Halakhah sobre Números 22:42
Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol III
The source of the obligation concerning za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim which imposes a general concern for the welfare of animals is far from clear. Indeed, the Gemara, Baba Mezi'a 32b, cites a dispute with regard to whether the obligation with regard to za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim is biblical or rabbinic in nature.10Whether ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is prohibited by virtue of biblical or of rabbinic law is of no significance whatsoever insofar as the normative regulations prohibiting overt acts of cruelty vis-à-vis animals are concerned. There are, however, a number of distinctions, albeit most of which are currently of relatively minor impact, with regard to the duty to intervene in order to relieve or prevent animal suffering. The most obvious distinctions are those posited by the Gemara, Baba Meẓi‘a 33a: “[If thou seest the ass of him that hateth thee lying under its burden] ‘lying’ [just now], but not an animal which habitually lies down [under its burden]; ‘lying,’ but not standing.” The Gemara then queries, “If you say that [relieving the suffering of an animal] is biblically [enjoined] what does it matter whether it was lying [this once only], habitually lay down or was standing?” and concludes that such distinctions are cogent only if ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is the subject of rabbinic enactment,but that such exclusions from the duty to relieve animals from pain cannot be entertained if ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is a matter of biblical law. Indeed, it is Rambam’s failure to make such distinctions which, in part, prompts Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Roẓeah 13:9, to conclude that Rambam maintains that ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is biblically enjoined. On the basis of the discussion recorded in Baba Meẓi‘a 33a, Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 80, concludes that intervention to rescue an animal from pain is mandated only if ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim is mandated by biblical law, whereas, if ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim is the subject of rabbinic decree, such legislation only prohibits acts of cruelty but does not command intervention. See below, note 11. See also Mahari Perla, Commentary on Sefer ha-Miẓvot of R. Sa’adia Ga’on, aseh 24, s.v. ve-adayin ẓarikh. [Cf., however, R. Moses Sofer, Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 314, s.v. ve-la‘asot, and no. 318, s.v. ve-hinneh, who apparently maintains that the obligation to rescue an animal from pain is limited to one’s own animals. See also Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 185, s.v. ma she-katavta me-Rabad. Thus, Ḥatam Sofer maintains that, although an overt act of cruelty toward any animal is forbidden, one may allow an ownerless animal to starve. See, however, R. Ezekiel Landau, Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah, Mahadura Kamma, Yoreh De‘ah, nos. 81-83, who fails to draw a distinction of this nature. See also Kiẓur Shulḥan Arukh 191:1 and sources cited by R. Eliyahu Klatzkin, Teshuvot Imrei Shefer, no. 34, sec. 1.] Another distinction is found in the application of certain Sabbath restrictions. If it is accepted that obligations with regard to ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim are biblical in origin, a non-Jew may be requested to perform acts of labor on the Sabbath, e.g., milking a cow, in order to relieve the animal’s discomfort and certain specific rabbinically proscribed acts may also be performed even by a Jew in order to alleviate the animal’s pain; but no suspension of Sabbath restrictions is countenanced if duties with regard to ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim are the product of rabbinic enactment. See Ritva, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b, as well as Rosh, Baba Meẓi‘a 2:29 and Shabbat 18:3; see also Magen Avraham, Oraẓ Ḥayyim 305:11, and Korban Netanel, Shabbat 18:3, sec. 50. [Cf., however, Teshuvot Rav Pe’alim, 1, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 1, who maintains that such actions are permitted only when the life of the animal is endangered. Failure to milk a cow, he asserts, endangers the animal.] There is some controversy with regard to whether a non-Jew may be directed to perform a rabbinically proscribed act; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, II, 45. According to the authorities who adopt a permissive position with regard to this question, such a procedure would be permissible with regard to ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim as well, were it accepted that regulations concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim are rabbinic in nature. [The citation of Pilpula Ḥarifta, Baba Meẓi‘a 2:29, in this context by R. Ze’ev Metzger in his useful survey, “Nisuyim Refu’iyim be-Ba‘alei Hayyim,” Ha-Refu’ah le-Or ha-Halakhah, vol. II (Jerusalem, 5743), part 3, p. 11, appears to be inaccurate.] See also below, note 52. As has been indicated, if biblical in nature,11It is the virtually unaminous opinion of rabbinic decisors that obligations with regard to ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim are biblical in nature. See Rif, Shabbat 128b; Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 450 and no. 451; Rosh, Baba Meẓi‘a 2:29 and Shabbat 3:18; Nimmukei Yosef, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b; Me’iri, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b; Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Meẓi‘a 33a; Sefer Yere’im, no. 267; Sefer Ḥasidim (ed. Reuben Margulies), no. 666; Rema, Ḥoshen Mishpat 272:9; Levush, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 305:18; and Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 305:11.
