Halakhah sobre Levítico 1:1

It is good to recite the passage of the Binding (Genesis 22:1-19), the passage of the Manna (Exodus 16:4-36), the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20:2-13), and the passages of the burnt-offering (Leviticus 1:1-17), tribute-offering (Leviticus 2:1-13), peace-offering (Leviticus 3:1-17), sin-offering (Vayikra 4:27-35), and guilt-offering. Rem"a: But only in private is it permissible to recite the Ten Commandments each day: it is forbidden to recite them in congregation (Rashb"a Responsum 144).

It is good to recite the passage of the Binding (Genesis 22:1-19), the passage of the Manna (Exodus 16:4-36), the Ten Commandments (Exodus 20:2-13), and the passages of the burnt-offering (Leviticus 1:1-17), tribute-offering (Leviticus 2:1-13), peace-offering (Leviticus 3:1-17), sin-offering (Vayikra 4:27-35), and guilt-offering. Rem"a: But only in private is it permissible to recite the Ten Commandments each day: it is forbidden to recite them in congregation (Rashb"a Responsum 144).

b) Leviticus 1:1

The prohibition against divulging a non-personal confidential communication is formulated by the Gemara, Yoma 4b: "Whence is it derived that [if] one relates something to one's fellow [the latter is commanded], 'Thou shalt not tell' until [the former] tells him 'Go tell'? For it is said, 'And the Lord spoke to him from the tent of meeting l'emor' " (Leviticus 1:1). Rashi understands the prohibition to be based upon talmudic exegesis interpreting the word "l'emor," which is spelled lamed, alef, mem, resh, as a contraction of two words "lo emor—do not say."¹¹See Maharsha, ad locum. Thus, the written word vocalized in two alternative ways literally constitutes a double entendre: "to say" and "do not say." As explained by Or ha-Hayyim, Exodus 25:2, the initial phrase of the immediately following sentence beginning "Speak to the children of Israel" clearly places upon Moses an affirmative obligation to repeat what he has been told. Taken together, the two sentences declare, in effect, that Moses may not speak other than when expressly directed or granted permission to speak. As formulated by the Gemara, Moses is admonished "Do not tell!" unless and until he is told "Go tell!" Prior to their communication to Moses, the contents of revelation were reserved to the Deity and, accordingly, the contents of revelation would have been held inviolate by Moses on the basis of the injunction "Do not say" had he not been commanded explicitly "l'emor," to speak and disclose that information to Israel. Interpreting the statement of the Gemara in a manner consistent with that of Rashi, Sefer Mizvot Gadol, lo ta'aseh, no. 9, regards violation of this injunction as transgression of a biblical commandment.¹²However, Sefer Miẓvot Gadol’s interpretations of the word “l’emor” is somewhat different from that of Rashi. Sefer Miẓvot Gadol also interprets that word as a contraction, but as the assimilated contraction of the words “lav amur,” i.e., “a negative commandment has been stated [with regard to this matter].”
R. Baruch ha-Levi Epstein, Torah Temimmah, Leviticus 1:1, regards the statement of the Gemara, Yoma 4b, as establishing a rabbinic prohibition. Cf., however, Bet ha-Beḥirah, Yoma 4b, who describes the stricture against disclosure of a non-personal communication, imparted in a confidential manner, as merely a matter of derekh ereẓ or unseemly behavior. This talmudic statement is cited as normative by Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Hayyim 156:2, and serves to establish a formal obligation to regard the communication of any personal or proprietary information as confidential unless permission for disclosure is explicitly granted.

Both Maharsha, ad locum, and R. Baruch ha-Levi Epstein, Torah Temimmah, Leviticus 1:1, offer an interpretation of the derivation that is less elegant but far simpler than that advanced by Rashi.¹³This interpretation of Yoma 4b is inherent in the comments of Or ha-Ḥayyim, Exodus 25:2. See infra, note 15. According to those scholars the prohibition is predicated upon the plain meaning of the word "l'emor." The term "l'emor" is rendered in English translations as "saying." That translation portrays the entire sentence, "And God spoke to Moses saying," as a preferatory comment conveying the notion that the ensuing passages constitute the content of what was "said" to Moses. In effect, the sentence is rendered as a declaration indicating that what follows constitutes the content of God's communication to Moses. The translation of "l'emor" as "saying," although it serves to make the sentence read smoothly in the vernacular, is contrary to the plain meaning of the text and is probably incorrect. The initial letter lamed is a prefix meaning "to" and hence the word "l'emor" should properly be understood as a contraction of "le-emor" and translated as "to say," i.e., God commanded Moses "to say" the words of the verses that follow. Accordingly, the import of the sentence is not a declaration to the effect that the subsequently recorded verses were communicated to Moses, but that Moses was commanded to declare those verses to the children of Israel. The appropriate, albeit infelicitous, translation would be: "And God spoke to Moses to say."¹⁴This nuance of meaning is accurately captured in the standard Yiddish translation published in the Bet Yehudah edition of the Pentateuch which renders the “l’emor” as “zu zogen” rather than as “zogendig.” However, although linguistically accurate, this rendition of the passage seems to render the entire verse redundant. The very next verse begins with the phrase "Speak to the children of Israel and say to them." That phrase is synonymous in meaning with "l'emor" and renders "l'emor" superfluous. The plain inference, comments Maharsha, is that Moses would not have had the right to transmit the divine communication unless given express permission by God to do so.¹⁵Torah Temimmah differs from Maharsha only in understanding that the principle is derived from the plain meaning of “l’emor” and is not based upon its redundancy in light of the immediately following “Speak to the children of Israel.” Or ha-Ḥayyim, Exodus 25:2, understands the Gemara’s comment much in the same manner as Torah Temimmah but comments that “l’emor” alone would have served only to give Moses discretionary license to divulge the prophetic message he received; the phrase “speak to the children of Israel” is in the imperative voice and serves to make it incumbent upon Moses to do so. Hence that directive is recorded in order to teach that, absent such a waiver, all communications are to be regarded as confidential.

The prohibition against divulging personal information concerning another person is derived from the biblical verse "Thou shalt not go as a bearer of tales among your people" (Leviticus 19:16). Such activity is forbidden even when it is not accompanied by malicious intent and even if the information is not derogatory in nature. As formulated by Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot De'ot 7:2, "Who is a tale-bearer? One who carries reports and goes from one person to another and says, 'So-and-so said this' or 'Such and such have I heard about so-and-so.' Even if he tells the truth, [the tale-bearer] destroys the world.¹³Although not in the category of talebearing and hence not the object of a negative commandment, the Gemara, Yoma 4b, declares disclosure of even a non-personal communication to be improper unless prior permission has been granted for such disclosure. See also commentary of Oraḥ Ḥayyim on Ex. 25:2. Sefer Miẓvot Gadol, lavin, no. 9, interprets Yoma 4b as establishing a negative prohibition (interpreting the word “lamor” as “lo emor”) forbidding disclosure of such information; see, however, Torah Temimah, Lev. 1:1, who understands Sefer Miẓvot Gadol as positing a rabbinic rather than a biblical prohibition. Cf., Bet ha-Beḥirah, Yoma 4b, who describes the stricture against disclosure of a non-personal communication which has not been imparted in a confidential manner as a matter of derekh ereẓ or seemly behavior.