Talmud sobre Números 30:3

MISHNAH: The following vows are permitted¹Even though they sound like vows, they are not vows.: Profane I would eat with you²Since he vows to eat what is permitted, there is nothing to it.; like pork³As the Halakhah explains, a vow must refer to something which can be a sacrifice. Since swine cannot be sacrificial animals, if he says “what I would eat from you is like pork”, there is no vow and no legal consequence. If he would say, a qônām that what I would eat from you is like pork, he would be forbidden since he referred to the sacrifice., like idolatry, like carcasses⁴Forbidden food, Deut. 14:21., like meat from a torn animal⁵Forbidden food, Ex. 22:30., like abominations⁶Forbidden food, Lev. 11:29 ff., like crawling things⁷Forbidden food, anything not on the list of permitted animals. These are explicitly permitted to Gentiles, Gen. 9:3., like Aaron’s ḥallah and his heave⁸Heave and ḥallah, the heave from dough, are holy. Sacrifices can only be brought from sources that are profane before dedication. Therefore, heave and ḥallah cannot become sacrifices. As long as the person making the vow does not mention qorbān or any of its substitutes, there is no vow., are permitted. One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother⁹He says that sexual relations with his wife should be forbidden as they are with his mother. Since his mother cannot be a sacrifice, there is no vow but the rabbi is not permitted to tell him this but must find another reason (e. g., do you realize how much money a divorce would cost you?) to find a cause to annul the vow because people should be made uncomfortable vowing. If the vow is not dissolved within one week, the wife can ask the court to force a divorce; the husband being the guilty party (Mishnah Ketubot 5:6). (Cf. Qor‘an 58:2.), one finds for him an opening from another place that he should not be flippant about this. A qônām that I shall not sleep, that I shall not speak, that I shall not walk, or one who says to his wife, a qônām that I shall not sleep with you, he is under the obligation¹⁰Num. 30:3. As long as qorbān or one of its substitutes is not mentioned, sleeping, speaking, and walking are all immaterial and there really is no vow. But since there was intent to make a vow, the verse may be applied (at least by rabbinic standards). “he shall not profanate his word.” An oath that I shall not sleep, that I shall not speak, that I shall not walk, he is forbidden¹¹Since an oath does not depend on any material substrate (Chapter 1, Note 4)..

HALAKHAH: “All substitute names of vows are like vows,” etc. It is written¹²Num. 30:3. “Any person who vows,” why does the verse say “a vow”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows. “Or he swears,” why does the verse say “an oath”? From here that substitute names of oaths are like oaths. “But any ban,¹³Lev. 27:28.” why does the verse say “which he bans”? From here that substitute names of bans are like bans. “A vow of nazir¹⁴Num. 6:2.”, why does the verse say “to be a nazir”? From here that substitute names of nazir vows are like nazir vows. So far for Rebbi Aqiba who says that these are expressions of additions. ¹⁵Cf. Yebamot 8:1, Note 72, Babli Avodah zarah 27a (and another 18 times without attribution). The quotes are from speeches of Laban and Joseph in Gen. which have no legal implications. This proves that the repetitions are a matter of style. For Rebbi Ismael who said, these are double expressions in the normal style of the Torah, “going you went, desiring you desired, by stealing I was stolen”, from where? “¹²Num. 30:3. Any person who vows a vow to the Eternal or swears an oath to forbid a prohibition on himself shall not profane his word,” why does the verse say “he must fulfill anything coming out of his mouth”? From here that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths¹⁶The second half of the verse is clearly written for emphasis. It implies (a) that a vow is valid only if pronounced, not if only thought of and (b) that any speech which can be interpreted as a vow is a vow.
The Babli, 3a/b, quotes both the argument in the style of R. Aqiba and that of R. Ismael without mentioning any names.. And from where that substitute names of bans are like bans? “A vow, a vow”¹⁷This is an application of the second hermeneutical rule of gezerah šawah “equal cut”. If it was established in Num. 30:3 that “vow” means “anything that implies a vow” and in Lev. 27:2 any dedication to the Temple, including bans, is classified as “vow”, it follows that anything which implies a ban is a ban.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of vows are like vows and substitute names of oaths are like oaths, “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of bans are like bans. And from where that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir? “A vow, a vow”¹⁸Again this is an application of gezerah šawah, but this time the reference quote is Num. 6:2, cf. Note 14.. Since “a vow” at one place means that substitute names of oaths are like oaths¹⁹This reference is odd since the argument is about vows, not oaths. One has to assume that the scribe left out the relevant portion of the sentence which should be identical to the one used in the preceding case., “a vow” at the other place means that substitute names of being a nazir are like being a nazir.