Rambam, both in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Beiẓah 3:4, and in the Guide, Book III, chapter 17, affirms that the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is biblical in origin. There is some dispute regarding the proper understanding of the position adopted by Rambam in his Mishneh Torah. Although in Hilkhot Shabbat 25:26 Rambam appears to adopt the identical position, the language employed in Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 13:9 is somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, Kesef Mishneh, ad locum, understands even the latter source as consistent with the view that the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is biblical in nature. However, Pnei Yehoshu’a, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b, and R. Elijah of Vilna, both in his Hagahot ha-Gra al ha-Rosh, Baba Meẓi‘a chapter 2, sec. 29;1, and in his Bi‘ur ha-Gra, Ḥoshen Mishpat 272:11, understand Rambam’s ruling in Hilkhot Roẓeah as reflecting the view that these strictures are rabbinic in nature. See also Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 80.
Pri Megadim, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, Eshel Avraham 308:68, and R. Meir Simchah ha-Kohen of Dvinsk, Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Shabbat 25:26, both resolve any apparent contradiction in Rambam’s rulings by asserting that in Hilkhot Shabbat Rambam’s intention is only to affirm the biblical nature of the obligation concerning the requirement that animals be permitted to rest on the Sabbath and that it is that biblical law which prompted suspension of certain rabbinic restrictions regarding Sabbath regulations in order to prevent suffering by animals on the Sabbath. In comments which are at variance with his own heretofore cited thesis, Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 13:9, offers a novel analysis of Rambam’s position. Or Sameaḥ here asserts that Rambam affirms the biblical nature of strictures against ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim, but that Rambam distinguishes between practicing cruelty toward animals, which is forbidden, and intervention in an overt manner to spare the animal from discomfort. According to these comments of Or Sameaḥ, Rambam maintains that such intervention is not mandated. Rambam reasons, avers Or Sameaḥ, that there is no prohibition against causing discomfort to an animal in order to satisfy a human need; similarly, argues Or Sameaḥ, there is no requirement that a person discomfit himself in order to promote the welfare of an animal. See also R. Jacob Kamenetsky, Iyyunim be-Mikra (New York, 5744), Numbers 22:32.
Mordekhai, Baba Meẓi‘a 2:263, rules that ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is biblically enjoined, but, in his work on Avodah Zarah 1:799, the same authority rules that such strictures are rabbinic in nature. Ḥiddushei Anshei Shem, Baba Meẓi‘a, sec. 20, endeavors to resolve the contradiction by asserting that, according to Mordekhai, “grave pain” (ẓa‘ar gadol) involves a biblical prohibition whereas “minor pain” (ẓa‘ar mu’at) involves only a rabbinic injunction. It is noteworthy that, according to the Ḥiddushei Anshei Shem, causing an animal to die of starvation involves only “minor pain,” whereas killing an animal in an overt manner is categorized as entailing “grave pain.” [See, however, R. Jacob Ettlinger, Teshuvot Binyan Ẓion, no. 108, who states that “perhaps” causing an animal to die of starvation entails “grave pain.”] Nimukei Yosef, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b, quite independently draws a similar distinction between “grave pain” and “minor pain” without in any way referring to Rambam’s statements. According to Nimukei Yosef, “minor pain” is the subject of rabbinic injunction while “grave pain” is biblically proscribed. See also Ritva, Avodah Zarah 11a.
