression of a time period (onah). [This] means to say that we do not fix time periods to say time x is good to do action y; and anyone who does it at that time will be successful, but one who does it at time z will not be successful - like the empty clairvoyants say. And the negative commandment about this matter is repeated in the Order of Shoftim, as it is written there (Deuteronomy 18:10), "There shall not be found in you, etc. a soothsayer." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 65b) that included in this negative commandment of the soothsayer is the fooling the eyes that people do. And this matter is a great type of machination that is connected with lightness of hand and its powerful quickness to the point that it appears to people that the trickster is doing fantastic things, meaning to say that they are supernatural. As what those that make efforts in this always do, such that they take a rope and put it into the corner of their clothes in front of people's eyes, and afterwards they take out a snake; and so [too,] they throw a ring into the air, and afterwards they take it out from the mouth of one of the bystanders in front of them; and many things similar to these. And each one of these evil acts is forbidden, and one who does it is called a fooler of the eyes. And it is included in the prohibition of the soothsayer and we administer lashes for it. And even though [the prohibition of the] soothsayer is stated next to the sorcerer in one verse, it is not precisely a type of magic. As if the prohibition about it was on account of the negative commandment of the sorcerer, we would not administer lashes for it, since the negative commandment of the sorcerer is given over to the warning of a death penalty from the court, as it is stated (Exodus 22:17), "You shall not keep a witch alive." And it is established for us (Eruvin 17b) that we do not administer lashes for any negative commandment that is given over to the warning of a death penalty from the court.

To not encircle the corner of the head: To not encircle the corner of the head, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:27), "You shall not encircle the corner of your head." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained that the matter is that it is forbidden for an Israelite to shave and even out the hair of his head behind his ears and to his forehead, like the idolaters and their priests do also today. And this is what they, may their memory be blessed, said in Tractate Makkot 20b, "Which is [the prohibition of] the corner of the head? That is the one that evens his temples to the back of his ears and to his forehead."

To not destroy the corner of the beard: To not destroy the corner of the beard, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:27), "and you shall not destroy the corner of your beard." And there are five corners to the beard, and there is a [separate] liability for lashes for each one, even if he removed them all at once and with one warning. And these are them: the upper and lower jaw on the right; the upper and lower on the left - behold, that is four - and the chin of the beard, and that is the place of connection of the jaws below, which is called menton in the vernacular - behold, that is five. And the language of the Mishnah (Mishnah Makkot 3:5) is "For the beard, five: two from here and two from there and one at their bottom." And the transcriber wrote in the name of Rambam, may his memory be blessed, (on Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 44), "And the prevention came about this with these words, 'and you shall not destroy the corner of your beard,' and it did not say, 'and you shall not destroy your beard' - even though it is all called the beard. It wanted to say with this that you should not shave even one corner from the whole of the beard. And we administer one [set of] lashes for each one. And even if he shaved all of them at one time, he is liable five [sets of] lashes for it."

He prohibited us from wronging the convert with words. And that is His stating, "You shall not wrong a convert" (Exodus 22:20). And the prohibition was repeated with His saying, "you shall not wrong him" (Leviticus 19:33). And in the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:2): "You shall not say to him, 'Yesterday you worshipped idolatry, and now you have entered under the wings of the Divine Presence.'" (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Sales 14.)

He who shuts his eyes against the ransoming of captives transgresses the negative precepts, "Thou shalt not harden thy heart",²Deut. 15:7. and, "[Thou shalt not] shut thy hand";²Deut. 15:7. also this, "Neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor",³Lev. 19:16. and this, "He shall not rule with rigor over him in thy sight";¹Lev. 25:53. and he neglects the positive precepts, "Thou shalt surely open thy hand unto him",²Dent. 15:8. and, "that thy brother may live with thee,"³Lev. 25:36. The Hebrew text permits the rendition “Let thy brother live,” etc. and, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"⁴Lev. 19:18. and, "Deliver them that are carried away unto death."⁵Prov. 24:11.

He who shuts his eyes against the ransoming of captives transgresses the negative precepts, "Thou shalt not harden thy heart",²Deut. 15:7. and, "[Thou shalt not] shut thy hand";²Deut. 15:7. also this, "Neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbor",³Lev. 19:16. and this, "He shall not rule with rigor over him in thy sight";¹Lev. 25:53. and he neglects the positive precepts, "Thou shalt surely open thy hand unto him",²Dent. 15:8. and, "that thy brother may live with thee,"³Lev. 25:36. The Hebrew text permits the rendition “Let thy brother live,” etc. and, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself"⁴Lev. 19:18. and, "Deliver them that are carried away unto death."⁵Prov. 24:11.

That we not imprint an imprinted tatoo into our flesh: To not imprint an imprinted tatoo into our flesh, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:28), "and an imprinted tattoo you shall not put into your flesh." And the content is like that which the Yishmaelites do today, as they imprint an imprint that is inscribed and stuck into their flesh, such that it is never erased. And the liability is only with an imprint that is inscribed and impressed with ink or blue dye or with other colors that make an impression. And so did they say in Makkot 21a, "[If] he tattooed, but did not imprint" - meaning to say, he did not make an impression with color - "[if] he imprinted, but did not tattoo" - meaning to say that he did make an impression [on] his flesh with a color, but he did not make a marking in his flesh - " he is not liable, until he imprints, and tattoos with ink, or with blue dye or with anything that makes an impression."

The commandment of awe for the Temple: To be inawed from the Temple, meaning to say that we set it up in our souls as a place of fear and awe, so that our hearts soften in our coming there to pray or to offer sacrifices, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:30), "and be inawed by My Temple." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 7:9 and likewise in Berakhot 54a, "Which is awe? One may not enter the Temple Mount with his staff, with his shoes, with his money belt, with the dust on his feet or with money bundled into his cloak; and he may not make it a shortcut" - meaning to say he enter from one opening and exit from an opening across from it, only in order to shorten his path - "and through an a fortiori inference, spit" - and there is no need to say that the place is forbidden for spitting. And they also elucidated in Sanhedrin 101a that it is only fit for kings of the House of David to sit in the [Temple] yard, due to the honor of the monarchy - as it is stated (II Samuel 7:18), "And King David came and sat before the Lord." And they said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 7:7, "Not from the Temple should you be inawed, but from the One who commanded about the Temple."

