Commentaire de citation sur Le Lévitique 27:2

דַּבֵּ֞ר אֶל־בְּנֵ֤י יִשְׂרָאֵל֙ וְאָמַרְתָּ֣ אֲלֵהֶ֔ם אִ֕ישׁ כִּ֥י יַפְלִ֖א נֶ֑דֶר בְּעֶרְכְּךָ֥ נְפָשֹׁ֖ת לַֽיהוָֽה׃

"Parle aux enfants d’Israël et dis-leur: Si quelqu’un promet expressément, par un vœu, la valeur estimative d’une personne à l’Éternel,

English Explanation of Mishnah Arakhin

Rabbi Judah says: he can evaluate but cannot be evaluated. Rabbi Judah holds the opposite. A non-Jew can evaluate himself or others, but he cannot be evaluated. It seems that these two rabbis debate the applicability of Leviticus 27:2, “Speak to the Israelite people and say to them….” The verse can be read as saying that the laws in the chapter refer only to Jews. However, which aspect of the chapter is not clear evaluating others or being evaluated? That is what they debate.

German Commentary

so muss er den vollen Erech zahlen. es wird das in dem Ausdruck בערכך נפשות (Lev. 27, 2) angedeutet gefunden: den Erech von etwas, wovon נפש das Leben abhängt.

Rabbeinu Bahya

This also explains the choice of the word איש with which the Torah describes the person initiating the vow, whereas in Leviticus such a person is describes as נפש “a person,“ i.e. it is immaterial if he is a grown up or a minor. When, in our situation, the person who made the vow is a male 12 years and over or a female 11 years and over they were examined as to whether they understand what is implied by their making such a vow. If they are shown to be mentally mature, their vows are valid, if not, their vows are not valid. If either of them has reached biological maturity, usually 13 years of age in the case of a boy and 12 years of age in the case of a girl, their vows are valid without mental examination. The same applies if such biological minors made over property to the Temple treasury (Maimonides Hilchot Nedarim 11,1). If they can be seen to know the full impact of what they are doing they need only be 12 or 11 years old respectively to be legally liable for their words. This ruling is known as Halachah leMoshe miSinai, i.e. as Sinaitic in origin, not spelled out in detail in the written Torah, and the logic for this distinction not having being revealed to us.
In the Talmud Temurah 2, the basis for this ruling is attributed to Leviticus 27,2 where the Torah writes איש כי יפליא נדר, וג'. The apparently superfluous and unusual word יפליא is regarded as the basis for a biological minor being held liable for vows he pronounced under the circumstances discussed earlier.
Seeing that, as we explained, the vow is applicable equally to matters which are permissible and matters which are mandatory, when a person vowed not to eat on the Sabbath (by declaring the food as out of bounds to him on that day) he will have to fast as penance for having violated the commandment to “enjoy” the Sabbath, i.e. by means of eating more frequently and better quality food on it than on weekdays. The same does not apply when the same person used the formula of an oath to deny himself food on the Sabbath, as, seeing such an oath would be legally invalid, keeping it has no consequences regarding atoning for his conduct by fasting afterwards as a sign of penance. If someone vowed that food is out of bounds to him on a weekday he does not have to fast as penance if he observed his vow as there is no commandment to eat on those days. If he vowed that food is out of bounds for him on Chanukah or New Moon, days which have the status of a holiday by rabbinical decree only, he needs to fast for having violated the proper observance of such a day, seeing that his vow was valid and as a result he violated a rabbinical decree. Some halachic authorities hold that in the examples quoted last the person who made the vow may defer observing it until after the New Moon, (assuming he had specified a certain day of the week for his vow, being unaware at that time that that day would coincide with New Moon). There are opinions that the status of New Moon as a quasi holiday is Biblical rather than rabbinical and therefore the same rule applies as if he had vowed that food is out of bounds for him on the Sabbath. Regarding the validity of vows when they conflict with Sabbath legislation, for instance, some authorities hold that this is restricted only to vows whose fulfillment involves passivity, such as abstaining from food on the Sabbath, not when fulfillment involves an activity which violates the Sabbath (Radbaz 5 on Maimonides Nedarim 3,9).
This is reflected in Taanit 12 that if a person vows to fast (place food outside his domain) every Monday and Thursday of the year and it happens that on one or more of these days there occurs a festival listed in the Megillat Taanit as such, if he made the vow before the Rabbis instituted this festival his vow overrides it. If the Rabbis had decreed such a festival prior to his having made his private vow, the rabbinical decree overrides, i.e. automatically invalidates the vow of the private individual. Although this ruling appears to contradict what we said previously regarding Biblical laws which certainly preceded any vow made by an individual, the reason for the ruling in Taanit is that the sages saw the need to reinforce their decrees and to lend it weight precisely because people might say that such laws are “only” rabbinical and carry less authority. (Maimonides concurs in Hilchot Nedarim 3,9).