פירוש על שמות 22:34

אם במחתרת means when he was breaking in into the house (i. e. in the very act of forcing an entry, but at no other moment).

אם במחתרת, as well as at night, prepared to either kill or be killed in the pursuit of his quest. This is why there is no demand to account for his blood which has been shed. אין לו דמים, the killer does not even have to make financial restitution to the slain thief’s next of kin.

אם במחתרת ימצא הגנב, “If the thief is found while in hiding.” The word מחתרת suggests that he was tunneling his way into the house in the dark of night.
אין לו דמים, “there is no blood-guilt on his account.” If the owner killed the thief believing his life to be in danger he is not accused of manslaughter. The Torah presumes that if someone breaks into a house at night he is also prepared to kill if discovered by the owner who would defend his property.

He was actually in the act of breaking in. This is as opposed to explaining: the thief was found in the place of breaking in. [That cannot be the meaning,] because “breaking in” is not a place, about which we could say that the thief was “found” there. Therefore, Rashi explains that he was found “in the act” of breaking in.

אם במחתרת ימצא הגנב, the expression במחתרת reflects the activity of the thief, i.e. that he makes a practice of digging or undermining houses in the dark of night. והוכה ומת אין לו דמים, the person who killed him is not guilty of murder. The fact that the thief operated at night is prima facie evidence that he posed a death threat to his potential victim.

(Exodus 22:1) "If the thief be found breaking in": This speaks of a doubt (in the owner's mind) as to whether he is breaking in to steal or to kill. You say this, but perhaps the doubt is as to whether he is breaking in to steal or not to steal. Would you say that? If he (broke in) to steal of a certainty and he killed him, he would be liable (for murder), how much more so if there is a doubt as to whether he came to steal! We must thus perforce accept not the second supposition, but the first. From here it follows that a doubt (i.e., a possibility) of saving a life overrides the Sabbath. For if (the sin of) killing, (in this instance, the thief,) (— killing,) which defiles the land and causes the Shechinah to depart (from Israel) — is overridden by the possibility (of saving one's life, how much more so does it follow that the possibility of saving life overrides the Sabbath.)

Kap. 22. V. 1 u. 2. מחתרת, Einbruch, von חתר, dem spezifischen Ausdruck für Eindringen in geschlossene Räume durch Einbruch, חתר בחשך בתים (Job 24, 16 u. f.) ist der gerade Gegensatz zu dem vorhergehenden Ochsen- und Schafdiebstahl. Diese waren völlig frei, der öffentlichen Rechtsachtung anvertraut, aus deren Höhnung die erhöhte Pön resultiert. מחתרת setzt den Verschluss des Eigentums zunächst für eine solche Zeit voraus, für welche das Auge der öffentlichen Rechtsvertretung nicht hinreicht, und daher ein Zustand der Selbsthilfe gegeben ist, der, wenn das Recht nicht in der Gesellschaft Schutz und Vertretung fände, überhaupt der allgemeine wäre. Es ist dies die Zeit der Nacht. Daher an der zitierten Stelle Job das Problem zur Lösung gibt, warum die Weltordnung durch das völlige Dunkel der Nacht selbst Verbrechen begünstige. Ein bisschen Morgenröte würde die meisten Verbrecher verscheuchen. Da heißt es denn auch vom Diebe: חתר בחשך בתים יומס חתמו למו לא ידעו אור, "im Finstern bricht er in Häuser ein, Tags tragen sie ihnen ein heiliges Siegel, Licht ist nicht ihr Freund". Daher heißt es (Sanhedrin 72 a) הבא במחתרת נידון על שם סופו, "dem nächtlich einbrechenden Diebe wird nach seinem Endvorsatz begegnet". Er weiß, dass der auf Selbsthilfe angewiesene Besitzer nötigenfalls mit tödlichen Waffen sein Eigentum verteidigt, bei ihm selbst ist also im Einbruch der Vorsatz eines eventuellen Mordes vorauszusetzen, dem der Besitzer durch eventuelle Tötung des Diebes aus dem Grundsatz der Selbstverteidigung zuvorkommen darf: אם בא להרגך השכם להרגו.

אם במחתרת ימצא הגנב, “if the thief is discovered while tunneling, underground, etc.;” the scenario described here where the owner of the house being burgled kills the intruder, and the Torah exonerates him, applies only when the thief had made an effort to remain undiscovered. If he broke in the front door and the owner harms or kills him, he is liable for damages or even murder, seeing that his life had not been endangered. The thief had obviously decided that if discovered he would flee the way he had entered, and not become violent.

אם במחתרת ימצא הגנב, “if the thief was discovered while tunneling” (acting so as not to be discovered); according to Rashi he had left behind evidence of forcible entry into the victim’s house;

אין לו דמים THERE SHALL NO GUILT OF BLOOD BE INCURRED FOR HIM — This is not regarded as a murder; it is as though he (the thief) has been dead from the beginning of his criminal act (אין לו דמים is taken to mean: he, the thief, had no blood — no vitality). Here the Torah teaches you the rule: “If one comes with the intention of killing you, be quick and kill him”. — And this burglar actually came with the intention of killing you, for he knew full well that no one can hold himself in check, looking on whilst people are stealing his property before his eyes and doing nothing. He (the thief) therefore obviously came with this purpose in view — that in case the owner of the property would resist him, he would kill him (Sanhedrin 72a).

Beim Diebe am Tage sind aber in der Regel keine Mordgedanken vorauszusetzen. Siehe ראב׳׳ד zu רמב׳׳ם הל׳ גנבה ט׳ ח׳. Daher in der Regel: Nachts: אין לו דמים, Tags: דמים לו. Indem es aber im Texte nicht: ואם זרחה השמש, sondern: ואם זרחה השמש עליו heißt, so ist damit die Erweiterung gegeben: Wenn es auch allgemein nicht Tag ist, wenn es nur über ihm, dem Diebe, tagt, d. h. wenn die Umstände der Art sind, wenn namentlich der Dieb in einem solchen persönlichen Verhältnisse zu dem Besitzer steht, dass dieser zuversichtlich selbst bei einem nächtlichen Einbruch nur "Tagesgedanken", keine Mordgedanken, voraussetzen muss, so: דמים לו, so trägt der Besitzer Blutschuld, wenn er, ihm zuvorkommend, ihn tötet. So אם זרחה השמש עליו וכי השמש :מכילתא עליו בלבד זרחה והלא על כל העולם כלו זרחה אלא מה שמש שלום בעולם אף זה אם ידוע הוא שבשלום עמו והרגו חייב und Sanhedrin 72 a: אם ברור לך כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו ואם לאו הרגהו.

אין לו דמים, “the owner is not guilty of having shed the blood of that thief.” The thief had made it plain that he was afraid of a potentially fatal confrontation with the owner of that house who would physically protect his belongings.

שלם ישלם: der nicht nächtliche Dieb hat nicht sein Leben verwirkt, wohl aber hat er die volle Ersatzpflicht und steht dafür aber insoweit mit seiner Persönlichkeit ein, dass im Falle des Unvermögens, אם אין לו, er zum Ersatz des Gestohlenen in Knechtesdienst sich verkaufen lassen muss (siehe zu Kap. 21, 2 f.).

אם זרחה השמש עליו IF THE SUN SHONE UPON HIM — This is only a metaphorical expression signifying: if the fact is clear to you that he is peaceably disposed towards you. The simile is: just as the sun brings peace (happiness) to the world so if it is evident to you that he did not come with the intention of killing, even if the owner of the property would resist him (Sanhedrin 72a), as, for instance, when a father breaks in to steal the money of his son, for it is certain that the father cherishes feelings of pity for his child and the matter of taking human life is not in his thoughts at all, — then

IF THE SUN HAS RISEN UPON HIM.²⁰²The verses read: 1. If a thief be found breaking in, and be smitten so that he dieth ‘ein lo damim’ (there shall be no guilt of blood incurred for him). 2. If the sun be risen upon him ‘damim lo’ (there shall be guilt of blood incurred for him). He shall make restitution; if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft. “This is nothing but a metaphorical expression, [for did the sun rise upon him alone? Does it not rise upon the whole world? It means etc.]²⁰³The Hebrew text shortens here Rashi’s interpretation, since Ramban’s intention here is not to comment on Rashi’s own explanation, but upon Rashi’s understanding of Onkelos. But Onkelos who rendered the phrase if the sun has risen upon him as: ‘if the eye of the witnesses fell upon him’ chose a different way of interpreting the verse, which is as follows: if the witnesses found the thief before the householder came, and when the householder came to resist the thief, they warned him not to kill the thief, then damim lo, he is liable if he killed him, for since there were witnesses watching him, the thief had no thought of taking human life, and he would not have killed the householder.” Thus is Rashi’s language.
But I wonder! When He said above [in Verse 1], there shall be no guilt of blood incurred for him, thereby acquitting the householder for the murder of the thief, it must surely be speaking of a case where the witnesses warned him not to kill him, for no murderer is ever liable to death without prior warning. And if you say then that in stating: there shall be no guilt of blood incurred for him, Heaven permitted the thief’s blood to be shed, that is to say, it is permissible to kill him — that is not true!²⁰⁴I.e., such an interpretation cannot be the true meaning of this particular verse. For while the law itself is true [that the owner is permitted to kill him], but here the verse speaks of a case where he has already killed him! So how can you say that the intent of the verse is to give him permission to kill him, when he has already killed him! Moreover, since damim lo [in Verse 2] declares the householder culpable both by the court and at the hand of Heaven, then ein lo damim [in the preceeding verse, stating the opposite case], must as a counterpart free him from both, and the way Rashi interpreted Onkelos ein lo damim frees him only from punishment at the hand of Heaven! In other words, Verse 2 must be a case where there were witnesses, as is indicated by the phrase if the sun be risen upon him, as Rashi understands Onkelos. In contrast Verse 1 speaks of a case where there were no witnesses, and hence it cannot refer at all to freeing him from the death by the court, for the court can never act anyway without witnesses; but instead it refers only to freeing him from death by the hand of Heaven. But in that case, the ein lo damim [of Verse 1] and damim lo [of Verse 2] are not in exact contrast: ein lo damim frees him only from punishment by Heaven, and damim lo holds him guilty in both! (Mizrachi). Rather etc. Rather, the first verse acquits the householder under all circumstances from the hand of Heaven, [where he had no prior warning], and from the court if he had prior warning, and the second verse [dealing as it does with another set of circumstances], holds him guilty by the law of both. Perhaps the Rabbi’s intention [i.e., Rashi’s intention in interpreting Onkelos’ translation], was to say that if the witnesses found the thief before the householder came, and recognized him, and the thief knew of their presence, then the thief no longer could have intended to take human life, since he saw that the witnesses recognized him and knew that if he would kill, the witnesses would come to court and have him put to death. And this is the reason for the expression, if the sun has risen upon him, for at night, seeing that the witnesses did not recognize him, he would kill the householder and escape.
In my opinion Onkelos intended to say that if the thief has left the break-through, and the householder comes to court to say that he has witnesses that he was found breaking through, damim lo [literally: “he has blood”] as other living people do, and it is not permissible to kill him, and if the householder did kill him, he is to be put to death; but the thief is to pay if he took anything from there. Scripture uses the expression, if the sun be risen upon him because it speaks of the usual manner, for those who break into homes generally do so at night when no one recognizes them, and the one who kills them there is free and may do so with impunity. But if the thief stayed there until the sun had risen upon him, and then left in a stealthy manner and ran for his life, then if the householder comes to bring a charge against him with the help of witnesses, he [i.e., the thief] is not liable to death, neither by the hands of the court nor by the householder. If this is so, then — according to the opinion of the Sage who says²⁰⁵The opinion is that of Rav (Sanhedrin 72 a). that a thief who broke into a house and took some of its vessels and went out, is free from paying for them, because he acquired them with “blood”²⁰⁶Had he been found by the householder while still in the house and he were killed by him, the householder would be free from punishment. — we must say that the second half of the verse which states, he shall make restitution; if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft, refers back to a previous verse [i.e., Verse 37 in the preceeding chapter]: if a man steal an ox etc. A similar case is the verse, And also unto thy bondwoman thou shalt do likewise.²⁰⁷Deuteronomy 15:17. This is to be connected with Verse 14 there, which states that the master must present gifts to a manservant who goes out free, and here it states that the same must also be done to a maidservant. But it does not refer to the first half of that verse [17] which speaks of the piercing of the ear of a manservant, since that law does not apply to a woman.
The plain meaning of the verse is known to be as follows: If a thief dug through into a home at dark, and was found there at night, he may be killed; but if the sun shone upon the thief and someone saw him and recognized him, he may not be killed, but he must pay for what he stole and took from there at daytime. The meaning of the term hashemesh (the sun) is “in the sight of those who saw him.” Similarly, in the sight of this sun²⁰⁸II Samuel 12:11. means “openly.” The reason for this law is as we have mentioned, that one who comes at night will kill the householder, [and therefore the householder may kill him], whilst one who comes at daytime will flee from him [once he is recognized].

ונמכר בגנבתו, if the Torah had not legislated this form of paying off one’s debt for theft most of the poor people of the nation would become thieves, knowing that they did not have to make restitution except with liquid assets. As a result of such lack of legislation civilisation would disintegrate into anarchy.

אם זרחה השמש, if he was stealing in broad daylight.

אם זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו, “If the sun illuminated the burglar, etc.” According to the plain meaning of the text, the assumption of the Torah is that if someone breaks into a house at night he means to kill the owner (if he obstructs him in his attempt to steal) The murderer plans to flee by daylight when his being about does not arouse any suspicion. If the owner of the house kills the intruder, this is considered self defense even if the intruder had not yet laid a hand on the owner. When the intruder came by day, it is presumed that he had no intention to kill, and if nonetheless, the owner killed him, he is guilty of having shed his blood.

אם זרחה השמש עליו, “if the sun shone upon him, etc.” If the thief entered in broad daylight or remained in the house of the victim till morning,

If the issue is clear to you. . . That is, if reason dictates that his intentions are peaceful. For example, a father who is breaking in to steal money from the son. But if reason dictates that he has intention of killing, since he knows that a man does not remain silent while seeing his property being taken — then you should kill him first. (Re’m)

שלם ישלם שנים, “must pay twice the value of what he had destroyed” The Talmud tractate Baba Kamma, folio 60, quotes G–d as having said: “I have lit a destructive fire in Zion,” (Lamentations 4,11) it therefore behooves Me when (the time comes) to pay for the destruction I have caused.” This is the deeper meaning of what the prophet Zecharyah has said in Zecharyah 2,9, “I will be for Zion a (protective) wall of fire all around it.”

אם זרחה השמש עליו, “if the thief had remained in full view of his potential victim;” (and the owner had killed him)

דמים לו, then he is to be regarded as a living man (cf. Rashi’s explanation of אין לו דמים v. 1.), and it is murder if the householder kills him.

