Halakhah sur La Genèse 34:13

Jewish thought—and law—is based upon an entirely different set of premises. Man is bound by divinely imposed imperatives which oblige him to be concerned with the needs of his fellow. Some of these obligations are entirely personal. Others either could not possibly be discharged by any person acting independently or, if directed to individuals, would constitute an inordinate burden. Hence such obligations become the responsibility of society at large. According to Nachmanides,¹Commentary on the Bible, Gen. 34:13. the very first divinely commanded system of law, the Noachide Code, contains a single positive commandment, dinim, which translates into a general obligation to promulgate laws and to establish standards regulating the manifold areas of interpersonal intercourse. Jewish law recognizes not only the reciprocal dependency of members of the human race, but also that the human condition requires that the governing authority, acting as the representative of society as a whole, be endowed with the broad powers necessary for the promotion of social welfare.

The Ramban (commentary to Bereishit 34:13 and 49:5-6) strongly disagrees with the Rambam’s opinion. While he believes that Shimon and Levi were justified in killing Shechem and Chamor, he argues that the killing of the other males of Shechem was entirely unjustified. The Ramban presents two basic arguments for his position. Firstly, the residents of Shechem did nothing wrong to Yaakov’s family. The Ramban asserts that the residents of an area do not deserve death for failure to control the evil actions of their leader. He adds that even if the people did in fact deserve to die due to other violations of the Noahide laws, Shimon and Levi were not authorized to execute such punishment.

The obligations and powers of non-Jewish courts are markedly different. Gentiles are not bound by the 613 commandments revealed to Jews at Sinai but are obligated to obey the "Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah." The Noachide Code is primarily restrictive rather than prescriptive in nature and bans reprehensible activities such as murder, theft, sexual immorality, etc. The last in this series of commandments is known as "dinin." The specific nature of this precept is the subject of disagreement among early rabbinic authorities. Ramban, in his commentary on the Bible, Genesis 34:13, understands this commandment as a general obligation with regard to the establishment of laws and regulations essential to the maintenance of a social order, e.g., laws governing commerce and interpersonal behavior, laws banning theft and fraud, laws regulating payment of wages, bailment, etc.³Teshuvot Rema, no. 10 and Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, VI, no. 14, maintain that in these areas Jewish law in all its details is incorporated in the Noachide Code by virtue of the commandment concerning dinin; Ha‘amek She’elah, She’ilta 2:3, asserts that while non-Jews are commanded to establish a system of jurisprudence, the detailed regulations of such a system are left to their discretion. Even he-Azel, Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh 27:1 appears to accept the latter view. Rambam understands the substance of this commandment to be significantly different. Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 9:14, formulates this obligation as follows: