Talmud zu Bamidbar 30:24

MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons¹The language of the Mishnah implies that the wife was told (maybe by hearsay), not that she received testimony that would stand up in court. This is clear from the following Mishnaiot and the discussion at the end of Halakhah 2. came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried²Without having her husband declared dead by a competent court. That a woman may remarry even if her husband’s death is not confirmed by two independent witnesses of sterling character (Deut. 19:15) is a rabbinic institution. and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands³It is clear that she has to leave the second husband since her marriage to him was invalid by biblical standards. As pointed out by both Talmudim, this shows that the rules of the Mishnah are rabbinical., she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows⁴Num. 30:14.. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah⁵If the deceased husband had sons from different wives, before the inheritance is distributed the ketubah of each wife should be given to her sons; only the remainder is distributed among all sons.. If they died⁶Before the divorce documents were executed and there are no children., the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

MISHNAH: The following vows are permitted¹Even though they sound like vows, they are not vows.: Profane I would eat with you²Since he vows to eat what is permitted, there is nothing to it.; like pork³As the Halakhah explains, a vow must refer to something which can be a sacrifice. Since swine cannot be sacrificial animals, if he says “what I would eat from you is like pork”, there is no vow and no legal consequence. If he would say, a qônām that what I would eat from you is like pork, he would be forbidden since he referred to the sacrifice., like idolatry, like carcasses⁴Forbidden food, Deut. 14:21., like meat from a torn animal⁵Forbidden food, Ex. 22:30., like abominations⁶Forbidden food, Lev. 11:29 ff., like crawling things⁷Forbidden food, anything not on the list of permitted animals. These are explicitly permitted to Gentiles, Gen. 9:3., like Aaron’s ḥallah and his heave⁸Heave and ḥallah, the heave from dough, are holy. Sacrifices can only be brought from sources that are profane before dedication. Therefore, heave and ḥallah cannot become sacrifices. As long as the person making the vow does not mention qorbān or any of its substitutes, there is no vow., are permitted. One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother⁹He says that sexual relations with his wife should be forbidden as they are with his mother. Since his mother cannot be a sacrifice, there is no vow but the rabbi is not permitted to tell him this but must find another reason (e. g., do you realize how much money a divorce would cost you?) to find a cause to annul the vow because people should be made uncomfortable vowing. If the vow is not dissolved within one week, the wife can ask the court to force a divorce; the husband being the guilty party (Mishnah Ketubot 5:6). (Cf. Qor‘an 58:2.), one finds for him an opening from another place that he should not be flippant about this. A qônām that I shall not sleep, that I shall not speak, that I shall not walk, or one who says to his wife, a qônām that I shall not sleep with you, he is under the obligation¹⁰Num. 30:3. As long as qorbān or one of its substitutes is not mentioned, sleeping, speaking, and walking are all immaterial and there really is no vow. But since there was intent to make a vow, the verse may be applied (at least by rabbinic standards). “he shall not profanate his word.” An oath that I shall not sleep, that I shall not speak, that I shall not walk, he is forbidden¹¹Since an oath does not depend on any material substrate (Chapter 1, Note 4)..

HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. ²A similar argument in the Babli, 67a/b. In both Talmudim, the argument is amoraic. It is written³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written⁴Num. 30:11. “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written⁵Num. 30:4. “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ.” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.

HALAKHAH: “These are the vows which he can dissolve,” etc. It is written⁵Num. 30:14. The verse ends: “Her husband shall confirm it or her husband shall dissolve it.”: “Any vow and any oath of prohibition to mortify.” That covers only vows which contain mortification. Vows regarding the relations between him and her, from where? “Between a man and his wife⁶Num. 30:17. One opinion in this Halakhah (Notes 11 ff.) and the consensus in the Babli (79b) hold that the dissolution of vows of mortification is permanent since it is expressly sanctioned by the verse but that dissolution of a vow regarding marital relations, which is the result of an indirect inference, is valid only as long as the marriage continues. Such a dissolution would be automatically voided for the divorcee or widow. The Mishnah mentions only vows the husband can permanently dissolve..” So far the husband; the father from where? Since the husband can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her, so the father can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her⁷This argument seems to be taken out of thin air. It is explained in Sifry Num. 155: V. 17 reads “These are the principles which the Eternal commanded to Moses between a husband and his wife, between a father and his daughter, in her adolescence, in her father’s house.” Now this verse is really an appendix to the laws governing the married wife. It is concluded that the restrictions which apply to the husband in relation with his wife in his house also apply to the father in relation to the adolescent daughter in his house..

HALAKHAH: “These are the vows which he can dissolve,” etc. It is written⁵Num. 30:14. The verse ends: “Her husband shall confirm it or her husband shall dissolve it.”: “Any vow and any oath of prohibition to mortify.” That covers only vows which contain mortification. Vows regarding the relations between him and her, from where? “Between a man and his wife⁶Num. 30:17. One opinion in this Halakhah (Notes 11 ff.) and the consensus in the Babli (79b) hold that the dissolution of vows of mortification is permanent since it is expressly sanctioned by the verse but that dissolution of a vow regarding marital relations, which is the result of an indirect inference, is valid only as long as the marriage continues. Such a dissolution would be automatically voided for the divorcee or widow. The Mishnah mentions only vows the husband can permanently dissolve..” So far the husband; the father from where? Since the husband can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her, so the father can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her⁷This argument seems to be taken out of thin air. It is explained in Sifry Num. 155: V. 17 reads “These are the principles which the Eternal commanded to Moses between a husband and his wife, between a father and his daughter, in her adolescence, in her father’s house.” Now this verse is really an appendix to the laws governing the married wife. It is concluded that the restrictions which apply to the husband in relation with his wife in his house also apply to the father in relation to the adolescent daughter in his house..

HALAKHAH: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve,” etc. Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written⁶Num. 30:2.: “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes.” He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve the people’s vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel⁷Num. 30:3. The same argument in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a, in response to Mishnah 1:8: Dissolutions of vows “hang in the air” (have no biblical basis). This is the only argument accepted in the Babli.: “He shall not profane his word.” He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow. Ḥananiah the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said⁸Ps. 119:106. Also in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a. In Nedarim 8a, the verse is interpreted to authorize vows to keep commandments of the Torah. In Sadducee theory (Damascus Document CD XVI 7–8), the consequence of such a vow is that the corresponding commandment cannot be broken even under extreme pain, which in pharisaic theory applies only to idolatry, incest and adultery, and murder., “I swore and I shall keep it.” Sometimes I keep it. Rebbi Joshua said⁹Ps. 95:11. Also in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a., “What I swore in my rage:” In my rage I swore; I change my mind.

