Halakhah zu Bamidbar 20:35

Other scholars advance less obvious sources as constituting the scriptural basis for obligations concerning za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim. R. Moses ibn Habib, Yom Teru'ah, Rosh ha-Shanah 27a, finds a source for such obligations in the verse "… and thou shalt bring forth to them water out of the rock; so thou shalt give the congregation and their cattle drink" (Numbers 20:8). Water was miraculously produced from the rock for the benefit of animals as well as of humans. Water was produced for the animals, states R. Moses ibn Habib, in order to obviate za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim. In the opinion of this authority, Scripture specifically records that the miracle was performed on behalf of animals as an admonition to man directing him likewise to alleviate the suffering of brute creatures. R. Moses Sofer, Hagahot Hatam Sofer, Baba Mezi'a 32b, similarly regards obligations with regard to animal welfare as predicated upon emulation of divine conduct. Thus Hatam Sofer cites the verse "And His tender mercies are over all His works" (Psalms 145:9) as imposing an obligation upon man to exercise compassion toward animals. Earlier, Sefer Haredim, chapter 4, expressed the opinion that compassion toward animals is mandated by the commandment "and you shall walk in His ways" (Deuteronomy 28:9). Rambam, Hilkhot De'ot 1:6, apparently basing himself upon Sifre, Deuteronomy 11:22, renders the verse as meaning, "just as He is merciful so also shall you be merciful."

Yirmiyahu (29:5-7) prepares us for exile by teaching us to build homes, to marry and to pray and act for the benefit of the city in which we reside. The principle of dina d’malchuta dina certainly is in harmony with Yirmiyahu’s teaching. It also fits with the teaching of Chazal (cited in Rashi to Bemidbar 20:17) that a guest must benefit his host. Strict adherence to dina d’malchuta dina helps insure that we benefit the country in which we reside.

Approximately a century later, a related but quite different query was addressed to Binyan Ẓion. That incident involved the miscarriage of a normal, fully-developed fetus. A Jewish doctor wished to preserve the fetus in whiskey in a glass jar for the purpose of scientific study "as is the wont of physicians." Binyan Ẓion, no. 119, cites the earlier responsum of Noda bi-Yehudah in which the latter rules unequivocally that no benefit may be derived from a fetal cadaver.²⁵Remarkably, Binyan Ẓion does not speak of examination of the fetal cadaver for purposes of deriving scientific information as constituting a form of prohibited benefit. Instead, he confines his discussion to the prohibition against retaining in one’s possession an object from which it is forbidden to derive benefit lest some benefit be derived unwittingly. In responsa examining the permissibility of postmortem examinations in general, both Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 336, and Maharam Shik, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 344, declare that acquiring medical information by means of such procedures constitutes a forbidden benefit. In support of that position Maharam Shik cites the ruling found in the Mishnah, Nedarim 48a, to the effect that a person who, by means of a vow, generates a prohibition against benefiting from a fellow townsman is forbidden to use scrolls or books that constitute property owned by the community. Quite apparently, the knowledge gleaned from such books is regarded as a “benefit” forbidden to such an individual. This argument is rebutted by R. Yitzchak Arieli, Torah she-be-‘al Peh, VI (5724), who argues, inter alia, that examination of a cadaver for scientific purposes constitutes an “unusual” form of benefit and hence is not forbidden under such circumstances. That position is based upon Teshuvot Radbaz, III, no. 548. A permissive view is also espoused by R. Chaim Sofer, Teshuvot Maḥaneh Ḥayyim, II, no. 60. The tenor of Binyan Ẓion’s discussion tends to support this permissive view; see R. Yehudah Leib Graubart, Ḥavalim be-Ne‘imim, III, no. 64. However, R. Akiva Eger, Gilyon ha-Shas, Avodah Zarah 12b, declares that even “unusual” forms of benefit may not be derived from a corpse since the prohibition is not couched as a prohibition against “eating.” That principle is codified by Rambam, Hilkhot Ma’akhalot Asurot 14:10, with regard to basar be-ḥalav and kila’ei ha-kerem. Conflicting views regarding the permissibility of deriving “unusual” forms of benefit from a corpse are recorded by R. Mordecai Winkler, Teshuvot Levushei Mordekhai, III, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, no. 29. See also infra, p. 228. Binyan Ẓion, however, questions that assertion. The prohibition against deriving benefit from a cadaver is formulated by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 47b, on the basis of a gezeirah shaveh, a hermeneutic principle applied to the occurrence of an identical term in different contexts. An identical term is used in describing the ritual of the eglah arufah, breaking the neck of a heifer in expiation of an unsolved homicide, as prescribed in Deuteronomy 21:4, and in the description of the burial of a human corpse, as recorded in Numbers 20:1, in conjunction with the burial of Miriam. The use of an identical term in both instances is understood by the Gemara as signaling the transposition of the already established prohibition against deriving benefit from the heifer to a prohibition against deriving benefit from a human corpse. Binyan Ẓion argues that, since the prohibition is derived from a description of interment, it is forbidden to derive benefit only from a corpse that must be buried in fulfillment of the mizvah of burying the dead. Indeed, Mishneh le-Melekh, Hilkhot Avel 14:21, cites Ramban in support of the position that it is permitted to derive benefit from a non-Jewish cadaver for precisely this reason, viz., the locus of the prohibition against deriving benefit indicates that it is a concomitant of the mizvah of burial. Since there is no biblical requirement commanding the interment of a non-Jewish corpse, reasons Mishneh le-Melekh, there is no prohibition against deriving benefit from such a corpse. Similarly, if the mizvah of burying the dead does not include burial of a nefel—as Binyan Ẓion indeed maintains—it then "perhaps" follows, argues Binyan Ẓion, that there is no prohibition against deriving benefit from the corpse of a nefel. Binyan Ẓion nevertheless refused to grant permission for the contemplated external embalming and preservation of the nefel because, as noted earlier, he maintained that burial of a nefel is mandated, not as a mizvah per se, but in order to prevent priestly defilement.