דמים לו, “there is blood guilt on his account.” Anyone who kills unless his own life was in danger is subject to the penalty for murder or manslaughter. In this instance, when the identity of the thief has become known, he would not threaten his victim with death as he would be aware that he would suffer the penalty for murder. Seeing that the owner of the house was not in danger he must not kill the intruder.
The reason why the Torah describes the sun shining by using the feminine form of the word זרחה, rather than the customary זרח (compare Kohelet 1,5 or Genesis 32,32) is that the Bible usually does so when it describes the sun spreading its rays over the earth during the day. Examples are: Samuel II 12,11 לעיני השמש הזאת, “in view of this bright sunlight.” The sun is described as masculine in the Bible when it is only at the beginning of its daily journey across the sky. Example: השמש יצא על הארץ, “the sun had risen over the earth” (Genesis 19,23). The author quotes additional examples. At any rate, the meaning is that if the sun has already spread its light all over the earth and it is clear that the thief will be caught and cannot escape, דמים לו, anyone killing him will be guilty. The words have a dual meaning, i.e. they also mean that the thief has to pay compensation to the victim failing which the court will sell his labor for the next 6 years to the kind of master described in 21,2 so that the owner of the stolen property can be compensated.

That his intentions. . . are peaceful — just as this sun. . . The Re’m was puzzled why Rashi cited the Mechilta, [which says that the sun is an allegory for peace,] and ignored the Baraisa in Sanhedrin 72a, which says: “If it as clear to you as the sun that his intentions towards you are peaceful. . .” For according to the Baraisa, the sun is an allegory for the issue being clear, not for peace. [To resolve this,] it seems that Rashi was answering a question: [If the simple meaning of the verse is as the Baraisa said,] why does the verse not say, “If it shines on him like day,” or simply “day,” as in, “Sell, as the day, your birthright to me” (Bereishis 25:31)? This would have meant that the issue is clear. Therefore Rashi explains [the verse according to the Mechilta:] “Just as the sun represents peace. . .” Yet you might object: Why does Rashi cite the Mechilta, [which does not follow the plain meaning of the verse either]? The answer is: The Mechilta is close to the verse’s plain meaning, and also resolves various difficulties in the verses.

דמים לו, “he is guilty of bloodshed;” the intended victim of the thief, the owner of the house. If it had been clear to that owner that the intruder did not mean to kill but only to steal, and he overreacted by killing him, then he must make restitution. Unless he felt immediately threatened by the intruder and had reason to be so, killing him is a form of manslaughter. He (the thief) has to pay fourfold or five fold its value as the case may be seeing he has disposed of it. If the thief cannot repay the value of the stolen items plus the penalty imposed upon him, he will be sold in order that the owner can be compensated.

שלם ישלם means the thief shall only restore the money he has stolen but is not subject to the death penalty. Onkelos who renders אם זרחה השמש עליו by, “If the eye of witnesses fall upon him” chose a different way of explaining the verse, namely, that if witnesses surprise him before the householder appears, and when the householder is going towards him they warn him not to kill him (the thief), then דמים לו, he is punishable if he kills him; for since there are people watching him the thief surely has no thought of taking human life and will not kill the owner of the property.

The thief. Rashi added the word “thief” so we will not say that the house-owner pays the heirs, [if he killed the thief. I.e.,] that the house-owner would not receive the death penalty even though “there is liability for the thief’s blood,” but would instead pay an atonement fine to the thief’s heirs. This cannot be [the verse’s meaning] because it is written afterwards, “If he does not have [the means to do so], he shall be sold for his theft.” Thus we see that the verse is speaking of the thief.

חיים שנים ישלם, if the animal in question is still alive and well, he will pay twice its value. (including the live animal)

המצא תמצא IF THE THEFT BE CERTAINLY FOUND IN HIS HAND i. e. in his possession (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:3:2), he having neither sold it nor slaughtered it he shall pay only double.

אם המצא תמצא ביד הגנב, If it was indeed found in the hands of the thief, etc. The reason that the Torah repeats the word המצא "to be found" is, A) if there are witnesses who testify that the thief has stolen this particular animal; B) that the owner or others have found the animal in its original state in the possession of the thief. If neither of these two conditions exists the thief is presumed to have either sold or slaughtered the animal in question and he has to make four or five-fold restitution on the basis of this assumption. The words: "he shall pay double" apply only when the animal is located unharmed. You should appreciate also that the law of four or five-fold restitution applies not only in the examples cited by the Torah; the same applies if the animal was lost or the thief gave it away as a gift. As long as the animal left the domain of the thief he becomes liable for this four or five-fold payment. Baba Kama 79 states so explicitly. The same applies even if the thief donated the animal to the Temple. I believe we can use this nuance as proof that if someone stole from a pagan or idolator he is not liable either for the double payment or to be sold for such theft if he is unable to make restitution as provided for in verse two. I am basing this on the use of the word רעהו in connection with this legislation (compare verse 35). This word always refers to someone who is a fellow-Jew. Clearly, the legislation in 21,35 applies only to offences committed against fellow Jews as mentioned in the Mechilta. We also know that the situation of a Jew being sold into servitude when unable to make repayment for theft applies only when the theft had been perpetrated against a Jew. Theft from Temple property also does not carry this kind of a penalty. The above is the opinion of Maimonides expressed in chapter three of his Hilchot Geneyvah. Since Maimonides does not cite a reason for these rulings I have decided to suggest the reasons for his decisions.

אם המצא תמצא בידו, he had not sold or otherwise disposed of the stolen animal;

In his possession, for he had not slaughtered it. . . [Rashi mentioned slaughtering] because it said earlier (21:37): “And then slaughters or sells it.” Thus Rashi writes here, “He had not slaughtered it nor sold it.” But Rashi does not really mean to say only slaughtering. [For if the thief slaughtered it, it would still be “in his possession”].

V. 3 אם המצא תמצא. In dem Satze: אשר ירשעון אלהי׳ ישלם שנים לרעהו (V. 8) ist die Bestimmung niedergelegt, dass die Pön der Doppelzahlung nur in Folge richterlichen Erkenntnisses einzutreten habe, dass somit מודה בקנס פטור, bei Selbstanklage oder in Folge nicht durch Zeugen unterstützter Klage gemachtem freien Geständnis nur auf einfachen Ersatz, nicht aber auf Doppelzahlung zu erkennen ist. Wir haben schon bemerkt, wie wir in der Selbstanklage oder dem freien Eingeständnis eine die Macht des öffentlichen Rechts bereits anerkennende Sühne erblicken, die die richterliche Pön überflüssig macht. Diese Bestimmung erhält nun durch den Satz אם המצא תמצא eine wesentliche Ergänzung. מציאת הגנבה ביד הגנב schließt an sich Selbstanklage und Selbstgeständnis aus. Das Gestohlene wird in seiner Hand gefunden, also durch andere, er hat es verheimlicht und geleugnet. Ein solches, die Basis eines Urteils bildendes "Finden" kann nur durch Zeugen geschehen. Durch die Verdoppelung המצא תמצא wird dieses die Pön bedingende "Gefundenwerden durch Zeugen" noch intensiver als Bedingung hervorgehoben: "nur wenn lediglich durch Zeugen er als der Dieb befunden worden, hat er das Doppelte zu zahlen", אם המצא בעדים תמצא בדיינים, die ganze Prozedur muss von Anfang an sich auf Zeugen basieren; ist aber der Zeugenaussage eine Selbstanklage oder ein freies Selbstgeständnis vor Gericht vorangegangen, so wird nicht auf Pönzahlung erkannt: מודה בקנס ואחר כך באו עדים פטור. Diese Bestimmung wird aber durch die Klausel beschränkt, dass die Selbstanklage oder das Selbstgeständnis relevant gewesen, d. h. dass sich damit der Beklagte zu irgend einer Zahlungsschuld, zum einfachen Wertersatz bekannt habe. War er aber zum einfachen Wertersatz und somit zur Doppelzahlung durch Zeugen verurteilt und klagt sich sodann frei des Schlachtens und des Verkaufes an, so hat er freilich, so lange hierfür Zeugen fehlen, die Pön des vier- und fünffachen nicht zu zahlen, allein wenn nachher auch diese Handlungen durch Zeugen konstatiert werden, ist er zur vier- oder fünffachen Pön zu verurteilen. Das Selbstgeständnis des Schlachtens etc. war ein irrelevantes, שהרי פטר עצמו מכלום weil es für ihn keine Zahlungspflicht zur Folge hatte (B. K. 64 u. 75 a).

חיים שנים ישלם, if the animal in question is still alive and well, he will pay twice its value. (including the live animal)

משור עד חמור WHETHER IT BE AN OX OR AN ASS — Every thing stolen whether it be animate or inanimate comes under the category of things for which two-fold compensation (“kefel”) must be made, for it is said in another verse, (8) “[for every matter of tresspass whether it be for ox, for ass…], for sheep, for raiment or for any lost thing … he shall pay double unto his fellow-man”(Bava Kamma 62b).

חיים, he had not slaughtered it preparatory to consuming it; then שנים ישלם, he pays only double its market value as restitution and not four or five times its value.

Pay two-fold to his fellow man. [A difficulty arises:] The other verse, [“for a sheep, a garment. . .”] is speaking of [a different case: that of a watchman] who [falsely] claims that a thief [stole what he was guarding — and when disproved, he must pay two-fold.] But this verse is speaking of the thief [himself. So how can Rashi compare them?] The answer is: Since the Torah gave them the same law regarding two-fold restitution, surely they are the same as regards paying two-fold for everything, whether animate or not.

Noch nach einer Seite hin wird der Satz durch die Verdoppelung המצא תמצא erweitert, nämlich zur Erweiterung des Begriffes יד, Hand, in den Begriff: Besitz, der auch jeden Besitzraum, חצר usw. umfasst. Ob er es mit der Hand entwendet, oder es ist das Tier in sein Gehöfte gelaufen und er hat es darin eingeschlossen, אם המצא תמצא, wie es auch, d. h. in welcher räumlichen Besitzart es auch als Diebstahl bei ihm befunden worden, שנים ישלם. Es wird aber חצר, der Besitzraum, als Aneignungsmittel in doppelter Weise begriffen: als יד als künstliche Erweiterung der Hand, und als שליח, als bestellter Vertreter des Menschen, חצר משום יד אתרבאי ולא גרעה משליחות (B. M. 12 a). Wenn der Eigentümer in oder doch unmittelbar neben seinem Besitzraum anwesend ist, so gestaltet seine gegenwärtige Intelligenz den Besitzraum zur lebendigen Hand, und wird in Fällen, wo selbst wider Willen ein Objekt Eigentum werden kann, z. B. bei Niederlegung eines Scheidebriefes in die Hand der Frau, die Übergabe auch durch Niederlegung in deren Besitzraum vollzogen sein, wenn sie gegenwärtig ist. In Abwesenheit des Eigentümers hat jedoch der Besitzraum nur den Charakter des Boten und erwirbt nur das dem Eigentümer voraussetzlich Genehme (siehe תוספו׳ das.).

חיים שנים ישלם means, two living animals (חיים שנים) shall he pay and he shall not give dead animals in payment (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:3:4) — but either living animals or the value of living animals.

Im V. 2 war die Schuld ausgesprochen, die er zu lösen hat, selbst ohne Zeugen und ohne richterliches Erkenntnis: תשלומי קרן, den einfachen, aber vollen Ersatz des gestohlenen Wertes. Dieser gestohlene Wert, קרן, wird dort גנבה genannt. (Daher ja auch der Satz: ונמכר בגנבתו ולא בכפלו, siehe zu Kap. 21, V. 2 f). V. 3 heißt es nun: "Wenn aber nur auf Grund von Zeugen er als der Dieb des gestohlenen Wertes befunden wird, d. h. wenn er nicht durch Selbstanklage zum Ersatz des gestohlenen Wertes kommt, so hat er zwei zu zahlen". Dieser gestohlene Wert, קרן, im Texte: הגנבה, wird hier הי, und da es sich beispielshalber auf Tiere bezieht, חיים genannt. Es kann dies nicht sagen wollen, die Tiere seien noch lebendig in seinem Besitze befunden, also nicht geschlachtet und nicht verkauft, dass nämlich dann, im Gegensatz zu V. 37 u. 21, nur auf zweifache und nicht auf vier- und fünffache Zahlung zu erkennen sei; denn im Beispiele sind auch המור, Esel genannt, und bei diesem, wie bei jedem Objekt außer Ochs und Schaf, bleibt es auch bei verübtem Schlachten und Verkauf nur bei zweifacher Zahlung. Es wird daher durch das Epitheton חי nur die Art und Weise bezeichnet, in welcher הגנבה, der gestohlene Wert an sich, קרן, zur Bezahlung kommt, dass dieses nämlich חי, ganz, voll, ungeschmälert in der Größe zu ersetzen ist, die das Objekt im Momente der גנבה hatte, obgleich etwa im Momente der Verurteilung die Güter derselben Art im Marktpreise gesunken wären: אחייה לקרן כעין שגנב in Bezug auf יוקרא וזולא, während die Pön כפל וד׳ וה׳, in solchem Falle nur nach dem event. niedrigern Marktpreise des Momentes der gerichtlichen Prozedur anzusetzen ist: תשלומי כפל וד׳ וה׳ כשעת העמדה בדין. Die Pön, קנס, wird ja eben nur durch gerichtliche Verhandlung Schuld, für sie ist daher nur dieser Moment maßgebend (B. K. 65 a).

כי יבער … בעירה ובער All these terms are connected with the word בעיר which signifies “cattle”, as in (Numbers 20:4) אנחנו ובעירנו “we and our cattle" .

כי יבער איש שדה או כרם, within his own property, (originally)

כי יבער איש שדה, If a man cause a field to be consumed (the grain growing on it), etc. This verse has to be understood in conjunction with Baba Kama 56. Rav said that if someone places his own animal on a field of his neighbour, such field being full of growing grain, he is liable if his animal consumes some of it. The Talmud there adds that although this is obvious, we apply this rule even when the owner merely placed his ox in a position where it faced the growing field of his neighbour in every direction open to it; the owner of the ox is guilty although he had not actually led the animal by hand. The Torah writes: כי יבער איש, to tell us that even if the animal does not belong to the person who perpetrates this act, he is liable for the damage. The Torah goes on to say ושלח את בעירה, to tell us that even if he did not do what he did by hand but merely let loose his animal in the general direction of the neighbour's field failing to take precautions against his animal causing damage in his neighbour's field, he is liable for the damage caused by his beast.

כי יבער, if he causes his beast to feed in someone else’s field

מיטב שדהו ומיטב כרמו ישלם, “from the best of his field or the best of his vineyard he shall make payment to him (restitution).” The Talmud (Gittin 48) uses this wording to arrive at the general ruling that when compensation is assessed by the court for damages caused willfully or through negligence, the guilty party’s most valuable agricultural property is used. If the court would be content to take comparable produce grown on inferior soil belonging to the party causing the damage this would encourage such a party to openly steal the best quality of produce of his neighbor and have the court replace it with inferior quality from his own field or vineyard. In such cases the guilty party would profit by his crime. In order to discourage a farmer from engaging in this kind of pilfering, the law is slanted in favor of the potential victim so that the potential thief will realize that it will not pay him to steal from his neighbor as the court’s order will soon result in his losing instead of profiting by his crime.
When money is owed by a borrower who has failed to repay it on time, (an interest-free loan) the court assesses average quality of the debtor’s produce to be used to repay his debt.
When a husband has to pay a wife whom he has divorced her marriage settlement, he is entitled to compensate her from the most inferior quality produce which his fields produce. Actually, if we were to proceed strictly according to Biblical law, the borrower would also have to be assessed only to make repayment from his most inferior produce. (They wanted to base this on Deut. 24,11 where the lender is not permitted to enter the borrower’s house to pick himself the kind of security he wants to hold onto until the debt has been paid. It is reasoned that just as in that instance the debtor will surely volunteer only the cheapest of his possessions as a pawn, so here too the Torah would take only from his most inferior produce to satisfy his creditor). However, if the sages had applied this ruling the lenders would have refused to extend loans to impecunious borrowers in the future. In order to forestall such a possibility and to help future borrowers to obtain loans, the sages decided to upgrade the kind of produce from which such a defaulting borrower has to make repayment. The sages also advance a reason based on psychology of women to explain why if her marriage settlement becomes due she is presumed as satisfied with unfavorable conditions. It is presumed that a woman’s desire to be married (and to enjoy that status) is greater than the comparable desire of her husband to marry her (Kidushin 49).