HALAKHAH: “The following vows are permitted,” etc. “To the Eternal¹²Num. 30.3.”, nobody can forbid anything on himself unless it could be given to the Eternal¹³The comparison used in a vow must refer either to a sacrifice or to something that could be a sacrifice or a ḥerem. In the language of the Babli, 14a, “there is no vow unless it relates to something that can be vowed.” A lenghty paraphrase in Sifry Num. 153.. What is stated in the House of Rav disagrees: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says¹²Num. 30.3., ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.” They wanted to say, for example using “qorbān” or “oath”; but in all other respects it would be permitted. It comes to tell you, also all other respects¹⁴The opinion of R.Yose, Chapter 1, Notes 64 ff.. “To prohibit a prohibition on himself¹²Num. 30.3.”. There are Tannaїm who state: on himself, not on others. There are Tannaїm who state: even on others. They wanted to say that he who says on himself, not on others, to forbid others’ property¹⁵This sentence has been badly distorted by editors and commentators of recent editions of the Yerushalmi. The original scribe of the ms. wrote in both cases על אחדים. The corrector changed the first occurence into של אחרים. It seems that the correct version is על של אחרים “[to forbid his own property] to others.” It is clear that in both opinions, a person may forbid his own property (permanently) on another (in the Babli, 47a, compared to the power of a father to disinherit a son), but only according to the second opinion one may not forbid the property of others, over which he has no control, to himself. The second opinion has no parallel in either Talmud.
In Sifry Num. 153 one reads: “‘To prohibit a prohibition on himself’, he prohibits for himself but not for others.” This is opposed to both Talmudim., but he who says even on others, to forbid his own property for others, but not the property of others for himself.

HALAKHAH: “Four kinds of vows did the Sages dissolve,” etc. Do not the Sages permit all kinds of vows? It is written⁶Num. 30:2.: “Moses spoke to the heads of the tribes.” He referred the paragraph to the heads of the tribes that they should dissolve the people’s vows. Rav Jehudah in the name of Samuel⁷Num. 30:3. The same argument in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a, in response to Mishnah 1:8: Dissolutions of vows “hang in the air” (have no biblical basis). This is the only argument accepted in the Babli.: “He shall not profane his word.” He cannot profane his word; this implies that others can profane his words. Who is that? That is the Sage who dissolves the vow. Ḥananiah the nephew of Rebbi Joshua said⁸Ps. 119:106. Also in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a. In Nedarim 8a, the verse is interpreted to authorize vows to keep commandments of the Torah. In Sadducee theory (Damascus Document CD XVI 7–8), the consequence of such a vow is that the corresponding commandment cannot be broken even under extreme pain, which in pharisaic theory applies only to idolatry, incest and adultery, and murder., “I swore and I shall keep it.” Sometimes I keep it. Rebbi Joshua said⁹Ps. 95:11. Also in the Babli, Ḥagigah 10a., “What I swore in my rage:” In my rage I swore; I change my mind.

