Midrash for Numbers 15:3

10) Why need it be written below (Vayikra 1:3): "from the cattle"? ("If his offering is a burnt-offering from the cattle, etc.") To exclude treifah (a "torn," ritually unfit animal). Now does this not follow by kal vachomer? If a blemished animal, which is permitted for mundane purposes (i.e., eating), is pasul for the altar, treifah, which is forbidden for mundane purposes, how much more so should it be pasul for the altar! — This is refuted by cheilev (forbidden fats) and blood, which are forbidden for mundane purposes, yet kasher for the altar! — No (i.e., this is no refutation of the kal vachomer, for) forbidden fats and blood come from a thing (i.e., an animal) which is permitted (for mundane purposes), unlike treifah, which is entirely forbidden (for such purposes)! — This is refuted by melikah ("pinching" a bird's neck [as opposed to shechitah]), which is entirely forbidden (for mundane purposes), yet kasher for the altar! — No, (this is no refutation, for) the very thing that makes it kadosh (holy, for an offering), i.e., melikah, renders it forbidden (for mundane purposes), whereas with treifah, it is not the thing that makes it kadosh which renders it forbidden (for mundane purposes), and since this is so, it should be pasul for the altar! (Why, then, do we need an exclusion clause for treifah?) — Now that this refutation has been countered (at its origin, [viz., R. Akiva 8) above], so that the kal vachomer stands), what is the thrust of "from" (but not all) the cattle"? To exclude treifah.

11) (Vayikra 1:2): "from the sheep" — to exclude muktzeh (an animal designated for idolatry); "and from the sheep" — to exclude noge'ach (an animal which gored a man to death). If rovea is excluded, why need noge'ach be (separately) excluded? And if noge'ach is excluded, why need rovea be excluded? For there is that in rovea (prompting exclusion) which is lacking in noge'ach, and there is that in noge'ach which is lacking in rovea, viz.: With rovea, forcing (the animal to be rovea) was equated with volition (i.e., in both instances, the animal must be killed); with noge'ach, forcing was not equated with volition (i.e., only in the latter instance is the animal killed). (The owners of) noge'ach pay kofer (indemnity) after (the animal has been put to) death; rovea (in an instance where the woman dies as a result) does not pay indemnity after death. There is that in rovea which is lacking in ne'evad, and that in ne'evad which is lacking in rovea. Rovea, whether one's own animal or another's is forbidden (for the altar); ne'evad — one's own (animal that he made an object of idolatry) is forbidden; another's (animal that he made an object of idolatry) is permitted (for the altar, one not voiding what is not his). Rovea — its ornaments are permitted; ne'evad — its ornaments are forbidden. Therefore, Scripture must adduce all (of these exclusions).

4 (Numb. 15:3) “And you shall make an offering to the Lord, a burnt offering, or a sacrifice”: The Holy One said to them, “Whoever offers Me a sacrifice in this world, does not offer it in vain.¹⁰See Sifra to Lev. 9:24 (99: Parashat Shemini Mekhilta deMiluim); Lam. R. 5:1 (1); Lev. R. 7:96; also Deut. R. 4:11. Rather [if] he offers it, it is pleasing to Me. Also in the world to come, he shall have the right to make an offering. Then I will accept it, and it shall be pleasing to Me.” It is so stated (in Mal. 3:4), “Then shall the offering of Judah and Jerusalem be pleasing to the Lord, as in the days of old and as in the former years.”