Deuteronómio 4:5 Halajá: Arukh HaShulchan, Mishneh Torah, Torah Study & Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat

This G-d we are obligated to love with a complete and unreserved love, until the love of oneself, one's wife, sons, daughters and money are completely nullified in the presence of his love for G-d, as though they did not exist. This also has been stated in Torah (Devarim 4.5): "You should love G-d, your G-d, with all your heart, all your soul, and all your money (Heb. 'Mo-adecha'). This term 'Mo-adecha' is related to the Hebrew 'Ma-od', meaning 'very much', as if to say: "whatever is very much beloved by you should be considered null and void in the presence of your love for G-d." "...all your heart..." - Our Rabbis have expounded on this: "with both of your inclinations, the good inclination as well as the evil." This means to say that one should not ask 'If the evil inclination only tries to seduce one to transgress the will of G-d, why was it created?' The truth is that the intent of the evil inclination is that man should overpower him and not listen to him, but G-d has nevertheless created him to test whether man will transgress G-d's will, in order that one should serve G-d through free will and not as one forced by instinct. This is the ultimate purpose of the creation of man, and through this ability he is even greater than an angel, as I have written in section 1. [It is also explained in the Zohar along these lines PERHAPS VOLUME 3, FOLIO 68.2]

Where the custom of the state is to pay a beginner's teacher, he should give him his wages, and the obligation to pay for his son's education continues until he is through reading all of the Holy Writ. In a place where the prevailing custom is to teach the written Torah for pay, one may instruct for pay; but to instruct the Oral Torah for wages, is forbidden, as it is said: "Behold, I have taught you statutes and ordinances, even as the Lord my God commanded me, etc." (Deut. 4.5.), which means; "Even as I was instructed free so have you received instruction from me free; likewise when you will give instruction throughout the generations, instruct free even as you were instructed by me." (Nedarim, 37a; Bekorot, 29a). If he find not one who is so willing to teach him gratuitously, he may hire one for wages to be instructed by him, as it says: "Buy the truth" (Prov. 23.23.) Peradventure, one will deduct herefrom that he may instruct others for wages? The Verse, therefore, teaches us, saying: "But sell it not" (Ibid.) Herefrom you learn that one is forbidden to instruct others for hire although his master taught him for hire.

