וְנֶ֣פֶשׁ כִּֽי־תֶחֱטָ֗א וְשָֽׁמְעָה֙ ק֣וֹל אָלָ֔ה וְה֣וּא עֵ֔ד א֥וֹ רָאָ֖ה א֣וֹ יָדָ֑ע אִם־ל֥וֹא יַגִּ֖יד וְנָשָׂ֥א עֲוֺנֽוֹ׃
Y cuando <span class="x" onmousemove="Show('perush','Este es el <b>69no Precepto Positivo</b> enumerado por el Rambam en el Prefacio a Mishné Torá, su “Compendio de la Ley Hebrea” para todo el Pueblo de Israel.',event);" onmouseout="Close();">alguna persona transgrediera</span>, que hubiere oído la voz del que juró, <span class="x" onmousemove="Show('perush','Este es el <b>178vo Precepto Positivo</b> enumerado por el Rambam en el Prefacio a Mishné Torá, su “Compendio de la Ley Hebrea” para todo el Pueblo de Israel.',event);" onmouseout="Close();">y él fuere testigo que vió, o supo</span>, si no lo denunciare, él llevará su pecado.
Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot
He denied it27Lev. 5:22., not him28In Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 22(6) more in detail: “About it but not about its finder.” This Tanna and both Talmudim reject the understanding of the verse as given in the Targumim, that the person swearing had found the lost property and now denies it. This would be covered by “robbery” listed in v. 21. Rather it is that the person searching for his lost property, such as his donkey mares, asks a person whether he knows either of the property or of the person who might have taken it. If he under oath falsely denies any knowledge, according to this Tanna be becomes liable for a sacrifice only if he wrongly denies knowledge about the property, not about the person who might have appropriated it.
The big question then becomes, why should the person asked for testimony be liable for anything since by necessity he is a single person and the testimony of a single person cannot force a judgment. As Ravad explains in his Commentary to Sifra, this argument would be unconditionally valid only for oaths about testimony, not for oaths about causing monetary loss. His scenario is, e. g., that the lost animal was standing on another person’s property. The original owner took it but now the person from whom it was taken claims ownership and wants it back. The second person agrees that he found the animal but he disputes the fact that it is the animal which had belonged to the first. In this situation, testimony of one witness about ownership of the animal is sufficient for a judgment in favor of the first person since it is not a judgment to transfer property but to confirm an existing status. On the other hand, testimony that the second person took possession of some lost property but which failed to identify the property is worthless and its denial cannot trigger any liability by the potential witness.. 29Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 22(6), Babli Bava qamma 105b. In the Babli: “Three kinds of oaths [about lost property.]”“Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability30In the Babli, this is attributed to the early Galilean Amora R. Ḥanina.. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so31In the Babli, this is the authoritative opinion of Samuel.. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.32As the Babli points out, if somebody swears although he does not not know about the whole affair he swears truthfully and no liability of any kind can arise. In place of “neither about it nor about its finder” one must read “about it and its finder.”” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder33Only the middle clause is in dispute between Ben Azzai and the first Tanna.. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”
The big question then becomes, why should the person asked for testimony be liable for anything since by necessity he is a single person and the testimony of a single person cannot force a judgment. As Ravad explains in his Commentary to Sifra, this argument would be unconditionally valid only for oaths about testimony, not for oaths about causing monetary loss. His scenario is, e. g., that the lost animal was standing on another person’s property. The original owner took it but now the person from whom it was taken claims ownership and wants it back. The second person agrees that he found the animal but he disputes the fact that it is the animal which had belonged to the first. In this situation, testimony of one witness about ownership of the animal is sufficient for a judgment in favor of the first person since it is not a judgment to transfer property but to confirm an existing status. On the other hand, testimony that the second person took possession of some lost property but which failed to identify the property is worthless and its denial cannot trigger any liability by the potential witness.. 29Sifra Ḥova (Wayyiqra 2) Pereq 22(6), Babli Bava qamma 105b. In the Babli: “Three kinds of oaths [about lost property.]”“Ben Azzai says, there are three kinds of lost properties. One who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.” Rebbi Onias in the name of Rebbi Jeremiah: All of them to relieve from liability30In the Babli, this is attributed to the early Galilean Amora R. Ḥanina.. Rebbi Jacob bar Aḥa in the name of Rebbi Yose: This is not so31In the Babli, this is the authoritative opinion of Samuel.. Rebbi Yose asked, why should it be to relieve from liability? Rebbi Mana said, the three kinds of lost property cannot be “one who knows about it and its finder; about it but not about its finder; neither about it nor about its finder.32As the Babli points out, if somebody swears although he does not not know about the whole affair he swears truthfully and no liability of any kind can arise. In place of “neither about it nor about its finder” one must read “about it and its finder.”” About it and its finder, that is where we hold. But it must be about one who denies [knowledge] about it and its finder; about its finder but not about it; about it but not about its finder33Only the middle clause is in dispute between Ben Azzai and the first Tanna.. So is the baraita: “About it and its finder.”
Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot
Rebbi Ismael stated: He has to bear his punishment21I. e., the judges; the expression is from Ex. 23:2., a sacrifice. From where that one needs a court? “Telling, telling”. Since telling mentioned there is before a court, also telling here is before a court.
Jerusalem Talmud Shevuot
HALAKHAH: “What is an oath about testimony,” etc. A person, a person31A comparison of Lev. 5:1 about oaths concerning testimony and 5:21 about the person accused of larceny who swears falsely in purgation by oath; cf. Chapter 3:12, Note 165. The parallel use of identical terms is an equal cut which allows transfer of rules from one occurrence to the other.. Since there it is from his own words, also here from his own words. Since here it is from others’ words, also there it is from others’ words32In v. 5:1 the potential witness hears the sound of an imprecation; others formulate the oath to which he is asked to assent. In 5:21 he himself formulates the oath to deny a deposit, or a loan, or robbery. The equal cut allows one to transfer one situation to the other; oaths about testimony may be formulated by the potential witness himself; oaths of a person accused of larceny may be formulated by the aggrieved party.. Rebbi Meїr explains the equal cut which was said here: Since there it is said about his own words, so also here about his own words. Also the rabbis explain the equal cut which was said here. Since others’ words said there are in court, also others’ words said here are in court33This paragraph refers to the disagreement between R. Meїr and the rabbis in Mishnah 1.
The formulation here presupposes that one knows what was explained elsewhere about interpretation of equal cuts [Yebamot11:1 Notes 30,34 (Sanhedrin9:1); Chapter 5:2]. R. Meїr holds that the laws to be transferred are what can be read off the corresponding verses; the rabbis transfer laws only in the context of the verses on both sides.
Verse 5:21 reads, to deny a deposit … and he swears to a lie; it is understood that this creates guilt whether or not it was before a court. But testimony is before a court; therefore v. 5:1 only speaks of guilt incurred in a court trial. R. Meїr holds that an oath formulated by another person following the situation of v. 1 transferred to v. 21 cannot create liability for a sacrifice outside of court, but an oath pronounced by himself (v. 21) always creates such a liability. The rabbis hold that while we accept that the equal cut shows that oaths formulated by himself are covered by v. 1, the context of that verse forces the conclusion that one refers to court proceedings only..
The formulation here presupposes that one knows what was explained elsewhere about interpretation of equal cuts [Yebamot11:1 Notes 30,34 (Sanhedrin9:1); Chapter 5:2]. R. Meїr holds that the laws to be transferred are what can be read off the corresponding verses; the rabbis transfer laws only in the context of the verses on both sides.
Verse 5:21 reads, to deny a deposit … and he swears to a lie; it is understood that this creates guilt whether or not it was before a court. But testimony is before a court; therefore v. 5:1 only speaks of guilt incurred in a court trial. R. Meїr holds that an oath formulated by another person following the situation of v. 1 transferred to v. 21 cannot create liability for a sacrifice outside of court, but an oath pronounced by himself (v. 21) always creates such a liability. The rabbis hold that while we accept that the equal cut shows that oaths formulated by himself are covered by v. 1, the context of that verse forces the conclusion that one refers to court proceedings only..