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written¹²Num. 30:3. “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,¹³Lev. 27:28.” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir¹⁴Num. 6:2.”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. ¹⁵Cf. Yebamot 8:1, Note 72, Babli Avodah zarah 27a (and another 18 times without attribution). The quotes are from speeches of Laban and Joseph in Gen. which have no legal implications. This proves that the repetitions are a matter of style. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “¹²Num. 30:3. Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths¹⁶The second half of the verse is clearly written for emphasis. It implies (a) that a vow is valid only if pronounced, not if only thought of and (b) that any speech which can be interpreted as a vow is a vow.
The Babli, 3a/b, quotes both the argument in the style of R. Aqiba and that of R. Ismael without mentioning any names.. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”¹⁷This is an application of the second hermeneutical rule of gezerah šawah “equal cut”. If it was established in Num. 30:3 that “vow” means “anything that implies a vow” and in Lev. 27:2 any dedication to the Temple, including bans, is classified as “vow”, it follows that anything which implies a ban is a ban.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”¹⁸Again this is an application of gezerah šawah, but this time the reference quote is Num. 6:2, cf. Note 14.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths¹⁹This reference is odd since the argument is about vows, not oaths. One has to assume that the scribe left out the relevant portion of the sentence which should be identical to the one used in the preceding case., “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal¹²Num. 30.3.”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal¹³The comparison used in a vow must refer either to a sacrifice or to something that could be a sacrifice or a ḥerem. In the language of the Babli, 14a, “there is no vow unless it relates to something that can be vowed.” A lenghty paraphrase in Sifry Num. 153.. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says¹²Num. 30.3., ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects¹⁴The opinion of R.Yose, Chapter 1, Notes 64 ff.. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself¹²Num. 30.3.”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property¹⁵This sentence has been badly distorted by editors and commentators of recent editions of the Yerushalmi. The original scribe of the ms. wrote in both cases על אחדים. The corrector changed the first occurence into של אחרים. It seems that the correct version is על של אחרים “[to forbid his own property] to others.” It is clear that in both opinions, a person may forbid his own property (permanently) on another (in the Babli, 47a, compared to the power of a father to disinherit a son), but only according to the second opinion one may not forbid the property of others, over which he has no control, to himself. The second opinion has no parallel in either Talmud.
In Sifry Num. 153 one reads: “‘To prohibit a prohibition on himself’, he prohibits for himself but not for others.” This is opposed to both Talmudim., but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

HALAKHAH: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve,” etc. Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written⁶Num. 30:2.: “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes.” He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve the people’s vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel⁷Num. 30:3. The same argument in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a, in response to Mishnah 1:8: Dissolutions of vows “hang in the air” (have no biblical basis). This is the only argument accepted in the Babli.: “He shall not profane his word.” He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow. Ḥananiah the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said⁸Ps. 119:106. Also in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a. In Nedarim 8a, the verse is interpreted to authorize vows to keep commandments of the Torah. In Sadducee theory (Damascus Document CD XVI 7–8), the consequence of such a vow is that the corresponding commandment cannot be broken even under extreme pain, which in pharisaic theory applies only to idolatry, incest and adultery, and murder., “I swore and I shall keep it.” Sometimes I keep it. Rebbi Joshua said⁹Ps. 95:11. Also in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a., “What I swore in my rage:” In my rage I swore; I change my mind.

HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. ²A similar argument in the Babli, 67a/b. In both Talmudim, the argument is amoraic. It is written³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written⁴Num. 30:11. “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written⁵Num. 30:4. “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ.” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.

HALAKHAH: “An adolescent girl,” etc. ²A similar argument in the Babli, 67a/b. In both Talmudim, the argument is amoraic. It is written³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., “if she should be a man’s”. What are we speaking about? If a married one, it already is written⁴Num. 30:11. “if she vowed in her husband’s house”. If about an unmarried one, it already is written⁵Num. 30:4. “if she vows a vow to the Eternal”. Why does the verse say³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., ““if she should be a man’s with her vows on her”? That refers to the preliminarily married adolescent girl whose vows are dissolved by father and husband. So far for vows which she vowed after she was prelinimarily married. Vows which she vowed before she was prelinimarily married? “With her vows on her,³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ.” to include the vows which come with her from her father’s house.

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar⁶If the material in the first paragraph is Amoraic, R. Eleazar is the Amora, bar Pedat. If the argument is tannaїtic, he is the Tanna, ben Shamua. R. Eleazar’s argument is paralleled in Sifry Num. 153 by R. Joshia, student of R. Ismael. The final argument in this paragraph is attributed to R. Ismael in the Babli, 68a.: “If she should be a man’s”³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl⁷At 12 years and 6 months (or 6 months after she developed two pubic hairs) she permanently leaves her father’s potestas. He reads the verse as dealing with a case where there is no residual power of the father. But since vv. 11 ff. speak of the married woman, he must find a case of a preliminarily married woman free from her father.. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly⁸His interpretation follows the wording of the verse more closely.. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult⁹Vv. 7–8 give the husband the right to dissolve vows which preceded the marriage. But vv. 11 ff. restrict the right of the husband to vows made during the marriage (Mishnah 2). For the rabbis, the right to dissolve prior vows depends on the father’s collaboration. But R. Eleazar denies any participation to the father; why should the power of the preliminarily married husband be greater than that of the fully married one?? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died¹⁰If the father had arranged his daughter’s preliminary marriage and then had died, the husband cannot dissolve his wife’s prior vows (Mishnah 2) and, after the definitive marriage ceremony, he cannot dissolve prior vows. (The existence of undisclosed prior vows might be grounds for divorce.) An underage girl orphaned from her father can be married off by her mother and brothers, but that is only a rabbinic institution (cf. Yebamot1:2, Note 118). The husband can dissolve her vows only after the definitive marriage or after she became an adult. The latter case is the one dealt with by R. Eleazar.? The husband dissolves¹¹But only the vows made after the preliminary marriage and only after she has reached adulthood.. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered¹²Why are vv. 11 ff. needed after vv. 7–9? That is a rhetorical question since the two cases are not comparable. For the rabbis, the husband dissolves the vow of the preliminarily married minor only in conjunction with the father, but he also dissolves vows made before the marriage. Once the woman is emancipated from her father, either by completed marriage or by becoming of age, the husband dissolves alone but only vows made during the marriage.? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve¹³If they do not exercise their powers, they get no second chance. If the girl became an adult between preliminary and definitive marriage, the father lost his right of dissolution and the husband lost it with him. If the father died between preliminary and definitive marriages, the husband alone cannot dissolve; therefore, he cannot dissolve her vow after the definitive marriage when he lives with her.. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died¹⁴Before she was preliminarily married. Then the father never had any right concurrent with the husband; the husband is not hindered by the father’s power. and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.¹⁵Since he rejects the references given in the first paragraph.” “Between a man and his wife.¹⁶Num. 30:17.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.¹⁶Num. 30:17.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others¹⁷This is the topic of Chapter 11. The husband can only void vows that either involve the relations between husband and wife or “vows of deprivation” (v. 14); he can forbid his wife to mortify herself. As in Mishnah 11:13, if she had vowed not to sleep with any man, he can void his part but she remains forbidden if she should become a widow or a divorcee.; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