Either by sending in his cattle. . . Rashi is saying that there are two types of damages here: one is “sending in,” which is damage caused by trampling of the רגל (foot). And the other is “feeding,” which is damage of the שן (tooth). The verse does not mean that he sent the animal into a vineyard and it went and ate, which would be only the damage of שן .

V. 4. Mit diesem Verse werden die mit V. 37 des vorigen Kapitels unterbrochenen Gesetze über die aus nicht gehöriger Hut schadenbringenden Eigentums entstehende Verantwortlichkeit, נזיקין, fortgeführt, und zwar zunächst hinsichtlich des lebendigen Eigentums. V. 35 u. 36 war von קרן, von Verantwortlichkeit für anormale, aus der gewöhnlichen Natur des Tieres nicht vorauszusetzende Beschädigungen die Rede; hier wird von solchen gehandelt, die der Eigentümer aus der gewöhnlichen Natur seines Tieres voraussetzen muss, hinsichtlich deren das Tier מועד מתחלתו, von vornherein מועד, genannt wird, im Gegensatz zu dem erst durch Wiederholung מועד gewordenen Hornstoß. Es sind dies רגל und שן: was das Tier im natürlichen Gange und was es in Folge seines Nahrungstriebes beschädigt. Aus diesem Begriff des מועד מתחלתו, der naturgemäßen Kraftäußerung, erklärt sich der dreimal wiederholte Ausdruck בער, mit welchem unser Text hier sowohl das Tier, als auch die von ihm geschehene Beschädigung charakterisiert. Wir haben drei Ausdrücke für Tier: חיה, insofern es das für sich abgeschlossene selbständige Tierleben entfaltet; בהמה, insofern es sich dem Menschen als במה als Basis seiner Herrschaft unterordnet, und endlich בעיר, insofern es in vernunftloser Unfreiheit nur einem Naturtriebe folgt (siehe Bereschit 1, 24), בַעַר ist. Namentlich hinsichtlich dieser, der Natur des Tieres als בעיר innewohnenden Kraftäußerungen ist es, dass der Mensch in dem Augenblicke die Verantwortung übernimmt, in welchem ein lebendiges Wesen sein wird. Er hat die natürlichen Kraftäußerungen seines Tieres, hinsichtlich dessen es בַעַר ist, unter die Obhut seiner Intelligenz zu stellen, dass durch sie dem Eigentumsrechte des Nächsten kein Schaden erwachse. Mit der Aneignung bestellt er sich als Vormund des sonst seinen Trieben folgenden Tieres. Daher ist auch wohl hier, wo er die "männliche" Obhut seines Tieres nicht bewährt, das den Besitz anzeigende männliche Suffixum weiblich, בעירה geschrieben. כי יבער איש שדה וגו׳ heißt daher buchstäblich: wenn jemand ein Feld oder einen Weinberg von naturgemäßen Tierkraftäußerungen betroffen werden lässt, er lässt entweder sein dem Naturtriebe folgendes Tier in das Feld eines andern laufen, oder er lässt es seinem Naturtriebe gemäß in dem Felde eines andern fressen. Wie die verzehrende Kraft des Feuers ebenso wie das Verzehren durch Lebendige אכילה heißt, so heißt auch die verzehrende Kraft des tierischen Naturtriebs wie das Verzehren des Feuers: בער. —

כי יבער איש שדה או חרם, “when a man lets his livestock loose to graze in someone else’s field or vineyard;” the expression בער always describes destruction of something, as in Deuteronomy 21,9: ואתה תבער דם הנקי, “you must out eliminate innocently spilled blood;” [we are more familiar with the expression from getting rid of our chametz on the eve of Passover. The author quotes two more examples, which I omitted. Ed.]

כי יבער means accordingly, he takes his cattle into the field or the vineyard of his fellow-man and causes damage to him by one of these two ways: either by the mere fact that he lets his cattle go (tread) there (ושלח את בעירו), or by letting it graze there (ובער). Our Rabbis explained (Bava Kamma 2b), that ושלח refers to the damage done by “treading” (Rashi uses a Biblical phrase Deuteronomy 5:1. “treading of the hollow of the foot”) and ובער to the damage caused by the tooth that eats up and removes (מבערת) the crops (grazing).

ובער בשדה אחר, even if the animal had wandered off into someone else’s field without encouragement by its owner,

מיטב שדהו, from the best quality of the offending party’s field he has to pay the injured party. This is the way our sages (Baba Kamma 6) have explained our verse. According to the plain meaning of the text the meaning is that the injured party will receive his compensation based on the best quality of the land he owns, not that of the offending party. The reason is that the animal causing the damage may have eaten some of that quality produce of the injured party’s fields.

In another man’s field. Rashi added the word “man’s”, [and did not explain שדה אחר as “another field”,] because שדה is feminine, whereas אחר is masculine. [Therefore, אחר cannot be the adjective of שדה .] (Maharshal)

וְשִלַח וּבִעֵר, indem hier die, im Grunde nur nicht verhinderte Tätigkeit des Tieres als direkte Veranlassung des Eigentümers ausgedrückt wird, so ist damit die Bestimmung gegeben, dass er nur verantwortlich ist, wenn seine Vernachlässigung einer direkten Veranlassung gleichkommt, עד דעביד כעין ושלח וכעין ובער, d. h. wenn er sie so gut wie gar nicht, auch nicht mit שמירה פחותה, mit gewöhnlicher Vorsicht, gehütet hat; allein mit einer gewöhnlichen Umständen genügenden Hut ist er der Verantwortung enthoben, und es braucht auch hier, wie überall bei נזיקין, wo sich das Gesetz auf dem Rechtsboden bewegt, wie bei בור und מועד, keiner שמירה מעולה (B. K. 55 b). —

מיטב שדהו, “from the best quality of his own field;” Rashi explains that this verse teaches that whenever damages are paid in kind instead of in cash, the quality of the compensation is to be of the best that the offending party possesses. The reason for this is that most people always treasure what is personally their own to its equivalent in twice that in someone else’s possession. [The origin of that proverb is Talmud Baba Metziah folio 38. Ed.] Furthermore, what is his own he is familiar with and therefore prefers it to something he is not familiar with. Furthermore, in order to make a sure that people do not cause damage with their livestock in other people’s property this penalty is meant primarily to ensure that they make sure their animals do not stray to other people‘s property. When it comes to compensating a creditor for a borrower defaulting on a loan, another type of damage, the Torah allows the borrower to pay in kind by giving him the lowest quality of his land. The reason that the Torah applies a different yardstick there is to insure that owners of livestock have to pay such heavy fines so that no one will be scared to take out a loan as the chances of having to pay 4 or 5 times the amount owed is too daunting. The sages agreed therefore that the amount of land in lieu of cash repayment would taken from the medium quality of land owned by the person defaulting. In the case of a divorcee or a widow being paid out her ketuvah, financial settlement the husband or heirs may use the lowest grade land they own. After all, the woman in question had not sustained any loss as a result of which this payment had become due.

בשדה אחר means בשדה של אחר IN THE FIELD OF ANOTHER MAN (not “in another field”, when it would be punctuated בְּשָׂדֶה, for בִּשְׁדֵה is the construct form).

מיטב שדהו ומיטב כרמו ישלם, the quality of the restitution must consist of the best of the field or vineyard, seeing that animals wandering off to feed elsewhere is such a widespread phenomenon. [the author explains the apparent injustice of the restitution being worth more than the damage the injured party had sustained. Ed.]

We evaluate the damage. . . [Rashi is saying] that the damager does not give him all of his best fields even if they are worth more than the damages. He cannot give him whichever field he wishes, [i.e., pick an inferior field to pay from]. Also, that he is not required to pay specifically from prime fields as opposed to paying money.

ברשות הניזק :בשדה אחר, die Verantwortung für die durch naturgemäße Kraftäußerung seines Tieres verübte Beschädigung findet nur da statt, wo der Zutritt des Tieres unberechtigt, und das Vorhandensein des beschädigten Gutes ein berechtigtes ist, also in dem Besitzraum des Beschädigten. Wo die Anwesenheit des Tieres eine berechtigte ist, z. B. auf öffentlicher Straße, da ist dessen Eigentümer eben in Folge dieser Berechtigung von jeder Verantwortung für diejenigen Beschädigungen frei, die von der Natur des Tieres, seinen Trieben und naturgemäßen Bewegungen unzertrennlich sind, und liegt es dort vielmehr den Besitzern von Früchten, zerbrechlichen Gegenständen etc. etc. ob, sie nicht also in den vorauszusetzenden Weg der Tiere kommen zu lassen, dass sie von diesen verzehrt oder im Gange zertrümmert werden können. שן ורגל sind daher בר׳׳ה פטורים, und wenn ein Tier בר׳׳ה fremde Früchte gegessen, so hat dessen Eigentümer nicht den Schaden zu ersetzen, sondern lediglich so viel zu vergüten, als ihm etwa durch das Tier an Fütterungswert ein Nutzen von fremdem Eigentume geworden, משלמת מה שנהנית (B. K. 19 b). — Es heißt endlich nicht: ובער שדה אחר, er lässt das Feld eines andern abweiden, wie כי יבער איש שדה sondern: ובער בשדה אחר, er lässt im Felde eines andern abweiden, es wird somit der Schaden nicht an sich, sondern als Beschädigung des Teiles eines Feldes begriffen. Darin sieht die Halacha (B. K. 58 b) die Bestimmung, als eine Milderung der Ersatzpflicht, niedergelegt, dass nicht der absolute Wert des verzehrten Gewächses, sondern der relative Wert desselben als Teil eines größern Komplexes zu schätzen und nach einer billigen Schätzung festzustellen sei, wie viel das Feld, (oder ein größeres Stück des Feldes), an Wert durch die Vernichtung des abgeweideten Teiles eingebüßt habe, שמין בית סאה באותה שדה כמה היתה יפה וכמה היא יפה (siehe רש׳י und תוספו׳ das.).

מיטב שדהו, “from the best grade of soil that he owns;” here we speak of the land owned by the party that had caused the loss, i.e. the party who has to pay damages must do so during the harvest season when the value of the field is at its highest value. [This is the plain meaning of the text, whereas Rashi, above had not explained according to the plain meaning but had switched subjects in the verse. Ed.] The injured party, after all had lost the harvest from the area that the offender’ ox had grazed instead.

מיטב שדהו … ישלם THE BEST OF HIS FIELD SHALL HE PAY — We assess the damage, and if the defendant proposes to make restitution to him for the damage he has suffered with “land’” then he has to pay him with the best of his fields. If for instance the damage amounted to a Sela he has to give him a Sela-worth of the best of the fields he possesses). Scripture teaches you that in cases of damages (which it is proposed to pay with land) we assess and collect them from the best land of the defendant (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:4:6; Bava Kamma 6b).

He must pay him from the best of his fields. . . If he chooses to pay from moveable possessions, he may pay even from bran [i.e., items of the lowest quality]. For with moveable possessions, everything is considered the best [because one can take it from place to place and find a buyer for it].

B. K. 23 b findet sich eine auffallende Äußerung אביי's, der zufolge die hier statuierte Verantwortung für naturgemäßen Schaden im Felde eines andern nur statthaben würde, wenn der Besitzer des Feldes sein Feld gehörig umzäunt hatte, das Tier aber eingebrochen, oder der Zaun über Nacht eingefallen war. Wenn das Tier aber in ein unumzäuntes Feld liefe, wäre der Eigentümer des Tieres ersatzfrei. Nach dieser Ansicht läge jedem Feldbesitzer die Umzäunung seines Feldes ob, ein Verhältnis, das ja im großen nicht stattfindet und auch wohl nie stattgefunden hat (siehe B. B. 2 a). Es spräche sodann unser Text nur von einem seltenen Fall, der fast zu den Ausnahmen gehörte. ב׳׳י ,רמב׳׳ם ,רי׳׳ף ,תוספו׳ adoptieren auch die entgegenstehende Ansicht des ר׳ יוסף, nach welcher auch in einem nichtumzäunten Felde die Veranwortung für שן ורגל stattfindet. Allein בה׳׳ג und ר׳׳ח, und ihnen folgend ש׳׳ך zu ח׳׳מ, 397 adoptieren die Meinung אביי's und unterscheiden zwischen Häusern in der Stadt, deren Türverschluss am Tage dem Besitzer nicht obliegt, und wo daher שן ורגל selbst bei geöffneter Türe Ersatzpflicht nach sich zieht, und dem Treiben des Viehes im Freien, wo es unvermeidlich wäre, dass nicht ein Tier in ein offenes Feld sich verlaufe.

Vielleicht erklären sich danach die einleitenden Worte unseres Textes: כי יבער איש שדה או כרם, die sonst völlig überflüssig erschienen; es hätte genügt: כי ישלח איש את בעירו ובער בשדה אחר. Es scheinen nämlich שדה und כרם gerade in der hier in Frage stehenden Beziehung zu differieren. שדה ist in der Regel das freie, unumzäunte Feld, כרם aber das geschützte. Wenn dies aus vielen Ausdrücken ersichtlich ist, so liegt dieser Unterschied insbesondere Bamidbar. 22, V. 23 u. 24 vor Augen. Bileams Tier weicht (V. 23) vom Wege ab und geht in ein Feld. V. 24 steht es aber in einem Weinbergpfad, wo rechts und links sich Zäune befinden. Demgemäß dürften die einleitenden Worte unseres Textes sagen: Es mag jemand ein freies Feld oder einen umzäunten Weinberg durch sein Vieh beschädigen lassen, und damit eben die von תוספו׳, רי׳׳ף und רמב׳׳ם rezipierte Ansicht ausgesprochen sein. Die andere Ansicht müsste durch כרם eben die Bedingung der Umzäunung auch für שדה statuiert erblicken: שדה דומיא דכרם.

מיטב שדהו וגו׳, .siehe zu Kap. 21, 34

כי תצא אש IF A FIRE GOETH FORTH — i. e. even if it goeth forth (extends) by itself (Bava Kamma 24b) from the field in which it has been lit into another persons field.