As will be shown later, a latter-day authority, R. Jacob Ettlinger, Teshuvot Binyan Ẓion, no. 108, permits causing an animal “grave pain” only for purposes of human medical needs but permits “minor pain” even for lesser reasons, at least insofar as normative law is concerned. according to most authorities, this duty is not directly derived from the obligation of "unloading." One notable exception is Rashi, Shabbat 128b. Rashi states that, according to those Sages of the Talmud who maintain that binding regulations may be inferred from the rationale underlying precepts, obligations concerning za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim are directly derived from the verse "thou shalt surely release it with him" (Exodus 23:5).12See also Rabad, quoted in Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b, s.v. teda, and Levush, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 305:18. If obligations concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim are derived from the commandment concerning “unloading” it would certainly seem to follow that this obligation is not limited to a prohibition against cruelty but includes a positive obligation to intervene in order to rescue from pain. See R. Joel Schwartz, Ve-Raḥamav al Kol Ma’asav, p. 43, note 3, and cf., above, note 10. Rambam, Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 17, and R. Judah he-Hasid, Sefer Hasidim (ed. Reuben Margulies), no. 666, regard the biblical narrative concerning Balaam and his ass as the source of the biblical prohibition against cruelty toward animals. These authorities indicate that the verse "And the angel of the Lord said unto him: 'Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass these three times?' " (Numbers 22:32) serves to establish a prohibition against conduct of that nature.13See below, note 43. Me'iri, Baba Mezi'a 32b, is of the opinion that obligations concerning za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim are derived from the prohibition against muzzling an ox while it is engaged in threshing (Deuteronomy 25:4). Shitah Mekubezet, Baba Mezi'a 32b, suggests that these obligations may either be derived from the prohibition against muzzling an ox engaged in threshing or, alternatively, za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim may simply be the subject of halakhah le-Mosheh mi-Sinai, i.e., an oral teaching transmitted to Moses at Mount Sinai with no accompanying written record in the Pentateuch.14See also Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 80
Rambam, both in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Beiẓah 3:4, and in the Guide, Book III, chapter 17, affirms that the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is biblical in origin. There is some dispute regarding the proper understanding of the position adopted by Rambam in his Mishneh Torah. Although in Hilkhot Shabbat 25:26 Rambam appears to adopt the identical position, the language employed in Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 13:9 is somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, Kesef Mishneh, ad locum, understands even the latter source as consistent with the view that the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is biblical in nature. However, Pnei Yehoshu’a, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b, and R. Elijah of Vilna, both in his Hagahot ha-Gra al ha-Rosh, Baba Meẓi‘a chapter 2, sec. 29;1, and in his Bi‘ur ha-Gra, Ḥoshen Mishpat 272:11, understand Rambam’s ruling in Hilkhot Roẓeah as reflecting the view that these strictures are rabbinic in nature. See also Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 80.
Pri Megadim, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, Eshel Avraham 308:68, and R. Meir Simchah ha-Kohen of Dvinsk, Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Shabbat 25:26, both resolve any apparent contradiction in Rambam’s rulings by asserting that in Hilkhot Shabbat Rambam’s intention is only to affirm the biblical nature of the obligation concerning the requirement that animals be permitted to rest on the Sabbath and that it is that biblical law which prompted suspension of certain rabbinic restrictions regarding Sabbath regulations in order to prevent suffering by animals on the Sabbath. In comments which are at variance with his own heretofore cited thesis, Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 13:9, offers a novel analysis of Rambam’s position. Or Sameaḥ here asserts that Rambam affirms the biblical nature of strictures against ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim, but that Rambam distinguishes between practicing cruelty toward animals, which is forbidden, and intervention in an overt manner to spare the animal from discomfort. According to these comments of Or Sameaḥ, Rambam maintains that such intervention is not mandated. Rambam reasons, avers Or Sameaḥ, that there is no prohibition against causing discomfort to an animal in order to satisfy a human need; similarly, argues Or Sameaḥ, there is no requirement that a person discomfit himself in order to promote the welfare of an animal. See also R. Jacob Kamenetsky, Iyyunim be-Mikra (New York, 5744), Numbers 22:32.
Mordekhai, Baba Meẓi‘a 2:263, rules that ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is biblically enjoined, but, in his work on Avodah Zarah 1:799, the same authority rules that such strictures are rabbinic in nature. Ḥiddushei Anshei Shem, Baba Meẓi‘a, sec. 20, endeavors to resolve the contradiction by asserting that, according to Mordekhai, “grave pain” (ẓa‘ar gadol) involves a biblical prohibition whereas “minor pain” (ẓa‘ar mu’at) involves only a rabbinic injunction. It is noteworthy that, according to the Ḥiddushei Anshei Shem, causing an animal to die of starvation involves only “minor pain,” whereas killing an animal in an overt manner is categorized as entailing “grave pain.” [See, however, R. Jacob Ettlinger, Teshuvot Binyan Ẓion, no. 108, who states that “perhaps” causing an animal to die of starvation entails “grave pain.”] Nimukei Yosef, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b, quite independently draws a similar distinction between “grave pain” and “minor pain” without in any way referring to Rambam’s statements. According to Nimukei Yosef, “minor pain” is the subject of rabbinic injunction while “grave pain” is biblically proscribed. See also Ritva, Avodah Zarah 11a.