“Then there are no vows.” Let there be no vows! But is it not written⁹Num. 30:2, the start of the chapter on vows.: “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes.” He hung the chapter on the heads of the tribes, that they could dissolve their vows¹⁰Chapter 3:1, Note 6.. If you say so¹¹That there should be no vows., it turns out that you uproot the chapter of vows from the Torah.

There¹²Mishnah ‘Arakhin 1:2., we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate¹³This refers to Lev. 27:1–8, where “evaluation” amounts are specified to be offered to the Sanctuary for persons of specified age and sex. According to R. Meïr, a Jew may vow to pay a Gentile’s evaluation but a Gentile cannot make such a vow. According to R. Jehudah, a Gentile may vow to pay a Jew’s valuation but a Jew cannot offer to pay the Gentile’s evaluation.; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows¹⁴Both Jew and Gentile may make a vow to pay to the Sanctuary the amount another person would fetch were he to be sold on the slave market..” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir¹⁵The texts used to introduce a vow of evaluation (Lev. 27:2) and a vow of nazir (Num. 6:2) are completely parallel. It is to be assumed that the rules derived from the texts are also parallel; if a Gentile can cause an obligation of payment of an evaluation, he also can cause an obligation of nazir; if a Gentile can be the object of an obligation of payment of an evaluation, he also can be the object of an obligation of nazir.? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]¹⁶The context requires to read ניזור for מזיר and vice-versa.? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir¹⁷Tentative answer.. Would he listen to him¹⁸Rejection of the tentative answer.? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt¹⁹The Gentile may well vow to the Jew’s obligatory sacrifices since by biblical law, Gentiles’ sacrifices are accepted. But this does not make the Gentile a nazir.. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]¹⁶The context requires to read ניזור for מזיר and vice-versa.? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir¹⁷Tentative answer.. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir¹⁸Rejection of the tentative answer.. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.²⁰Since the Gentile’s vow is invalid, so is the Jew’s.” What did you exclude from him²¹This now is R. Jeremiah’s real question. Since it was shown that the power to evaluate is not related to the power to vow for nazir, the question arises whether in general the power of Gentiles to make vows is equal to that of Jews or not.? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”²²Num. 30:3; Sifry zuṭa 30:2. Since a Gentile is not subject to biblical laws other than those given to Adam and Noah, he cannot be held responsible if he “desecrates his word,” i. e., does not keep his vow., a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage²³An Elder can annul the vow; cf. Tractate Nedarim, Introduction and Chapter 9., Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage²⁴Since Gentiles are not subject to the Law, they cannot profit from the Law. He will hold that Gentiles, whose informal marriages have biblical sanction, never can be divorced; cf. Qiddušin 1:2, Notes 33 ff.. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved²⁵Since Gentiles are not subject to the Law, they do not need the Law. He will hold that since Gentiles are not under the biblical obligation of formal marriage, they never need a divorce but can validly terminate a companionship through unilateral action by either one of the parties.. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances²⁶Which is forbidden to Jews, Mishnah Nedarim 9:2. He ordered the lady’s vow to be dissolved to give her peace of mind, not because it would have been necessary.. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years²⁷Babli Sanhedrin 105b, as tannaïtic text. The story would make Laban live more than 300 years..

“One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother”. Your cohabitation is for me like cohabitation with my mother, like my mother’s flesh; he did not say anything¹⁶The translation and interpretation of these sentences are uncertain. Another approach to the text, based on a different reading of the meaning of the periods, would be: “One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother, your cohabitation is for me like cohabitation with my mother. Like my mother’s flesh, he did not say anything.” In that case, the first example is an explanation of the Mishnah, the second is a separate statement which might not conflict with the Mishnah. This is the approach of the Babli, 14a. If the translation in the text is chosen, the requirement that a formal annulment of the vow is required, is restricted to the wording in the Mishnah, where it is not so clear even to the unlearned that the vow is null and void.. If he said, this loaf is for me like cohabitation with my mother, what¹⁷What are the rules?? Let us hear from the following: A qônām that I shall not sleep with you, Rav says, he is forbidden, Samuel says he is permitted. How does Samuel uphold “he shall not profanate his word”? As if he shall not profanate his word¹⁸The statement of the Mishnah is purely rabbinical; it cannot possibly have a biblical basis.. Rav sticks with his opinion¹⁹From the previous paragraph.: The Tannaїm in the House of Rav disagree: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says¹²Num. 30.3., ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.”