כי תצא אש, If fire escapes (from someone's private domain), etc. The Torah means that even if one lights a fire in one's own private yard such a person is liable for damage caused by such fire outside his domain if the blaze was such that the owner should have foreseen it could extend beyond his own fence. If an individual lit a fire in his private yard which could not be expected to extend beyond his own boundaries he is free from responsibility if it happened unexpectedly. Such an accident would have to be considered an act of G'd (compare Baba Kama 61). When the Torah speaks about ומצאה קוצים, that the fire "finds thorns," it means that even if there were no other inflammables in its path, the fact that the stack of corn is consumed by fire results in the person starting the fire having to make repayment, שלם ישלם. He will have to pay for either the stack of corn or the field in which the corn is still growing, as the case may be. He will even have to pay for the stalks though the latter were a contributing cause to the corn being burned. All of this applies only if the fire "found" the thorns. If a person other than the one who started the fire contributed to its spreading, then that second person is liable for the entire damage which occurs as a result.

כי תצא אש, the one lighting the fire was negligent in not taking sufficient precautions that the fire be confined to his own property assuming no extraordinary wind is blowing.

כי תצא אש, “if a fire is started and spreads, etc.” by itself;
שלם ישלם המבעיר את הבערה, “the party who started the conflagration must pay compensation.” The party who had started the fire is the root-cause of the damage. Had he not started it the fire could not have spread and burned standing corn or stacked, harvested grain. The sages in Baba Kama 60 use this verse to see an allusion in it to the destruction by fire of the Holy Temple. They quote G’d as saying that He Himself must compensate the Jewish people for the burning down of the Temple as He had started the fire. The sages quote Isaiah 64,10: “our Holy Temple, our pride, where our fathers praised You, has been consumed by fire; all that was dear to us has been ruined.” Seeing that the Jews attribute the destruction to their own faults, G’d was willing to describe Himself as the root-cause and assumes the burden of compensating the Jewish people as if He had started the fire (compare Rashi there).

Even by itself. [Rashi knows this] because it does not say יבעיר (he made it burn) as it is written in the preceding verse, “If he damages a field. . . with his animal ( כי יבער ).” It is written here “ המבעיר את הבערה (The one who started the fire).”

V. 5. כי תצא אש: wenn vorhandenes Feuer in das Gebiet eines andern hinüber geht, also von selbst, שלם ישלם המבעיר את הבערה so, ist der Anzünder des Brandes ersatzpflichtig; offenbar ist hier Feuer im Verhältnis zu der dem Menschen obliegenden Hut in doppeltem Charakter begriffen: einmal als ממונו, als der Obhut des Menschen unterstehendes schadenfähiges Eigentum, das er wie sein Tier vor Beschädigung des Nachbargutes zu schützen hat; und dann als חִצָיו, als von ihm in Bewegung gesetztes schadenbringendes Mittel, dessen Wirkung als seine Tat begriffen wird. In diesem doppelten Charakter spricht sich auch die Halacha darüber aus. Zu allem demjenigen, was unter gewöhnlich vorauszusetzenden Umständen in dem Momente des Anzündens des Feuers von diesem bedroht ist, hat das Feuer den Charakter als Pfeil in der Hand des Anzünders, und dieser ist dann nicht nur zum Ersatz von Güterbeschädigungen, sondern auch zum Ersatz und zur Strafe für Menschenverletzung und Tötung ganz in der Weise wie bei direkter Verwundung und Tötung zu verurteilen.

ומצאה קוצים AND CATCH IN THORNS —chardons in old French

גדיש, a stack of grain which had already been harvested, or even הקמה, while it was still growing on the field. Or even השדה, the “field,” i.e. the soil on which the crops grow was damaged by the flames licking it.

The Torah repeats the words המבעיר את הבערה "he who kindled the fire," to hint that the guilty party has to pay even for the stalks which were the real culprits in spreading the blaze.

Wo aber כלו חציו, die als direkte versöhnliche Tat zu begreifende Wirkung ihr Ende gefunden, das Feuer schreitet aber durch nachher eintretende Umstände weiter, es stürzt z. B., nicht durch die Wirkung des Feuers, eine Mauer ein, durch deren unterlassene Wiederaufrichtung der Anzünder des Feuers diesem hätte Einhalt tun können, — oder es hat sich von selbst Feuer in einem Orte entzündet, das dessen Besitzer nicht gehörig vor Hinüberschreiten in des Nachbars Gebiet geschützt hat, da ist die Beschädigung nur als Wirkung nicht gehörig geschützten schadenbringenden Eigentums zu behandeln. Bei Menschenverletzung ist nur נזק, der einfache Schaden, wie bei שור und בור, nicht aber צער רפוי שבת ובשת zu ersetzen, und auch bei Güterbeschädigung tritt eine in dem Charakter des Feuers als zu hütenden Eigentums begründete eigentümliche Milderung ein. Wie nämlich bei בור, als leb- und bewegungslosem, nur in Ruhe schadendem Eigentume, Beschädigung lebloser, und daher nur durch andere in Bewegung zu setzender Gegenstände, כלים, als nicht direkt durch בור bedroht, nicht zum Ersatz kommt, so sind auch bei Beschädigungen durch Feuer, als nicht hinlänglich vor Schadenäußerung geschütztes Eigentum, nur direkt davon bedrohte, also offen, בגלוי, liegende Gegenstände, nicht aber טמון, Verstecktes, zu ersetzen. Die im Texte exemplifikatorisch genannten Gegenstände: Dörner, Getreidehaufen, stehendes Getreide und der Acker selbst, schließen alle beweglichen und unbeweglichen, wertvolle und nicht wertvolle, feuerfangende und nicht feuerfangende, in die Beschädigungsersatzpflicht ein und nur טמון, Verstecktliegendes, aus. Dieser Ausschluss alles טמון fällt aber weg, sobald das Anzünden des Feuers selbst schon ein unberechtigtes, z. B. auf des Nachbars Gebiet geschehen war, oder als חציו, als Wirkung persönlicher Tat zu beurteilen ist (siehe B. K. 22 a u. 60 a ff).

ונאכל גדיש SO THAT THE STACKS OF CORN [OR THE STANDING CORN] BE CONSUMED, because it (the fire) licked up the thorns and gradually reached the stacks of corn or the standing corn, i. e. corn that is still attached to the ground.

Another aspect addressed by the word ומצאה, "and finds," is a situation where the person kindling the fire was unaware that there were any thorns in the vicinity, or where these thorns at least had not been present at the time the fire was kindled. It is presumed here that some third person came along and placed these thorns in a position where they created a hazard. In all of these situations the person kindling the fire is still liable for damage caused.

אש, Feuer, ist das Musterbeispiel für alles leblose, durch als vorhanden vorauszusetzende Naturkraft bewegte Eigentum, das in Bewegung schadet. Zu dieser Kategorie gehört z. B. auch אבנו סכינו ומשאו שהניחן בראש גגו ונפלו ברוח מצויה והזיקו בהדי דקא אזלי, Steine, Messer, Last, die man auf das Dach gelegt und die, durch gewöhnlich vorauszusetzenden Wind hinabgeworfen, im Fallen schaden. Schaden sie בתר דנייהי, nachdem sie zur Ruhe gekommen, so gehören sie zur Kategorie בור (B. K. 6 a).

או השדה OR THE FIELD — because it (the fire) liked up his furrow (the newly broken soil), so that it became hard and he (the owner) has to plough it again (Bava Kamma 60a).

There is, of course, also a moral/ethical approach to this whole paragraph. The Torah describes the wicked practicing their wickedness in order to awaken man from his lethargic and mindless sleep when he observes how evil takes root all around him. The Torah says כי תצא אש, "when fire spreads," a simile traditionally describing people's problems. We find a description of this in Yuma 77 [discussing certain aspects of the prophet Ezekiel's vision in Ezekiel chapter 10, Ed.] where the archangel Gabriel is portrayed as asking the "man clothed in linen," (an angel in charge of fire) to prepare the destruction of Jerusalem by fire. This angel is to be regarded as a symbol of an intensified attribute of Justice at work.

Mit אש sind die ארבעה אבות נזיקין, die vier Kategorien schadenbringenden Eigentums: קרן ,בור ,שן ורגל ,אש, oder wie sie in der Mischna aufgezählt sind: השור ,והבור .המבעה ,וההבער, erschöpft. (Im Jeruschalmi werden diese Kategorien der Mischna also den Textesstellen korrespondierend erklärt: השור :זה קרן דכתיב כי יגף שור וגו׳ ,הבור :כי יפתח איש בור וגו׳ ,המבעה :כי יבער איש שדה ושלח זה הרגל ובער זה השן ,וההבער :כי תצא אש וגו׳. Im Babli werden diese Kategorien der Mischna anders aufgefasst). Sie werden in dem Gesamtbegriff zusammengefasst: הצד השוה שבהן שדרכן להזיק ושמירתן עליך וכשהזיק חב המזיק לשלם תשלומי נזק במיטב הארץ "es sind schadenbringende Güter, deren Überwachung dir obliegt, und wenn eines derselben Schaden angerichtet, ist der Schädiger zum Schadenersatz mit besten Gütern verpflichtet" (B. K. 2 a). Sie differieren in der Eigentümlichkeit, dass bei קרן ein Unterschied ist zwischen תם und מועד, dass שן ורגל in רה׳׳ר ersatzfrei sind, dass bei בור für כלים und מיתת האדם kein Ersatz und כופר stattfindet, und dass אש einerseits bei טמון ersatzfrei bleibt, andererseits selbst für Beschädigung nicht verbrennbarer Güter Ersatz eintritt (das. 5 b).

שלם ישלם המבער HE THAT KINDLED [THE CONFLAGRATION] SHALL SURELY PAY — Although he has lit the fire on his own soil and it extended by itself through the thorns which it came across, he has to make restitution because he did not guard his fire (lit., burning coals) that it should not extend and cause damage.

When the Torah speaks of ומצאה קוצים, this is a reference to the wicked who are considered nothing but painful thorns. The expression ומצאה may be understood in a sense similar to Deut. 31,21 that "trouble befell them." The justification for using the word מצאה is that the wicked have no one who is responsible for them, either benevolently or otherwise. Wickedness means rejection of authority. G'd is the only true authority, and He has abandoned them as a result of their deliberate wickedness. Anything that happens in their lives subsequently is in the nature of a מציאה, a find, something one comes upon accidentally. Anyone who encounters such a person may do to him what he wants without divine interference. The verse also informs us that once fire has been given permission to act destructively, i.e. as the attribute of Justice, it will not only burn the thorns but it will also consume the stack of corn (the good, the useful). The choice of the word גדיש is an allusion to youngsters studying Torah, children who have not yet attained the height of adults, i.e. קמה. They are swept away together with the guilty as part of the troubles sweeping society. According to Shir Hashirim Rabbah on Song of Songs 1,4, when G'd was about to give the Jewish people the Torah He demanded guarantors that the people would continue to observe it. After having turned down the patriarchs as suitable guarantors, the Midrash relates that G'd accepted the people's children as their guarantors. This is the meaning of Psalms 8,3: "from the mouths of infants and sucklings You have established strength, etc." As a result of this arrangement the attribute of Justice is entitled to include such children in retribution when these forces are at work.

The Torah says: או הקמה, "or the standing corn;" this is a hint that on occasion when the destructive forces are about to engulf all of mankind, or all of the Jewish people, the choicest of the people are killed as an act of atonement for the members of their generation and in order to ensure that society as such can continue. This too is explained by Shir Hashirim Rabbah in connection with Song of Songs, 1,14 אשכל הכפר, the word הכפר being understood by the Midrash in the sense of כפרה, atonement. The Psalmist (Psalms 92,13) compares the upright posture of the righteous to that of a palm tree. Hence the term קמה describes צדיקים very aptly. On occasion the iniquities of the people have become so great that the death of the righteous is not enough to ensure the survival of the people. This is why the Torah mentions: או שדה, "or a field;" the field is an allusion to the totality of the Jewish people, i.e. there are circumstances when even the death of the children plus the death of the righteous are not sufficient atonement to give the rest of the people another lease on life.

The Torah informs us that a day will come when G'd will make a reckoning with the forces who have initiated all this, and on account of whom G'd had to use the children and the righteous as atonement for the common people. This is the meaning of: שלם ישלם המבעיר את הבערה, "the thorns which have kindled the fire will certainly have to make restitution." Sanhedrin 100 tells us that when the time comes, G'd will make sure that the wicked are tough enough to be able to endure all the suffering G'd has in store for them as part of the restitution they have to make. We have it on the authority of Bereshit Rabbah 63,10 that when the sons of the righteous reach maturity so that they are no longer punished for the sins their parents may have been guilty of, their parents make a feast at which they bless the Lord for having freed their children from being guarantors of the conduct of their fathers. [This appears to be the reverse of fathers blessing the Lord on the day their sons become of age because they, the fathers, are no longer liable for mistakes made by their children. Anyone interested in pursuing this is referred to the commentary of Rabbi David Luria on this Midrash. Ed.] At any rate, G'd punishes the ones who by their actions have released the forces of retribution in the world. The way a person is able to vanquish all these potential fires of his evil urge which if allowed to rage is apt to consume both the children and the righteous together, is if he is truly concerned about all these consequences that his own conduct will evoke and suppresses his evil inclination as a result of such concern. Our sages have taught us in Kidushin 40 that one should always view oneself as if the world teetered on a scale of guilty and innocent and the next action one performs decides in which direction the scales will tilt so that one holds the fate of mankind in one's hands, figuratively speaking. Should one make the wrong move one not only carries the guilt of an untold number of souls but is also responsible for all the souls which will never be born (placed inside bodies) due to the premature death of their parents. Alternatively, the reason the Torah repeats שלם ישלם is an allusion that G'd does not only bring retribution on the person who has started the actual fire but also on the one who has been the ultimate cause of such a fire, i.e. Satan. We have been taught in Sukkah 52 that the day will come when G'd "slaughters" the evil urge, (angel of death). At that time the angel of death will not even be able to escape to Bazrah, a reference to Betzer [the first city of refuge mentioned in the Torah Deut 4,43 Ed.] seeing that he was an intentional killer and as such does not qualify for taking refuge in such a city (compare Makkot 12). The Talmud Baba Kama 60 has interpreted the passage in Isaiah 63 in a different but also homiletical way.

וגנב מבית האיש AND IT BE STOLEN OUT OF THE MAN’S HOUSE — i. e. according to his statement),

IF A MAN DELIVER UNTO HIS NEIGHBOR MONEY OR VESSELS TO KEEP. This section [Verses 6-8] speaks of an unpaid guardian, therefore He has freed him from payment in case the money or vessels are lost or stolen, as is the Tradition of our Rabbis.²⁰⁹Baba Metzia 94b. Scripture mentioned it without specifying what the case is because those who guard money or vessels generally do so without reward. The second section [Verses 9-12] speaking of a paid guardian mentions an ass, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast,²¹⁰Verse 9. because it is the customary way to give over cattle into the hands of shepherds who pasture them for payment.

כסף או כלים, examples of the items most commonly entrusted to one’s neighbour for safekeeping during the owner’s absence from his home. These are looked after on a reciprocal basis, no fee being charged for this service.

