Pensée juive sur L’Exode 34:7

נֹצֵ֥ר חֶ֙סֶד֙ לָאֲלָפִ֔ים נֹשֵׂ֥א עָוֺ֛ן וָפֶ֖שַׁע וְחַטָּאָ֑ה וְנַקֵּה֙ לֹ֣א יְנַקֶּ֔ה פֹּקֵ֣ד ׀ עֲוֺ֣ן אָב֗וֹת עַל־בָּנִים֙ וְעַל־בְּנֵ֣י בָנִ֔ים עַל־שִׁלֵּשִׁ֖ים וְעַל־רִבֵּעִֽים׃

il conserve sa faveur à la millième génération; il supporte le crime, la rébellion, la faute, mais il ne les absout point: il poursuit le méfait des pères sur les enfants, sur les petits-enfants, jusqu’à la troisième et à la quatrième descendance."

Akeidat Yitzchak

Rabbi Assi, in the same Midrash, describes it somewhat differently. Seeing that Abraham's question referred only to the chances of future generations, G-d’s answer matched the question. Rabbi Assi describes Abraham as taking a hammer and beating down on the carcasses, which, however, withstood his hammering. Thereupon Abraham used the power of repentance to chase away the vultures. The parable is that there are two ways of insuring character growth; either suffering, which is character refining, or repentance. Since suffering is limited in time, and after too long a period may become counterproductive through the victim having died before his character had been sufficiently refined, the power of someone else's merit may have to be employed by G-d to revive such a victim. G-d explained to Abraham that after four generations of suffering, designed to steel his descendants against moral decay, salvation would have to occur. The darkness Abraham saw in his vision, was the suffering of his descendants which would ensure that they would eventually inherit the land G-d had promised (after four generations). Abraham himself, would not have to undergo suffering, of course, as part of this process of readying Israel for nationhood. Abraham accepted G-d’s explanation that the power of sacrifices would be of a redeeming quality should his descendants suffer moral lapses. He was concerned, however, over what would take the place of these sacrifices during periods when, owing to the absence of a temple, such sacrifices could not be offered. Regarding this eventuality, he was shown that the experience of exile coupled with suffering would constitute the way his descendants' sins could be expiated. The concept of "who remembers the sins of the fathers to the children" revealed to Moses at a later stage (Exodus 34,7) is already embodied in the statement about the fourth generation of Jews having to wait for the fourth generation of depraved Emorites having exhausted their claim to continued existence in the land of Canaan. The covenant concluded at that time has still not been fulfilled in its entirety. Therefore, we still live on the strength of it, awaiting the total fulfilment, i.e. inheritance of the lands of all the ten tribes mentioned in the promise. "The great river" is, after all, identical with the river emanating from Eden, whose waters irrigated the entire globe. Isaiah 58,11-12 envisages Israel as the well-irrigated garden which provides sustenance for the whole of mankind, in due course. Abraham's fears about the future are thus laid to rest, as mentioned in the Midrash we quoted at the outset. Abraham, who had feared that among the soldiers he had slain in liberating Lot there could have been good persons, was thanked by G-d instead for having done the Lord's work for Him. He had removed unwanted thorns and thistles. Success in such an enterprise does not constitute reward in itself, on the contrary, it merely qualifies Abraham for even greater rewards in the future.

Akeidat Yitzchak

From all this it seems clear, that if the red heifer contaminates all that it comes in contact with, surely the heifer itself must be the source of the contamination! The whole matter seems to defy our normal way of reasoning. Therefore, the use of the words "this is the statute of the Torah", at the beginning of this paragraph is to remind us that logic cannot be employed if we want to comprehend the meaning of this commandment. This is why our sages quote the wisest of men, Solomon, as admitting that comprehension of this mitzvah, or rather its mechanics, its halachic rulings, escapes him. People who try to philosophise about Torah, fall into two categories. Group one believes that everything written in the Torah needs to be understood at face value, literally. For instance, if the Torah refers to G'd "smelling the sweet fragrance of a sacrifice," they perceive G'd literally employing His sense of smell. Or, if the Torah reports G'd as descending on Mount Sinai, they understand this to have been a physical descent. The second group is aware that statements in the Torah are subject to interpretation. Some members of this group will interpret on the basis that the Torah employs human idiom in order to facilitate our understanding of certain concepts. This group will not interpret in a manner that conflicts with known Torah principles. A sub group of category number two, arrogates to itself the right to make its interpretations primary and Torah principles only secondary. This is done by most Christian and a few Jewish philosophers. Making one's own intellect supreme in the matter of exegesis is heretical, of course. Solomon refers to all three groups in Proverbs 14, 14-16. (1) The fool will believe anything. (2) The crafty one will understand in line with his principles. (3) The haughty fool will come to grief through exaggerated self confidence. The manner in which the Torah portrays the laws of the red heifer is a clear hint not to try and unravel that which is conceptually beyond the human intellect. The contradictions have been built into this legislation to warn us off trying to comprehend it.

Akeidat Yitzchak

Shemot Rabbah 7 states that G-d revealed the course of events to Moses so that the latter would not be dumbfounded by the apparently counterproductive results of his mission to Pharaoh. Even so, Moses was appalled, asking G-d: "Why have You caused things to get worse since I have come to Pharaoh?" This is what Solomon meant in Kohelet 7,7, "Oppression causes the wise to become foolish." Even a Moses can become confused in his faith when confronted by excessive oppression and apparent injustice. At any rate, G-d ascribes Pharaoh's obstinacy to Pharaoh himself, not to Divine interference. Maimonides's reason for Sichon King of the Emorites having been denied the exercise of free will when he denied the Israelites passage through his country seems inadequate. Why was his sin worse than that of the kings of Edom and Moab who did not have their freedom of choice interfered with according to Maimonides (compare Deuteronomy 2,30)? Most difficult however, is the thought frequently expressed in scriptures that the gates of repentance are never closed (Jeremiah 3, Psalms 25, to quote but a few).