Comentario sobre Levítico 17:3

ישחט שור או כשב‎ ‎‎‏ אשר [WHAT MAN SOEVER] THAT SLAUGHTERETH AN OX, OR A LAMB — Scripture is speaking here of consecrated animals since it says (v. 4) "and bringeth it not unto the appointed tent to offer an offering" (cf. Sifra, Acharei Mot, Section 6 3; Zevachim 106a).

איש איש …אשד ישחט, any person who slaughters, etc. Why is the word איש repeated here? In Zevachim 108 they explain this in terms of Rabbi Shimon who claimed that if someone slaughters an animal (intended as a sacrifice) on behalf of a private individual he would be guilty of slaughtering sacred things outside the Temple precincts. They base this on the repeated mention of איש meaning איש לאיש. They do not explain it as meaning that if two people combined in that act that they would both be culpable for that sin. The reason is that the Torah phrased culpability by referring to האיש ההוא, i.e. a single individual. The Talmud also explains the restrictive word ההוא as excluding anyone who committed this act accidentally, erroneously or inadvertently. At the same time they explain the word as excluding two people who combined to slaughter the animal by saying the Torah did not write ההם, but ההוא. We find this somewhat difficult seeing that Torat Kohanim is on record as deriving this halachah from the words דם שפך and not from the word ההוא. One may answer that inasmuch as there are two separate restrictive expressions, i.e. ההוא as well as שפך (verse 4), Torat Kohanim derives from the one that when two people slaughter jointly that they are not culpable, and from the other that if the act did not occur intentionally and without outside coercion the perpetrator is not punishable.

אשר ישחט שור או כשב או עז במחנה או מחוץ למחנה, “who will slaughter either an ox, a sheep, or a goat inside the camp or even beyond the boundaries of the camp, etc.” According to the commentary by Nachmanides our paragraph discusses two separate subjects. Subject number one is the prohibition for Israelites while in the desert to eat meat which was not part of a sacrificial offering, something which in halachah we call בשר תאווה, meat eaten merely to satisfy one’s craving for it. The penalty for violating the commandment is karet, the same penalty as is applied to people who deliberately eat on the Day of Atonement, or people who violate the Sabbath deliberately when there are not any witnesses whose testimony would lead to a conviction in court. Even slaughtering non-consecrated animals outside the confines of the Tabernacle is equally forbidden when these had not been brought to the entrance of the Tabernacle to be offered there as שלמים, peace offerings, in which case the fat parts and the blood are sprinkled or burned on the altar as the case may be, and the remainder, after the priest has received his statutory share, may be eaten by the owners. Subsequent to this legislation, the Torah continues in verse eight to deal with the reverse situation, when an Israelite arrogates to himself the right to perform priestly procedures within the confines of the Tabernacle. The Israelite as well as the priest is warned not to erect altars even to Hashem outside the confines of the Tabernacle. While it is true that upon entry into the Holy Land the regulations concerning בשר תאווה were considerably relaxed, the prohibition to erect private altars was never rescinded. Even a עולה, a burnt offering, of which the owner of the animal does not receive anything, must not be offered on a private altar in a private domain. While it is true that immediately after the Israelites entered the Holy Land, some altars outside the Tabernacle were permitted for the purpose of offering communal offerings, in the main, that was only a temporary arrangement. The permission to eat meat that had not first been part of a sacrificial offering was a concession to the fact that once in the land of Israel, the journey all the way to either Shiloh, or later on Jerusalem, was a great inconvenience for the people, who, but for this concession, would normally have eaten meat only on the three pilgrimage festivals when at least the male had to appear in the Temple. At any rate, it is hard to understand that the mere fact of slaughtering an animal that had not been consecrated as an offering should carry the karet penalty, seeing that even Rabbi Yishmael derives this prohibition from what is written in Deut. 12,20, and there the Torah speaks about animals which had been consecrated as offerings. Rabbi Akiva, on the other hand, does not agree that meat that had not been consecrated was ever forbidden. From that verse we can derive that while the people were in the desert and the Tabernacle was right in their midst, only consecrated meat was allowed. But nothing had been spelled out about someone slaughtering such animals becoming guilty of the karet penalty.