כי יתן איש אל רעהו כסף, If a man deliver money to his neighbour (to keep), etc. Our sages in Baba Metzia 94 understood this passage as speaking of a שומר חנם, a trustee who does not get compensation for his trouble. As such he is not liable in the event the item on deposit with him was either stolen or lost. The sages there consider such a trustee as guilty of rendering an oath concerning any kind of misconduct a trustee could have committed. I do not know whence the sages derive their conclusion. The Torah obligated said trustee to swear that he had not been negligent in guarding the item properly against theft or disappearnce. Having sworn this oath he is free of any further liability. Rashi, (folio 95) in his commentary on the case of someone who borrows a neighbour's tools or beasts (without paying for the use) and who was guilty of some form of abuse, writes as follows in his introduction to the discussion of a שומר חנם. "The Torah deals with a situation where a wrong was committed, seeing the Torah uses the expression על כל דבר פשע in connection with the oath to be rendered." Whence does Rashi conclude that verse 6 speaks of a שומר חנם? Perhaps Rashi's reasoning is that the fact that verse 6 describes items such as money or utensils which normally do not require any special supervision seeing that they do not move about. It is likely that these are the items which a neighbour would undertake to guard without compensation. In verse 9, however, the Torah chooses as its examples such animals as a donkey, an ox, etc., animals which require much more supervision, something that one cannot expect from one's neighbour unless one pays him for his troubles.

כי יתן איש אל רעהו כסף או כלים, in this paragraph the Torah releases the guardian of responsibility for loss by natural causes or thievery when the custodian in question does not receive compensation for his looking after the items in question. In the second paragraph the custodian of whom the Torah speaks is a שומר שכר, a paid trustee. According to the plain meaning of the text, in the first paragraph the Torah speaks of chattels which are to be kept in the house of the trustee just as his own chattels. He is supposed to treat them with no less care than he treats his own chattels. This is why if they were stolen from his house he is free from responsibility, as he had guarded them as well as he guards his own property. In the second paragraph the Torah lists as examples of what had been given to the trustee animals, objects requiring to be tended, to be fed, etc. Moreover, such animals are usually grazing in the pasture and not under the constant supervision of their owners. If the trustee undertook to look after them, something involving a lot of attention and time, he would not do this unless he would receive compensation for such an undertaking. Seeing the trustee is being paid, he is liable for restitution if any of these animals are stolen while under his care.

כי יתן איש אל רעהו כסף או כלים, “When a man entrusts his neighbour with silver or chattels for safe-keeping;” the first paragraph in this sequence deals with someone who does not receive compensation for looking after his friend’s valuables in his own house. The reason why the Torah singled out money or vessels is that these are the most common items a person asks his neighbour to keep for him during his absence from home. The next paragraph deals with a situation where the guardian of his friend’s property is compensated for his trouble. This is why the Torah chose domestic animals as the example of what is to be guarded, as these require time-consuming care, not like money or vessels. It may therefore be presumed that the owner offered to compensate his neighbour for his trouble.

According to his own testimony. Rashi, [in explaining that the theft is not an established fact,] is answering the question: But it says afterwards (v. 7), “He must come before the judges [to swear]” — [and why should he swear, if we already know?] Furthermore, how could Chazal say that “If the thief is not found,” it means that the watchman stole it himself? Yet here it says, “And they are stolen,” apparently meaning that they were surely stolen. [Therefore Rashi explains that this is not an established fact; rather it is the watchman’s claim.]

V. 6. Mit VV. 6—14 betreten wir das Gebiet der aus freiwillig übernommenen Verpflichtungen resultierenden Rechtsfolgen. Vier Rechtsverhältnisse werden entwickelt: שומר חנם ,שומר שכר ,שוכר ,שואל: der unbezahlte Hüter, der bezahlte Hüter, der Mieter, der Anleiher von Sachen. In den Problemen, an welchen der Text diese Rechtsverhältnisse entwickelt, und in den darüber ausgesprochenen Bestimmungen sind zugleich folgenreiche Grundsätze des zivilrechtlichen Prozesses überhaupt niedergelegt.

כסף או כלים לשמור, “money or chattels for safekeeping.” Rashi here states that in this verse the Torah speaks of a shomer chinom, of a friend or relative who undertook this task without charging a fee. The logic is that when you undertake to look after such things as money or inert chattels, no additional labour or expense is involved by the party under whose care this service is performed. He simply stores these items in the same place where he stores his own valuables. This is why, if they were stolen or lost, the keeper is not held responsible as he had given them the same attention as he had given to his own valuables.

אם ימצה הגנב ישלם IF THE THIEF BE FOUND HE — the thief — SHALL PAY שנים DOUBLE to the owner (to the bailor not to the bailee) (Bava Kamma 63b).

AND IT BE STOLEN OUT OF THE MAN’S HOUSE. Rashi explained it as meaning that it was stolen out of the man’s house “according to his statement,” meaning that this is what the unpaid guardian claims.²¹¹It cannot mean that it was admittedly stolen, for then how could Scripture say in the next verse that if the thief was not found, the guardian must swear, since it is admitted that it was stolen from him? Hence the verse must mean that he claims it was stolen. Scholars have brought parallel cases in Scripture [as proof to Rashi’s explanation]. Thus: If there arise in the midst of thee a prophet;²¹²Deuteronomy 13:2. The case there speaks of a false prophet. The term “prophet” must therefore be understood as “one who claims to be a prophet.” Hananiah the son of Azzur the prophet,²¹³Jeremiah 28:1. [The reasoning is as in the previous Note.] for he is not referred to by that epithet [“prophet”] as a true description, but only because he claimed to be so. But there is no need for this. For Scripture is stating that if it was really stolen out of the man’s house and the thief be found, he shall pay double; and if the thief be not found,²¹⁴Verse 7. they shall come to court and the guardian shall swear concerning the stolen article whether he have not put his hand unto his neighbor’s goods,²¹⁴Verse 7. and he whom the court condemns as the thief of this article shall pay double,²¹⁵Verse 8. as the court will not convict anyone and make him pay double unless he stole it, since the law of twofold restitution applies only to a thief, as He said above, If the theft be found in his hand alive… he shall pay double.²¹⁶Verse 3.

אל רעהו, to his neighbour, etc. Our sages in Baba Metzia 56 understand this word as excluding a situation where the item was deposited with the Temple Treasurer for safe-keeping. The reason that such a Temple treasury is not liable for any damages is that there is no time when G'd Himself does not supervise everything entrusted to the Temple treasury. Requiring confirmation by an oath would be most inappropriate then.

Wie aus dem Text erhellt, sprechen VV. 6 —8 von einem Hüter, der nicht für Diebstahl einzustehen hat. פטור בגנבה, VV. 9 —12 jedoch von einem Hüter, der auch was ihm gestohlen wird zu ersetzen hat, חייב בגנבה, und nur ersatzfrei ist, wenn der Gegenstand in von ihm unmöglich zu verhütender Weise zu Grunde gegangen, פטור באונסין, er ist frei für "übermächtigen Zwang", wenn z. B. ein Tier מת, eines natürlichen Todes gestorben, oder נשבה, ihm mit übermächtiger Hand entrissen worden. Die tradierte Halacha lehrt, dass das erste Problem vom שומר חנם, dem unbezahlten Hüter, spricht, das zweite vom שומר שכר, vom bezahlten. Der nicht bezahlte Hüter sagt dem anvertrauten Gute, stillschweigend, eine solche Obhut zu, wie man gewöhnlich auch dem eigenen Eigentume zuwendet, das man zu Zeiten, z. B. nachts, sich begnügt, einem wohlverschlossenen Gewahrsam zu überlassen. Der bezahlte Hüter sagt aber, stillschweigend, dem anvertrauten Gegenstande seine unausgesetzte persönliche Gegenwart zu, er ist also selbst ersatzpflichtig, wenn ihm der Gegenstand aus einem wohlverschlossenen Gewahrsam vermittelst Einbruchs gestohlen wird, sobald er ihn aus seiner persönlichen Obhut gelassen. (B. K. 57 a תוספו׳ ד׳ה כגון שטענו. B. M. 93 b 313,2 ח׳׳מ .להכי יהבי לך אגרא לנטורי לי נטירותא יתירתא). Die Wahl der Gegenstände und Ausdrücke in den beiderseitigen Problemen unseres Textes entsprechen ganz diesen Bestimmungen. Das Problem des שומר חנם nennt "Geld oder Geräte" als anvertraute Gegenstände, somit solche, die man in der Regel nicht durch stete persönliche Gegenwart schützt, sondern sich begnügt, sie in ein sicheres Gewahrsam niederzulegen. Ihnen sagt der Hüter nur "sein Haus" zu. (Vergl. תוספ׳. B. M. 41 b ד׳׳ה לומר.) Darum auch: ונקרב בעל הבית וגו׳, וגנב מבית האיש. Beim שומר שכר ל werden hingegen Tiere, חמור או שור וגו׳ somit solche Objekte genannt, die in der Regel durch persönliche Gegenwart geschützt werden. Darum auch: ואם גנב יגנב מעמו, der anvertraute Gegenstand war nicht bloß durch sein "Haus", sondern durch seine "Person" zu schützen.

וגנב מבית האיש, “and it has been stolen from the house of the man;” the reason for this verse is to tell us that what follows applies only if these goods had been stolen from the original keeper, not if in the meantime they had been stolen again from the thief. ישלם שנים, “the second party will not only have to make restitution but will have to pay double as if he had stolen it in the first place. The reason is that this so called “safekeeper,” had explained the object’s disappearance by claiming that it had been stolen from him. His penalty is the same as if he personally had stolen it.

כסף או כלים, money or utensils, etc. The Torah did not really have to write more than "when a man gives to his neighbour to keep, etc." Verse eight already lists all the various things which are subject to safe-keeping. Our sages deduce from here all the details of liability if the trustee did not exercise due care. If the verse had spoken about a keeper who does not receive compensation, the Torah needed to mention only money, why did the Torah add the additional "or utensils?" The Mechilta suggests that just as money is something one is in the habit of counting, the utensils mentioned are also of the kind which are normally counted; this statement is used for the principle that any claim not involving something that can be measured, counted, or weighed is not a true claim. Thus far the text of the Mechilta. There is no contradiction with what we have written. I believe that an additional reason for the Torah writing the word כלים is to tell us that even if the keeper was willing to compensate the owner by paying for the missing utensils he has not thereby discharged his liability of swearing an oath that he was not negligent in his guardianship. In chapter six of his Hilchot She-eylah u-Pikadon Maimonides writes that if the utensil in question was in good condition at the time he received it, the keeper has to render an oath (concerning his not having been at fault if it disappeared). While it is true that Maimonides considers this rule merely of rabbinic origin, he regards the Torah's words: "if he did not put his hands במלאכת רעהו," as proof that the only way the utensil was identifiable was that it was the work of his neighbour. Even if one could not identify it by size, weight or quantity, the keeper still has to render an oath if he claims he had lost it or that it had been stolen.

וגֻנַב, nicht wie V. 11. גנב יִגָנֵב im נפעל, durch welches der Diebstahl als Tatsache festgestellt würde, sondern im פועל, in welchem die Urheberschaft des Nichtvorhandenseins des Gegenstandes völlig unentschieden gelassen ist, בנין שלא נזכר שם פועלו nach dem Ausdruck der jüdischen Grammatiker. Es wird damit nur die Behauptung des Hüters ausgesprochen: טוען טענת גנב.

ישלם שנים לרעהו. He is to pay twice its value to his fellowman, i.e. the one who had entrusted the object to him. This appears to contradict another verse in Leviticus 5,24 where we have been told that when someone had sworn a false oath concerning illegally misappropriated property, that he had to pay a penalty of only one fifth of the value of said property. How do we reconcile these two verses?When someone had admitted his fault after first having denied it on oath, he repays the value of said object and adds one fifth [of the value plus a penalty of 25%, actually, so that of the combined value the portion that is penalty represents one fifth. Ed.] whereas if he had denied it and was found guilty through witnesses testifying against him, he has to pay twice the value of the stolen object as penalty including the original value of the misappropriated object. (Mechilta Mishpatim, 15)

לשמור, to keep safe, etc. In his Mechilta Rabbi Yishmael describes a scenario according to which the owner deposited the items in the home of the keeper and told him: "keep it safe for me." If, however, he merely said to him: "your eyes are on it," the neighbour bears no responsibility. In Baba Kama 93 the sages interpret the word לשמור, to guard, as excluding liability for losing it, tearing it, or money which had been intended for distribution to the poor. It is evident from the words of Tossaphot on that folio that the Rabbi only meant to exonerate the keeper from negligence if the owner had not used the words: "keep it safe for me." If, however, the keeper had damaged or abused the utensil in question with his own hands he is still liable for compensating the owner unless the owner had specifically authorised the keeper to destroy the item in question. I find it hard to understand how the sages could deduce two separate exclusions from the word לשמור, A) that if the owner had not specifically worded his request by saying "keep it safe for me" that the keeper would not be liable for negligence, and b) that if the owner told the keeper to destroy it that he would not incur a penalty for doing so? I believe that the interpretation in the Mechilta is soundly based on our accepted principles of exegesis, whereas the statement in Baba Kama is merely based on logic. The author of that theory used the wording of the verse as an אסמכתא, a loose link to the written Torah, in order to support a rabbinic decree. You ought to realise that the reason the sages added the clause of excluding the keeper's liability if the ultimate designation of that money had been distribution of it to the poor, is based on the fact that it is money which has no legal claimants. Rabbi Yoseph cites an occurrence in which a purse full of money for the poor in Pumbedita arrived there. Rabbi Yoseph entrusted this money for safe-keeping to a trustee; the money was then stolen from said trustee due to the latter's negligence, and Rabbi Yoseph declared the keeper as liable to replace it. Abbaye queried this, citing a Baraitha in which the words לשמור ולא לחלק לעניים are used as the basis for exonerating the keeper from liability. Thereupon Rabbi Yoseph countered that this applied only if the money had not been allocated for the poor in a specific location (compare Rashi there). In that instance, however, the money had been intended for the poor people of Pumbedita and each one of them had a claim to a certain portion of this money. Seeing the matter is so, there was no need for the Torah to write a special exclusion such as the word לשמור in order to teach us that the keeper is not liable for money which has no legal claimants. As soon as the money had been designated for the poor, the owner, i.e. the person entrusting the purse containing such money to a neighbour for safe-keeping, no longer owned it and therefore could not hold anyone responsible for it. It should not make any difference whether the person entrusting the purse of money had told the keeper to distribute it to the poor or not; the keeper should be free from liability as the money has no legal claimants. The proof for this argument lies in Abbaye's query. What was Abbaye's argument? Perhaps in the case of Rabbi Yoseph the person handing the purse to the trustee had told him specifically: "guard it well?" Why did Abbaye not use the stronger argument that we can prove from the Baraitha that unless the trustee had been told specifically: "guard it well," he had not accepted liability for negligence even if the money had not been intended for distribution to the poor at all? Furthermore, the sages state in that Baraitha that Rabbi Nathan interpreted the word לשמור as including anything which is comparable to either money or utensils.

אם ימצא הגנב, B. K. 63 b erklärt eine Auffassung diesen Satz des V. 6 von גנב עצמו von dem Fall, dass der Dieb wirklich gesunden wird, und erst V. 7 u. 8 bespricht den Fall טוען טענת גנב, dass der Hüter den Diebstahl behauptet und beschwört. und es stellt sich hintennach heraus, dass er selbst der Dieb ist. Eine andere Auffassung erklärt auch schon V. 6 von diesem Fall des טוען טענת גנב ונמצא שהוא עצמו גנבו, und würde dann das אם ימצא הגנב zu übersetzen sein: "wenn er als der Dieb befunden wird, so hat er, der als Dieb befundene Hüter, zwiefach zu zahlen", und enthielte dann V. 7 u. 8 die nähere Erläuterung, dass diese doppelte Ersatzpflicht nur nach vorgängigem falschem Reinigungseide eintritt. Aus der Verhandlung daselbst ist jedoch ersichtlich, dass, wenn Die Worte אם המצא תמצא (V. 3) als Ausdruck des als Halacha rezipierten Rechtssatzes: מודה בקנס ואח׳׳כ באו עדים פטור verstanden werden, unser Satz אם ימצא הגנב vom גנב עצמו zu verstehen sei, und folgt daher unsere Übersetzung dieser Auffassung.