As will be shown later, a latter-day authority, R. Jacob Ettlinger, Teshuvot Binyan Ẓion, no. 108, permits causing an animal “grave pain” only for purposes of human medical needs but permits “minor pain” even for lesser reasons, at least insofar as normative law is concerned. according to most authorities, this duty is not directly derived from the obligation of "unloading." One notable exception is Rashi, Shabbat 128b. Rashi states that, according to those Sages of the Talmud who maintain that binding regulations may be inferred from the rationale underlying precepts, obligations concerning za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim are directly derived from the verse "thou shalt surely release it with him" (Exodus 23:5).12See also Rabad, quoted in Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Meẓi‘a 32b, s.v. teda, and Levush, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 305:18. If obligations concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim are derived from the commandment concerning “unloading” it would certainly seem to follow that this obligation is not limited to a prohibition against cruelty but includes a positive obligation to intervene in order to rescue from pain. See R. Joel Schwartz, Ve-Raḥamav al Kol Ma’asav, p. 43, note 3, and cf., above, note 10. Rambam, Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 17, and R. Judah he-Hasid, Sefer Hasidim (ed. Reuben Margulies), no. 666, regard the biblical narrative concerning Balaam and his ass as the source of the biblical prohibition against cruelty toward animals. These authorities indicate that the verse "And the angel of the Lord said unto him: 'Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass these three times?' " (Numbers 22:32) serves to establish a prohibition against conduct of that nature.13See below, note 43. Me'iri, Baba Mezi'a 32b, is of the opinion that obligations concerning za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim are derived from the prohibition against muzzling an ox while it is engaged in threshing (Deuteronomy 25:4). Shitah Mekubezet, Baba Mezi'a 32b, suggests that these obligations may either be derived from the prohibition against muzzling an ox engaged in threshing or, alternatively, za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim may simply be the subject of halakhah le-Mosheh mi-Sinai, i.e., an oral teaching transmitted to Moses at Mount Sinai with no accompanying written record in the Pentateuch.14See also Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 80
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol III
… Divine Providence extends to every man individually. But the condition of the individual beings of other living creatures is undoubtedly the same as has been stated by Aristotle. On that account it is allowed, even commanded, to kill animals; we are permitted to use them according to our pleasure…. There is a rule laid down by our Sages that it is directly prohibited in the Torah to cause pain to an animal based on the words: "Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass?" (Numbers 22:32). But the object of this rule is to make us perfect; that we should not assume cruel habits; and that we should not uselessly cause pain to others; that, on the contrary, we should be prepared to show pity and mercy to all living creatures, except when necessity demands the contrary: "When thy soul longeth to eat flesh" (Deuteronomy 12:20).28The immediately following verse. “… then thou shalt kill of thy herd and of thy flock … and thou shalt eat within thy gates” (Deuteronomy 12:21), serves to sanction ritual slaughter for purposes of food. Since, in context, the reference in Deuteronomy 12:20 is to ritual slaughter, it is clear that Rambam regards even the painless mode of ritual slaughter, when undertaken other than for purposes of food, as forbidden by reason of ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. However, Rambam would certainly regard ritual slaughter undertaken in order to satisfy other legitimate human needs as tantamount to slaughter for purposes of food. Ritual slaughter other than for purposes of food is clearly permitted as evidenced by the statement of the Gemara, Ḥullin 85b, to the effect that R. Ḥiyya slaughtered a bird in the prescribed manner because he sought to use its blood to destroy worms which had infested his flax. See Sefer Ḥasidim (ed. Reuben Margulies), no. 667. Moreover, when the blood of an animal is necessary for some beneficial purpose, the Gemara, Ḥullin 27b and 85b, permits putting an animal to death even by means other than ritual slaughter in order to conserve its blood. The comments of Rashi, Shabbat 75a, s.v. shoḥet, serve to indicate that, under any circumstances, when an animal is killed for human benefit other than for food, it is not necessary to put it to death by means of ritual slaughter. Cf. Rashi, Ḥullin 27b, s.v. ḥayyav le-khasot. We should not kill animals for the purpose of practicing cruelty or for the purpose of sport.29See also Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 186, who explains that the slaughter of sanctified animals outside of the Temple precincts, even though the act is performed in the ritually prescribed manner, is forbidden because no purpose is served by such slaughter. Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh comments that wanton killing of animals is tantamount to “shedding blood.”
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Terumat ha-Deshen, Pesakim u-Ketavim, no. 105, regards the permissibility of causing suffering to animals for the benefit of mankind to be inherent in the biblical dispensation granting man the right to use animals for his needs.40This concept is echoed in Psalms 8:7-9 which says of man: “Thou hast made him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands; Thou hast put all things under his feet. Sheep and oxen, all of them, yea, and the beasts of the field. The fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea; whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas.”
