Comentario citado sobre Deuteronómio 15:4

אֶ֕פֶס כִּ֛י לֹ֥א יִֽהְיֶה־בְּךָ֖ אֶבְי֑וֹן כִּֽי־בָרֵ֤ךְ יְבָֽרֶכְךָ֙ יְהוָ֔ה בָּאָ֕רֶץ אֲשֶׁר֙ יְהוָ֣ה אֱלֹהֶ֔יךָ נֹֽתֵן־לְךָ֥ נַחֲלָ֖ה לְרִשְׁתָּֽהּ׃

Para que así no haya en ti mendigo; porque SEÑOR te bendecirá con abundancia en la tierra que SEÑOR tu Dios te da por heredad para que la poseas,

Tosafot

Rav Yehuda says, "From that of the son": RI (Rabbi Yitzchak) was precise, according to the one that holds it is from that of the son - what should one do if he was confronted by the honor of his parent, his own lost object and the last object of his fellow [all at the same time]? If he occupies himself with the honor of his parent, does not the lost object of his fellow take precedence? As we say in [the chapter entitled] Elu Metziot (Bava Metzia 32a), "Perhaps [if] his father said to him, 'Do not return [it],' perhaps he should listen to him? [Hence] we learn to say, etc." And this, "Do not return," is that he says, "Occupy yourself with my honor." For [regarding], "Do not return," for nothing, I do not need a verse! It is therefore implied that the lost object of his fellow takes precedence over the honor of father and mother. But if he occupies himself with the lost object of his fellow, behold his lost object takes precedence! As it is written (Deuteronomy 15:4), "However, there will not be among you any needy one" - yours is before [that of] all people (Bava Metzia 30b, 33a). And if he occupies himself with his lost object, behold the honor of his parent takes precedence, according to the one that holds it is from that of the son. So it appears to RI that he should leave the honor of his parent and the lost object of his fellow and occupy himself with his [own] lost object. For that which it said that the honor of a parent takes precedence is only when he allows his parent to do what he wants with his money. For this is the crux of honor. But with his lost object: Since the parent does not benefit from the lost object itself, the son is not obligated to lose his lost object because of his parent. And even though we say adjacently, "Such that he takes a purse and throw it into the sea, and the son does not embarrass him" - according to the one that holds it is from that of the son, it is speaking there about such a manner in which the father derives pleasure from it. For example, he throws it into the sea to cause fear among the people of his household. For if it were not thus - if he throws it into the sea for nothing, he is wicked; as he transgresses, do not waste! And even when it is inadvertent and he throws it in his anger, he nevertheless derives pleasure from throwing his purse. And because of that, one may not embarrass him.
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Ibn Ezra

God endowed man with a rational faculty, which is also referred to as lev in order to actualize every soul's potential in due time. God also provided him with mitzvot to make it possible to maintain everything in proper proportion... Now although the three souls are alluded to by one all-embracing name, we shall distinguish the three different powers of the soul by three specific names: neshamah, ruach, nefesh. This will avoid undue elaboration on the various qualities associated with each of the three souls. Thus the term nefesh refers to man's desire to eat, to be merry, and indulge in sexual pleasures. The name ruach alludes to our sensations that stir feelings for mastery and self-glorification. Neshamah denotes our rational faculties. Saadia made a similar classification of the three souls. It is, moreover, apparent that when the nefesh increases in power, the neshamah becomes weaker and has no strength to resist the power of the nefesh, reintroduced as it is by all the other organs of the body. Hence one who overindulges in food and drink can never acquire wisdom. And when neshamah and ruach get together they overpower nefesh and pave the way for a partial opening of the "eyes" of the neshamah to comprehend the physical but not yet the metaphysical disciplines. The reason for this limitation is due to the power of ruach which strives for mastery and gives rise to the sensation of anger. This is then the implication of the verse: "Vexation is better than revelry, for though the face may be sad, the heart may be glad." (Ecclesiastes 7:3) Sadness of the face refers to vexations, and the "heart" alludes to our rational faculty. Subsequently, when neshamah finally prevails over nefesh with the help of ruach, it becomes necessary for neshamah to be preoccupied exclusively with wisdom in order that with the help of the latter, neshamah will be able to overcome ruach and render her subservient to neshamah. This is the meaning of the verse, "Don’t let your spirit be quickly vexed, for vexation abides in the breasts of fools." (Ecclesiastes 7:9) "For as wisdom grows, vexation grows." (Ecclesiastes 1:18) "Don’t act the wise man to excess." (Ecclesiastes 7:16) For much wisdom increases indignation over the petty vanities of the world and its inhabitants...Thus the apparent contradictions that appear in the Book of Ecclesiastes where the author seems to say one thing in one instance and its opposite another time are only on the surface. The same applies to the Book of Proverbs where the author says: "Do not answer a dullard in accord with his folly" (Proverbs 26:4) and in the following verse: "Answer a dullard in accord with his folly." (Proverbs 26:5) In the Prophets and the Torah, our principal source book, we find similar contradictions, e.g. "There shall be no needy among you" (Deuteronomy 15:4) and later, "For there will never cease to be needy ones in your land." (Deuteronomy 15:11) In reality they are similar provided we apply to them the proper philosophic notions.
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Rashi

according to the sanction of Heb. כְּרִשְׁיוֹן as the sanction of the king was upon them to build the Temple. כְּרִשְׁיוֹן is an expression of permission (רְשּׁוּת) derived from רשּׁה ; since from אבה to want, he says [i.e., derives] אֶבְיוֹן, a needy person; and from צבה, to desire, צִבְיוֹן, desire; and from חזה to see, חִזָיוֹן, a vision; and from רעה, רַעְיוֹן, thought; from חבה, חֶבְיוֹן, hiding; and from רשּׁה, he says רְשּׁוּת, permission; like from, ענה, עֱנוּת, affliction; and from שּׁבה, שְּׁבוּת,captivity; and from ראה, רְאוּת, a sight; and from זנה, זְנוּת, harlotry. The result is that רְשּׁוּת and רִשְׁיוֹן are derived from the same root according to the gauge of grammar, and they are the same expression. Menahem, (p. 34) however, associated it with (Ps. 21:3): “and the speech of his lips (וַַַַַאֲרֶשֶּׁת),” but he was not exact with its root. Nevertheless, these two manners [of defining words] are close to each other in their meanings.
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