This verse speaks of consecrated [animals]. Explanation: the verse is speaking about consecrated animals that were slaughtered outside [the Temple courtyard]. (Gur Aryeh) You cannot say the verse is saying that [even] unconsecrated animals slaughtered outside would make one liable for excision, as we find no commandment against this. You might ask that the Gemara Chulin (16b) says, “Originally, flesh of desire [i.e., unconsecrated animals killed in order to enjoy their meat] was forbidden,” and Rashi explains, “Because it is written, ’Each and every person [of the House of Israel] who will slaughter an ox, lamb, or goat etc.,” indicating that our verse is talking about unconsecrated animals? It seems to me that the correct way to explain Rashi is as follows: The main subject of the verse is not unconsecrated animals because the verse makes one liable for excision, and there is no penalty of excision regarding unconsecrated animals. However, because Scripture writes in general terms, “Each and every person of the House of Israel who will slaughter an ox, lamb, or goat,” instead of writing, “who will slaughter a burnt-offering or a sacrifice,” this indicates that no animal may be slaughtered outside because “meat of desire” was forbidden to them. Because no animal may be slaughtered outside as meat of desire was forbidden to them, the verse did not write, “who will slaughter a burnt-offering or a sacrifice,” as that would have implied that other meat is permitted to slaughter outside. Therefore, since nothing may be slaughtered [anywhere] except for consecrated animals, because they were forbidden to eat meat of desire, the verse did not need to specify consecrated animals and wrote in general terms, “who will slaughter an ox, lamb, or goat.”

במחנה [WHAT MAN SOEVER SLAUGHTERETH …] IN THE CAMP — i. e. outside the forecourt (cf. Sifra, Acharei Mot, Section 6 5; Zevachim 107b).

Outside the [Temple] courts. I.e., when it is written “within the encampment” here, it does not mean the priestly encampment, i.e., within the Temple courts, making someone liable for excision if he slaughtered a sacrifice outside its correct place north of the altar. [This is not so], because even if one slaughtered in the south, what liability would there be for this, so long as he slaughtered within the Temple courts? [The Toras Kohanim derives from the words “beyond the encampment.” See Re’m]. Therefore it means outside the Temple courts.

אשד ישחט, who will slaughter, etc. Torat Kohanim phrases its comment thus: "From the mention of the words 'ox, sheep, and goat' I can only derive culpability for slaughtering four-legged mammals; whence do I know that slaughtering birds intended for the altar outside the precincts of the Temple or Tabernacle is also prohibited on pain of the karet penalty? Answer: from the words או אשר ישחט. I could have reasoned that if slaughtering the bird's neck, which is not the normal procedure is culpable, then someone who merely severed the bird's neck by pinching, i.e. מליקה i.e. the normal procedure, would certainly be culpable if he performed this act outside the precincts of the Temple, therefore the Torah had to tell us that he would only be culpable for שחיטה, slaughter, but not for מליקה, pinching." Thus far Torat Kohanim. From the above we learn that the word או serves to include culpability for slaughtering the bird in the wrong place whereas from the words אשר ישחט I derive that pinching is not culpable which I would otherwise have considered punishable due to the קל וחומר. How do I reconcile this with a Baraitha in Zevachim 107 where we are told by Rabbi Yishmael that he derives the culpability for slaughtering the bird from the expression אשר ישחט, whereas he derives the exclusion of culpability for pinching the bird's neck from the words זה הדבר (in verse 1) which I would have included on the basis of the קל וחומר had it not been for the words זה הדבר? Even Rabbi Akiva who disagrees with Rabbi Yishmael in Zevachim uses the extra words דם יחשב in order to derive the law that slaughtering sacrificial birds in the wrong place is culpable. He derives the exclusion of this culpability when the bird's neck is merely pinched from the expression אשר ישחט. We are forced to conclude that the author of Torat Kohanim was neither Rabbi Yishmael nor Rabbi Akiva. It is quite impossible to reconcile the view of Rabbi Yishmael with that of the author of Torat Kohanim, because the former uses the expression זה הדבר for an exegesis based on a גזרה שוה, comparing it to the same expression in Numbers 30,2, where the Torah speaks about who can cancel vows. On the other hand, the fact that Torat Kohanim does not record the exegetical comment of Rabbi Yishmael concerning the extraneous words דם יחשב, who includes culpability of someone who sprinkles the blood outside the precincts of the Tabernacle, it appears that the author of Torat Kohanim accepts the view of Rabbi Akiva. The exegetical use made by Torat Kohanim of the words או זבח in verse 8 i.e. that the blood is included in the prohibition and culpability of שחוטי חוץ makes it plain that Torat Kohanim does appear to accept the viewpoint of Rabbi Akiva as per the folio of the Talmud we quoted. From all this it emerges that the exegesis that the slaughtering of the bird is culpable when performed outside the courtyard of the Tabernacle is based on the words דם יחשב, whereas the exclusion of pinching the bird's neck as culpable is based on the words אשר ישחט. The question therefore arises why the author of Torat Kohanim derives two separate הלכות from the words אשר ישחט? Besides, why does the author of Torat Kohanim need the words דם יחשב in verse 4?