As evidenced by numerous biblical verses, it is clear that man is granted license to utilize animals as beasts of burden, for agricultural purposes, as a means of transportation and the like. Judaism also accepts the view that animals were created for the benefit of mankind. Thus, the Gemara, Berakhot 6b, reports: R. Eleazar said, “The Holy One, blessed be He, declared, ‘The whole world in its entirety was not created other than on behalf of this [human species].’ ” Even more explicit is the statement of R. Simeon ben Eleazar, Kiddushin 82b, declaring, “… they [animals] were not created other than to serve me.” This view is not contradicted by the position espoused by Rambam in a celebrated dispute with Sa‘adia Ga’on in which Rambam denies the homocentric nature of the universe. The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise IV, introduction, asserts that man is the intended and ultimate purpose of creation; Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 13, challenges this view, pointing out that the human species has no need for a great part of the cosmos. Rambam maintains that all parts of the world are equally intended by the divine will but acknowledges that certain beings were created for the service of others. Thus, in Rambam’s view, there is no contradiction in acknowledging that service to other species is the instrumental purpose of some creatures while yet affirming their own existence as the final cause of those creatures. R. Moses Sofer, Hagahot Hatam Sofer, Baba Mezi'a 32b,41See also Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 185, s.v. ma she-katavata me-Rabad; cf., however, Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 314 s.v. omnam; and Teshuvot Imrei Shefer, no. 34, sec. 2. cites the divine declaration to Adam and Eve, "… and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth" (Genesis 1:28),42Terumat ha-Deshen rules that, as a matter of law, it is permissible to cause pain to animals even for the esthetic pleasure of man, and, accordingly, permits clipping the ears and tail of a dog “in order to beautify it.” Cf., however, Sefer Ḥasidim (ed. Mekiẓei Nirdamim), no. 589, who forbids any attempt to effect a “change” in correcting a congenital anomaly in a limb or organ of an animal on grounds that such a procedure constitutes a violation of the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. In an even more general statement, Da‘at Kedoshim, Yoreh De‘ah 24:12, declares that acts which cause discomfort to animals are permissible in order to satisfy “any desire of man even if his desire in this regard is not in accordance with the weighing of need or benefit but only a desire without a proper reason.” The same authority permits such procedures even if there is only the mere possibility that the need or desire may be satisfied thereby. See also Da‘at Kedoshim, Yoreh De‘ah 23:28. A similar view is expressed by Ezer mi-Kodesh, Even ha-Ezer 5:14. Cf., however, below, note 67. as establishing man's absolute and unlimited mastery over the animal kingdom.43Cf., however, Sefer Ḥasidim (ed. Reuben Margulies), no. 666, who applies Genesis 1:28 in a radically different manner. Sefer Ḥasidim remarks that Adam was forbidden to eat the flesh of animals but was granted dominion over them, whereas the sons of Noah were permitted to eat the flesh of animals but were not granted dominion over them. According to Sefer Ḥasidim, it is because the sons of Noah were not granted dominion over animals that the angel chastised Balaam in demanding, “Wherefore has thou smitten thine ass these three times?” (Numbers 22:32). As pointed out by R. Reuben Margulies in his commentary on Sefer Ḥasidim, Mekor Ḥesed 666:7, Sefer Ḥasidim obviously maintains that Noachides are forbidden to engage in acts involving ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. As indicated earlier, Rambam also cites Numbers 22:32 as the source of the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. Hence there is some reason to assume that Rambam also maintains that ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is prohibited to Noachides. Teshuvot Imrei Shefer, no. 34, sec. 2 and sec. 8, also suggests that Noachides may be bound by strictures concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim which, in his opinion, may be encompassed in the prohibition contained in the Noachide Code concerning the eating of a limb torn from a living animal. See, however, Pri Megadim, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, Mishbeẓot Zahav 467:2 and R. Shalom Mordecai Schwadron, Teshuvot Maharsham, II, no. 364, who apparently maintain that non-Jews are not bound by strictures concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. See also Toldot Ya‘akov, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 33. R. Judah Leib Graubart, Havalim ba-Ne'imim, I, no. 43, sec. 3, advances an identical argument on the basis of Genesis 9:1-2: "And God blessed Noah and his sons…. And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all wherewith the ground teemeth, and upon all the fishes of the sea: into your hand are they delivered."