It was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar⁶If the material in the first paragraph is Amoraic, R. Eleazar is the Amora, bar Pedat. If the argument is tannaїtic, he is the Tanna, ben Shamua. R. Eleazar’s argument is paralleled in Sifry Num. 153 by R. Joshia, student of R. Ismael. The final argument in this paragraph is attributed to R. Ismael in the Babli, 68a.: “If she should be a man’s”³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl⁷At 12 years and 6 months (or 6 months after she developed two pubic hairs) she permanently leaves her father’s potestas. He reads the verse as dealing with a case where there is no residual power of the father. But since vv. 11 ff. speak of the married woman, he must find a case of a preliminarily married woman free from her father.. The colleagues say, Rebbi Eleazar says it correctly⁸His interpretation follows the wording of the verse more closely.. Is it not difficult for Rebbi Eleazar: Did she not leave her father’s power the moment she became an adult⁹Vv. 7–8 give the husband the right to dissolve vows which preceded the marriage. But vv. 11 ff. restrict the right of the husband to vows made during the marriage (Mishnah 2). For the rabbis, the right to dissolve prior vows depends on the father’s collaboration. But R. Eleazar denies any participation to the father; why should the power of the preliminarily married husband be greater than that of the fully married one?? Who may dissolve the vows of an orphan whose father had died¹⁰If the father had arranged his daughter’s preliminary marriage and then had died, the husband cannot dissolve his wife’s prior vows (Mishnah 2) and, after the definitive marriage ceremony, he cannot dissolve prior vows. (The existence of undisclosed prior vows might be grounds for divorce.) An underage girl orphaned from her father can be married off by her mother and brothers, but that is only a rabbinic institution (cf. Yebamot1:2, Note 118). The husband can dissolve her vows only after the definitive marriage or after she became an adult. The latter case is the one dealt with by R. Eleazar.? The husband dissolves¹¹But only the vows made after the preliminary marriage and only after she has reached adulthood.. It is difficult for the rabbis: If he may dissolve before she entered his power, is it not obvious [that he may dissolve] after she entered¹²Why are vv. 11 ff. needed after vv. 7–9? That is a rhetorical question since the two cases are not comparable. For the rabbis, the husband dissolves the vow of the preliminarily married minor only in conjunction with the father, but he also dissolves vows made before the marriage. Once the woman is emancipated from her father, either by completed marriage or by becoming of age, the husband dissolves alone but only vows made during the marriage.? How do the rabbis explain “with her vows on her”? What are we talking about? If about vows which she made before she was preliminarily married and she became preliminarily married, already the father and the husband had the power to dissolve¹³If they do not exercise their powers, they get no second chance. If the girl became an adult between preliminary and definitive marriage, the father lost his right of dissolution and the husband lost it with him. If the father died between preliminary and definitive marriages, the husband alone cannot dissolve; therefore, he cannot dissolve her vow after the definitive marriage when he lives with her.. But we must talk about a vow which she made before her father died, then the father died¹⁴Before she was preliminarily married. Then the father never had any right concurrent with the husband; the husband is not hindered by the father’s power. and she became an adult. From where does Rebbi Eleazar obtain: “The father and the husband dissolve the vows of a preliminarily married adolescent girl.¹⁵Since he rejects the references given in the first paragraph.” “Between a man and his wife.¹⁶Num. 30:17.” That deals with the husband. The father? “Between a father and his daughter.¹⁶Num. 30:17.” How do the rabbis interpret “between a man and his wife”? Not what is between her and others. “Between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others. Does Rebbi Eleazar not agree with this? He agrees; he understands everything from there: “Between a man and his wife”, not what is between her and others¹⁷This is the topic of Chapter 11. The husband can only void vows that either involve the relations between husband and wife or “vows of deprivation” (v. 14); he can forbid his wife to mortify herself. As in Mishnah 11:13, if she had vowed not to sleep with any man, he can void his part but she remains forbidden if she should become a widow or a divorcee.; “between a father and his daughter,” not what is between her and others.

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead²³Everybody agrees that there exist situations in which an agent acts with the full authority of a principal and others where only the person himself can act. The question is, what is the normal case and what is the exception?. “If he definitively will substitute²⁴This seems to be a quote from Lev. 27:10, but there the masoretic text is הָמֵר יָמִיר. If the word יְמִירֶנּוּ is not a slip of the scribe’s pen, the reference might be to יַחֲליפֶנּוּ (“he himself may exchange it”) in the same verse. There is no explicit baraita in rabbinic literature which would invalidate substitution by agent; the double expression is always interpreted as an addition in R. Aqiba’s system. In Sifra Beḥuqqotay Pereq 9(6), the double expression is interpreted to include a woman for her own sacrifice and an heir for an inherited one. Since the agent is not mentioned, he is excluded. In the Babli, Temurah 2a, the statement of Sifra is characterized as R. Meïr’s., if he himself will dissolve²⁵Num. 30:14. This does not refer to an infinitive construction but to the use of the word יְפֵרֶנּוּ instead of the simple יָפֵר. In R. Aqiba’s system, suffixes always carry a special meaning. The argument is explicit in the Babli, Nazir 12b, where the Tanna R. Joshia quotes Num. 30:14 to prove that a husband cannot delegate his power over his wife’s vows to an attorney. R. Jonathan holds that an agent always can act for his principal..” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,²⁶Lev. 1:4;3:2,8,13;4:24,29,33, a necessary action to validate a sacrifice. The repetition of his hand in all these verses is taken in the Babli, Menaḥot93b, as proof that any agency is impossible for animal sacrifices.” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent²⁷This formulation is in Sifra Wayyiqra Pereq 4(2).. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl²⁸Ex. 21:6, speaking of the Hebrew slave; cf. Chapter 1:2.;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent²⁹Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Neziqin 2 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 253), dR.Simeon ben Ioḥai Mišpaṭim 6:6.. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority³⁰This opinion is not found in any parallel source..

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron¹⁹Cf. Berakhot 7:5, Note 116. on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners²⁰Reading with Jastrow and Krauss קֻסְטוֹדִייָה for קֻסְטוֹרִייָה, Latin custodia “watch, guard; gang of prisoners”. was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself²¹Num. 30:3.”, as you say²²Jer. 40:1., “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan²³In the Babli, 22a, R. Nathan. provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.²⁴Prov. 12:18.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself²⁵Since a person who mortifies himself is called a sinner, Sifry Num.30, Nazir 1:5 (51c, 1. 58).. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing²⁴Prov. 12:18.. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition²¹Num. 30:3.”.

