Pensée juive sur Rois 1 22:19

As discussed in chapter ten, man's cognitive powers are twofold. Perception is possible by means of one's intellect, or by means of one's senses. Perception by intellect is divided into two categories. A) Things or beings that cannot be other than they are. B) Things or beings which are subject to change. We will call the perception of the first type the ability to "know," whereas we will call the perception of the second type, the ability to "calculate." There is a constant relationship between him who endeavours to know, and between the object that is being defined. If the object of one's perception undergoes a fundamental change, the faculty enabling us to perceive such object also undergoes some transformation. We observe a parallel phenomenon concerning perception with our senses. The sense of sight, vision, is affected by the object being perceived. Yet that same sense of sight remains completely unaffected by objects that are perceived merely by the sense of touch, for instance. Should an object that had been perceived as incapable of undergoing change be found to have changed nonetheless, the powers of perception applied to it will no longer be speculative reason, but practical reason. To determine the common denominator between man and bird for instance, we employ "wit," speculative reason. It tells us that both species are living entities, react to stimuli, breathe and move. To determine the difference between man and bird, we employ "sagacity," practical reason. The latter tells us of the ability of the birds to fly, their having wings etc. On the other hand, it tells us that man has the power of speech, the ability to express thoughts coherently etc. At any rate, we employ two branches of what may also be described as "soul power," when we engage in these perceptions. The reason "sagacity" is also known as "practical reason" is, that without it, almost no voluntary activity is possible. Being able to understand and analyse phenomena does not by itself lead to action. Therefore, the practical “reason” is an essential part of the cognitive process. Since speculative reason concerns itself with phenomena that are abstract, or at any rate immutable, everlasting, it too is constant. Practical reason, since it concerns itself with transient phenomena, is itself transient in nature. When departing this life and becoming a purely spiritual being, we will no longer possess this practical reason, since in the world of abstract beings there is nothing it could be applied to. This is in line with the statement in the Talmud that "the departed is aware of his own pain, but not of the pain of others." (Rosh Hashanah 18) Since all bodies die, he is aware of his own demise, since apart from this fact, each person's fate varies, he is unaware of other facts which would require practical reason in order to be appreciated. The term "life" is a constant, even though each individual living creature is bound to die at some point or other. Since the prophet perceives beings that cannot be perceived by other human beings with his soul, it follows that his soul's faculties are somewhat different from other people's faculties in this respect. According to Aristotele, the relationship between pure speculative reason and pure practical reason is similar to the relationship between Divine intellect and human intellect respectively. When G'd, at the time of creation, said that man was to be made in His image, He meant man in his ideal state. Picture for yourself the spiritual state of the people of Israel at the time they received the ten commandments at Mount Sinai. Our opening Midrash discusses a similar state of affairs. Since all the forces active in the universe are represented in man in some form, and he is therefore sometimes referred to as a microcosm, he had dominion over all the other creatures on earth, just as G'd had dominion over all things and spirits in the entire universe. Therefore, prophets, on occasion use the term "Adam" when referring to G'd, to describe Him in His capacity as the Omnipotent. See Daniel, 8,16, "I heard the voice of "Adam," or Ezekiel 1,2, "and on the likeness of the throne, a likeness such as "Adam " above." These terms are used only in order to facilitate understanding by human ears of all the anthropomorphical terms used for that purpose. Since it is permissible to employ the term "Adam" in this fashion, it is not surprising to find references to "perfect man" as "Adam" also. Chochmat adam ta-ir panav, "the wisdom of perfect man lights up his face." (Kohelet 8,1) It is this that is meant by Rabbi Yudan, when he stated that the descriptive powers of the prophets are very great indeed, since they can employ the form to describe its original Creator. When one considers that Moses gave of his spirit to the newly appointed elders, then one can understand the relationship between them and Moses as parallel to the relationship between G'd and His most superior creatures, i.e. the angels. According to Rabbi Akiva in Avot 3, 14, man is beloved since he was created in The image. The meaning is that since this image had been bestowed on him at the very beginning of the creative process, i.e. nivra, he has the potential to emulate Divine powers. However, not one in ten million reaches this lofty goal. Rabbi Akiva continues to single out the Jewish nation, which due to the gift of Torah, can hope to achieve the human ideal more easily than any other nation. The Jewish people are called banim, children, to show that they possess more of the traits of the "father," i.e. their Creator. Maimonides in the first section of his "Moreh," chapter 45, is at pains to explain that Ezekiel's visions describe his own image of G'ds throne, which image, though Divinely inspired, is not to be confused with the objectively true state of affairs. The greatness of Ezekiel lies in his describing the function of this image as being equivalent to the function of G'd Himself. Moses, being extremely humble, had his stature attested to by G'd Himself, who explains to Aaron and Miriam that his status is incomparably higher than theirs. When our sages say of Moses, that his face was like the sun, they mean that though the sun is only one of the planets, its stature is such that it is always mentioned separately, never lumped together with the other planets. Similarly, the prophetic powers of Moses cannot be lumped together with that of other prophets, as it is far too superior.

Judgement in the supernal court: And behold He, may His name be blessed, appears in all of these synods, and influences them and guides them to the content of the matter in truth - such that the true judgment come out. And in some of these synods, the Holy One, blessed be He, is there at the head - like the matter that is stated (I Kings 22:19), "I saw the Lord seated upon His throne, with all the host of Heaven standing in attendance to the right and to the left of Him." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Yerushalmi Sanhedrin 1:1), "These are going to the right for merit and those are going to the left for guilt." And Daniel said, (Daniel 7:9-10) "While thrones were set in place, and the Ancient of Days took His seat... the court sat and the books were opened."