As evidenced by numerous biblical verses, it is clear that man is granted license to utilize animals as beasts of burden, for agricultural purposes, as a means of transportation and the like. Judaism also accepts the view that animals were created for the benefit of mankind. Thus, the Gemara, Berakhot 6b, reports: R. Eleazar said, “The Holy One, blessed be He, declared, ‘The whole world in its entirety was not created other than on behalf of this [human species].’ ” Even more explicit is the statement of R. Simeon ben Eleazar, Kiddushin 82b, declaring, “… they [animals] were not created other than to serve me.” This view is not contradicted by the position espoused by Rambam in a celebrated dispute with Sa‘adia Ga’on in which Rambam denies the homocentric nature of the universe. The Book of Beliefs and Opinions, Treatise IV, introduction, asserts that man is the intended and ultimate purpose of creation; Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 13, challenges this view, pointing out that the human species has no need for a great part of the cosmos. Rambam maintains that all parts of the world are equally intended by the divine will but acknowledges that certain beings were created for the service of others. Thus, in Rambam’s view, there is no contradiction in acknowledging that service to other species is the instrumental purpose of some creatures while yet affirming their own existence as the final cause of those creatures. R. Moses Sofer, Hagahot Hatam Sofer, Baba Mezi'a 32b,41See also Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 185, s.v. ma she-katavata me-Rabad; cf., however, Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 314 s.v. omnam; and Teshuvot Imrei Shefer, no. 34, sec. 2. cites the divine declaration to Adam and Eve, "… and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that creepeth upon the earth" (Genesis 1:28),42Terumat ha-Deshen rules that, as a matter of law, it is permissible to cause pain to animals even for the esthetic pleasure of man, and, accordingly, permits clipping the ears and tail of a dog “in order to beautify it.” Cf., however, Sefer Ḥasidim (ed. Mekiẓei Nirdamim), no. 589, who forbids any attempt to effect a “change” in correcting a congenital anomaly in a limb or organ of an animal on grounds that such a procedure constitutes a violation of the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. In an even more general statement, Da‘at Kedoshim, Yoreh De‘ah 24:12, declares that acts which cause discomfort to animals are permissible in order to satisfy “any desire of man even if his desire in this regard is not in accordance with the weighing of need or benefit but only a desire without a proper reason.” The same authority permits such procedures even if there is only the mere possibility that the need or desire may be satisfied thereby. See also Da‘at Kedoshim, Yoreh De‘ah 23:28. A similar view is expressed by Ezer mi-Kodesh, Even ha-Ezer 5:14. Cf., however, below, note 67. as establishing man's absolute and unlimited mastery over the animal kingdom.43Cf., however, Sefer Ḥasidim (ed. Reuben Margulies), no. 666, who applies Genesis 1:28 in a radically different manner. Sefer Ḥasidim remarks that Adam was forbidden to eat the flesh of animals but was granted dominion over them, whereas the sons of Noah were permitted to eat the flesh of animals but were not granted dominion over them. According to Sefer Ḥasidim, it is because the sons of Noah were not granted dominion over animals that the angel chastised Balaam in demanding, “Wherefore has thou smitten thine ass these three times?” (Numbers 22:32). As pointed out by R. Reuben Margulies in his commentary on Sefer Ḥasidim, Mekor Ḥesed 666:7, Sefer Ḥasidim obviously maintains that Noachides are forbidden to engage in acts involving ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. As indicated earlier, Rambam also cites Numbers 22:32 as the source of the prohibition against ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. Hence there is some reason to assume that Rambam also maintains that ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim is prohibited to Noachides. Teshuvot Imrei Shefer, no. 34, sec. 2 and sec. 8, also suggests that Noachides may be bound by strictures concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim which, in his opinion, may be encompassed in the prohibition contained in the Noachide Code concerning the eating of a limb torn from a living animal. See, however, Pri Megadim, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, Mishbeẓot Zahav 467:2 and R. Shalom Mordecai Schwadron, Teshuvot Maharsham, II, no. 364, who apparently maintain that non-Jews are not bound by strictures concerning ẓa‘ar ba‘alei ḥayyim. See also Toldot Ya‘akov, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 33. R. Judah Leib Graubart, Havalim ba-Ne'imim, I, no. 43, sec. 3, advances an identical argument on the basis of Genesis 9:1-2: "And God blessed Noah and his sons…. And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, and upon all wherewith the ground teemeth, and upon all the fishes of the sea: into your hand are they delivered."
