Comentario citado sobre I Samuel 25:26

וְעַתָּ֣ה אֲדֹנִ֗י חַי־יְהוָ֤ה וְחֵֽי־נַפְשְׁךָ֙ אֲשֶׁ֨ר מְנָעֲךָ֤ יְהוָה֙ מִבּ֣וֹא בְדָמִ֔ים וְהוֹשֵׁ֥עַ יָדְךָ֖ לָ֑ךְ וְעַתָּ֗ה יִֽהְי֤וּ כְנָבָל֙ אֹיְבֶ֔יךָ וְהַֽמְבַקְשִׁ֥ים אֶל־אֲדֹנִ֖י רָעָֽה׃

Ahora pues, señor mío, vive SEÑOR y vive tu alma, que SEÑOR te ha estorbado que vinieses á derramar sangre, y vengarte por tu propia mano.  Sean pues como Nabal tus enemigos, y todos los que procuran mal contra mi señor.

Malbim

All of this requires that there be nothing in existence that depends on man's choice. For if there were, all the above queries would return home (1 Samuel 25:26). A person's deeds are all simply determined and apportioned from the beginning of time, and God, may He be Blessed, knows everything in one eternal, universal, and immutable knowledge, which neither changes, nor increases, nor evolves; neither as a result of the increase in the number of things in existence nor by virtue of those events which depend, according to our imagination, on time or choice. For He knows everything through His perception of Himself, upon which the linking of all the causes and all their effects depends, through to the end of the series.12This mechanistic-deterministic view is resonant of Descartes' writings, though his solution to the problem of free-will and God's foreknowledge is quite different. Descartes held that 'freedom of the will is self-evident.' Doubt was the human faculty that proved this. On the other hand, he also asserted that 'we likewise know that everything is pre-ordained of God…His power is so immense that it would be a crime for us to think ourselves ever capable of ding anything which He had not already pre-ordained.' He reconciled these two apparently opposing statements as follows:
We will have no trouble at all if we recollect that our thought is finite, and that the omnipotence of God, whereby He has not only known from all eternity that which is or can be, but also willed and pre-ordained is, is infinite. In this way we may have intelligence enough to know that this power is in God, but not enough to know how He leaves the free action of man indeterminate; and, on the other hand, we are as conscious of the liberty which exists in us that there is nothing that we comprehend more clearly and perfectly. (Principles of Philosophy, 41)
This is the thrust of Job's argument and reply in Chapter 10.
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