And this commandment is practiced [even today] by males and females. As even though the Temple is destroyed today on account of our iniquities, every person is [still] obligated in its awe. And [so] he should only enter a place that it is permitted to enter when it is built, and he should not even sit in the courtyard; and he should not be light-headed opposite the Eastern Gate - as it is stated (Leviticus 19:30), "You shall keep my Shabbats and be inawed by My Temple"; and they said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 7:8, "Just like keeping the Shabbat is forever, so too is awe of the Temple forever." And one who transgresses it and acts light-headedly in these matters that we have said has violated this positive commandment.

To not do an act of ov: To not do an act of ov - and that we not turn to it; meaning to say, that we not ask of it, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:31), "Do not turn to the ovs." And the content is that they offer well-known incense and perform well-known acts; and through these things, it appears to a person that he hears speech from under the armpit that answers what he will ask. And this is one of its types. And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 7:10 [is] "Ov is pitom which speaks from his armpit."

To not do an act of yidaaoni: To not do an act of yidaaoni, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:31), "Do not turn to the ovs and to the yidaaonis." And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, explained (Sefer Ha Mitzvot, Mitzvot Lo Taaseh 9) and this is his language: "That the matter is that he takes a bone of a bird the name of which is yidoaa, places it into his mouth, burns types of incense to it, makes incantations and performs actions, until he is connected with the matter of the disease of epilepsy - like the disease that is called sovat - and speaks out predictions. And so did they, may their memory be blessed, say (Sanhedrin 65a), 'Yidaaoni [is that] he places a well-known bone into his mouth and it speaks on its own.' And do not think that this is a general negative commandment, as it already separated them: When it mentioned the punishment, it stated, 'ov or a yidaaoni' and made one liable for stoning and excision for each of the two of them, when volitional. And that is its stating (Leviticus 10:1), 'And a man or a woman that has an ov or a yidaaoni with them shall surely be killed, etc.' And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 9:1 [is] 'Since it states, "And a man or a woman, etc." We have heard the punishment; from where [do I know] the warning? [Hence] we learn to say, "Do not turn to the ovs and to the yidaaonis."'" Its neighbor, ov (Sefer HaChinukh 255), will speak about all of the content of yidaaoni. And there in Sanhedrin [in] the sixth chapter are its laws also elucidated.

The commandment to honor sages: To honor sages and to rise in front of them, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:32), "Before an elder rise" - and Onkelos translated [it as], "Before one who understands the Torah rise" - "and dignify the face of the aged (zaken)." They, may their memory be blessed, explained (Kiddushin 32b), "A zaken is only one who has acquired (shekanah) wisdom. And the reason that the verse expressed, the sage, with the language of "aged," is because the young sage has seen with his wisdom that which the aged has seen from his many years.

To not cheat in measures, and all measures are included: To not cheat in liquid and dry measures, and not with scales; and included in measures is also the measuring of lands; and anything that is measured by people, such as clothes and that which is similar to them - as it is stated (Leviticus 19:35), "You shall not pervert justice with measures of length, weight, or capacity (mesurah)." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Bava Metzia 61b) that mesurah is a liquid and a dry measure; and it is the smallest measure, as it is one thirty-third of a log. And we learn from this that the Torah is concerned about the smallest amount with measures; meaning to say that even though the Torah was only concerned about [the value of] a small coin with other thefts, regarding measures, it was concerned about the smallest amount.

The commandment of having just scales, weights and measures: To have just scales, weights and measures and to be very careful about them, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:36), "You shall have just scales, just weights, a just eiphah, and a just hin." And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:7 [is] "'Just weights' - justify the scales precisely" - meaning to say, that the scales be righteous. And the matter is well-known regarding scales that there are important adjustments to make, as it is possible to do many types of falsehood with them. "'Just weights' - justify the weights precisely" - also with weights, it is also possible to do many types of falsehood, and similar to that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 61b), "I will repay in the future anyone who submersed his weights in salt." "'A just eiphah' - justify the eiphahs precisely; 'and a just hin' - justify the hin precisely." And an eiphah is a dry measure and a hin is a liquid measure. And the Torah warned us about each and every one of these things specifically, due to the severity of the matter - and even though it is all included in the principle of "And a man shall not cheat his compatriot." And the language of Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:10 [is] "On condition of this, I took you out from the Land of Egypt - that you accept upon yourselves the commandment of measures." And they, may their memory be blessed, also said (Bava Metzia 61b), "I am He Who distinguished in Egypt between the drop of a firstborn and the drop that is not of a firstborn, and I am [He Who is] destined to exact punishment from one who submerses his weights in salt" in order to cheat the creatures, since they do not notice it.

From the laws of the commandment is, for example, that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Batra 89a), that we do not make weights out of tin and lead and from any of the other types of metal, since they bring up rust and become lacking, but we [rather] make them out of stone and glass and what is similar to them; and the things that they said regarding the measurement of land; and that which they taught us about the shape of the leveler, that they call rasero in the vernacular. And they also said (Bava Batra 89b) that he should not cause foam in a liquid measure at the time that he measures, and even if it was the smallest measure. As behold, we have found that the Torah is concerned with measures about the smallest amount. As it is stated (Leviticus 19:35), "You shall not pervert justice with measures of length, weight, or capacity (mesurah)"; and mesurah is the smallest measure, as it is one thirty-third of a log. And the sizes that they, may their memory be blessed, gave to the length of the bar of the scales and the length of the strings; and the distinction that they said between scales that are made to weigh one type and the scales for another type; and that which they said that the court is obligated to set up supervisors in each and every place to make rounds to regulate the scales and weights, and they have the authority to fine the money, and [even] the body of anyone with whom lacking scales are found; and the rest of its details [are] in the fifth chapter of [Bava] Batra (see Tur, Choshen Mishpat 231).

With regard to a woman's bill of divorce, Deuteronomy 24:1 states: "And he shall write to her, “for her sake” and a document free a female (canaanite) slave reads “Nor was freedom given to her," Leviticus 19:2 teaching that the bill of release must be written for her sake.