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Sefer Chasidim
There is a pious individual whose heart eagerly pursues the will of his Creator. He does not increase his good deeds as does the wise pious man who is instructed by his teacher and is therefore (also) wise. The reason why the good deeds of the other are not many is because he is not instructed by a teacher. However, if he did know (receive instruction) he would fulfill (his share of good deeds), because they have said, “A man should always be deliberate (schooled) in the fear of the Lord.”1Berakoth 17a. Behold, one who has not learned, his heart is not like a sponge to absorb learning, and even if he has a teacher, behold, his heart is closed and at time disarrayed, he is unable to understand and know. And we find in the Torah that any one who is able to understand (what is proper to do) even though he was not commanded, is punished if he did not take the matter to heart.2Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedlander (reprint of 1st ed., 1881-1885; New York: Hebrew Publishing Co.), Part 3, Chapter XVII, p. 73. For it is written, “And Moses was wroth with the officers of the host, the captains of thousand, and the captains of hundreds, who came from the service of the war. And Moses said unto them: ‘Have ye saved all the women alive?’” (Num. 31:14). Why did they not answer him, “Why then did you not command us? You did not tell us to put the women to death.” But Moses knew that there were wise men and experts able to argue a conclusion a minori ad majus.3Yalkut Reuveni (Warsaw: Levin and Epstein Publishers), Numbers, Chapter II, pp. 118-119. If with the Caananites where it is written “Thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth,” “That they teach you not to do etc.…” (Deut. 20:16-18), and it is written, “For he will turn away thy son from following Me” (Deut. 7:4), lest he cause you to sin in the future, (they are to be put to death) these who have already sinned and caused others to sin is it not a matter of course that you should have argued a conclusion a minori ad majus4Sanhedrin 68a. (that they be put to death). Similarly, when the angels said to Balaam, “Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass” (Num. 22:32), why did he not reply “What transgression is it that I hit my ass.” Even the prohibition not to cause pain to a live thing does not apply. She did not buckle because of the load (but because of an angel that blocked the road). Also when she squeezed his leg why should he not hit her? Because he should have reflected, “Perhaps it is without the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, that I curse them. He permitted (me) only to reveal to them the future, for it is said, ‘If the men are come to call thee’ (Num. 22:20), you should tell them of the future.” The Holy One, blessed be He, saw that he (Balaam) would rejoice if he were allowed to curse Israel, and this is what is said, “I have sinned for I know not that thou (angel) stoodest in the way against me” (Num. 22:34). (And yet) on the contrary the reverse stands to reason, because he did not know that he (the angel) stood opposite him he did not sin. However, he said thus, “I sinned because I did not take the pains to know, I did not examine and search into the roots of the (my) transgression.” From this we learn that a man should be deliberate in the fear of the Lord since he is punished because of his ignorance. He must know and investigate, for in the presence of the Ruler you will not be able to plead inadvertence, as Shimei was unable to say to Solomon, “ I forgot that I went out to the river Kidron.”5I Kings 2:40. It is for this reason that I said I will write a book for those that fear God lest they think that they are being punished without cause. Heaven forfend, attributing evil to God “For Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness” (Ps. 5:5), and it is written “Warn them from Me. When I say unto the wicked: O’ wicked man thou shalt surely die, and thou dost not speak to warn the wicked from his way; that wicked man shall die in his iniquity, but his blood will I require at thy hand. Nevertheless, if thou warn … the righteous he shall surely live… but thou hast delivered thy soul” (Ezek. 33:7-9). The seven warnings correspond to the (seven) abominations of the heart: “There are six things that the Lord hateth, Yea seven which are an abomination unto Him” (Prov. 6:16); and to, “Seven times more for your sins” (Lev. 26:18). “But thou hast delivered thy soul” (Ezek. 33:9), mark that he does not say “thou hast ‘merited’” or “vindicated” but rather, “thy soul hast thou ‘delivered.’” From this we learn that anyone who has a friend that is being punished and he does not warn him and say to his friend “do not do so,” all the punishment visited upon his friend is attributed to him as if he personally killed his friend, because he should have warned him but he did not.6Shabbath 55a. Moreover, we exact from him the blood of his friend, concerning him it is said, “His blood will I require at thy hand” (Ezek. 33:8). For this reason have I prepared this Book of Reverence so that those who fear the word of God be circumspect. And furthermore my son be admonished,7Ecclesiastes 12:12. (beforewarned) if I have been mistaken let the wise man set it aright and understand in order to fear God all of the days in truth.