אם לא ימצא הגנב IF THE THIEF BE NOT FOUND then this bailee — who is בעל הבית “the owner of the house” for the time being (since the bailment is then in his possession although he is not really its owner) — shall come.

WHETHER HE HAVE NOT PUT HIS HAND UNTO HIS NEIGHBOR’S GOODS. In the opinion of Rashi this means that the guardian is to come before the judges to swear that he has not put his hand to his fellow-man’s goods [i.e., that he is not guilty of embezzlement]. The correct interpretation is that he is to come before the judges to swear that it was stolen and thus substantiate his claim, but he can only swear thus if he did not put his hand to make use of his neighbor’s goods, for he who puts to his own use what had been left in his keeping is answerable for it as if he were a robber, and is liable to make restitution even if it was lost through an unavoidable accident.²¹⁷Baba Metzia 41a.

אם לא שלח ידו, if the trustee had done anything illegal with the object entrusted to him for safekeeping he is responsible even for accidents happening to said items.

'אם לא ימצא הגנב ונקרב וגו, the words אם לא ימצא are understood by our sages (Baba Kamma 63) as meaning that the trustee claimed the animals had been stolen, while in effect he himself had stolen them. If he swore an oath before the judges that he was not involved in their disappearance and he is found afterwards to have perjured himself then he must compensate the owner by paying him twice the value of the “stolen” animals. Personally, I will explain the verse in terms of the plain text, although this does not reflect the halachah. The words אם לא ימצא הגנב ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלוהים, refer to the trustee. שלא שלח ידו במלאכת רעהו, he swears that he personally had not been guilty of appropriating any of his fellow man’s goods but that those that are missing were stolen. On the basis of such an oath he is exonerated from all responsibility.

ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלוהים,...עד האלוהים יבא דבר שניהם. אשר ירשיעון אלוהים, “then the householder shall approach the court.....to the court shall come both their claims....whomever the court shall find guilty shall pay.” In this short paragraph the word Elohim appears three times. This prompted our sages in Sanhedrin 3 to rule that a court must consist of a minimum of three judges. You will note that in the whole portion commencing with chapter 21 up until here the four-lettered name of G’d has not appeared even once. The reason for this is spelled out in Deut. 1,17 כי המשפט לאלוהים הוא, “for justice is a matter which is the domain of (the attribute) Elohim.” The only time the tetragrammaton is mentioned is in connection with the oath where the Torah defines such an oath as שבועת י-ה-ו-ה; we have already explained that theקו האמצעי is the principal emanation associated with an oath. It is therefore logical that such an oath should be described as sworn in the name of the attribute Hashem. The word שבעה is spelled without the letter ו, to show its connection with the lower seven emanations as we have explained repeatedly in Yitro 20, 7 as well as in Genesis 21,23.

V. 7. ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהי׳ ist Ausdruck für den Reinigungseid, den er zu schwören hat, korrespondierend dem שבעת ד׳ תהיה בין שניהם des V.10 (B. K. 63 b). Die Wurzel קרב kommt nur noch einmal im נפעל vor (Josua 7, 14): ונקרבתם בבקר לשבטיכם, in der Geschichte Achans, und bezeichnet es dort ebenso ein Hintreten zum Gottesurteil zur Reinigung von dem Verbrechen des Sich-Vergreifens an der entlobten Beute Jerichos. Wir haben schon zu Bereschit 21, 23 u. Schmot 20, 7 erläutert, wie der Begriff des Eides, הִשָבֵעַ, ein "Unterstellen seiner ganzen sichtbaren Existenz unter die den Meineid strafende Macht des unsichtbaren Einen" sei. Dieses "sich Gott dahin stellen" scheint hier durch הִקָרֵב ausgedrückt zu sein. Obgleich daher das האלהי׳ hier חול ist und somit zunächst Richter bedeutet, so glauben wir doch, dass in dieser Ausdrucksweise der Richter ganz besonders als Vertreter des Gottesrechts und des Gottesgerichtes gedacht sei, und haben es daher "sich Gott nahe stellen" übersetzt. Das anvertraute Gut war ihm als בעל הבית übergeben, dass er es "durch sein Haus" wie sein eigenes Eigentum geschützt sein lasse. Er behauptet, es sei ihm gestohlen worden, Zeugen sind nicht dafür da, ונקרב בעל הבית וגו׳, so hat er denn als "Herr des Hauses" sich mit seinem Hause im Reinigungseide Gott zu unterstellen und die Existenz seines ganzen "Hauses", das ist ja nichts anderes, als die Existenz seines ganzen Besitzes und seine Persönlichkeit als Besitzer, für den Fall einzusetzen, wenn sein Wort nicht wahr und das Gut noch in seinem Besitze sein sollte.

ונקרב בעל הבית, “the owner has to come to court for the purpose of confirming his claim by an oath;” This rule is applicable if he had claimed not to have misappropriated said object or objects which had disappeared. If he had claimed that the object or animal had become the victim of wild beasts, etc. he is only asked to produce evidence supporting his claim before a court.

ונקרב אל AND SHALL APPROACH UNTO THE אלהים — the judges, to put his case against the other and to swear unto him that he has not put forth his hands against his property (Bava Kamma 63b).

אם לא שלה ידו במלאכת רעהו. Sonderbarerweise nimmt man diesen Satz hier und so auch V. 10 als Inhaltsobjekt des zu leistenden Eides, ohne zu bedenken, dass (wie wir dies bereits zu Bereschit 21, 23 bemerkt und erläutert), konstant beim Eide mit אם verneint, und mit אם לא bejaht werde. Demgemäß hieße שבועה אם לא שלה וגו׳: Schwören, dass er seine Hand an das Gut gestreckt, und wenn er dies im Eide verneinen sollte, müsste es heißen: אם לא שלח ידו וגו׳ .שבועה אם שלח וגו׳, kann daher unmöglich den Inhalt des Eides angeben sollen und ist durchaus nur konditional zu verstehen: wenn er nicht seine Hand an das Gut des Nächsten gestreckt. So ergibt sichs auch aus B. K. 107 b. Das ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהי׳ ist durchaus absolut zu verstehen. אם לא ימצא הגנב, wenn der Dieb nicht gerichtlich gefunden wird, d. h. wenn er den behaupteten Diebstahl nicht durch Zeugen erweisen kann, ונקרב וגו׳, so hat der Herr des Hauses, oder: so hat er als Herr des Hauses sich Gott nahe zu stellen, d. h. er hat sich als Herr des Hauses hinsichtlich seiner ganzen Verfahrungsweise als solcher in betreff des seinem Hause anvertrauten Gutes durch einen Eid vor dem Gerichte zu reinigen und ist dann ersatzfrei — vorausgesetzt אם לא שלח וגו׳, dass er seine Hand nicht bereits vor dem behaupteten Diebstahl "an das anvertraute Gut gestreckt hatte"; d h. nicht bereits im Begriff gewesen, es in Gebrauch zu nehmen. Denn in dem Momente hätte er aufgehört, zu dem Gegenstande als שומר zu stehen und wäre in Beziehung auf ihn גזלן geworden. Als solcher aber wird er sofort für alles, was auch dem Gegenstande zustoßen möge, also auch für Diebstahl, dem Eigentümer ersatzpflichtig.

במלאכת רעהו, a somewhat strange sounding expression; it means: “something belonging to his fellowman;” we find a similar construction in Genesis 33,14: לרגל המלאכה, Yaakov referring to his livestock.

Der ihm durch ונקרב וגו׳ auferlegte Reinigungseid umfasst alle Momente seiner Beziehung zu dem Gute. ג׳ שבועות משביעין אותו, er hat drei Eide zu schwören: שבועה שלא פשעתי בה, dass er den Diebstahl nicht durch vernachlässigte Hut verschuldet habe, in welchem Falle er zum einfachen Ersatz verpflichtet wäre. ,שבועה שלא שלחתי בו יד dass er es nicht zum Gebrauch in die Hand genommen, in welchem Falle er ebenfalls, wie bereits bemerkt, zum einfachen Ersatz verpflichtet wäre. שבועה שאינו ברשותי, dass er es in der Tat nicht mehr im Besitze habe; fände es sich nachher, dass er das vorgeblich Gestohlene noch im Besitze habe, so hätte er sodann nach V. 8 als selbst der Dieb die Doppelpön zu zahlen (das.).

שליחות יד בפקדון mit der Absicht in die Hand nehmen entweder לגוזלו, es sich ganz anzueignen, oder es in einer Weise zu gebrauchen, dass es dadurch leiden würde, selbst wenn die Absicht nicht ausgeführt worden. Sobald die Absicht nur begonnen hat Tat zu werden, d. h. mit dem in solcher unrechtfertigen Absicht in die Hand nehmen, wird er חייב באונסין, hat er für alles, was auch dem Gute zukommen möge, vollen Ersatz zu leisten; denn שליחות יד אינה צריכה חסרון, denn beim שומר braucht die dem anvertrauten Gute schädliche Absicht nicht ausgeführt zu sein. Wenn jedoch die Benutzung dem Gegenstande in keiner Weise nachteilig ist, so macht nicht die Absicht, sondern der wirkliche Gebrauch als שואל שלא מדעת zum גזלן und als solchen für alle Fälle ersatzpflichtig (B. M. 41 a, Ch. M. 292). Siehe oben zu Kap. 21, 37. אם לא שלח ידו ב־ steht hier ganz in dem Sinne wie: על אשר שלח ידו ביהודיים beim Haman (Esther 8, 7), wo es ebenfalls die unausgeführte feindliche Absicht bedeutet.

Mit großer Feinheit wird hier bei שליחות יד das Gut des Nächsten mit dem seltenen Ausdruck: מלאכת רעהו bezeichnet. Es heißt dies ja buchstäblich: das seinem Nächsten zu Gebote stehende, das seinem Nächsten "Botmäßige" (von מלאך, Bote). Es handelt sich ja hier nur um einen augenblicklichen unberechtigten Gebrauch des fremden Eigentums und ist daher mit מלאכת רעהו der Begriff des verbrecherischen Charakters der Handlung ausgesprochen. Obgleich ihm anvertraut, steht die Disposition, die Gebrauchsverfügung über das Gut, doch nicht ihm, sondern dem Eigentümer zu. Es ist: מלאכת רעהו.

על כל דבר פשע FOR ALL MANNER OF TRESSPASS in which he (the bailee) is proved a liar in respect of his oath (i. e. is convicted of perjury), because witnesses testify that he himself has stolen it and the judges condemn him on the evidence of the witnesses,

WHEREOF ONE SAITH: ‘THIS IS IT.’ Rashi comments: “according to the literal sense it means: that which the witness will say ‘this is it — this is that article about which you have taken an oath [that it was stolen from you] but see, it is in your possession!’ And our Rabbis have explained that the phrase this is it teaches us that an oath cannot be imposed [by the court on a defendant] unless he admits part of the claim, saying ‘I owe you so and so much, but the rest was stolen from me.’”²¹⁸But if he denied the claim altogether, he is free from having to take an oath of the Torah. The Rabbis, however, instituted a consuetude oath in such cases (Shebuoth 40 b).
But this principle of partial admission which the Rabbi [Rashi] has written here, is in accordance with the opinion of certain individual Rabbis [in the Talmud],²¹⁹Rabbi Chiya bar Aba in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, and Rami bar Chama (Baba Kamma 106-107 a). but is not the accepted decision of the law, for guardians [to incur liability to an oath] need not partially deny and partially admit the claim,²²⁰In other words, while the principle of partial admission applies to claims of debts, in the case of claims in guardianship, the accepted decision of the law is that the guardians need not partially admit the claim in order to be liable an oath of the Torah. The above interpretation of Rashi agrees therefore only with the opinion of certain individual Rabbis, but is not the accepted opinion. but even if they claim that the whole article was stolen, they still have to take the oath of the guardians, [unlike debts, which, if the debtor denies completely, do not require an oath of the Torah]. Moreover, it has been explained in the Gemara²²¹Baba Kamma 107a. with convincing proofs, that when he denies the very fact that he ever became a guardian, such as where he says “you have never given me the object to keep,” in that case if he denied it totally, he is free from taking an oath, and if he admitted it partially he is obliged to take an oath, this being the opinion of all Rabbis in the Talmud,²²²Ramban is here making an important distinction [in accordance with the teaching of the masters of the Tosafoth — see my Hebrew commentary, p. 430]: If the guardian sets up the kind of defense which can apply to cases of guardianship, such as where he says “an unavoidable accident happened to it” [such a defense has no place naturally where one is sued for a plain debt], then there is no distinction between total and partial admission — he is liable to an oath in either case. But where he puts up the kind of defense which can apply also to a debt, such as where he says, “You have never given me the object to keep” [which can apply to a debt as well: “You have never lent me”], then the law of partial admission applies to a guardian as well as to a debtor: if he denies it totally he is free of an oath, and if he admits it partially he is subject to an oath. — A re-reading of Ramban’s words [“Moreover, etc.”] will yield this thought clearly. even though the Rabbi [Rashi] has not written so in his commentaries to the Gemara.²²¹Baba Kamma 107a. If so, we may say that the phrase [this is it — from which we derive the principle of partial admission, as explained above], speaks according to the interpretation of the Sages of a case where the guardian’s defense is: “He never gave me anything to keep,” in which case if he denied it totally he is free of an oath, and if he partially admitted it and partially denied it, he is liable to take an oath.²²³Such as where the claimant said, “I gave you two vessels to keep,” and he replies, “You gave me one to keep, but the other you never gave to me.” Had the defendant claimed so on both vessels, he would be free of an oath of the Torah. However, if his defense had been that an unavoidable accident happened, even if he claimed so on both of them, he would have had to swear [see preceding Note]. Thus the verses are to be explained as follows: If the thief be not found, then the master of the house shall come near unto the judges²¹⁴Verse 7. — for every claim of trespass which he may claim against him, such as: “You were negligent in your guarding it,” or where the guardian says: “this is it, — this is what you have deposited with me, and you did not deposit any more with me” — then the one with whom the article was deposited that the judges will condemn, [upon testimony given before them that he embezzled it], shall pay double unto his neighbor. Thus, both [the debtor and the guardian] pay, but double restitution is only where the guardian claims falsely that it was stolen, and the rule concerning the plea of partial admission applies to all claims, even to loans, robbery and other matters. In all these laws the verses of Scripture are few and the rules many. But there is no need to explain them here, except in order to interpret the verses.

אשר יאמר כי הוא זה, also if the accused says “this is the truth,” implying that only part of the accusation is true. This is what is called in Talmudic parlance מודה במקצת, a partial admission.

