Commentaire de citation sur Les Nombres 35:15

ולכל חיתם, "and for all their livestock." The plain meaning of the verse is that these מגרשים, "open spaces" are to serve the various needs of the Levites. The Talmud in Makkot 12 derives from the word חיתם, that these spaces are to serve only the needs of the living, they are not to be used as burial plots, with the exception of burying an involuntary murderer who had used this city as his city of refuge. This is based on the word תהיינה in verse 15 of our chapter from which the Talmud derives "there shall be their burial." According to the exegetical approach of our sages in the Talmud the words ולכל חיתם are difficult. Seeing that these words are only intended to forbid burial of the regular residents of these cities in their מגרשיהם, all the Torah should have written was the word לחיתם leaving out the word ולכל which implies all kinds of other usages. The addition of the letter ו at the beginning of the word ולכל makes this even more difficult to understand as we are clearly dealing with a רבוי, an expression intended to include additional meanings. Perhaps we can best explain this by saying that the רבוי implied in the word ולכל was meant to counteract the מיעוט, the restrictive nature of the word חיתם. The meter of the verse then is as follows: ולכל, "the use of the מגרש is permitted for every kind of use for the living, i.e. only burial of the dead is excluded." Had the Torah only written לחיתם, I would have concluded that anything which is not directly required for life is prohibited, i.e. a host of activities other than burial.

ואשר לא צדה והאלוקים אנה לידו, If a man did not lie in wait but G'd caused it to happen to him, etc. Why did the Torah say the same thing in different words, i.e. "he did not plan it," and: "G'd caused it to happen?" Besides, why would G'd deliberately cause a person to become an involuntary murderer? Makkot 10 as well as the Mechilta dealing with the laws of the city of refuge and who has to go there, explain that the Torah speaks about wicked people who will become the instrument of performing evil deeds (compare Samuel I 24,14). They illustrate their meaning by the following example. Two people, one an intentional murderer, the other an unintentional killer, meet. There had not been any witnesses to either killing. The unintentional killer was in the process of descending from a ladder; he fell and hit the murderer who sat under the ladder with fatal consequences. The person descending the ladder has to go to a city of refuge. (If the same accident occurred while the unintentional killer was ascending the ladder, he would not have to go to the city of refuge). The intentional sinner was killed by the unintentional sinner. Thus far the Mechilta. This does not seem very satisfactory. True, the intentional murderer winds up getting his just deserts, the unintentional killer, however, has by now committed two killings and has to atone for only one killing while he is in the city of refuge. If we were to argue that he is altogether innocent concerning the instance when G'd made him fall off the ladder, then we must assume that the falling off the ladder was not an act of G'd and as a result the death of the person under the ladder was not the punishment due him as he was not guilty. Had he really been guilty then the fall off the ladder would have to be considered under the heading of "a deliberate act of G'd." This seems a very forced explanation as the Torah describes the example of an unintentional killing as unrelated to Divine interference (Numbers 35,15). The Torah did not distinguish between different categories of such unintentional killings as did the Mechilta.

בשבט WITH A ROD — Scripture speaks of a rod that is capable of inflicting death. Or perhaps it speaks even of one that is not capable of inflicting death (but some-how or other the servant died beneath his hand)? Scripture however states, (Numbers 35:17) in reference to an Israellite (cf. Numbers 35:15) “And if he smote him with a stone in the hand, wherewith he may die, [and he die, he is a murderer]”. Now is not the following statement a logical conclusion à fortiori? How is it if one has killed an Israelite whose case is more stringent (inasmuch as the leniency mentioned in v. 21 is not applied to it)? He is not subject to the death penalty unless he smote him with an instrument capable of inflicting death and unless it be a limb through the striking of which by such an instrument he is likely to die! Then in the case of a servant where (as can be seen from v. 21) the conditions are less stringent, does it not follow all the more that he is not subject to the death penalty? (cf. Mekhilta).