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Sefer Chasidim
There is a pious individual whose heart eagerly pursues the will of his Creator. He does not increase his good deeds as does the wise pious man who is instructed by his teacher and is therefore (also) wise. The reason why the good deeds of the other are not many is because he is not instructed by a teacher. However, if he did know (receive instruction) he would fulfill (his share of good deeds), because they have said, “A man should always be deliberate (schooled) in the fear of the Lord.”1Berakoth 17a. Behold, one who has not learned, his heart is not like a sponge to absorb learning, and even if he has a teacher, behold, his heart is closed and at time disarrayed, he is unable to understand and know. And we find in the Torah that any one who is able to understand (what is proper to do) even though he was not commanded, is punished if he did not take the matter to heart.2Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedlander (reprint of 1st ed., 1881-1885; New York: Hebrew Publishing Co.), Part 3, Chapter XVII, p. 73. For it is written, “And Moses was wroth with the officers of the host, the captains of thousand, and the captains of hundreds, who came from the service of the war. And Moses said unto them: ‘Have ye saved all the women alive?’” (Num. 31:14). Why did they not answer him, “Why then did you not command us? You did not tell us to put the women to death.” But Moses knew that there were wise men and experts able to argue a conclusion a minori ad majus.3Yalkut Reuveni (Warsaw: Levin and Epstein Publishers), Numbers, Chapter II, pp. 118-119. If with the Caananites where it is written “Thou shalt save alive nothing that breatheth,” “That they teach you not to do etc.…” (Deut. 20:16-18), and it is written, “For he will turn away thy son from following Me” (Deut. 7:4), lest he cause you to sin in the future, (they are to be put to death) these who have already sinned and caused others to sin is it not a matter of course that you should have argued a conclusion a minori ad majus4Sanhedrin 68a. (that they be put to death). Similarly, when the angels said to Balaam, “Wherefore hast thou smitten thine ass” (Num. 22:32), why did he not reply “What transgression is it that I hit my ass.” Even the prohibition not to cause pain to a live thing does not apply. She did not buckle because of the load (but because of an angel that blocked the road). Also when she squeezed his leg why should he not hit her? Because he should have reflected, “Perhaps it is without the will of the Holy One, blessed be He, that I curse them. He permitted (me) only to reveal to them the future, for it is said, ‘If the men are come to call thee’ (Num. 22:20), you should tell them of the future.” The Holy One, blessed be He, saw that he (Balaam) would rejoice if he were allowed to curse Israel, and this is what is said, “I have sinned for I know not that thou (angel) stoodest in the way against me” (Num. 22:34). (And yet) on the contrary the reverse stands to reason, because he did not know that he (the angel) stood opposite him he did not sin. However, he said thus, “I sinned because I did not take the pains to know, I did not examine and search into the roots of the (my) transgression.” From this we learn that a man should be deliberate in the fear of the Lord since he is punished because of his ignorance. He must know and investigate, for in the presence of the Ruler you will not be able to plead inadvertence, as Shimei was unable to say to Solomon, “ I forgot that I went out to the river Kidron.”5I Kings 2:40. It is for this reason that I said I will write a book for those that fear God lest they think that they are being punished without cause. Heaven forfend, attributing evil to God “For Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness” (Ps. 5:5), and it is written “Warn them from Me. When I say unto the wicked: O’ wicked man thou shalt surely die, and thou dost not speak to warn the wicked from his way; that wicked man shall die in his iniquity, but his blood will I require at thy hand. Nevertheless, if thou warn … the righteous he shall surely live… but thou hast delivered thy soul” (Ezek. 33:7-9). The seven warnings correspond to the (seven) abominations of the heart: “There are six things that the Lord hateth, Yea seven which are an abomination unto Him” (Prov. 6:16); and to, “Seven times more for your sins” (Lev. 26:18). “But thou hast delivered thy soul” (Ezek. 33:9), mark that he does not say “thou hast ‘merited’” or “vindicated” but rather, “thy soul hast thou ‘delivered.’” From this we learn that anyone who has a friend that is being punished and he does not warn him and say to his friend “do not do so,” all the punishment visited upon his friend is attributed to him as if he personally killed his friend, because he should have warned him but he did not.6Shabbath 55a. Moreover, we exact from him the blood of his friend, concerning him it is said, “His blood will I require at thy hand” (Ezek. 33:8). For this reason have I prepared this Book of Reverence so that those who fear the word of God be circumspect. And furthermore my son be admonished,7Ecclesiastes 12:12. (beforewarned) if I have been mistaken let the wise man set it aright and understand in order to fear God all of the days in truth.
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