With regard to a woman's bill of divorce, Deuteronomy 24:1 states: "And he shall write to her, he who does not (the bill should be written) on a substance that is lacking only to be given. This excludes a bill of divorce that is written while the article on which it is written is attached and afterwards detached. For it is lacking both being detached and being given. Similarly, with regard to a bill of release, it is written: "given to her," (Lev 19:2) teaching that the bill of release should be lacking only being given.

He prohibited the doing of inequity in the measurement of land and of weights. And that is His saying, "You shall not commit injustice in judgement; in measure, etc." (Leviticus 19:35). And the explanation of the verse according to that which appears in the tradition about it is, "You shall not commit injustice in the judgement of the measure." And they said in explanation of the content of this negative commandment (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:5), "'You shall not commit injustice in judgment' - if this is to a judge, it is already written, (viz. Leviticus 19:15). If so, why is it stated, 'in judgment?' It is to teach that a measurer is called a judge." And there (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:6), they said, "'Of the measure' - that is the measure of the land" - meaning to say, the measuring out and its division that one does upon it should be according to that which is required by the rules of mathematics that are exacting in measure, and knowledge of the true geometry for [use upon] them; and that he should not use imagined reckonings for this - as is done by most of the people - for they lack truth. "In weight," includes weights and scales. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Theft 6.)

He prohibited the doing of inequity in the measurement of land and of weights. And that is His saying, "You shall not commit injustice in judgement; in measure, etc." (Leviticus 19:35). And the explanation of the verse according to that which appears in the tradition about it is, "You shall not commit injustice in the judgement of the measure." And they said in explanation of the content of this negative commandment (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:5), "'You shall not commit injustice in judgment' - if this is to a judge, it is already written, (viz. Leviticus 19:15). If so, why is it stated, 'in judgment?' It is to teach that a measurer is called a judge." And there (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 8:6), they said, "'Of the measure' - that is the measure of the land" - meaning to say, the measuring out and its division that one does upon it should be according to that which is required by the rules of mathematics that are exacting in measure, and knowledge of the true geometry for [use upon] them; and that he should not use imagined reckonings for this - as is done by most of the people - for they lack truth. "In weight," includes weights and scales. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Theft 6.)

That He prohibited the judge from having compassion on the poor person in a case. Rather he should make the rich and poor the same, and force him to repay what he is obligated to repay. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "Do not favor the poor in his dispute" (Exodus 23:3). And the prohibition of this content was repeated with a different language; and that is His, may He be blessed, saying, "you shall not raise the face of the indigent one" (Leviticus 19:15). And the language of the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4:3) is "'You shall not raise the face of the indigent one' - that you not say, 'He is a poor man; and since I and this rich man are obligated to sustain him, I shall vindicate him in judgment, so that he can support himself honorably.' [Hence] we learn to say, 'you shall not raise the face of the indigent one.'" (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 2.)

That He prohibited the judge from slanting the judgement of converts and orphans. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "You shall not slant the judgment of a stranger and an orphan" (Deuteronomy 24:17). And behold it has already been explained that one who slants the judgment of an Israelite transgresses a negative commandment; and that is His saying, "You shall not commit injustice in judgement" (Leviticus 19:15). So if he slanted the judgment of a convert, he transgresses two negative commandments. And if he was a convert and an orphan, he transgresses three negative statements. (See Parashat Ki Teitzeh; Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 20.)

The second collective part is when a person commits a sin without desire for it or pleasure; but [rather] with his action, he intends to anger [God]. This is also profaning the Name of the Heavens and he is lashed. And therefore it stated (Leviticus 19:12), 'And you shall not swear falsely in My name and profane the Name of your God.' As this one displays the causation of anger with this thing, since there is no physical pleasure in it. And the part which is upon the individual is when a person who is famous for acts of kindness and good deeds commits an act which appears to the public as a sin, such that this act is unfitting for a pious person like this to do - even if it is a permissible act, he has profaned the Name. And this is [the understanding of] their, may their memory be blessed, saying (Yoma 86a), 'How is profaning the Name? [...] "Such as if I purchase meat from the butcher and do not give him money immediately." [...] Rabbi x said, "Such as if I walk four ells without tefillin and without words of Torah."' And this negative commandment is already repeated elsewhere and it is stated (Leviticus 18:21), 'and you shall not profane the Name of your God, I am the Lord.'" To here [are his words.]

That which we said, the trappings of idolatry, the matter is to say, anything that is prohibited for us from any prohibition specific to idolatry. And [it is] similar to that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in [Pesachim 25a], "One who is in peril may be healed by anything except for asheirah (a tree-god) wood." And they said about this in Yerushalmi Shabbat 14:4 [that] it is not only if the physician said, "Bring me leaves of asheirah x," that he would [then] seem like he concedes to it. Rather even if he just said to him, "Bring me leaves of tree x," and he went and he only found [them] on the asheirah, he should be killed and not transgress. And even though when he is healed with the wood of the asheirah, it is not truly idolatry - for he did not worship it - nonetheless he benefited from it, and there is in it the matter of the negative commandment of "Nothing is to cling to your hand from the anathema" (Deuteronomy 13:18), which is a negative commandment specific to idolatry. But the many prohibitions of idolatry that exist, which we learn from the negative commandment of "in front of the blind you shall not place a stumbling block" (Leviticus 19:14), are not included in trappings of idolatry to be killed for them - since the negative commandment of "in front of the blind," is not specific to idolatry itself, as it is also with all of the [other] commandments.

He prohibited that some of us hate others of us. And that is His saying, "You shall not hate your brother in your heart" (Leviticus 19:17). And the language of the Sifra (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 4:8) is, "I only spoke of hatred in the heart." However when one shows [another] hatred and informs him that he hates him, he does not transgress this negative commandment, but rather, "You shall not take vengeance or bear a grudge" (Leviticus 19:18); and he [also] transgresses a positive commandment - and that is, "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself." But hatred in the heart is a stronger sin than all. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Human Dispositions 7.)