73. The Rabbi: Let us rather assume two other possibilities. Either they employ secret methods of interpretation which we are unable to discern, and which were handed down to them, together with the method of the 'Thirteen Rules of Interpretation,' or they use Biblical verses as a kind of fulcrum of interpretation in a method called Asmakhtā, and make them a sort of hall mark of tradition. An instance is given in the following verse: 'And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat' (Genesis 2:16 sq.). It forms the basis of the 'seven Noahide laws' in the following manner: ['He] commanded' refers to jurisdiction. 'The Lord' refers to prohibition of blasphemy. 'God' refers to prohibition of idolatry. 'The man' refers to prohibition of murder. 'Saying' refers to prohibition of incest. 'Of every tree of the garden,' prohibition of rape. 'Thou mayest surely eat,' a prohibition of flesh from the living animal. There is a wide difference between these injunctions and the verse. The people, however, accepted these seven laws as tradition, connecting them with the verse as aid to memory. It is also possible that they applied both methods of interpreting verses, or others which are now lost to us. Considering the well-known wisdom, piety, zeal, and number of the Sages which excludes a common plan, it is our duty to follow them. If we feel any doubt, it is not due to their words, but to our own intelligence. This also applies to the Tōrāh and its contents. We must ascribe the defective understanding of it to ourselves. As to the Agādās, many serve as basis and introduction for explanations and inunctions. For instance: the saying, 'When the Lord descended to Egypt,' etc. is designed to confirm the belief that the delivery from Egypt was a deliberate act of God, and not an accident, nor achieved with the assistance of human plotting, spirits, stars, and angels, jinn, or any other fanciful creation of the mind. It was done by God's providence alone. Statements of this kind are introduced by the word kibejākhōl, which means: If this could be so and so, it would be so and so. Although this is not to be found in the Talmud, but only in a few other works, it is to be so understood wherever it is found. This is also the meaning of the words of Micaiah, when he said to Ahab: I saw the Lord sitting on his throne . . . host of heaven. And the Lord said, who shall persuade Ahab. . . . And there came forth a spirit,' etc. (I Kings 22:19 sqq.) As a matter of fact all that he intended conveying was: Behold, the Lord has put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these prophets. Verses of this kind serve as a fulcrum and induction, rendering a subject eloquent, apposite, and showing that it is based on truth. To the same category belong tales of visions of spirits, a matter which is not strange in such pious men. Some of the visions they saw were the consequence of their lofty thoughts and pure minds, others were really apparent, as was the case with those seen by the prophets. Such is the nature of the Bāth Qōl, often heard during the time of the second Temple, and regarded as ranking next to prophecy and the Divine voice. Do not consider strange what R. Ishmael said: 'I heard a voice cooing like a dove, etc.' For the histories of Moses and Elijah prove that such a thing is possible, and when a true account is given, it must be accepted as such. In a similar sense we must take the words: 'Woe unto me that I have destroyed my house' (Genesis 6:6), which is of the same character as: 'And it repented the Lord, . . . and it grieved Him at His heart.' Other Rabbinic sayings are parables employed to express mysterious teachings which were not to be made public. For they are of no use to the masses, and were only handed over to a few select persons for research and investigation, if a proper person suitable--one in an age, or in several--could be found. Other sayings appear senseless on the face of them, but that they have their meaning, becomes apparent after but a little reflection. The following is an instance: Seven things were created prior to the world: Paradise, the Tōrāh, the just, Israel, the throne of glory, Jerusalem, and the Messiah, the son of David.' This is similar to the saying of some philosophers: 'The primary thought includes the final deed.' It was the object of divine wisdom in the creation of the world to create the Tōrāh, which was the essence of wisdom, and whose bearers are the just, among whom stands the throne of glory and the truly righteous, who are the most select, viz. Israel, and the proper place for them was Jerusalem, and only the best of men, viz. the Messiah, son of David, could be associated with them, and they all entered Paradise. Figuratively speaking, one must assume that they were created prior to the world. Seemingly against common sense is also the saying: Ten things were created in the twilight, viz. the opening of the earth, the opening of the spring, the mouth of the she ass, etc., as otherwise the Tōrāh were out of harmony with nature. Nature claims to pursue its regular course, whilst the Tōrāh claims to alter this regular course. The solution is that ordinary natural phenomena are altered within natural limits, since they had been primarily fixed by the divine will, and clearly laid down from the six days of creation. I will not deny, O King of the Khazars, that there are matters in the Talmud of which I am unable to give thee a satisfactory explanation, nor even bring them in connexion with the whole. These things stand in the Talmud through the conscientiousness of the disciples, who followed the principle that 'even the commonplace talk of the Sages requires study.' They took care to reproduce only that which they had heard from their teachers, striving at the same time to understand everything they had heard from their masters. In this they went so far as to render it in the same words, although they may not have grasped its meaning. In this case they said: 'Thus have we been taught and have heard.' Occasionally the teacher concealed from his pupils the reasons which prompted him to make certain statements. But the matter came down to us in this form, and we think little of it, because we do not know its purport. For the whole of this relates to topics which do not touch on lawful or unlawful matters. Let us not therefore trouble about it, and the book will lose nothing if we consider the points discussed here.