על כל דבר פשע, Concerning any matter of trespass, etc. Our sages in Baba Metzia 57 understand the first words על כל as an inclusive rule, whereas they consider the subsequent details, i.e. שור, חמור, etc., as exclusions of categories not fitting the details mentioned; the final words על כל אבדה are again nterpreted as an all inclusive rule covering any movable object which represents money. This excludes landed property which cannot be moved, slaves which are compared to land, as well as documents which are not viewed as constituting money. Maimonides rules similarly in chapter two of his Hilchot Geneyvah. The plain meaning of this ruling appears to be that if the שומר חנם was negligent in guarding either a slave or documents he would not be liable seeing that he would not even be liable for the disappearance of either money or utensils unless he had been negligent.

על כל דבר פשע...אבדה, concerning any matter entrusted to him involved in an accusation that he had abused his fellow man’s trust, כי הוא זה, identifying it as the very thing he claims had been stolen from him either by a thief or by the trustee; those declared guilty by judges will have to pay double the value of the stolen goods to the person owning it.

Unless he made a partial admission. . . [Rashi knows this] because “Of which [a witness] says, ‘This is it!’” implies that the watchman had previously said to the owner: I owe you only this [part, not more].

V. 8. על כל דבר פשע. Wir folgen hier der als Halacha rezipierten Ansicht des ר׳ חייא בר יוסף (B. K. 107 a): עירוב פרשיות כתוב כאן וכי כתיב כי הוא זה אמלוה הוא דכתיב, und zwar der Erklärung des תוספו׳) ריב׳׳א das.), die auch vom ראש und den späteren Autoritäten adoptiert ist. Diesem gemäß ist die hier niedergelegte Bestimmung über den gerichtlichen Eid nicht nur für den Eid des Hüters, sondern allgemein für jede zivilrechtliche Prozesssache, auch z. B. für die Kategorie "Darlehnsforderung", die V. 24 berührt wird, und daher auch für den Hüterprozess nur in sofern maßgebend, als sich dabei der Eid auf ein den allgemeinen Schuldforderungen homogenes, nicht aber auf ein der Klage aus dem Hüterverhältnis speziell eigentümliches Moment bezieht. Diese Verallgemeinerung der Textesstelle für alle Zwvilrechtsklagen, aus welcher sie zugleich für die Hüterklage, bei welcher sie steht, auf die allgemeinen Momente dieser Hüterklage beschränkt wird, heißt עירוב פרשיות, eine "Zusammenmischung der Rechtskapitel", wodurch eine homogene Anwendung der hier gegebenen Bestimmung über den Eid auf alle homogenen Momente der verschiedenen Fälle gegeben ist. Der Satz כי הוא זה אמלוה הוא דכתיב ist nach dieser Erklärung zu verstehen: בטענה דשייכא במלוה, d. h. in Beziehung auf eine auch bei einer gewöhnlichen Darlehnsforderung stattfindende Einrede. —

על כל דבר פשע, “concerning any matter of trespass, such as, etc.;” concerning this unusual wording, the Midrash points out that the numerical value of the words: כל דבר, “any matter,” is the same as the numerical value of the letters in the name of Aaron, אהרן=256. The Torah continues with the words: על שור, “on account of an ox (calf),” a hint at the damage caused by Aaron who had produced a golden calf from the crucible into which he had thrown the golden jewelry given to him. The word: חמור, “donkey,” is understood by that Midrash as applying to the mixed multitude who had joined the Israelites’ bandwagon at the Exodus, and who had been the first to clamour for a replacement of Moses, who had not returned from the Mountain after 40 days and forty nights without food and drink. (Exodus chapter 32). The word שה in this verse is understood by that Midrash as applying to the Jewish people in Jeremiah 50,17 where he called them שה פזורה, “scattered sheep.” The words: על שלמה, “for a raiment,” are a metaphor for idolatry, a variant of the word צלם idolatrous image, the letter ש substituting for the letter צ, and the vowel patach for the vowel tzeyreh. Both the letter צ and the vowel patach are used interchangeably in the Bible on other occasions. The words: על כל אבדה, “every type of lost object,” are also a metaphor for idolatry. In Deuteronomy 12,2 the Torah commands us to destroy any kind of idolatry which we will find in the land of Canaan. The word used for “destroying” is the word used for “losing” something, i.e. אבד תאבדון. To continue with the interpretation of our verse: the words: אשר יאמר כי הוא זה, of which he says: “this is it,” are a reminder of what the people said of the golden calf when it emerged from the crucible into which Aaron had thrown the men’s gold in Exodus 32,4, when they proclaimed of the golden calf: אלה אלוהיך ישראל אשר העלוך מארץ מצרים, “these are your gods Israel which have taken you out of Egypt.” The words: עד האלוהים, normally translated as “to a judge,” refer to Moses whom G–d had described as being an elohim compared to Aaron (Exodus 7,1) who would be his interpreter in his dealings with Pharaoh. The words: יבא דבר שניהם, “shall the matter of their litigation be presented,” refer to G–d and Aaron respectively, whereas the words: אשר ירשיעון, “whom they condemn” refer to Moses, whereas the words:ישלם שנים, “he will repay twofold,” refer to the two sons of Aaron, Nadav and Avihu, who paid with their lives for having brought alien fire on the censers on which they presented incense. (Leviticus 16,1) Thus far Tanchuma on section eight of his commentary on Parshat Acharey Mot.

ישלם שנים לרעהו HE SHALL PAY THE DOUBLE TO HIS FELLOW-MAN — Scripture teaches you that in a case of a bailment where one pleads that it has been stolen from him and it is proved that he himself has stolen it he is liable to pay “kefel” (twice the value of the article) to the owner. When, however, does this law hold good? In the case that he has taken an oath that it has been stolen from him and witnesses afterwards appear and testify to the contrary. For our Rabbis expound this phrase as follows: (Bava Kamma 63b) “and the owner of the house shall approach unto the judges” — this “approaching the judges” is an expression signifying the taking of an oath. You say that it means approaching the judges in order to take an oath, but perhaps this is not so, and it means that he approaches them to put his case, and that the meaning of the verse is. that as soon as the bailee appears before the court and denies any liability, saying, “it has been stolen” from me, he at once becomes liable to pay double if witnessess appear who testify that the bailment is still in his possession? You certainly cannot argue thus! For “conversion” (שליחות יד) is mentioned here and later on (v. 10) it is mentioned again: “Then shall the oath of the Lord be between the two of them, if he hath not put his hand (אם לא שלח ידו) unto his fellow-man’s goods”. — Now, what is the meaning of the phrase in the latter case? It is evident from what precedes it that it is a matter of taking an oath! So also here it is a matter of taking an oath. (Bava Kamma 63b).

עד האלוהים יבא דבר שניהם, both claimant and defendant are to render an oath. It does not matter whether the subject matter under dispute is a loan and whether it has been repaid, or something entrusted for safekeeping; in either case the claim being admitted partially.

I have found the following statement by Maimonides in chapter two of his Hilchot Sechirut: "It appears to me that if the unpaid keeper was negligent in his supervision of slaves entrusted to him for safe-keeping, or in similar situations, he is liable to make restitution. The only reason we find an exemption to such liability in the case of slaves, documents, and lands, is when they have been stolen or lost and the keeper does not have to render an oath as to his not having been negligent. If, however, there is evidence of the keeper having committed a trespass, we follow the rule that everyone who commits a trespass is treated as if he had caused actual damage and has to make restitution. There is no distinction in such a situation between lands, documents, and movable objects considered as equivalent to money. Anyone examining this will find that this ruling is absolutely correct. Thus far Maimonides on the subject. Various commentators disagree with Maimonides on this, however. Their argument is that if the keeper (also a borrower) had indeed committed an actual trespass in the presence of the owner, he would not have been considered as guilty as the Torah states specifically that if the animal he borrowed died while the owner was present (i.e. had approved of the activity to which the borrower put such animal) the borrower does not have to pay (22,23). This includes a situation when the borrower was clearly guilty of trespass. Maimonides himself writes in chapter one of his Hilchot Sechirut that "even if he was guilty of trespass, i.e. negligent guardianship, as long as he had obtained permission for the activity the borrowed animal performed, the borrower is free from paying compensation. Maimonides cites Exodus 22,23 as proof for his ruling. Clearly, we cannot compare the law applicable to someone who is merely guilty of negligence to someone who has caused damage with his own hands. The פושע, negligent person, is neither in the category of a guardian nor is he an actual מזיק, spoiler. He is a person who had absented himself from his task of guarding an object, as a result of which the object entrusted to him disappeared. The spoiler, on the other hand, caused the damage himself. As a result the commentators query how it is possible that such a spoiler should not be responsible for his actions? At the very least the unpaid keeper should have to swear that he was not negligent seeing that if he was negligent he is guilty.

Diese Verallgemeinerung unseres Textes über den gerichtlichen Eid dürfte schon in den Worten: על כל דבר פשע ausgesprochen sein. V. 7 war in dem: ונקרב בעל וגו׳ der gerichtliche Reinigungseid für den Diebstahl des anvertrauten Gutes behauptenden Hüter ausgesprochen. Daran knüpft das Gesetz die Lehre über den gerichtlichen Eid überhaupt und sagt in Parenthese: על כל דבר פשע וגו׳ אשר יאמר כי הוא זה עד האלהי׳ יבא דבר שניהם ,bei jeder Anschuldigung (Klage), wo er (der Beklagte) sagt: "es ist dies", "hat bis zu Gott das Wort beider zu kommen", d. h. ist im Eide Gott die Entscheidung zu unterstellen. Also auf den Eid ist zu erkennen überall, wo der Beklagte sagt: כי הוא זה. Er sagt: כי הוא, aber: זה, er weist die Klage nicht ganz zurück, ist nicht כופר בכל, sondern er sagt: כי הוא, die Klage sei begründet, aber זה, beschränkt, nicht in der vom Kläger behaupteten Ausdehnung, er ist also מודה במקצת הטענה gesteht einen Teil der Klage zu. In כי הוא liegt die הוראה, er gibt die Klage zu und zwar ממין הטענה, nicht nur im Werte, sondern auch in den geforderten Objekten, also nicht טענו חטין והודה לו בשעורים dass z. B. auf Weizen geklagt und Gerste zugestanden worden. In זה liegt die כפירה, die beschränkende Leugnung. Die Klage lautet auf zwei Maß Weizen, er gesteht ein Maß Weizen zu (Schebuoth 39 b). Es ist hier somit die Bestimmung gegeben, dass שבועה דאורי׳, dass der vom Gesetze statuierte gerichtliche Eid nur bei מודה במקצת, nur bei beschränktem Zugeständnis der Klage, nicht aber bei כופר בכל, nicht aber bei völliger Zurückweisung der Klage eintritt, und zwar wissen wir aus der V. 10 gegebenen Bestimmung ולקח בעליו ולא ישלם dass der Eid nur dem Beklagten zukommt, כל הנשבעים שבתורה נשבעין ולא משלמין (Schebuoth 44 b): "Jeder Eid der תורה tritt nur zum Schutz des angegriffenen Besitzes, zur Zurückweisung, nie zur Begründung einer Klage ein." Es gibt ursprünglich kein נשבע ונוטל, keinen erwerbenden, nur einen freimachenden Eid.

אשר יאמר כי הוא זה means, according to the literal sense, any article about which the witness will say: “this is the very article” about which you have taken an oath that it has been stolen from you; see, it is actually in your possession! — then the matter of dispute between the two of them shall come before the judges. These shall examine the witnesses, and if they prove to be trustworthy and they (the judges) condemn this bailee, then he has to pay double. If, however, they condemn the witnesses because these are found to be “plotting” witnesses (זוממין) then shall they (the witnesses) pay double to the bailee. Our Rabbis, of blessed memory, however, explained that כי הוא זה tells us that no oath can be imposed upon him (the defendant) except if he admits a part of the other’s claim asserting, “So-and-so much I owe you, and the rest has been stolen from me” (according to this explanation the phrase כי הוא זה is not a statement of the witnesses but that of the bailee himself; i. e. he says, כי הוא זה, “it is this only” that you have to claim and not as much as you say) (Bava Kamma 107b).

אשר ירשיעון אלוהים ישלם שנים, when the judges convict the guilty party this is equivalent to a conviction for theft, and the penalty is restitution of twice the amount under dispute. A false claim that something had been stolen is equivalent to the person making the claim being judged a thief.

I believe that the commentators who attacked Maimonides by using the example of a borrower who uses the owner's animals or tools with his permission are quite wrong The situation they cite is an entirely different one from the one discussed by Maimonides. In that case the Torah had stated explicitly that the borrower is free from making restitution. When the Torah excluded an unpaid keeper's liability in the event he has been entrusted with a slave, documents, or land, the Torah nowhere excluded the keeper's liability in so many words even if the keeper was only negligent, never mind if he turned out to be a spoiler (מזיק). The Torah spoke only of a situation when such a keeper "did not put a hand to the matter entrused to him." This means that he is free only if he was not a מזיק. When we do hold an unpaid keeper responsible for lack of care this is only an outgrowth of the law applicable to a מזיק. How could we apply such an exclusion to something the Torah had not mentioned at all as being applicable to any category of a keeper? While it is true that if the negligence of such a keeper was not in the realm of being a spoiler we would have said that the Torah excluded him from all the categories of damage an unpaid keeper is liable for even if this was not mentioned by the Torah specifically. However, once we see that when the sages indict such an unpaid keeper they do so on the basis of the law of the spoiler, how can we suddenly apply such leniency in the matter? This is precisely why Maimonides wrote that the keeper in question must not be exonerated.

Nach der oben gegebenen Interpretation, עירוב פרשיות, gilt nun der allgemeine Kanon: כי הוא זה, d. h. dass der Eid bei beschränktem Zugeständnis, nicht aber bei ,ארבעה שומרין gänzlicher Zurückweisung der Klagforderung einzutreten habe, auch für auch für den Hüterprozess nur hinsichtlich solcher Klag- und Einredemomente, die denjenigen allgemeiner Klagforderungen konform sind, d. h. die sich auf das Faktum der Hutübergabe selbst beziehen. So wie z. B. bei der Darlehnsklage: מנה לי בידך אין לך בידי כלום פטור, dagegen אין לך בידי אלא חמשים זוז חייב, "du bist mir hundert Gulden schuldig", "ich bin dir gar nichts schuldig", frei ist, dagegen: "Ich bin dir nur fünfzig Gulden schuldig" schwören muss, so ist auch bei der Hüterklage: "Ich habe dir zwei Schafe zur Hut übergeben", "du hast mir gar nichts übergeben" frei vom Eide, dagegen: "du hast mir nur ein Schaf übergeben" zum Eid verpflichtet.