⁴⁸A baraita similar to this one is quoted and explained in the Babli Šebuot 20a.“ ‘Prohibition’, is an oath. ‘Expression’⁴⁹Num. 30:4: “If she be married to a man and her vows are on her or the expression of her lips which she forbade on herself.” Since “expression” is opposed to “vows”, it must refer to oaths. Similarly, “to express with one’s lips” is used for “to swear an oath” in Lev. 5:4; cf. Šebuot 20a., is an oath. If you say prohibition is an oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath. If you say prohibition is⁵⁰It seems that “not” has fallen out here. The two cases will be explained below. a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.” “Prohibition is an oath”, and you say “if you say so”?⁵¹First one states that ‘prohibition’ is an expression of an oath. Then one argues ‘if it is an oath’, ‘if it is not an oath’. This contradicts the first statement. Rebbi Eleazar said, these are two Tannaїm⁵²The first two sentences have one author, the last two a different one.. Rebbi Jeremiah said, it is from one Tanna⁵³The baraita, as one would reasonably expect, is from one author. But the implicit verb in the first two sentences should not be read as “is” but as “may be”.. If he said it in the language of a vow⁵⁴That he forbids the object for himself. you catch him in the language of a vow. If he said it in the language of an oath⁵⁵That he forbids himself the use of the object. Since “prohibition” is applied to both vows and oaths, the meaning of the word is determined by the syntax of the sentence in which it is used; cf. Note 4. you catch him in the language of an oath. If you say, prohibition is a kind of oath, he is guilty for every single prohibition and for every single oath⁵⁶Violating a vow is a prohibition which, if proved in court by two witnesses, might subject the perpetrator to punishment by whipping. Even if the violation was inadvertent, there never is a possibility of a sacrifice. But inadvertently violating an oath imposes on the perpetrator the duty to offer a reparation or a purification offering in the Temple, Lev. 5:1–13.. Rebbi Yose said, this comes only for five loaves⁵⁷Multiple guilt (multiple sacrifices) are possible only for multiple objects of prohibitions, not for repeated prohibitions of the same object.. But for a single loaf, from the moment he mentioned “oath” for it, he made it a cadaver⁵⁸If somebody made an oath to the effect that he would not eat a certain food, that food is forbidden to him as if it were cadaver meat, forbidden to any Jew.. Furthermore, he may want to have oaths apply to prohibited items, but oaths cannot apply to prohibitited items⁴⁰Mishnah 2:2: “A vow that I shall not build a tabernacle, that I shall not take a lulab, that I will not wear phylacteries: vows are forbidden, oaths permitted, for one cannot swear to break religious obligations.” If somebody makes a vow that religious objects should be forbidden to him (as if they were dedicated sacrifices), he commits a twofold sin in making a frivolous vow and breaking biblical commandments, but what he did is done. But if he swears that he will not fulfill his religious obligations, the oath is invalid since, in the language of the Babli, “he already is under oath from Mount Sinai”, and a valid oath cannot be superseded by another oath. Since visiting the sick is a religious obligation, if the prohibition of usufruct is interpreted as an oath it should be nonexistent in the case of a visit to a sick person. No answer is given since practice follows R. Joḥanan.. Rebbi Ḥananiah said, it applies even to a single loaf. As we have stated⁵⁹Tosephta Šebuot 2:4, referred to in Babli Šebuot 28b., “in that the past is more stringent than the future, if he said I did not eat, I did not eat, he is guilty for every statement⁶⁰If he swore falsely that he had not eaten, he committed the sin of a false oath. Since that oath does not forbid anything, each statement stands on its own and subjects him to the punishment for swearing falsely.; I shall not eat, I shall not eat, he is guilty only once⁶¹The first oath established the prohibition; the following oaths are futile, forbidden in the Third Commandment, but not triggering any obligation of sacrifice..” Rebbi Yudan said⁶²He explains the prior statement “If you say prohibition is not a kind of oath, he is guilty for this separately and that separately.”, only if he first mentioned “vow” and then mentioned “oath”. But if he mentioned oath and then vow, vows can apply to prohibitions but oaths cannot apply to prohibitions⁶³Since vows are subject related, if he forbade himself the use of a loaf, he may later declare the loaf to have the status of qorbān, to add the prohibition of sacrilege to the prohibition of eating. But if he first declared the loaf to be qorbān, it is automatically forbidden to him and no oath can increase the degree of prohibition. Therefore, the oath following the vow is a futile oath..

Rebbi Yose explained “to forbid”⁶⁴Num. 30:3, “to forbid a prohibition to himself”, which can be either a vow or an oath.: That should be forbidden to me⁶⁵Even though no oath formula was mentioned, this is an oath since it is person-related.; there should be a prohibition on it, it is forbidden⁶⁶Even though no vow was mentioned, this is a vow since it is object-related.. An oath is on me, it is forbidden, there should be an oath on it, it is forbidden⁶⁷The only problem is in the last statement, since an oath cannot be binding on a thing. R. Yose holds that an oath formula, used when a vow formula would have been appropriate, induces a vow since it cannot induce a valid oath. In the language of the Talmudim, the oath formula is a handle to introduce the vow.. Rebbi Yudan said, in vows it is forbidden, in oaths it is permitted⁶⁸He holds that an oath formula applied to a thing is ineffective; it is as if it had not been said. This paragraph is discussed at length in the Commentary of R. Nissim Gerondi on the Babli, 2b.. There is a prohibition on me, it is forbidden. There is a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is there on me, it is forbidden. There is an oath on (me) [it]⁶⁹It seems that it must be read עליו instead of עליin order to make sense. is permitted⁷⁰An oath directed to a thing is void and has no consequences..

It is written³⁰Num. 30:14.: “Every vow and every oath of prohibition to mortify a person.” For example, [a qônām] if I would taste peppers, if I would taste rolls³¹In the opinion of S. Fraenkel κολλίκιον, diminutive of Greek κόλλιξ “large round bread”.. Not only if that kind is available now; even if that kind is not available now, perhaps he might bring her some later on. Rebbi Joḥanan in the name of Rebbi Yannai: If there were two pieces before them, one nice and one not nice. If she desired the nice one³²There were two pieces of meat and she was afraid her husband would take the nicer (larger) one for himself. It is assumed that the servants cooked and brought the meal. and made a vow to forbid herself the less nice one, he may dissolve that. Why can he dissolve? The colleagues say, because of her mortification³³She might change her mind and opt for the smaller piece. The Babli, 82b, holds that the husband cannot dissolve as long as she has enough not to be hungry. It does not discuss the case of a person becoming afraid of overeating.. Rebbi Ze‘ira and Rebbi Hila both say, because of his mortification³⁴Since the verse speaks only of mortification whithout indicating to whom it refers, it is implied that the husband can dissolve his wife’s vow if it mortifies him.. Rebbi Ze‘ira in the name of Samuel: A man can dissolve all vows except if she says, any benefit from me shall [be qônām] for X. That means he can dissolve: Any benefit from X shall [be qônām] for me³⁵The Babli, 82a, agrees with both statements.. But did we not state: “The produce of this grocery store [is qônām] for me, he cannot dissolve.” Explain that following Rebbi Yose and they disagree with him, for we did state there³⁶Which is declared to be R. Yose’s opinion.: “If he can get the necessities of life only from that grocer, he may dissolve.” Rebbi Yose³⁷The late Amora. said, because he gives him credit, he delivers to him³⁸Since he would have to go hungry if he is temporarily out of cash and could not pay another grocer, this certainly is potential mortification for him.. Rebbi Mana said, because he gives him good quality produce³⁹R. Mana even considers it mortification if he had to take a lesser quality from another store..