He prohibited - not to curse father and mother. Indeed, the language of the Torah is clear about its punishment, when He says, "And if one curses his father or his mother, he shall surely die" (Exodus 21:17); and he is among those that are stoned. And even if he [only] cursed one of them with [God's] name after [the parent's] death, he is stoned. However the prohibition is not explicit in Scripture. For it does not say, "You shall not curse your father." But it already preceded that a prohibition came about cursing every Israelite; and that includes a father and anyone besides him. And in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 21:17:3), they said, "'And if one curses his father or his mother, he shall surely die' - we have heard the punishment; from where [do we know] the prohibition? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall not curse the powers' (Exodus 22:27). If your father is a judge, behold he is included in the powers. And if he is a nassi, behold he is included in, 'and do not maledict a nassi among your people.' And if he is a boor, behold he is included in, 'You shall not curse a deaf person' (Leviticus 19:14). [If he is not a judge, not a nassi and not a deaf person,] behold, you can argue by induction (binyan av) from the three of them, according to the common element among them: That they are, 'among your people,' and you are prohibited [from] cursing them." And it is written in the Sifra (Sifra Kedoshim, Chapter 10:7), "'If any man curses his father or his mother, he shall surely die' (Leviticus 20:9) - we have heard the punishment; from where [do we know] the prohibition? [Hence] we learn to say, 'You shall not curse the powers'" - exactly like the language of the Mekhilta. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the seventh [chapter] of Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Rebels 5.)

Which time is this, hired by day, the time to give it to him is all night; if it is not given to him, he [the employer] transgressed it in the morning because of the prohibition of holding onto the wages (from Vayikra 19:13). Hired by night, the time to give it to him is all day; it is not given to him, he [the employer] transgressed it in the evening, because of “At this day you shall give him his hire” (Devarim 24:15). Note: And the workers to them, that there isn’t making work until night, since that investment upon him a hot transgression upon him because of “At this day you shall give him his hire”; at night, and if he made work until night, he has time even though that his didn’t pay him according to his proper fee.

He gives shawl to the artisan to fix it as a contractor, and he finished it, all the time that the shawl is in the hand of the artisan you do not transgress [by withholding pay]. He [the artisan] gave it to him [the owner of the garment] even in the middle day, until the sun sets [you have until the sunset to pay for the mend], he transgressed because of Bal Talin/Don’t withhold, that contractor is like his hiring to repay on time.

Anyone who steals even on par with a penny’s worth transgressed not stealing and he is obligated to pay, one that steals money of a Jew or who steals money of a non-Jew and one that steals from the great or from the small. Note: a gentile’s mistake, for example to mistake in counting or repaying his loans, is permitted, and provided that he doesn’t know, so that there is no blasphemy. And there are those who say that it is forbidden to mislead him except if he makes the mistake from his own, and then it’s allowed.

He prohibited - not to have sexual intercourse with a woman without a contract (ketubah) and marriage (kiddushin). And that is His saying, "There shall be no harlot from the daughters of Israel" (Deuteronomy 23:18). And the prohibition of this content was already repeated with a different language; and that is His saying, "Do not profane your daughter to make her a harlot" (Leviticus 19:29). And the language of the [Sifra] (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 7:2) is, "'Do not profane your daughter to make her a harlot' - that is one who gives over his single daughter, not for the sake of marriage; and, similarly, her giving herself over, not for the sake of marriage." And listen to me [as to] why this negative commandment was repeated with this language, and what content was added with it: And that is that He already preceded that one that has sexual intercourse with a virgin - whether it was seduction or whether it was rape - is not liable for any of the punishments, but rather for a monetary fine and to [have to] marry her, as is explained in Scripture. So it would enter our thoughts that since there is only a monetary fine, its law is like any monetary matter. So just like a person has the right to give his money to his fellow as he wants, and exempt him from [returning] anything that he has with him; it would likewise be permissible for him to take his maiden daughter and give her to a man for him to have sexual intercourse, and then exempt him from it - meaning to say, the fifty [measures of] silver which go to the father - given that this is one of his rights; or to also give her to him, on condition that he receive such and such dinars from him. That is why He prohibited this and said, "Do not profane your daughter to make her a harlot." For that which I judged to only punish him with money is in fact [only] when it happens that a man seduces her or rapes her. But that the matter be with the mutual consent of both of them and permissible, there is no way [for such a] thing! And the proof for this explanation is His saying [in the continuation of the verse], "lest the land fall into harlotry, and the land be filled with lewdness." For seduction and rape only occur a little, but if the matter were to be by choice and permissible, it would grow and spread in the land. And this explanation is very fine and praiseworthy regarding this verse; and it is fitting regarding all that the Sages mentioned and all that is in accordance with Torah laws. And we give lashes for this negative commandment of a single woman; and the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in various places in Yevamot. (See Parashat Ki Tetzeh; Mishneh Torah, Marriage.)

Paragraph 1- It is forbidden to purchase from robbers and bandits, and to derive benefit from their money; and what is Dina deMalkhuta Dina (government law) - 11 paragraphs. One is prohibited from a purchasing a robbed item from a robber. One is prohibited from assisting the robber to change the item so that he acquire it because anyone who does such a thing or something similar strengthens the hands of sinner and violates the negative commandment of, “do not place a stumbling block in front of the blind.” If one purchases movable items from him, it has the same law as one who buys from a thief, which was discussed in Siman 356.

Paragraph 6- When is it true that a tax collector is like a bandit? Where the tax collector is a gentile, he created the tax on his own or the tax is from the king but has no set amount and he can take what he wants. If the tax was set by the king and was a set amount, however- even if the king instructed that the Jew give more than the gentile, it is still considered a set amount for each person- and the king appointed a Jewish collector to collect for him and this person is known as trustworthy and would not add anything to what the king instructed, he is not presumed to be a robber because the law of the government is the law. Moreover, one who evades the tax violates “do not steal” because he has stolen the king’s gift, whether the king was Jewish or a gentile. Similarly, if a Jew acquired the tax from the king, if one evades the tax he is robbing the Jew who acquired the rights to it. There are those who say that even where it is known that the Jew takes more than the set amount, one is still prohibited from evading the set amount, because it is like he is robbing a robber, which is prohibited. If a gentile acquired the tax, however, one is permitted to evade because it is like evading a loan which is permissible where there is no desecration of God’s name. There are those who say that even if the tax collector is Jewish, if he did not acquire for himself and just collects on behalf of the king, although one is prohibited from evading because of the government law, if a person were to evade the collector cannot force him to give because is like evading a loan, which is permissible. If there is any concern that he is afraid of the king, however, he is certainly able to force him to give.