There¹²Mishnah ‘Arakhin 1:2., we have stated: “The Non-Jew, Rebbi Meїr says, is evaluated but does not evaluate¹³This refers to Lev. 27:1–8, where “evaluation” amounts are specified to be offered to the Sanctuary for persons of specified age and sex. According to R. Meïr, a Jew may vow to pay a Gentile’s evaluation but a Gentile cannot make such a vow. According to R. Jehudah, a Gentile may vow to pay a Jew’s valuation but a Jew cannot offer to pay the Gentile’s evaluation.; Rebbi Jehudah says, he evaluates but is not evaluated. Both agree that they make vows and are objects of vows¹⁴Both Jew and Gentile may make a vow to pay to the Sanctuary the amount another person would fetch were he to be sold on the slave market..” Rebbi Jeremiah asked: For him who says there that he evaluates, here can he declare a nazir? For him who says there that he is evaluated, here can he be declared a nazir¹⁵The texts used to introduce a vow of evaluation (Lev. 27:2) and a vow of nazir (Num. 6:2) are completely parallel. It is to be assumed that the rules derived from the texts are also parallel; if a Gentile can cause an obligation of payment of an evaluation, he also can cause an obligation of nazir; if a Gentile can be the object of an obligation of payment of an evaluation, he also can be the object of an obligation of nazir.? How would it be possible for him to [be declared a nazir]¹⁶The context requires to read ניזור for מזיר and vice-versa.? A Israelite can declare a Gentile to be a nazir¹⁷Tentative answer.. Would he listen to him¹⁸Rejection of the tentative answer.? But the Israelite said, “I am a nazir,” the Gentile heard it and said, “I am responsible for what this one said.” It is only as if he paid a debt¹⁹The Gentile may well vow to the Jew’s obligatory sacrifices since by biblical law, Gentiles’ sacrifices are accepted. But this does not make the Gentile a nazir.. How would it be possible for him to [declare a nazir]¹⁶The context requires to read ניזור for מזיר and vice-versa.? A Gentile can declare an Israelite to be nazir¹⁷Tentative answer.. Since an Israelite cannot declare [another] Israelite to be a nazir, a Gentile cannot declare an Israelite to be a nazir¹⁸Rejection of the tentative answer.. But it must be that the Gentile said, “I am a nazir”, the Israelite heard it and said, “I am taking upon me what this one said.²⁰Since the Gentile’s vow is invalid, so is the Jew’s.” What did you exclude from him²¹This now is R. Jeremiah’s real question. Since it was shown that the power to evaluate is not related to the power to vow for nazir, the question arises whether in general the power of Gentiles to make vows is equal to that of Jews or not.? An Israelite is subject to “not to desecrate”²²Num. 30:3; Sifry zuṭa 30:2. Since a Gentile is not subject to biblical laws other than those given to Adam and Noah, he cannot be held responsible if he “desecrates his word,” i. e., does not keep his vow., a Gentile is not subject to “not to desecrate”. Rebbi Jonah said, Israelites can be relieved by a Sage²³An Elder can annul the vow; cf. Tractate Nedarim, Introduction and Chapter 9., Gentiles cannot be relieved by a Sage²⁴Since Gentiles are not subject to the Law, they cannot profit from the Law. He will hold that Gentiles, whose informal marriages have biblical sanction, never can be divorced; cf. Qiddušin 1:2, Notes 33 ff.. Rebbi Yose said, Israelites need a Sage to be relieved, Gentiles do not need a Sage to be relieved²⁵Since Gentiles are not subject to the Law, they do not need the Law. He will hold that since Gentiles are not under the biblical obligation of formal marriage, they never need a divorce but can validly terminate a companionship through unilateral action by either one of the parties.. It follows that Rebbi (Jonah) [Yose] follows Rebbi Abbahu. A Gentile woman came before Rebbi Abbahu, who said to Abime bar Tobi: Go and find her an opening by unforeseen circumstances²⁶Which is forbidden to Jews, Mishnah Nedarim 9:2. He ordered the lady’s vow to be dissolved to give her peace of mind, not because it would have been necessary.. And Rebbi Jonah follows Rebbi Aḥa, who said that Laban was Kushan-Riš‘ataim. Why was he called “Kushan the doubly bad”? Because he committed two evils. One that he desecrated his oath, the other that he subjugated Israel for eight years²⁷Babli Sanhedrin 105b, as tannaïtic text. The story would make Laban live more than 300 years..

“One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother”. Your cohabitation is for me like cohabitation with my mother, like my mother’s flesh; he did not say anything¹⁶The translation and interpretation of these sentences are uncertain. Another approach to the text, based on a different reading of the meaning of the periods, would be: “One who says to his wife, you are for me like my mother, your cohabitation is for me like cohabitation with my mother. Like my mother’s flesh, he did not say anything.” In that case, the first example is an explanation of the Mishnah, the second is a separate statement which might not conflict with the Mishnah. This is the approach of the Babli, 14a. If the translation in the text is chosen, the requirement that a formal annulment of the vow is required, is restricted to the wording in the Mishnah, where it is not so clear even to the unlearned that the vow is null and void.. If he said, this loaf is for me like cohabitation with my mother, what¹⁷What are the rules?? Let us hear from the following: A qônām that I shall not sleep with you, Rav says, he is forbidden, Samuel says he is permitted. How does Samuel uphold “he shall not profanate his word”? As if he shall not profanate his word¹⁸The statement of the Mishnah is purely rabbinical; it cannot possibly have a biblical basis.. Rav sticks with his opinion¹⁹From the previous paragraph.: The Tannaїm in the House of Rav disagree: “From where that one may not make and dissolve vows which are dissolved for you from Heaven but people consider them as binding? The verse says¹²Num. 30.3., ‘he shall not profanate his word.’ He should not make his words profane.”

Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is as if he put a neck-iron¹⁹Cf. Berakhot 7:5, Note 116. on his neck, would you have made the vow? It is as if a gang of prisoners²⁰Reading with Jastrow and Krauss קֻסְטוֹדִייָה for קֻסְטוֹרִייָה, Latin custodia “watch, guard; gang of prisoners”. was passing by, he saw that there was one unused neck-iron and put his head into it! “To bind a prohibition onto himself²¹Num. 30:3.”, as you say²²Jer. 40:1., “he was bound with chains.” Rebbi Jonathan²³In the Babli, 22a, R. Nathan. provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who builds an idolatrous altar and one who continues in it is like one who sacrifices there, would you have made the vow? That is difficult to understand. Idolatry is a capital crime but vows are a simple prohibition; how can you say that? You have only what Rebbi Yannai said, one who listens to his urges is as if he worshipped idols. Rebbi Isaac provided an opening: If you had known that one who makes a vow is like one who takes a sword and sticks it in his heart, would you have made the vow? “Some talk bluntly like sword piercings.²⁴Prov. 12:18.” Rebbi Ḥanina from Sepphoris in the name of Rebbi Phineas: It does not say “piercing” but “sword piercings”. For example, one who made a vow not to eat a loaf. Woe if he eats, woe if he does not eat. If he eats he transgresses his vow. If he does not eat he sins against himself²⁵Since a person who mortifies himself is called a sinner, Sifry Num.30, Nazir 1:5 (51c, 1. 58).. What can he do? He goes to a Sage who will dissolve his vow, “but the speech of Sages is healing²⁴Prov. 12:18.. Rebbi Eudaimon in the name of Rebbi Isaac: Is it not enough what the Torah forbade you that you want to forbid other things for yourself? “To forbid a prohibition²¹Num. 30:3.”.

Rebbi Yose explained “to forbid”⁶⁴Num. 30:3, “to forbid a prohibition to himself”, which can be either a vow or an oath.: That should be forbidden to me⁶⁵Even though no oath formula was mentioned, this is an oath since it is person-related.; there should be a prohibition on it, it is forbidden⁶⁶Even though no vow was mentioned, this is a vow since it is object-related.. An oath is on me, it is forbidden, there should be an oath on it, it is forbidden⁶⁷The only problem is in the last statement, since an oath cannot be binding on a thing. R. Yose holds that an oath formula, used when a vow formula would have been appropriate, induces a vow since it cannot induce a valid oath. In the language of the Talmudim, the oath formula is a handle to introduce the vow.. Rebbi Yudan said, in vows it is forbidden, in oaths it is permitted⁶⁸He holds that an oath formula applied to a thing is ineffective; it is as if it had not been said. This paragraph is discussed at length in the Commentary of R. Nissim Gerondi on the Babli, 2b.. There is a prohibition on me, it is forbidden. There is a prohibition on it, it is forbidden. An oath is there on me, it is forbidden. There is an oath on (me) [it]⁶⁹It seems that it must be read עליו instead of עליin order to make sense. is permitted⁷⁰An oath directed to a thing is void and has no consequences..

“That is more restrictive for oaths than for vows. What is more restrictive for vows than for oaths?” “Or a person who swears to lightly express with his lips for bad or for good³³Lev. 5:4..” Just as doing good is a matter of choice, so doing bad is a matter of choice; that excludes any prohibition which is a commandment³⁴In the Babli, 16b/17a, this verse, dealing with the obligation of a sacrifice for an oath inadvertently not kept, only frees the maker of an oath to violate some commandment from the obligation to bring a sacrifice.. They wanted to say, inadvertently, but not intentionally. It was found stated: Rebbi Ismael says, “anything that comes out of his mouth he shall do,³⁵Num. 30:3. In the Babli, this verse frees him from the sin of not keeping his vow. In the Yerushalmi, it extends the rule to any oath, including an intentional one.” not what comes out of Heaven’s mouth. Should we say that this is the same for vows of sanctification? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: For a man may vow his sukkah to Heaven³⁶Mishnah Temurah 7:2: Anything whatsoever can be vowed to support the Temple..

From where a warning about an oath for a permitted purpose? Rebbi Yose ben Rebbi Abun said, he shall not profane his word⁹⁸Num. 30:3, the paragraph about profane vows. Babli 21a., he shall not make his words profane⁹⁹He translates biblical into rabbinic Hebrew..

MISHNAH: ‘That you provide me with usufruct until Passover if you would go to your father’s house until Tabernacles⁶⁸In the interpretation of the Babli, 15 a/b, the husband after Tabernacles makes a vow of qônām that his wife cannot have anything from him until Passover (in the spring) if she goes to her father’s house before Tabernacles (next fall). It is obvious that if the wife goes before Passover, she is forbidden until Passover (and she should not have any usufruct from her husband now since maybe she will go afterwards). But if she goes during the six months between Passover and Tabernacles, any usufruct she had before Passover would be retroactively forbidden; therefore, he would transgress the commandment not to profane vows (by formulating his vow in a way which invites violating it) and she could be punished for violating his vow.
While this interpretation seems to fit the language of the Mishnah (and is accepted as obvious by Maimonides in his Commentary), the Yerushalmi in the Halakhah rejects the idea that the wife could be guilty because of the husband’s vow and reads the Mishnah as given in the translation, that the husband forbids himself any usufruct from his wife. Therefore, he cannot have any usufruct now since she later might defy his instructions. There is no reason to think that the text of the Halakhah be corrupt..’ If she went before Passover, she is forbidden to deliver usufruct to him until Passover, after Passover “he should not profane his word⁶⁹Num. 30:3..”