“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good³³Lev. 5:4..” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment³⁴In the Babli, 16b/17a, this verse, dealing with the obligation of a sacrifice for an oath inadvertently not kept, only frees the maker of an oath to violate some commandment from the obligation to bring a sacrifice.. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,³⁵Num. 30:3. In the Babli, this verse frees him from the sin of not keeping his vow. In the Yerushalmi, it extends the rule to any oath, including an intentional one.” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven³⁶Mishnah Temurah 7:2: Anything whatsoever can be vowed to support the Temple..

“Since the husband dissolves in adulthood.” The Mishnah follows Rebbi Eleazar, since it was stated in the name of Rebbi Eleazar⁶If the material in the first paragraph is Amoraic, R. Eleazar is the Amora, bar Pedat. If the argument is tannaїtic, he is the Tanna, ben Shamua. R. Eleazar’s argument is paralleled in Sifry Num. 153 by R. Joshia, student of R. Ismael. The final argument in this paragraph is attributed to R. Ismael in the Babli, 68a.: “If she should be a man’s”³Num. 30:7. The masoretic text reads הָיוֹ., the verse speaks about a preliminarily married adult girl⁷At 12 years and 6 months (or 6 months after she developed two pubic hairs) she permanently leaves her father’s potestas. He reads the verse as dealing with a case where there is no residual power of the father. But since vv. 11 ff. speak of the married woman, he must find a case of a preliminarily married woman free from her father..

HALAKHAH: “If she made a vow while preliminarily married,” etc. Rebbi Hila said, “being she will be”³⁹Num. 30:7. “To be” applied to a woman means “to be married,” Deut. 24:2., even for a hundred beings, her father and her last husband dissolve her vows. Rebbi Yose said, a Mishnah says so: “Her father and her last husband dissolve her vows²⁸Mishnah 3.”.

It is written: “The Eternal will forgive her⁴⁵Num. 30:6,9,13. The verses refer to girls or women whose vows are dissolved by father or husband. The verses assume that they felt impelled to make vows for some hidden guilt. In the Babli, 23a, the verse is interpreted to refer only to the case of the woman violating her vow, not knowing that it had been dissolved. The speaker there and in Tosephta 3:14 is R. Aqiba..” This tells that she needs forgiveness. When Rebbi Jacob came to this verse, he used to say: If somebody needs atonement having intended to get pig’s meat but happened to get kosher [animal’s] meat, so much more one who had the intent to get pig’s meat and got pig’s meat.

It is written: “The Eternal will forgive her⁴⁵Num. 30:6,9,13. The verses refer to girls or women whose vows are dissolved by father or husband. The verses assume that they felt impelled to make vows for some hidden guilt. In the Babli, 23a, the verse is interpreted to refer only to the case of the woman violating her vow, not knowing that it had been dissolved. The speaker there and in Tosephta 3:14 is R. Aqiba..” This tells that she needs forgiveness. When Rebbi Jacob came to this verse, he used to say: If somebody needs atonement having intended to get pig’s meat but happened to get kosher [animal’s] meat, so much more one who had the intent to get pig’s meat and got pig’s meat.

It is written: “The Eternal will forgive her⁴⁵Num. 30:6,9,13. The verses refer to girls or women whose vows are dissolved by father or husband. The verses assume that they felt impelled to make vows for some hidden guilt. In the Babli, 23a, the verse is interpreted to refer only to the case of the woman violating her vow, not knowing that it had been dissolved. The speaker there and in Tosephta 3:14 is R. Aqiba..” This tells that she needs forgiveness. When Rebbi Jacob came to this verse, he used to say: If somebody needs atonement having intended to get pig’s meat but happened to get kosher [animal’s] meat, so much more one who had the intent to get pig’s meat and got pig’s meat.

Who dissolves her obligations⁷⁸It is agreed that Num. 30 gives the husband the right to dissolve his wife’s vows. But where is it written that the husband can eliminate the sacrifices which are implied by his wife’s vow?? Rebbi Yose ben Ḥanina said, it is a decree of Scripture: “He dissolved her vow;” he dissolved her obligation⁷⁹Num. 30:9: “If on the day of his hearing he stops her and dissolves her vow [and] obligations.”. The one who dissolved her vow dissolved her obligation.

HALAKHAH: Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it⁶³Num. 30: 14: “Her husband may confirm it or her husband may dissolve it.”
The Tosephta (7:4) has a fifth version: The husband may confirm one and dissolve the other of two vows made at the same time, i. e., it is applicable to the situation described at the end of Mishnah 6.”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally⁶⁴The husband has only the choice to accept or to reject the wife’s vow in toto., “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall confirm it”, totally, “he shall dissolve it”, even partially. The Mishnah follows him who said, “he shall confirm it”, even partially, “he shall dissolve it”, totally. As we have stated: “If he confirmed for the figs he confirmed everything. If he dissolved for figs it is not dissolved unless he also dissolves for grapes.” If she said, a qônām that I shall not taste a fig nor a grape berry, that is a matter of difference between Rebbi Ismael and Rebbi Aqiba since Rebbi Ismael says, the vow decides, and Rebbi Aqiba says, the prohibition decides⁶⁵In Halakhah 9, R. Ismael says the determining factor is the vow. A multiplicity of vows made at the same time is treated as a multiplicity; there are two separate vows in our case. R. Aqiba says that a multiplicity of prohibitions imposed at the same time are one prohibition; there is only one vow..

From where a warning about an oath for a permitted purpose? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he shall not profane his word⁹⁸Num. 30:3, the paragraph about profane vows. Babli 21a., he shall not make his words profane⁹⁹He translates biblical into rabbinic Hebrew..

MISHNAH: If somebody says to his wife, all vows that you might vow from now until I shall return from place X shall be confirmed⁵⁴In his absence. Everybody agrees that an as yet nonexistent vow cannot be confirmed., he did not say anything; [if he says] they shall be dissolved, Rebbi Eliezer says, they are dissolved, but the Sages say, they are not dissolved.
Rebbi Eliezer said, if he can dissolve vows that came under the category of prohibition⁵⁵Vows actually made by which the wife imposes a legally enforceable prohibition on herself., should he not be able to dissolve vows that did not yet come under the category of prohibition⁵⁶Vows not yet made.? They said to him, it says⁵⁷Num. 30:14. The verse treats confirmation and voiding as parallels. ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them”. What can be confirmed can be dissolved; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.

