Pensée juive sur L’Exode 32:29

At the creation, we find no evidence that birthright was part of the rules guiding the affairs of man. Proof lies in the random order the names of Noach's sons are referred to on different occasions. This was changed when Abraham appeared on the stage of history. His descendants were to play a leading role due to their being descendants of Abraham. In effect G-d had said, "Until now I have bestowed blessings, henceforth I grant Abraham the authority to bestow and direct blessings" (Genesis 12,3). Abraham debated with himself if he were to bestow this power to bless on others. Since he was not certain that he might help weeds to sprout (promote the power of wicked people), if he took it upon himself to transfer this power to bless, he decided to leave well enough alone (Bereshit Rabbah 61). He waited for G-d to make His will known in the matter. G-d did bless his son Isaac (gave him the power to bestow blessings). Since Abraham had two first born sons, he would have had to bestow the blessing (power to bless) on both of them. He was afraid to err; on the other hand, the trait of "chessed," kindness, for which he was famed would not allow him to deprive Ishmael of a share in favor of Isaac. This in spite of the fact that he knew that his descendants would be known primarily through Isaac. Therefore, considering himself as the manager of the Almighty's orchard, he decided to leave this decision to the owner of the orchard. After Abraham's death, the owner chose Isaac, and thus we come to point two in our parable. When twins were born to Isaac, the older of whom exhibited signs of unfitness, problem three in our parable, this had to be dealt with. Isaac, true to his characteristic of pachad, din, i.e. justice, which our sages have credited him with, did not dare deviate from the principle of transferring power in accordance with birthright. When Jacob says some time later that "the One whom Isaac feared was on my side" (Genesis 31,42), this grants us an insight into the matter. An examination of all the instances in which a direct relationship or communication between G-d and Isaac is described reveals that the term used for "G-d" is invariably elokim, i.e. the attribute of justice. The only exception is the instance when G-d tells Abraham that Isaac is not to be slaughtered after all. This latter instance which taught Abraham that rachamim, mercy is one of G-d’s attributes, is the only time when this factor emerges as playing a role in the relationship between G-d and Isaac. It is understandable then that Isaac of all people would not deviate from the pattern of nobility of birth decreed from above. Isaac's own position as Abraham's heir was due to this very system. Add to this that Isaac personally had not observed any misconduct in Esau, and it becomes clear why he chose Esau to bestow the blessing on. Jacob himself had been very careful never to tell his father of the sale of the birthright, since he had kept hoping that he would secure his father's blessing by virtue of his superior moral conduct, plus the influence of his mother. He did not want to benefit by exposing his brother's unworthiness. This trait of Jacob was very laudable. Leviticus 25,36 tells us, "Your brother shall live alongside you." Our sages explain that this wording teaches that one's own life takes precedence over that of one's fellow man in a situation where only one of the two lives can be saved. If the object of one's quest for Divine help is personality growth rather than the acquisition of worldly goods, then competing for the attainment of that goal is permissible. Aristotle also states in his Ethics that self-love, when its objective is perfection of self, is virtuous. Our sages, when describing jealousy as a negative trait, do approve of jealousy when it involves envying scholars who know more (Baba Batra 25). The same idea is reflected in Bereshit Rabbah 71 in connection with Rachel's jealousy of her sister Leah (Genesis 30,1). She envied Leah her good deeds. This is why our sages can consider that kind of jealousy a positive quality. On the other hand, "good" character traits employed for a base purpose are viewed as a negative quality (compare Chapter 27 on Dinah). Our problem is to determine whether jealousy under the circumstances described is permitted even when the attainment of one's own purpose involves something detrimental to one's competitor. Consider the definition by our sages of the commandment "Love your fellow man like yourself." The Talmud Shabbat 31 explains this to mean " do not do to others that which is hateful to yourself." Aristotle defines it in a similar vein. In other words, we should want for our fellow man what we want for ourselves. We certainly do not need to want for our fellow man what he wants for himself. This is especially so, when our fellow man is wicked or a criminal. In Psalms 139,21, David expresses it in these words: "Must I not hate those who hate You O Lord, and quarrel with those who rise up against You?" Clearly the word "fellow man" referred to in the Torah means someone sharing the same objectives in life that we ourselves believe in. Since Jacob's motivations corresponded to the ones stipulated by our sages, the verse we quoted from Psalms may be applied to him. Having established this point, we return to item four in our parable. The problem is how to restore the position of leadership to those qualified for it. It does not suffice to deny G-d’s special blessings to the undeserving, rather action is needed to channel those blessings to those who deserve them. When Jacob blessed his grandsons prior to his death, he reversed his hands to ensure that Ephrayim would be the recipient of the greater blessing. Er, the firstborn son of Yehudah, is described as unfit, unworthy. Peretz and Zerach respectively, are not treated according to what the order of their birth would call for. Reuben, Jacob's firstborn, is not accorded the privileges his birthright calls for. David was not Yishai's firstborn, neither was Solomon the senior of the surviving sons of David when he was assured that he would be his father's successor. To prove that birthright as an automatic claim to the succession was not practiced at the time of the Exodus, see Numbers 3,3. G-d says, "The day I smote all the firstborn of Egypt, I established an exclusive claim on all the firstborn of Israel." Obviously, if succession by birthright had been the norm at that time, there would have been no need for G-d to underline that only from that day on would G-d claim the firstborn of Israel as especially beholden to Him. We see then that the practice of succession by birthright had been discontinued at some time, only to be re-introduced at the time of the Exodus. Later, after the episode of the golden calf, when this method of succession had again been found unreliable, the privileges of that group were transferred to the tribe of Levi which had proved its worthiness. This then is the fifth rule that we learned from our parable. Now we understand what the Midrash quoted at the beginning of our chapter had in mind. Since Jacob may well have been aware that the privileges of the firstborn would be abolished once the tabernacle was to be erected, why did he risk his life merely in order to hasten that event? The question is even more justified when we consider that Jacob derived no practical advantage from all his machinations. There is no mention of Jacob ever having offered sacrifices in his capacity as firstborn, and if he had done so, the fact would no doubt have come to the attention of his father. His father could not then have been surprised when he heard from Esau some forty-eight years later, that the latter had traded away his birthright. The Midrash wishes us to know that if Jacob's actions had been motivated by materialistic considerations, this would have been most dishonorable; since he was guided by the desire to secure for himself a higher spiritual level, however, such purpose was laudable. Jacob was aware that the heter bamot, permission to erect altars for G-d wherever one wanted, in order to draw down G-d’s blessing, could lead to grievous abuse if the excercise of the priestly functions was left in the hands of the unworthy. Such abuse would lead to G-d’s blessings being channelled to those who were undeserving, something that could not be pleasing in the eyes of G-d. Therefore, he hastened to restore the source of blessing to those who were fit for it for as long as the condition "wherever I allow My name to be mentioned, I will come and grant My blessing," existed (Exodus 20,24). He realized that at a later stage a central site for the residence of the shechinah, Divine Presence, would be established, and that then the function of priesthood would be performed only in that central place (tabernacle or temple) and only by priests who had to meet exacting criteria of physical and moral fitness.