And so [too,] from the matter of the commandment is that which they said (Nazir 44a), that one who causes a nazirite to become impure - if the nazirite was volitional - [the nazirite] is given lashes, and the one who rendered him impure transgresses on account of "in front of a blind man, etc." (Leviticus 19:14). But if the nazirite is indavertent, [even] if the one who makes him impure is volitional, neither one of them is lashed. And why is the one who makes him impure not lashed? Because it is stated (Numbers 6:9), "and he makes impure the head of his naziriteness" - meaning to say that the liability for lashes is only when he becomes impure with his consent. [These] and the rest of its details are in Tractate Nazir.

The obligation for a man to save his friend in body, money, or the like. One who saw his fellow drowning, or threatened by thieves or by a wild animal, and could have either saved him himself or hired others to save him – and he did not – or someone who heard that gentiles or informants are plotting against someone or preparing to ensnare him – and he did not reveal this to his friend and tell him – or someone who knew that a gentile or violent man was approaching his fellow, and he could have appeased him and changed his attitude towards his fellow – and he did not appease him – in all such situations, he has transgressed, “Do not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor.”

The commandment of loving the strangers (converts): That we were commanded to love the converts, meaning to say that we be careful not to cause them pain in any thing, but [rather to] do them good and grant them kindness according to what is proper and is possible. And converts are anyone who connects with us from the other nations, that leaves his religion and enters into our religion. And about them is it stated (Deuteronomy 10:19), "And you shall love the stranger, etc." And even though the commandment (Sefer HaChinukh 243) about the Israelite includes him, as it is stated about him (Leviticus 19:18), "and you shall love your neighbor as yourself" - since behold, a righteous convert is included in "your neighbor" - God added for us a specific commandment about his love. And so too is the thing in the prevention against cheating him. As even though he was included in "A man shall not wrong his countryman" (Leviticus 25:17, Sefer HaChinukh 338), Scripture added a specific prevention about him in its stating, "You shall not wrong a stranger" (Exodus 22:20, Sefer HaChinukh 23). And they said in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 59b) that one who wrongs the convert transgresses because of "[A man] shall not wrong" and because of "You shall not wrong a stranger." And so too [with this], he nullifies the commandment of "and you shall love your neighbor" and the commandment of "And you shall love the stranger."

To not save the seducer That the seduced is prevented from saving the seducer when he sees him in danger of death and perdition. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:9), "and your eye shall not be concerned for him." And so did they, may their memory be blessed, say (Sifrei Devarim 89:3), "Since it is stated (Leviticus 19:16), 'and you shall not stand upon the blood of your neighbor,' it is possible that you do not stand upon [the] blood of this one [too]; [hence] we learn to say, 'and your eye shall not be concerned for him.'"

To not gash ourselves, like the worshipers of idolatry: To not gash our bodies, like the worshipers of idolatry. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 14:1), "you shall not gash yourselves." And this negative commandment is repeated with another word, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:28), "And a marking for a soul, you shall not put onto your flesh, etc." And in Tractate Yevamot 13b, they, may their memory be blessed said, "'You shall not gash yourselves' is required for itself, as [the Torah] said that that you shall not make a wound." And it is also said there that "You shall not gash yourselves" is for the dead. And in Tractate Makkot 21a, they, may their memory be blessed, said that marking and gashing are one thing. And there it is said that one who makes a mark for the dead is liable whether it is with the hand or with a tool; but for idolatry, with a tool, [one is] liable, with the hand, [one is] exempt. As such was their custom to gash themselves in front of the idolatry with a tool, and like the matter that is written (I Kings 18:28), "and they gashed themselves like their statute with swords and spears." And regardless, according to that which appears [to come out] from the words of our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, (Makkot 22) the liability of the negative commandment is only about one who gashes himself for the dead or for idolatry. But for one who gashes himself without a reason or from anger about his house that has fallen or his ship that has sunk - even though it is something extremely disgusting and ugly and forbidden - there is no liability of the negative commandment for it.

That the tribe of Levi not take a portion in the spoils: That the whole tribe of Levi not take a portion in that which Israel despoiled upon their entering into the land (see Sefer Hamitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 170), and in that which they would despoil from their enemies afterwards. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 18:1), "There shall not be a portion and inheritance for the priests." And so [too,] does it appear in Sifrei Devarim 163, "'Portion' in the spoils, 'inheritance' in the land." And let not the matter of a general prohibition be difficult for you about this negative commandment (as there appear to be two prohibitions from the same phrase); since two prohibitions come in Scripture about these two negative commandments - and they are, "There shall not be a portion and inheritance for the priests, the Levites," and also afterwards, "And no inheritance shall be for him, etc." (Deuteronomy 18:2). And these two negative commandments themselves are repeated for the priests, as it is stated with Aharon (Numbers 18:20), "In their land you shall not inherit, and there will not be a portion for you among them." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Bamidbar 119), "'In their land you shall not inherit' - at the time of the division of the land; 'and there will not be a portion for you among them' in the spoils." And even thought the priests were in the tribe of Levi, the prevention is repeated about them for strengthening. And so [too,] all that is similar to this in the Torah, such that it repeats negative commandments in many places - it is all to strengthen the matter or to complete the law when it is not complete from the one negative commandment. And you will understand why God made it lack in one place and completed in another from that which I wrote at the beginning of the book of Eleh HaDevarim (Deuteronomy). And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Sefer Hamitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 170), "If we had counted these negative commandments, which are 'In their land, you shall not inherit, etc.' about the priests, additionally to the negative commandments stated about the Levites, etc., it would, according to this comparison, be fitting likewise for us to count the prohibition of the divorcee, the challalah and the zonah for the high priest as three additional negative commandments in addition to the three that came on every priest - whether common or high. And if the speaker say that this is so, we shall answer him with what they, may their memory be blessed, said in Kiddushin 77b that a high priest is only liable one [punishment] for a divorcee. And were the law to be [that a high priest is transgressing two commandments], he would be liable two for it - one because of [being] a priest, since a divorcee is forbidden to him, and a second from the angle of his being high priest, since she is forbidden to him in a different negative commandment. And from this type itself are the preventions that came to the priests for 'They shall not make a bald spot on their heads, and they shall not shave their beards and their flesh they shall not gash with a gash' (Leviticus 21:5); as they were already preceded for all of Israel more generally, in its stating, 'You shall not round off the corner, etc.' (Leviticus 19:27), 'and you shall not place a bald spot' (Deuteronomy 14:10), 'And a marking for a soul, you shall not put onto your flesh, etc.' (Leviticus 19:28). However these were repeated with the priests to complete the law, as is elucidated at the end of Tractate Makkot 20a. And therefore a priest that transgresses one of these is only liable for one [set] of lashes. And understand this principle and guard it."

