Midrasch zu Wajikra 22:13

1) (Vayikra 22:13) ("And the daughter of a Cohein, if she be widowed or divorced, and she have no seed, then she shall return to the house of her father in her maidenhood. From the bread of her father she may et, but no non-priest may eat of it.") If we learned [Vayikra 22:12] (that the mother eats on the strength of the "seed") in respect to terumath hakodshim (the breast and the thigh), why need it be stated [Vayikra 22:11] in respect to kodshim (terumah)? And if it is stated in respect to "kodshim," why need it be stated in respect to "terumah"? For there obtains with kodshim what does not obtain with terumoth, and with terumoth what does not obtain with kodshim. Kodshim are permitted to a zar and terumoth are not permitted to a zar. Kodshim are liable for piggul, nothar, and tamei, and terumoth are not. So that because there obtains with terumah what does not obtain with kodshim, and with kodshim what does not obtain with terumoth, both must be stated.

1) "widowed or divorced": Let "divorced" be stated and not "widowed." And I would say: If a divorcée who is forbidden to an ordinary Cohein returns (to her father's house to eat terumah), then a widow, who is forbidden to an ordinary Cohein, how much more so does she return! — (No, for) If so, I would say: A divorcée who has no children returns; a widow, whether or not she has children, returns. It is, therefore, written "If she be widowed or divorced and have no seed."

1) "then she shall return to the house of her father": to exclude a woman awaiting levirate marriage, (her being linked to the yavam.) "as in her maidenhood": to exclude one who is pregnant. (— But why is the verse needed for this?) Does it not follow a fortiori, viz.: If in a place where a child from her first husband is not made equivalent to a child from her second husband to exempt her from levirate marriage, a fetus is made equivalent to a child (to exempt her), then here, where a child from her first husband is made equivalent to a child from her second husband to disqualify her from terumah (in her father's house), how much more so should a fetus be equivalent to a child to disqualify her from terumah! — No, why is a fetus made equivalent to a child to exempt her from levirate marriage? Because a dead child is made equivalent to a living child (i.e., If her husband had a son who died after his father's death, she is exempt from levirate marriage.) Should we then make a fetus equivalent to a child to disqualify her from terumah, where a dead child is not made equivalent to a living child? (i.e., Only a living child disqualifies her from the terumah of her father's house, and not a dead child. (Therefore, the verse is necessary.) "then she shall return": I might think (that she returns) even to the breast and the thigh. It is, therefore, written "From the bread of her father she may eat. We are speaking only of "the holy things of the boundary" (i.e., terumah, and not of "the holy things of the altar," breast and thigh).