Comentario citado sobre Levítico 24:17

מכה איש ומת, “if someone strikes a man and he dies as a result;” Rashi explains this as being based on Leviticus 24,17: ואיש כי יכה כל נפש אדם מות ימות, “if a man strikes a lethal blow on another human being it is a capital offence and the attacker will be subject to execution.” If you were to ask: “where did we ever hear that if a person strikes another and he does not die as a result, that he is still subject to execution? After all, even if he did cause his victim to lose a limb, he is only liable for monetary compensation? Some commentators have provided what is a very forced answer by saying that if the injury to the victim of the blow is such that he will die within 12 months that the attacker will be subject to the death penalty. Alternately, the verse could have meant that death resulted from a blow with an instrument not meant to cause death. Since we could have thought that he would still be guilty of the death penalty as it is the result that counts, the Torah had to write that unless the weapon used was of a kind that is used as a lethal weapon the killer is not liable to the death penalty.

מכה איש, “if someone strikes an adult male, etc;” Rashi compares this verse with a similar verse in Leviticus 24,17, reading איש כי יכה, “when an adult male strikes someone,” explaining that both verses are necessary. Verse 14 here, commencing with “if someone deliberately strikes some with intent to kill, but tries to make it look as if it was unintentional,” is also needed as explained by Rashi on that verse, i.e. that unless it had been written, I would have thought that penalties are in place only when the aggression was deliberate with intent to harm or kill. Without our verse one could have thought that killing a woman or injuring her, or doing so to a hermaphrodite would not be punishable, or would be punishable less severely. Rashi explains all this on verse 16 in our chapter.

מכה איש ומת WHOSOEVER SMITETH A MAN SO THAT HE DIE — Why is this said (how does the particular form of words used here tell us some point of law which is not contained in another text bearing upon the same subject)? Since it is said, (Leviticus 24:17) “And the man that smiteth (יכה) any person (more lit., the soul of any human being) [shall surely be put to death]”, I might have inferred that mere smiting without resultant death is subject to the death penalty. Scripture therefore states here, “Whosoever smiteth a man so that he die [shall surely be put to death]”, thus telling you that he is not punishable with death unless the stroke proves fatal. On the other hand if it had stated here, “Whosoever smiteth a man…” and it had not said there “If a man smiteth [any person]”, I might have inferred that the murderer is not guilty except if he killed “a man”; whence, however, could I know that he is subject to the death penalty if he killed a woman or a minor? Therefore Scripture states “And if [a man] smiteth any person”, thus including even a minor and a woman. Then again: if it had stated only, “Whosoever smiteth a man” I might have inferred that even a minor who smote and killed a person is punishable with death. Scripture therefore states “and if a man smiteth” — a man but not a minor. Then on the other hand, so far as concerns the statement “And if [a man] smiteth the soul of any man” it might be held that even premature births at a term of eight months are included in the term כל נפש אדם “soul of any man”, Scripture therefore states “Whosoever smiteth a man” to intimate that one is not subject to the death penalty unless he kills a viable child — one which is fitted to become a man (Mekhilta).