HALAKHAH: ⁶⁸This refers to Mishnaiot 8,9. Tosephta 6:5; Babli 75b.“He⁶⁹In the parallel sources: They. This is no longer part of R. Aqiba’s argument, but belongs to the anonymous Sages. answered to the words of Rebbi Eliezer: Let the miqweh⁷⁰The ritual bath cleanses from most impurities. But a pure person cannot immerse himself to become immune to future impurities. prove it! It frees the impure from their impurities but it cannot save pure ones. Rebbi Eliezer argued another track: Since in a situation where he cannot dissolve his own vows before he made them, he dissolves his wife’s vows before she made them, in a situation where he can dissolve his own vows after he made them, would it not be logical that he could dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them?⁷¹It is difficult to make sense of this text. In Tosephta and Babli one reads: מָה אִם בְּמָקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ מֵפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ מִשֶׁנָּדַר הֲרֵי הוּא מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא יִדּוֹר. מָקוֹם שֶׁמֵפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ מִשֶׁנָּֽדְרָה אֵינוֹ דִין שֶׁיָּפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִדּוֹר. “Since he cannot dissolve his own vows after he vowed (for only a Sage can do that), but he can dissolve his own vows before he vows (by a declaration that all his future vows are null and void), then since he can dissolve his wife’s vows after she vowed it is only logical that he should be able to dissolve his wife’s vows before she vowed.” It seems that the Yerushalmi text should follow similar lines. No! Why can he not dissolve his own vows before he made them⁷²This text contradicts the next sentence. The Tosephta reads אָֽמְרוּ לוֹ וּמָה מֵיפֵר נִדְרֵי עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא יִדּוֹר. “They said to him, why is it that he can dissolve his own vows before he made them?”? For if he wants to confirm them, he confirms them. Could he dissolve his wife’s vows after she made them, when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?⁷³The Tosephta reads יָפֵר נִדְרֵי אִשְׁתּוֹ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִדּוֹר. שֶׁכֵּן אִם רָצָה לְהָקֵם אֵינוֹ מוּקָם. “Could he dissolve his wife’s vows before she made them when if he wanted to confirm them, he could not confirm them?” (As R. Eliezer agrees in the Mishnah.)” ⁷⁴Tosephta 6:6; Babli 76b.“But it says⁵⁷Num. 30:14. The verse treats confirmation and voiding as parallels., ‘her husband may confirm them and her husband may dissolve them’. What can be confirmed can be dissolved,; what cannot be confirmed cannot be dissolved.”

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated⁷⁷Babli 76b, 77a, Šabbat 157a.: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say⁷⁸In Sifry Num. 156 this is attributed to R. Simeon himself., the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time⁷⁹24 hours from the moment the husband is informed..” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day⁸⁰Num. 30:15..” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing⁸¹Num. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours.
It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing..” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night⁸²In that case, the husband has 24 hours even according to the rabbis.. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night⁸³The mention of the start of Friday night is problematic. It is a correction by the scribe himself and probably an insertion at the wrong place., he became paralyzed⁸⁴After he was informed of the vow., and then his power of speech returned⁸⁵Within 24 hours after he heard from his wife.. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day⁸⁶Until nightfall on Saturday, less than 24 hours.. If he became paralyzed, and later⁸⁷Not on the same day. his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours⁸⁸The paralysis does not stop the clock. In this case, R. Yose ben R. Jehudah is more restrictive than the rabbis.. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour⁸⁹“One hour” means “a short time”. If the husband was informed of the vow shortly before sundown and before he could dissolve the vow was paralyzed at sundown, for the rabbis he had his day and when he regains his speech cannot undo the vow. before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated⁷⁷Babli 76b, 77a, Šabbat 157a.: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say⁷⁸In Sifry Num. 156 this is attributed to R. Simeon himself., the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time⁷⁹24 hours from the moment the husband is informed..” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day⁸⁰Num. 30:15..” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing⁸¹Num. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours.
It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing..” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night⁸²In that case, the husband has 24 hours even according to the rabbis.. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night⁸³The mention of the start of Friday night is problematic. It is a correction by the scribe himself and probably an insertion at the wrong place., he became paralyzed⁸⁴After he was informed of the vow., and then his power of speech returned⁸⁵Within 24 hours after he heard from his wife.. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day⁸⁶Until nightfall on Saturday, less than 24 hours.. If he became paralyzed, and later⁸⁷Not on the same day. his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours⁸⁸The paralysis does not stop the clock. In this case, R. Yose ben R. Jehudah is more restrictive than the rabbis.. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour⁸⁹“One hour” means “a short time”. If the husband was informed of the vow shortly before sundown and before he could dissolve the vow was paralyzed at sundown, for the rabbis he had his day and when he regains his speech cannot undo the vow. before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated⁷⁷Babli 76b, 77a, Šabbat 157a.: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say⁷⁸In Sifry Num. 156 this is attributed to R. Simeon himself., the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time⁷⁹24 hours from the moment the husband is informed..” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day⁸⁰Num. 30:15..” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing⁸¹Num. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours.
It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing..” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night⁸²In that case, the husband has 24 hours even according to the rabbis.. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night⁸³The mention of the start of Friday night is problematic. It is a correction by the scribe himself and probably an insertion at the wrong place., he became paralyzed⁸⁴After he was informed of the vow., and then his power of speech returned⁸⁵Within 24 hours after he heard from his wife.. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day⁸⁶Until nightfall on Saturday, less than 24 hours.. If he became paralyzed, and later⁸⁷Not on the same day. his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours⁸⁸The paralysis does not stop the clock. In this case, R. Yose ben R. Jehudah is more restrictive than the rabbis.. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour⁸⁹“One hour” means “a short time”. If the husband was informed of the vow shortly before sundown and before he could dissolve the vow was paralyzed at sundown, for the rabbis he had his day and when he regains his speech cannot undo the vow. before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