That the tribe of Levi not take a portion in the spoils: That the whole tribe of Levi not take a portion in that which Israel despoiled upon their entering into the land (see Sefer Hamitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 170), and in that which they would despoil from their enemies afterwards. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 18:1), "There shall not be a portion and inheritance for the priests." And so [too,] does it appear in Sifrei Devarim 163, "'Portion' in the spoils, 'inheritance' in the land." And let not the matter of a general prohibition be difficult for you about this negative commandment (as there appear to be two prohibitions from the same phrase); since two prohibitions come in Scripture about these two negative commandments - and they are, "There shall not be a portion and inheritance for the priests, the Levites," and also afterwards, "And no inheritance shall be for him, etc." (Deuteronomy 18:2). And these two negative commandments themselves are repeated for the priests, as it is stated with Aharon (Numbers 18:20), "In their land you shall not inherit, and there will not be a portion for you among them." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Bamidbar 119), "'In their land you shall not inherit' - at the time of the division of the land; 'and there will not be a portion for you among them' in the spoils." And even thought the priests were in the tribe of Levi, the prevention is repeated about them for strengthening. And so [too,] all that is similar to this in the Torah, such that it repeats negative commandments in many places - it is all to strengthen the matter or to complete the law when it is not complete from the one negative commandment. And you will understand why God made it lack in one place and completed in another from that which I wrote at the beginning of the book of Eleh HaDevarim (Deuteronomy). And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Sefer Hamitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 170), "If we had counted these negative commandments, which are 'In their land, you shall not inherit, etc.' about the priests, additionally to the negative commandments stated about the Levites, etc., it would, according to this comparison, be fitting likewise for us to count the prohibition of the divorcee, the challalah and the zonah for the high priest as three additional negative commandments in addition to the three that came on every priest - whether common or high. And if the speaker say that this is so, we shall answer him with what they, may their memory be blessed, said in Kiddushin 77b that a high priest is only liable one [punishment] for a divorcee. And were the law to be [that a high priest is transgressing two commandments], he would be liable two for it - one because of [being] a priest, since a divorcee is forbidden to him, and a second from the angle of his being high priest, since she is forbidden to him in a different negative commandment. And from this type itself are the preventions that came to the priests for 'They shall not make a bald spot on their heads, and they shall not shave their beards and their flesh they shall not gash with a gash' (Leviticus 21:5); as they were already preceded for all of Israel more generally, in its stating, 'You shall not round off the corner, etc.' (Leviticus 19:27), 'and you shall not place a bald spot' (Deuteronomy 14:10), 'And a marking for a soul, you shall not put onto your flesh, etc.' (Leviticus 19:28). However these were repeated with the priests to complete the law, as is elucidated at the end of Tractate Makkot 20a. And therefore a priest that transgresses one of these is only liable for one [set] of lashes. And understand this principle and guard it."

To not plant forbidden mixtures in a vineyard: To not plant types of grain in a vineyard, and [also] not hemp or arum (loof). And this type of forbidden mixtures is called forbidden mixtures of the vineyard (kilayei hakerem). And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:9), "Do not plant your vineyard a forbidden mixture." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei on this verse), "[Why] do I need this, is it not stated (Leviticus 19:19), 'your field you shall not plant a forbidden mixture?' It teaches that anyone who keeps a forbidden mixture in his vineyard transgresses two negative commandments." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Kiddushin 39a) that forbidden mixtures of the vineyard are two types of grain seeds with grape seeds. And this is what Rabbi Yishaya said, "He [has not transgressed] until he plants wheat and barley and grape-seed in one fall of the hand," as this is what is implied to them by "forbidden mixtures in a vineyard," meaning to say that you need a forbidden mixture besides "your vineyard."

And they, may their memory be blessed, said about this matter (Yoma 49a), "Even [if there are] ten beddings, one on top of the other, it if forbidden to [sit] upon them," as we are concerned lest a fiber wrap itself upon his flesh. And they, may their memory be blessed, said this matter when the forbidden mixture underneath is soft, as then is there this concern of wrapping (see Mishneh Torah, Diverse Species 5:12-13). And this prohibition is rabbinic, as from Torah writ it is permissible, even when they are soft. And [it is] as they, may their memory be blessed, said, "'It shall not come upon you' (Leviticus 19:19) - but you can set it under you" (see Mishneh Torah, Diverse Species 10:12-13). And in Yerushalmi Kilayim 9:1, they said [that] pillows and comforters - even though they are hard - with full ones, it is forbidden to sit upon them rabbinically, since they double over on the one that is sitting upon them; but with empty ones ([this is what is written] in the Yerushalmi, [though there appears to be an error here in the Sefer HaChinukh, wherein it is written], the soft ones), since there is no concern that they will go on top, it is permissible to sit upon them, since (if) they are hard. And the explanation of the matter is [that it is] because the verse forbids shaatnez with an expression of wearing, meaning to say in the way of wearing is it forbidden and not in another way. And for this reason our teacher, God protect him, permitted us to put hats that are made from felt on our head to guard against the sun, since they are also very hard. And therefore, even though they have a forbidden mixture in them, they permitted them - as it is not the way of wearing something so hard. And there is one who wants to be stringent upon himself with this, and they did not protest against him. And for this reason - that it is the way of wearing that the Torah forbade - they also permitted the sellers of cloth to sell according to their way (to put the cloth on top of themselves) but only when they do not have any intention at all to warm up from it. And nonetheless, the modest and good wholesalers extend clothes from forbidden mixtures on a stick behind them so that they not touch them. And they, may their memory be blessed, said that there is no measurement to forbidden mixtures - that even one string in a large garment forbids all of it until he removes it (see Mishneh Torah, Diverse Species 10:5). Kelech - which is a type of wool and it grows on stones in the Dead Sea - is forbidden with flax rabbinically, because of the appearance [of sin] (marait ayin). And the rest of the details of the commandment are elucidated in Mishnah Kilayim 9 and in Tractate Shabbat and in the end of Makkot.