I have seen the following comment by Maimonides in chapter 18 of his treatise on Ma-asseh Hakorbanot. "When two people get hold of a knife and they perform ritual slaughter jointly they are free from punishment because the Torah wrote: אשר ישחט או אשר ישחט, i.e. one who slaughters not two who slaughter." Why did Maimonides have to look for a different expression in our verses and could not derive this הלכה from the existing exegesis either in the Talmud or Torat Kohanim ? Another difficulty in the statement by Maimonides is that the very words from the verse used by Maimonides for exonerating two people who slaughter jointly have already been used exegetically to derive the law about slaughtering birds, something which both Rabbi Yishmael and Rabbi Akiva had agreed on in Zevachim 107? We have explained earlier that according to one of these Rabbis the word אשר ישחט is used to include culpabiity for slaughtering the bird, whereas according to the other Rabbi this word serves to exclude culpability if one merely pinched the neck of the bird in question. Maimonides accepts this latter ruling in chapter 19 of the treatise we mentioned earlier. We have still another difficulty with the exegesis of Maimonides' ruling in the matter of someone slaughtering on behalf of a private individual, i.e. איש. He derives this from the words דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך. This is how Maimonides explains his exegesis: "Although the person in question had not intended to slaughter these קדשים, sacrificial animals, for G'd as such, he will still be culpable because the Torah wrote: "it shall be accounted as blood (guilt) for that man, he has spilled blood." The latter words mean that though in his own mind this blood was similar to ordinary blood spilled on the ground and not blood intended for the altar at all he is guilty. Thus far Maimonides. The Talmud, on the other hand, uses the words איש איש as the basis for the culpability of someone who slaughters such an animal; furthermore, Torat Kohanim uses the words דם שפך as the exegetical base for excluding joint slaughter by two parties or people who slaughtered inadvertently or while under duress as we mentioned earlier. How can we use the same words exegetically to derive the prohibition of שחוטי חוץ? The last mentioned explanation is offered in the name of Rabbi Yossi who disagrees with Rabbi Shimon concerning the meaning of איש איש in Zevachim 108.

We must understand therefore that Maimonides chose to bring proof for his הלכה from the superfluous words דם שפך, as it is a stronger kind of proof than the exegesis based on the repetition of the word איש. Proof of this is found in Baba Metzia 31 where the repetition of the word העבט תעביטנו in Deut.15,8 is discussed. In that instance Rabbi Shimon took the view that the Torah employed normal human syntax and that the extra word was not intended for special exegetical purposes. Tossaphot write there that when there is evidence in the verse under discussion that the repetition is not justifiable in the context of that verse, we say that it has exegetical significance. When there is some justification for the repetition, however, we may choose not to look for further הלכות based on that word. Rabbi Shimon holds that in the case of Deut. 15,8 the words די מחסורו אשר יחסד לו, "in the amount that he is short," provide ample reason to rule that when the impoverished person does not want to turn his assets into cash and prefers to receive handouts, one need not assist such a person. This is what is meant by our "ignoring the repetition תעביטנו and declaring that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax." Considering this comment by Tossaphot, we can appreciate why the words איש איש are not as good an exegetical base as are the words דם שפך which are used by the Talmud as the exegetical basis according to Rabbi Yossi. Although the Talmud uses this exegetical basis only according to the view of Rabbi Yossi, we are entitled to assume that Rabbi Shimon feels the same way about it seeing we have no reason to assume that the two Rabbis disagree. While it is true that the Talmud (Zevachim 108) presents Rabbi Shimon as using the repetition by the Torah of the word איש איש as teaching that it is culpable to slaughter a mammal outside the precincts of the Temple if said animal was slated to be a sacrificial animal, this was only before Rabbi Shimon had heard of the exegetical value of the words דם יחשב לאיש ההוא דם שפך. This is presumably why Maimonides also quoted this latter exegesis as the basis for our הלכה.

[The author proceeds to deal with the first question he raised against Maimonides. I have decided to skip this. Ed.]