HALAKHAH: “The dissolution of vows may take place the entire day,” etc. It was stated⁷⁷Babli 76b, 77a, Šabbat 157a.: “Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah and Rebbi Eleazar ben Rebbi Simeon say⁷⁸In Sifry Num. 156 this is attributed to R. Simeon himself., the dissolution of vows may take place from time to time⁷⁹24 hours from the moment the husband is informed..” What is the reason of the rabbis? “From day to day⁸⁰Num. 30:15..” What is the reason of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah? “On the day of his hearing⁸¹Num. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours.
It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing..” How do the rabbis explain Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah’s reason, “on the day of his hearing”? Explain it that she made the vow on the start of the night⁸²In that case, the husband has 24 hours even according to the rabbis.. How does Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah explain the rabbis’ reason, “from day to day”? Explain it that she made the vow at the start of Friday night⁸³The mention of the start of Friday night is problematic. It is a correction by the scribe himself and probably an insertion at the wrong place., he became paralyzed⁸⁴After he was informed of the vow., and then his power of speech returned⁸⁵Within 24 hours after he heard from his wife.. In the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one gives him 24 hours. In the opinion of the rabbis he has only that day⁸⁶Until nightfall on Saturday, less than 24 hours.. If he became paralyzed, and later⁸⁷Not on the same day. his power of speech returned, in the opinion of Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Jehudah one adds up to a total of 24 hours⁸⁸The paralysis does not stop the clock. In this case, R. Yose ben R. Jehudah is more restrictive than the rabbis.. In the opinion of the rabbis he always can dissolve when his speech returns. But if it happened one hour⁸⁹“One hour” means “a short time”. If the husband was informed of the vow shortly before sundown and before he could dissolve the vow was paralyzed at sundown, for the rabbis he had his day and when he regains his speech cannot undo the vow. before sundown, he can no longer dissolve.

May one permit¹⁰³R. Ḥiyya [the older] is the great authority for the Mishnah text. According to him, one has to switch the attributions in the Mishnah and, therefore, practice has to follow what in the common Mishnah is attributed to R. Jehudah. Naḥmanides (11:1) holds that practice has to follow the Yerushalmi in this since the Babli does not discuss the theme; Maimonides (Commentary to Nega‘im 2:5; Code Hilkhot Ševu‘ot 6:6) disagrees and follows the majority opinion in the Mishnah. vows in the night? Since vows under the husband’s jurisdiction, about which “on the day” is written⁸¹Num. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours.
It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing., he may dissolve in the night, vows under the jurisdiction of the Elder, where “on the day” is not written, not so much more¹⁰⁴The Babli agrees, 77b, Eruvin 62b.? Can one permit through an interpreter? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Abba bar Ẓutra was made an interpreter for Rebbi Joḥanan in the case of a woman who did not know Syriac¹⁰⁵She spoke only Greek. In general, a judge is only competent to sit in a case if he understands all witnesses since it says “by the mouth of two witnesses”, not the mouth of an interpreter (Deut. 19:15; Makkot 1:9. Sifry Deut. 188.).

May one permit¹⁰³R. Ḥiyya [the older] is the great authority for the Mishnah text. According to him, one has to switch the attributions in the Mishnah and, therefore, practice has to follow what in the common Mishnah is attributed to R. Jehudah. Naḥmanides (11:1) holds that practice has to follow the Yerushalmi in this since the Babli does not discuss the theme; Maimonides (Commentary to Nega‘im 2:5; Code Hilkhot Ševu‘ot 6:6) disagrees and follows the majority opinion in the Mishnah. vows in the night? Since vows under the husband’s jurisdiction, about which “on the day” is written⁸¹Num. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours.
It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing., he may dissolve in the night, vows under the jurisdiction of the Elder, where “on the day” is not written, not so much more¹⁰⁴The Babli agrees, 77b, Eruvin 62b.? Can one permit through an interpreter? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Abba bar Ẓutra was made an interpreter for Rebbi Joḥanan in the case of a woman who did not know Syriac¹⁰⁵She spoke only Greek. In general, a judge is only competent to sit in a case if he understands all witnesses since it says “by the mouth of two witnesses”, not the mouth of an interpreter (Deut. 19:15; Makkot 1:9. Sifry Deut. 188.).

May one permit¹⁰³R. Ḥiyya [the older] is the great authority for the Mishnah text. According to him, one has to switch the attributions in the Mishnah and, therefore, practice has to follow what in the common Mishnah is attributed to R. Jehudah. Naḥmanides (11:1) holds that practice has to follow the Yerushalmi in this since the Babli does not discuss the theme; Maimonides (Commentary to Nega‘im 2:5; Code Hilkhot Ševu‘ot 6:6) disagrees and follows the majority opinion in the Mishnah. vows in the night? Since vows under the husband’s jurisdiction, about which “on the day” is written⁸¹Num. 30:6,8,13. In the Babli, 76b, and Sifry Num. 156, the arguments are switched: “On the day of his hearing” implies that at nightfall the time has run out, “from day to day” implies 24 hours.
It is not necessary to amend the Yerushalmi since Targum Pseudo-Jonathan and Rashi explain Num. 30:15 following the rabbis: “If her husband remains silent from the day he was informed to another day”, i. e., the next night. R. Yose ben R. Jehudah will explain that “the day of his hearing” starts only with his hearing., he may dissolve in the night, vows under the jurisdiction of the Elder, where “on the day” is not written, not so much more¹⁰⁴The Babli agrees, 77b, Eruvin 62b.? Can one permit through an interpreter? Let us hear from the following: Rebbi Abba bar Ẓutra was made an interpreter for Rebbi Joḥanan in the case of a woman who did not know Syriac¹⁰⁵She spoke only Greek. In general, a judge is only competent to sit in a case if he understands all witnesses since it says “by the mouth of two witnesses”, not the mouth of an interpreter (Deut. 19:15; Makkot 1:9. Sifry Deut. 188.).

MISHNAH: ‘That you provide me with usufruct until Passover if you would go to your father’s house until Tabernacles⁶⁸In the interpretation of the Babli, 15 a/b, the husband after Tabernacles makes a vow of qônām that his wife cannot have anything from him until Passover (in the spring) if she goes to her father’s house before Tabernacles (next fall). It is obvious that if the wife goes before Passover, she is forbidden until Passover (and she should not have any usufruct from her husband now since maybe she will go afterwards). But if she goes during the six months between Passover and Tabernacles, any usufruct she had before Passover would be retroactively forbidden; therefore, he would transgress the commandment not to profane vows (by formulating his vow in a way which invites violating it) and she could be punished for violating his vow.
While this interpretation seems to fit the language of the Mishnah (and is accepted as obvious by Maimonides in his Commentary), the Yerushalmi in the Halakhah rejects the idea that the wife could be guilty because of the husband’s vow and reads the Mishnah as given in the translation, that the husband forbids himself any usufruct from his wife. Therefore, he cannot have any usufruct now since she later might defy his instructions. There is no reason to think that the text of the Halakhah be corrupt..’ If she went before Passover, she is forbidden to deliver usufruct to him until Passover, after Passover “he should not profane his word⁶⁹Num. 30:3..”