One who takes payment to act as a Judge, all the judgments that he pronounced are void,²¹Mishna Bek. IV, 6(29a): ‘If a man takes payment to act as a Judge, his judgments are void.’ Gemara: ‘How do we know this? — Rab Judah stated on the authority of Rab: The Biblical verse says, Behold I have taught you etc., (Deut. IV, 5). Just as I teach gratuitously, so must you teach gratuitously. It was likewise taught thus: Scripture states: Even as the Lord my G-d commanded me (ibid.) — (i.e.,) just as I teach gratuitously, so must you teach gratuitously.’ Tosef (Z). Bek. III, 8: ‘One who is suspected (החשוד) of taking payment and (then) judges; (or taking payment) and (then) gives evidence, all the judgments that he pronounced and all the evidences that he gave are void.’ Cf. also Y. San. I, 1(18b) beg. Thus also RaN to Kid. II end, since the Mishna ibid. states ‘his judgments’ (דיניו) and not ‘his judgment’ (דינו). In the light of these sources we may say that not only where we know for certain that he received payment for pronouncing judgment, but also with respect to those regarding which we may entertain a suspicion that payment was taken by the Judge, we rule that they are null and void. Hence, it follows that where we know for certain that the Judge did not take payment for his decision, the judgment is binding. BaḤ writes that if the Judge took payment for adjudication, legally he does not have to return the money. It is only when he received money as a bribe that he is obliged to return it, for in the latter case an explicit Biblical principle has been transgressed (v. supra par. 1). Others maintain contra BaḤ that even when accepted as payment, it must be returned — P.Tesh. The judgments are regarded as void only from the moment we discover that the Judge took payment to act as Judge, for we say that only now has his status been impaired — Nethiboth. The adopted practice for both parties to give the Judge aught prior to the pronouncement of judgment dates back to former times when a communal measure was in vogue, enacted originally for the maintenance of the Judges. Hence, even nowadays when a Rabbi or Judge is appointed by a community it is as though a stipulation were made with the community to pay something to the Judge to pronounce judgment, since this was the original custom — Nethiboth. The other Judges of the Court are not disqualified on account of the Judge who took payment to pronounce judgment. Furthermore, his decision are null and void only with respect to discretionary judgment (שודא דדייני), i.e., where the Judges use their discretion to which of the litigants to adjudicate the claim, but not in the case where an explicit law is involved — P.Tesh. unless it is known that [in certain cases] he did not take payment [to act as Judge].²²e., that particular decision is binding, although he took payment for other judgments before or after this. This should not be compared to the case of one who transgressed a Biblical injunction where the law is that all his judgments and evidences are void until he repents, for here it is different since he did not transgress any Biblical principle and the fact that his judgments or evidences are regarded void is merely a penalty imposed by the Sages — M.E. Cf. previous note. However, if he takes payment only [to compensate] the loss of his [regular] work, it is permissible, provided it is clearly evident to all that he takes payment only [to compensate] the loss of his [regular] work, e.g., where he [the Judge] has special work to execute at the time that he has to act as Judge²³Ket. 105a in the case of Karna who received compensation for loss of work that could be ascertained since he was engaged in smelling tests at wine stores for which he was paid a fee. Similarly, in connection with R. Huna a.l. [and]²⁴Thus M.E. says to the litigants [before acting as their Judge], 'Give me payment for work [as compensation for my] specific occupation from which I will have to desist [during the adjudication of the lawsuit].'²⁵This law holds good if the Judge made this stipulation before he tries the case, but not if he demands compensation for loss of work after pronouncing judgment. In the latter case he may receive only as much as a labourer in that line would ask for stopping work in which he was engaged (which would be less than he would earn by working), as in the case of one who returns a lost article (v. infra § 264; § 265; Y.D. § 177; § 312) — M.E. TaZ disagrees with M.E. and holds that if no stipulation was made at the outset, he is not entitled even to compensation given for an idle labourer, for the litigant may say, ‘Had I known this, I would have taken my lawsuit to another Judge who would not have to interrupt his work.’ Thus also Tummim and Nethiboth. Shebuth Ya‘akob agrees with M.E. [Furthermore,] this [is permissible only] where he [the Judge] receives [payment] from both [litigants] in equal shares.²⁶Ket. ibid., where it is stated that Karna took equal shares from both litigants. Cf. Yad, Sanhedrin XXIII, 5 and Kesef Mishneh a.l. according to whom this is also derived from Ket. ibid. in connection with R. Huna who ‘used to say (to the litigants), Provide me with one who will draw water (to irrigate my fields) in my stead, and I will pronounce judgment for you.’ Hence, he must have spoken to both litigants. But if it not clearly evident [that he takes payment as compensation for loss of his work] e.g., where he has no special work [to execute],²⁷Thus Tur and Asheri in Resp. only that he says [to the litigants], 'Perhaps profit will accrue to me [while adjudicating your lawsuit] by purchasing goods [for trading, or through] brokerage,' and on account of this [possible profit] he demands payments [from the litigants], it is forbidden.²⁸ infra § 34, 18 — G where the same ruling applies to giving evidence and cf. supra n 21. ShaK on the authority of BaḤ writes that it is permissible to take payment for arbitration. If he has a specific occupation or he is a skilled worker, although when the litigants come to him with their lawsuit he is unemployed, nevertheless, ex post facto the decision holds good — M.E. If the Judge has to travel to another locality in order to try a case, he is permitted to set his fee for travelling expenditures for this does not constitute payment for acting as a Judge. Likewise, even if the Judge is obliged to go to another home to try a case, he is permitted to receive payment for his trouble — A.H. The entire ruling here has reference to Judges who were not permanently appointed by the community; but those who were appointed to act as permanent Judges are permitted to take equal shares of payment from the litigants. This is the prevailing custom. , supra n. 21