Not to have sexual relations with a woman without a marriage contract and betrothal: That we have been prevented from having sexual relations with a woman without a marriage contract and betrothal. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 23:18), "No daughter of Israel shall be a prostitute." And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 355) and this is his language: "The negative commandment about this matter has already been duplicated with a different language in the verse (Leviticus 19:29), 'Do not desecrate your daughter to make her a harlot' - and the [following is the] language of Sifrei Kedoshim 7:3, '"Do not desecrate your daughter" - this is one who gives over his single daughter not for the sake of marriage and also [a woman] who gives herself over not for the sake of marriage.' And hear from me for what [reason] this negative commandment of strong language was duplicated, and for what was it added to (see Mishneh Torah, Virgin Maiden 2:17): That which He already made precede from His laws that one who has sexual relations with a virgin - whether it be a seduction or a rape - is not obligated any one of the punishments, except only to [give] money and to marry the woman with which he had sexual relations, as it is explained in the verse, would let it come into our thoughts that since this thing only requires the payment of money, that this law goes according to the procedure of financial law. And [if so, just] like a person has the right to give whatever of his money to his fellow and he leaves it to him to do his will with that which is [now] his; so too has [the father] the right to take the maiden with him and to give her to a man to have sexual relations with her, since that is his law that is fitting to him - meaning to say the fifty shekel-coins of silver that go the father of the maiden. And this [father] will also give her on condition that he takes from him such and such dinar-coins. And he is prevented from this [thought] and it is told to him, 'Do not desecrate your daughter to make her a harlot.' Since that which is My law with her to only take money, however, is only when there is an incident when a man seduces or rapes [her]; but when the matter is with the consent of both of them together and it is public, there is no permissibility to this at all from any angle. And He showed the explanation for this and stated (Leviticus 19:29), 'lest the land fall into harlotry and the land be filled with depravity.' [This is] since the existence of seduction and rape is limited, but when the matter would be by choice and consent, it would spread and fill the land. And this reason is very nice and it enhances the verse. And similar to this is all that which the Sages have mentioned and all that they agreed upon regarding the Torah laws." To here is his language, may he be blessed. And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, wrangled with him about this (in his critique of Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 355) and said that this negative commandment of the prostitute is not coming to warn one having sexual relations without a wedding contract and betrothal, as the wedding contract is neither a commandment nor a form of acquiring a woman, at all, according to the Torah. But [rather] the main negative commandment [here] is coming to warn not to have sexual relations with a woman that is forbidden [in marriage] to the man having sexual relations in such a way that betrothal would not be effective for him with her. As they, may their memory be blessed, elucidated in the Gemara (Yevamot 61a), that the harlot (zonah) that is mentioned in every place in the Torah is none other than a woman who an Israelite has sexual relations with, when betrothal would not be effective for him with her. And this is the harlotry that the Torah distanced and loathed forever and [here] it warned the [man] and the [woman] about it. And so too from the foundation of this matter is that the verse warns the court that they should not let a woman be abandoned among them, since her end will be to have sexual relations with men that she is forbidden to [in marriage], to the point that betrothal is not effective for them with her. As there is no doubt that a woman abandoned to the many will not be exacting afterwards 'between a piece of permissible fat and a piece of forbidden fat.' And so too does it warn the father of the girl about this explicitly in another verse; that he should not abandon her to harlotry and not to give her over to one who cannot have betrothal with her. And about this is it stated, "Do not desecrate your daughter to make her a harlot." And it is all from the reason mentioned - since she will have sexual relations with one who she is forbidden to [in marriage]; not from the reason of marriage contract and betrothal, as is the opinion of Rambam, may his memory be blessed.

That the borrower not give interest to an Israelite: That we have been prevented from giving interest to an Israelite (see Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 236), and, so too, from taking it. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 23:20), "You shall not take interest from your brother, interest of money, interest of food, interest of any thing, etc". And the [traditional] explanation comes about this: "Do not take interest" means, do not have interest taken from you, which is to say, do not give interest - as the one who gives it is the one who has it taken from him. And in the elucidation, they said in the chapter [entitled] Eizehhu Neshekh (Bava Metzia 75b) [that] the borrower transgresses on "Do not take interest" and on "you shall not place a stumbling block before the blind" (Leviticus 19:14). And had this preventing of this not come explicitly, I would have reasoned that it is the lender that is forbidden from taking it, but [that] if the borrower wants to forgive and is willing to be oppressed, that it would be permitted - in the manner of [other] oppression, where it is the oppressor that is transgressing, not the oppressed.

And behold, my son, I will write a little of the text of general contracts. And even though this is not included in this commandment and its subject, the word, get that we have spoken about is a general word for all contracts, and [so] this is included in the word. Before anything, I will say that it is fitting for all proper witnesses to investigate and to understand the essence of the things to which they will testify, whatever the matter may be; and that they inform the involved parties to inform them of all the stipulations between them in a clear language, and to review all of the things in front of them until they comprehend them well. And [they should not act] like the foolish witnesses, who strip people of their cloaks and their possessions and their properties 'by the tail of their cloaks.' [The parties] whisper a little into the ears of the silly masses and, before they inform them [properly - such] that they understand the essence of the stipulations - they go and write and sign according to what is good in their eyes about them, until they [strip] them clean of their possessions. And the Lord, our God, did not give us, the holy people, this [way] to do anything that is not the way of truth. And therefore the prohibition against deceptions is repeated in the Torah three times, as it is written in three places (Leviticus 19:33, 25:14, 17), "a man shall not wrong his people."