If you own animals or birds (poultry), and it is your responsibility to feed them, you are not allowed to eat anything until you feed them, as it is written (Deuteronomy 11:15): "And I will put grass in your fields for your cattle (animals) and you will eat and be satisfied." Thus the Torah has given preference to feeding the cattle [animals] before the feeding of man. But as regards drinking, man comes first as it is written (Genesis 24:14): [Rivkah said] "Drink first and I will also give your camels to drink." Similarly it is written (Numbers 20:8): "And you will give drink to the congregation and to their animals."

If one of the deceased persons is a Torah scholar, and the other is an ignorant man, the Torah scholar should be taken out for burial first, even though the ignorant man died first. If there is a man and a woman, the woman should be buried first, even if the man died first, for it is written, "And Miriam died there, and was buried there,"³Numbers 20:1 (which means) the burial was immediately after her death.

That is that He commanded us to honor the sages, to rise in front of them and to glorify them. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "In the presence of the elderly you shall rise and you shall respect an elder" (Leviticus 19:32). And the language of the Sifra is, "Rising that has honor." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the first chapter of Kiddushin. And you should know that even if this commandment is obligatory for all people in general - meaning to honor sages, and even [towards] a sage that is one's equal in wisdom, like they explained in their saying (Bava Metzia 33a), "The Torah scholars in Babylonia would stand up for one another" - you should know that there are additional [obligations] of honor for the student. And that is because the honor a student is obligated towards his teacher is much more than the honor due to a sage [in general]. And along with the honor, he is obligated to fear him. For they have already explained that the law of his teacher upon him is like the law of his father, whom Scripture has obligated him to honor and fear. And they already said (Sanhedrin 5b) that it is not permissible to disagree with his rabbi - meaning a disagreement that breaks with his instruction and legal decision, such that he relies upon his [own] wisdom and teaches or decides and instructs, unless [his teacher] gives him permission. And it is not permissible to quarrel with him, nor to get upset with him. And he may not suspect him regarding his actions or words with various suspicions, as it is possible that this was not [his teacher's] intention. And in the chapter [entitled] Chelek (Sanhedrin 110a), they said, "Anyone who disagrees with his teacher is as if he disagrees with the Divine Presence, as it is stated (Numbers 26:9), 'when they strove against the Lord.' And anyone who argues with his teacher is as if he argues with the Holy One, blessed be He, as it is stated (Numbers 20:13), 'These are the waters of Meribah, [where the children of Israel quarreled with the Lord].' And anyone who gets upset with his teacher is as if he is upset with the Divine Presence, as it is stated (Exodus 16:8), 'Your complaints are not against us, but against the Lord.' And anyone who suspects his teacher is as if he suspects the Divine Presence, as it is stated (Numbers 21:5), 'And the people spoke against God, and against Moses.'" And this is completely clear, since the disagreement of Korach and the argument of the Children of Israel - and their complaint and their accusation and their suspicion - was with Moshe, who was the teacher of all of Israel; but Scripture put all of these matters of theirs towards God. And in the explanation (Avot 4:12), they said, "The fear of your teacher is like the fear of the Heavens." And [this fear] is all deduced and proved from Scripture's commanding [us] to honor parents and sages, as is explained in many places in the Talmud - but that [does not make] it a separate commandement. And understand this. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Torah Study).