Shemot Rabbah 42, answers the question from where Moses took the authority to kill Jews found worshipping the calf, by referring us to G-d’s own example on the occasion of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the Tower of Bable respectively. In either case, G-d had proceeded to mete out punishment after He had investigated the facts. Similarly, Moses, G-d’s trusted servant, was expected to carry out this task as G-d’s messenger. When the Levites had completed their task, Moses addressed the nation exhorting them to remain loyal to G-d, and thus turn away His wrath. He pointed to the example of their fellow Jews the Levites, who had demonstrated such loyalty by disregarding family ties when the law required that their closest relatives be executed. He explained that all that is needed to qualify for G-d’s blessing, is loyalty. (Exodus 32,29) On the morrow, after the three thousand had died, Moses said to the people that they too had sinned gravely by having demanded proof of G-d’s existence and power. Also, they should have prevented the three thousand from dancing around the calf. Therefore, it was now necessary for Moses to ascend the mountain and plead for forgiveness. Moses uses both understatement and exaggeration in his plea, in order to present a credible defense. By describing the sin as the construction of a golden deity, he exaggerated its importance. By pointing out that it had been removed, and that the guilty had been punished, and that none of those witnessing the punishment had protested the death of the guilty, he prayed that surely the time had come to forgive the remainder of the nation for this episode. G-d’s reply "whosoever has sinned against Me, I will wipe out from My book," is not a direct response to Moses’s request. Moses had spoken about the book "You have written," meaning the Torah, whereas G-d referred to the book of life, a book which G-d retains for His own exclusive use. The people were to be punished by acts of G-d only, since no human witnesses were at hand to testify to their culpable participation in the construction of the golden calf. However, G-d reserved the right to exact such punishment whenever an occasion would arise in the future to punish them for other misdeeds. For the present therefore, G-d says to Moses "lead this people to the place I have said to you." We read in verse 35, "G-d smote the people because they had made the calf that Aaron had made." The repetition of the words "they had made...Aaron had made," indicates that the intentions of the people and the intentions of Aaron had been quite different from one another. Aaron's part in it had been merely incidental, the real culprit having been the people. Nonetheless, Aaron reproaches himself after two of his sons have died, saying "all these things have happened to me," when in fact we had not read of anything else happening to him. 11) Since the progress of the Jewish people from now on was to be under the guidance of an angel, (Exodus 33, 1-3) the people thought that the Divine Presence would no longer be among them. They mourned this news by failing to wear their jewelry. Since they had not actually removed their jewelry from themselves, there was reason for Moses to command them to "remove" it. Apparently, some of the people had put on their jewelry. Why did some people wear their jewelry, whereas others did not? If we follow the tradition that the "jewelry" were the phylacteries of the head, the latter could be viewed as a protective device while worn. When in mourning, wearing such phylacteries is forbidden. The Jews who did not wear their phylacteries considered themselves in mourning, having heard G-d’s decree. Others considered themselves in the category of "outcasts," and as such Jewish halachah requires the continued wearing of phylacteries. The difference between the two groups stemmed from which part of G-d’s stricture they considered as paramount. (33,5) If they considered the reference to them as "a stiffnecked people" as paramount, they would be in mourning. If they considered the words "I will not go up with you" as paramount, they would view themselves as outcasts. When G-d used the words "children of Israel," a term of endearment at one and the same time, this was proof to those who continued to wear their phylacteries that it was the danger to their souls that was the greater source of worry. G-d having rescinded His descision to abandon the Jewish people, they were told not to grieve more than their brethren who had mourned their physical fate and had therefore divested themselves of their phylacteries. The commandment to the last group to remove their phylactries also, is a commandment to downgrade the state of their despair to a level in which they only mourned the physical consequences arising out of the episode of the golden calf. When Moses realised that the people were in a state of banishment, he had to remove his tent from their midst, or he would have forfeited further communication from the shechinah, since the latter would not communicate with him as long as he was amidst the banished.