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (see Mishneh Torah, Hiring 11:1-2) [that] it is one whether it is the wage for a person or the wage for an animal or the wage for vessels - [for them all,] he is obligated to give [the wage] to its owners at its time. And what is its time? A day wage-worker collects the whole night; and about this is it stated, (Leviticus 19:13), "the wages of a laborer shall not remain with you until morning." And a night wage-worker collects the whole day; and about this is it stated, "You must pay him his wages on the same day." And a day hourly wage-worker collects the whole day and a night hourly wage-worker collects the whole night. A monthly wage-worker, a weekly wage-worker, a yearly wage-worker, a seven-year wage worker - [if] he leaves during the day, he is paid [that] whole day, [and if] he leaves during the night, he is paid [that] whole night. And [also among its laws] is that which they said (see Mishneh Torah, Hiring 11:3) that contractual work is like wage-work concerning this commandment - that once he has finished the work and returned it to its owners, [the employer] is obligated to give [the worker] his wage on that day. But if he did not return the work to its owners, [the employer] does not transgress [by delaying payment]. And it is like the matter that they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 112a), "One who gives his cloak to a craftsman - when he has finished it and informed him, even after ten days - the whole time that it is in the hand of the craftsman, he does not transgress." And also what they said (see Mishneh Torah, Hiring 11:4) that the employer does not transgress unless the wage-worker makes a claim against him; but if he does not make a claim or if [the employer] does not have anything with which to pay him, [the employer] does not transgress; as the verse only obligated him when he has it in his house or he can pay him [otherwise] - but if he is not able to pay him on the same day unless he loses much of his [property], the verse did not apparently obligate him to do so. And nonetheless, it is fitting that the money be in the hand of any intelligent person before he hires the workers. And [regarding] one who hires someone on the eve of the Shabbat and is pushed off from paying because of Shabbat, the law would be that he does not transgress the law of the Torah in this, as once it is pushed off, it is pushed off; but he is obligated rabbinically because of 'do not say to your neighbor, "Go and come back."' And the rest of its details are elucidated there in Bava Metzia [in the] ninth chapter.

And one who transgresses this, and sways the judgement of a stranger, violates two negative commandments - the one is that mentioned here and the second is "Do not do injustice in judgement" in the Order of Mishpatim (Leviticus 19:15). And if [the judged] was a stranger and an orphan, [the judge] violates three [commandments]; one because of [being a] stranger, one because of [being an] orphan - that are [both] mentioned here - and one because of "Do not do injustice in judgement." And there is no doubt that the main warning here is to the men, as they are the charge of justice. But, nonetheless, women are [also] included in this negative commandment (see Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 2).

And this negative commandment is from the negative commandments that are rectified by a positive commandment - as anyone that transgresses and takes from what is forgotten is obligated to return it to the poor, as it states, "it shall go to the stranger, the orphan, and the widow." And I have written in this Order regarding the sending away of the nest (Sefer HaChinukh 544) [about] any negative commandment that is rectified by a positive commandment, [that if] he performs the positive commandment, he is not lashed. But if he does not perform the positive commandment and it is also impossible to perform it any longer - and for example, [if] the thing were lost or burnt - he is lashed. And the example of this is with the corner of the field, the reaping of which is a negative commandment (Sefer HaChinukh 217): And if he reaps it, he is not liable for lashes for the reaping; as behold, he is able to 'fix what he distorted' [by] giving it to the poor in its sheaves. And even if he threshed the wheat and ground and baked it, he can give the required amount of 'the corner' to the poor from the bread; and behold, it is still in his hand to fix [the sin] and [so,] he is not lashed. But if an accident happens that all of that wheat gets lost or it gets burnt, he is lashed; as behold, it is impossible for him to still perform the positive commandment in it. And [so,] he has already transgressed the negative commandment and he can not fix [it]. And this is called in the Gemara, 'he did not fulfill it.' And if he lost the wheat in his [own] hands or ate all of it, all the more so is he liable for lashes for it. And this is called, 'he negated it,' in the Talmud, as he was the cause for the negating of the negative commandment in his hands - a negation that no can longer be fixed. And [about] that which they said in Makkot 16a at the end of the chapter [entitled] Elu Hen HaLokin concerning the commandment of sending away the nest regarding 'he fulfilled it and he did not fulfill it,' "We only have this and one other [case]" - and it is known that the other is 'the corner' - as it is concluded there, "But rather 'this and one other' is about that," meaning to say, [about] 'the corner,' and the matter stays like that - their intention is not that it wants to say that only sending away the nest and 'the corner' have this law of 'he fulfilled it and he did not fulfill it.' But rather their intention was to say 'the corner' and all that have a similar law - such as fallen grapes, that which is forgotten, the fallen sheaves, and the bunchless grapes - as each one of these is a negative commandment that [involves] an act, and it is [just] as likely with them to have all that is likely with 'the corner,' regarding 'he fulfilled it and he did not fulfill it' or 'he negated it and he did not negate it.' As the verse from which we learned that in 'the corner' there is a positive commandment, is that which is written about it (Leviticus 19:10), "you shall leave them for the poor and the stranger." And with the sheaf of what is forgotten and the others mentioned, there is likewise about them, "you shall leave them for the stranger and the orphan and the widow," or "it shall go to the stranger, the orphan, and the widow." And take this matter and understand it, as it is a little hidden, in that the language in the Gemara is somewhat unclear - in that which they said, "We only have this and one other [case]."

And [it] is practiced in every place and at all times by males and females. And one who transgresses it and is able to save the pursued and does not save him with one of the limbs of the pursuer - or even with his life - has violated this positive commandment, besides having violated two negative commandments, which are "show no pity" and "do not stand by the blood of your neighbor" (Leviticus 19, 16); as we will write in the negative commandments (Sefer HaChinukh 601). And his punishment is very great - as if he destroyed a life from Israel.