Talmud zu Wajikra 4:13

²²Here one returns to a discussion of the theme of the Tractate, viz., the obligation of the High Court, as representatives of the people, to offer a purification sacrifice for a wrong ruling as described in Lev. 4:13–21.
It is sinful to bring an animal into the Temple precinct which is not dedicated as a sacrifice. For voluntary offerings this presents no problem; one simply has to dedicate them when bringing. But for obligatory offerings it implies that a sacrifice may be presented only if all conditions which make it obligatory are actually fulfilled. They only are liable²³To bring the sacrifice. for something²⁴An official ruling by the Court. that was clear to them and then covered from them²⁵They forgot either a precedent or their own ruling.. What is the reason? something was hidden²⁶Lev. 4:13. An erring High Priest (Lev. 4:1–12) or ruler (22–26) have to offer a sacrifice if they err inadvertently; the condition that a ruling must have been forgotten is introduced only for the Court., something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. ²⁷There is no problem with the explanation just given. One tries to connect the statement with a discussion about similar rules regarding sacrifices due for violations of either Temple purity or oaths (Lev. 5:1–13), where the same condition in mentioned in Lev. 5:2,3,4. R. Ismael and R. Aqiba differ in Ševuot 1:2 about the interpretation of the verses, but not about the actual rules. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, it became hidden from him, therefore he had known, and he knew²⁸Lev. 5:4: …an oath which a man would utter without thinking, it became hidden from him, and he knew and realized his guilt …, these are two knowledges²⁹One when he uttered the oath and one when he remembered it, separated by a period of oblivion.. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, it became hidden, it became hidden, two times³⁰R. Aqiba and R. Ismael actually are not differing in their interpretations; only R. Aqiba argues about violations of Temple purity (Lev. 5:2–3) where in both verses oblivion is mentioned but not remembering. However, in Babylonian sources [Ševuot 14b, Keritut 19a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Pereq 12(7)], R. Ismael is reported to read one about oblivion the impurity and the second oblivion about being in the Temple., therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, ³¹Returning to our topic, Note 22. something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.

MISHNAH: If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject; if they said, the menstruating woman is not mentioned in the Torah, Sabbath is not mentioned in the Torah, idolatry is not mentioned in the Torah, they are not liable⁹⁸Since anything written in the Torah is public knowledge and nobody would listen to them.. If they ruled to eliminate part and to confirm part, they are liable. How is that? If they said, the menstruating woman is mentioned in the Torah but one who copulates with one who is watching a day to the next day is not liable⁹⁹In rabbinic medical theory, the minimum time which must elapse between one menstrual period and the next is the seven days of the niddah(Lev.15:19) followed by another 11 days. If a woman has a discharge on one of these 11 days, she is not classified as niddah but as zavah, whose rules are spelled out in Lev.15:25–30. Since the verse speaks of a discharge of many days, it is concluded that the full rules of zavah only apply after 3 days. For the first and second discharges in that 11 day period, the woman is called “watching one day to the next day”. For a day she is under the rules of niddah(Lev. 15:25) and therefore forbidden to her husband. But since the verse uses the expression all the days of the flow of her impurity shall be like the days of her menstruation, one could think that she is impure only during the day and not during the following night, or that a discharge during the night does not make her impure. This is clearly a matter of rabbinic interpretation.; Sabbath is mentioned in the Torah but one who brings from a private domain to a public domain is not liable¹⁰⁰The pentateuchal root of the prohibition to carry from a private to the public domain is Ex. 16:29, nobody should go out from his place, which is explained in Jer. 17:22 by do not move a load from your houses. Since as a matter of principle prophetic utterances should not be used as legal texts, the ruling of the Court could not be dismissed out of hand.; idolatry is mentioned in the Torah but one who prostrates himself is not liable¹⁰¹This is more difficult to understand since Deut. 17:3 clearly defines prostrating oneself in idolatry as a capital crime. Therefore, one has to agree with Maimonides’s Commentary that the Court changed the definition of “prostration”, e. g., ruling that kneeling down, bowing the head to the ground, is not punishable as long as one does not lie on the ground with outstretched hands and feet.; these are liable for it is said¹⁰²Lev. 4:13. Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah4(7–8). something was hidden, something but not an entire subject.

HALAKHAH: “If the Court ruled to uproot an entire subject,” etc. Rebbi Ḥizqiah said, “of a subject,” not the entire subject. Rebbi Hila said, “of the commandments”, not entire commandments¹⁰³In Lev. 4:13, R. Hizqiah reads דָּבָר וְנֶעֱלַם as וְנֶעֱלַם מִדָּבָר, presupposing a script which does not differentiate between regular and final mem. R. Hila’s comment is really unnecessary since מִכָּל־מִצְוֹת already means “of any commandments” but not entire commandments. In all situations, prefix mem is read as partitive, some but not all; cf. Nazir 5:4 Note 105.. ¹⁰⁴The following text also is found in Sotah 5:1, explained in Notes 8–10, Nazir5:1 Note 56. Is that written? As Rebbi Immi said in the name of Rebbi Joḥanan: For interpretation, one removes from the beginning of the paragraph to its end. Rebbi Ḥananiah in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: Even a middle word. You have to pour oil on it, it is a flour offering, to include all flour offerings for pouring¹⁰⁵Sifra Wayyiqra 1 Pereq 12 on Lev.2:6. The ms. text follows the argument of Sifra while B reproduces the text of Sotah and Nazir. The argument of Sifra has no connection with the theories of RR. Johanan and Jeremiah; it is a straightforward reading of the verse. Since it is stated that one has to pour oil on the bread crumbs because it is a flour-offering, it follows that a flour-offering requires pouring oil over it unless it be explicitly excluded as in the purification offering of v. 5:11..