You may ask that seeing we treat the negligent keeper in a category similar to that of a spolier, then a householder who set ablaze the stack of corn of a hired hand or the hired hand's garment should equally be exonerated, for the negligent person is equivalent to a spoiler whom the Torah has exonerated. Perhaps the Torah meant to exonerate only a keeper who became a spoiler not any other spoiler such as the householder referred to in the most recent example. Furthermore, it appears that even Maimonides will admit that a negligent person is not considered as exactly in the same class as the spoiler, and that if he burned a garment entrusted to him for safe-keeping by its owner he is obligated to replace it. You will find that Maimonides writes in chapter 21 of his Hilchot Ishut that if a wife broke utensils (of her husband) while engaged in the authorised use of same, she is exonerated by a decree of the rabbis. Thus far Maimonides. Commentators remark on this that the woman should at least have to swear that she had not been careless! Concerning such an oath Maimonides writes in chapter 4 of Hilchot She-eylah u-Pikadon that if someone deposits an object with his neighbour for unpaid safe-keeping and it is stolen, the keeper has to swear that he has not laid a hand on said object; seeing that he already has to swear one oath, he is required to add that he has not been negligent either and that the theft did not occcur after he had laid a hand on the object entrusted to him. We can see from the wording that Maimonides considers the principle of the oath as a biblical injunction which covers only the fact that the object had indeed been stolen and is no longer in the keeper's possession. Maimonides clearly considers the oath that the keeper was not negligent as something secondary, rabbinic in nature. If not for the original oath, the keeper would not have had to swear an oath regarding negligence at all. We do not find one word in the Torah concerning an oath about negligent guardianship. It follows that when there is no injunction in the Torah that an oath has to be sworn, the rabbis have not imposed an oath concerning negligence either.

Einreden jedoch, die nur aus dem eigentümlichen Verhältnis der Hut entspringen, טענת גנבה bei טענת נאנסה ,שומר חנם bei שומר שכר, die Einrede des Diebstahls beim nichtbezahlten, des unabwendbaren Unterganges beim bezahlten Hüter, müssen beschworen werden, selbst wenn dabei kein beschränktes Zugeständnis, wie etwa: "ein Schaf muss ich dir geben, das andere ist gestorben", stattfindet, sondern selbst, wenn mit der Behauptung: alle anvertrauten Schafe seinen gestorben, die Klageforderung in ihrer Ganzheit zurückgewiesen wird.

As a result of the considerations we have just outlined, the exclusion in the Torah which we derived from the list of movable items such as oxen, donkeys, etc., applies only to such oaths in which the keeper declares that he has not himself laid a hand on the objects entrusted to him. If the injured party claims that the keeper has been negligent, he must swear a שבועת הסת, an oath designed to pacify the claimant, an oath instituted by the rabbinic authorities in the period of the Talmud. This oath is mentioned by Rabbi Nachman (Baba Metzia 5) as a rabbinic ordinance. According to the Talmud there the reason we would be unable to apply this oath in the case of Rabbi Yoseph who had entrusted to someone money for safe- keeping is that we do not superimpose one rabbinic ordinance on another. We described the details of the matter of Rabbi Yoseph on page 730. It is clear from Abbaye's question in that story that he felt that the Torah had exonerated the keeper even from the obligations for which a negligent keeper is liable, seeing that there was no one who could legally have claimed this money.

Wir haben hier somit bereits zwei Arten des Klagestandes, in welchen dem Beklagten ein gerichtlicher Eid auferlegt wird: מודה במקצת, das beschränkte Zugeständnis, und שבועת שומרין der Reinigungseid der Hüter, wie שלא פשעתי כה usw. Es gibt nur noch eine dritte Art, womit dann das ganze Ressort der gerichtlichen Eide nach der תורה erschöpft ist, diese ist: עד אחד, die nur durch einen Zeugen unterstützte Klage; überall nämlich, wo zwei Zeugen die Verurteilung zur Zahlung herbeiführen würden, muss der Beklagte einem Zeugen durch einen Eid begegnen, כל מקום ששנים .מחייבין אותו ממון עד א׳ מחייב אותו שבועה (Schebuoth 40. a)

Vergegenwärtigen wir uns den Begriff des Eides überhaupt, des gerichtlichen Eides insbesondere, suchen wir das charakteristisch Gemeinsame dieser drei Arten des Klagestandes, so dürfte das Motiv sich herausstellen, das den gerichtlichen Eid eben nur für diese drei Kategorien verhängt.

שבועה, der Eid, ist ja das Unterstellen der ganzen sichtbaren Existenz unter das göttliche Strafgericht für den Fall der Unwahrheit eines assertorischen (behauptenden), oder der Nichtwahrmachung eines promissorischen (gelobenden) Wortes. Bezieht sich, wie beim gerichtlichen Eide, das Wort auf ein Eigentumsobjekt, so ist der Eid zunächst die Einsetzung des ganzen Besitzstandes für den Fall, dass dieser Besitzstand in Beziehung auf das klägerischerseits in Anspruch genommene Objekt ein rechtswidriger sei. Es begreift sich, dass der gerichtliche Eid nur den Besitzstand schützend eintreten kann. Er setzt das Ganze ein zum Schutz des angegriffenen Teils. Es begreift sich aber auch, dass in zwei Fällen der gerichtliche Eid, dies Unterstellen der Entscheidung unter Gott, das בא דבר שניהם עד האלהי׳, wie es unser Text ausdrückt, unstatthaft ist, sowohl in dem Falle, dass die Klage völlig, als in dem Falle, dass sie gar nicht erwiesen ist. In dem ersten Falle ist der Eid unmöglich, da die Wahrheit des Gegenteils, durch Zeugen oder Geständnis des in seinem Besitzstand angegriffenen Beklagten, für das menschliche Gericht völlig erwiesen ist, somit der Angriff als völlig berechtigt dasteht und das Gericht zur Folge gebenden Vollziehung verpflichtet. In dem zweiten Falle ist der Eid unnötig, der Besitzstand des Angeklagten ist noch gar nicht angegriffen, eine durch nichts unterstützte Anklage ist für das Gericht als noch gar nicht vorhanden zu betrachten. Es kann daher der gerichtliche Eid nur da eintreten, wo die Anklage nicht voll erwiesen, aber auch nicht völlig zurückgewiesen ist, somit der Angriff auf den Besitzstand als geschehen, d. h. als unvollständig gerechtfertigt betrachtet werden muss, so dass, bei mangelndem Gegenbeweis, der angegriffene Besitzstand nur durch Appellation an Gottes Gericht im Eide geschützt werden kann. וכן פי׳ הריטבא ה׳׳ד ׳א׳ר מ׳ב ׳ופסות ׳יע ןכו. ש׳׳ע רבדל םילגר שיש תצקמב הדומ אקודד ׳א׳ג מ׳׳ב מ׳׳ש .הצד השוה

Betrachten wir die drei Kategorien שבועת שומרין ,מודה במקצת und עד אחד, so lassen sie sich unter den gemeinschaftlichen Begriff eines unvollständig angegriffenen Besitzstandes fassen. In מודה במקצת ist der Angriff hinsichtlich des Objektes, in שבועת שומרין hinsichtlich des Grundes, und in עד אחד Beweises unvollständig gerechtfertigt. Der מודה במקצת erkennt die an ihn gemachte Forderung hinsichtlich eines Teils ihres Objektes an, — die Einrede נגנבה oder נאנסה des שומר's erkennt eben damit den Hauptgrund der Forderung, ein noch nicht zurückgeliefertes Gut zur Hut empfangen zu haben, an, behauptet nur aus äußerem, weiterem Grunde der Rücklieferung enthoben zu sein, — durch עד א׳ endlich ist zur Hälfte der Beweis für die Richtigkeit der Forderung geliefert; alle drei Kategorien lassen sich daher unter den Begriff הודאה במקצת in weiterem Sinne fassen ( — denn auch beim מודה במקצת im engern Sinne ist es gleichgültig, ob sein Zugeständnis die Forderung hinsichtlich eines Teils ihres Objektes anerkennt, oder die Richtigkeit der Forderung hinsichtlich eines Teils ihres Objektes durch zwei Zeugen konstatiert ist, שלא תהא הודאת ¬B. K. 3 a) — in allen drei Kategorien ist der Besitz פיו גדולה מהעראת עדים מק׳׳ו stand des Angeklagten durch, in der Sache oder der Form unvollständigen, Beweis angegriffen, und er kann seinen Besitzstand gegen die Präsumtion der vollen Wahrheit der nur halb erwiesenen Klage nur durch einen Eid schützen (vergl. B. M. 4 a. ד׳ה הצד השוה תוספו׳).

Wenn wir somit die begriffliche Gleichartigkeit dieser drei Kategorien, also auch der שבועת שומרין mit הודאה במקצת, einzusehen glauben, indem alle drei sich in tieferm Grunde unter die Formel: אשר יאמר כי הוא זה, d. h. der unvollständig erwiesenen Klage, fassen lassen, so erscheint der Übergang von dem Reinigungseide des Hüters zu dem Kanon der הודאה במקצת durch das generalisierende על כל דבר פשע um so zutreffender. Es ist soviel als: Überhaupt bei jeder nicht ganz zurückgewiesenen, sondern beschränkt zugestandenen Anschuldigung ist דבר שניהם, die Klage und die Einrede, vom menschlichen Gerichte bis zu Gott zu bringen, d. h. Gott im Eide anheimzustellen.

Obgleich jedoch die Bestimmung der תורה in Folge einer unerwiesenen und vom Beklagten völlig zurückgewiesenen Klage diesem keinen Eid auferlegt, so ward doch zur Zeit der Amoraim auch bei völliger Negation der Klage, לא היו דברים מעולם, ein שבועת היסת, ein Geständnis provozierender Eid statuiert. Ein solcher Eid unterscheidet sich von dem שבועה דאוריי׳ unter anderm darin, dass er von dem Beklagten auf den Kläger zurückgeschoben werden kann, מיפך שבועה, was bei dem שבועה דאורי׳ nicht statthaft ist (Schebuoth 41 a).

Durch die exemplifikatorisch genannten Objekte שור חמור שה וגו׳ wird die gerichtliche Eidesleistung nur auf דבר המטלטל וגופו ממון, auf mobile Wertsachen, beschränkt, mit Ausschluss von קרקעות, liegenden Gütern, als nicht mobil, עבדים, Sklaven, die besitzrechtlich Immobilien gleichartig sind, und שטרות, Schuldscheinen, die nur eine Anweisung auf Werte, nicht aber selbst als sachliche Werte zu begreifen sind (Schebuoth 42 b). Ist der gerichtliche Eid, הִשָבֵעַ, zunächst ein Unterstellen des angegriffenen Besitzes unter die vernichtende Strafgerechtigkeit Gottes, wenn er nicht rechtmäßiges Eigentum ist, und darf vielleicht angenommen werden, es beziehe sich ein solches Unterstellen immer zunächst auf solche Güter, zu deren Art das betreffende Objekt des Eides gehört: so ist vielleicht begreiflich, dass der Eid sich nur auf solche Objekte soll beziehen können, a. die wirkliche Besitzgegenstände bilden; also nicht שטרות, Dokumente, deren Vernichtung ja nicht Besitzobjekte an sich, sondern nur Beweise für den Rechtstitel auf solche träfe. Ferner aber b. nur solche, deren Existenz und Bedeutung nicht über die Persönlichkeit des Schwörenden hinüber reichen, die ganz in dessen Persönlichkeit aufgehen, deren Existenz von dem Willen und daher auch von der Würdigkeit ihres Besitzers abhängen können, und die, wenn sie Vernichtung träfe, nur ihm vernichtet würden. Als solche, rein in die Persönlichkeit des Eigentümers aufgehende Güter stehen aber nur מטלטלין, bewegliche Güter da. Sie werden von der Persönlichkeit des Eigentümers ergriffen, sind ganz von ihm abhängig, er kann bis zu ihrer Vernichtung über ihre Existenz verfügen, und gehen sie zu Grunde, so gehen sie in Wahrheit nur ihm zu Grunde. Der Begriff unbeweglicher Güter ist aber nach jüdischer Rechtsanschauung der entgegengesetzte. Das unbewegliche Gut geht nicht in die Persönlichkeit des Eigentümers auf, es wird nicht von ihm erfasst, sondern umgekehrt: הֵאָחֵו ist der Ausdruck für Immobiliarbesitz, der Besitzer wird vom Boden gefasst und getragen, jeder Besitzer ist nur der vorübergehende Nutznießer, die Geschlechter gehen über den Boden hin und jeder Gegenwärtige überlässt den Boden dem kommenden künftigen Besitzer. Es kann aber einer vor Gott für seine Wahrhaftigkeit und Rechtschaffenheit nur das einsetzen, was in Wahrheit "sein" ist und ganz von seiner Persönlichkeit gedeckt wird. Ein Eid auf קרקע riefe für den Fall des Meineids Vernichtung über etwas herab, was weit über die Persönlichkeit des Meineidigen hinausgeht. Eben so und in noch höherem Grade hinsichtlich עבדים, leibeigner Menschen. Der עבד hat eine sittliche, selbständige Stellung und Bedeutung vor Gott und geht keineswegs als bloße Sache ganz in die Person des Herrn auf. Man denke sich das wahnsinnig Grässliche eines Eides, dessen Inhalt sich auf עבדים bezöge. Ein solcher hätte zum Inhalt: Gottes Strafgericht solle den עבד oder alle עבדים des Schwörenden mit Vernichtung heimsuchen, wenn die klägerische Behauptung hinsichtlich eines עבד wahr und das Wort des Schwörenden hinsichtlich eines solchen Meineid wäre! Hier tritt das widersinnig Unsittliche eines solchen Eides deutlich in die Augen, indem damit der rächende Blitz auf das Haupt anderer, Unschuldiger, geleitet würde. Es scheint uns nicht unmöglich, dass solche Erwägungen dem Motive dieser eigentümlichen Gesetzbestimmung nahe kommen dürften. וצ׳ע׳ע דלא משבועה לבד פטורים על אלה אלא מכל דיני ד׳ שומרים עי׳ תוספו׳ .וראש לב׳׳מ נ׳׳ז ב׳ וח׳׳מ ש׳׳א א׳

אשר ירשיעון אלהי׳ וגו׳, bis hierher ist in Parenthese, bei Gelegenheit der Reinigungseide des Hüters, die allgemeine Bestimmung über den gerichtlichen Eid ausgesprochen worden, אשר ירשיעון וגו׳ setzt die Bestimmung über den Diebstahl behauptenden Hüter fort: wenn nach dem geleisteten Eide das Gericht ihn als den Schuldigen findet, es nämlich durch Zeugen konstatiert wird, daß er das angeblich Gestohlene noch im Besitze hat, so hat er als Dieb die Doppelpön dem Eigentümer zu zahlen. Nur wenn er sich durch meineidig beschworene Behauptung des Diebstahls von Rückgabe oder Ersatz des Gutes freigemacht, טוען טענת גנב בפקדון, erliegt er, dem Diebe gleich, der Pön, nicht aber, wenn er dies durch meineidige Beschwörung einer andern Behauptung, z. B. אבדה, מיתה . u. dergl. bewirkt hat: טוען טענת אבדה בפקדון פטור מכפל (B. K. 63 b). Durch טוען טענת גנב hat er eben sich der größten Höhnung des Prinzips der allgemeinen Rechtsachtung, deren Sühne ja die Pön bedeutet, schuldig gemacht, indem er dem vorgeblich gebliebenen Schutze dieses Prinzips das Gut überlassen zu haben eidlich in einem Momente behauptet, in welchem er selbst an diesem Gute das größte Verbrechen gegen das Eigentumsrecht begeht! Der טוען טענת גנב missbraucht das Prinzip der Rechtsachtung zur Rechtshöhnung, ähnlich dem Diebe, dem sein Verbrechen nur durch das Vertrauen möglich wird, mit welchem der Eigentümer sein Gut dem Schutze dieser allgemeinen Rechtsachtung überlassen. Nicht also bei irgend einer andern Behauptung. Dagegen ist טוען טענת גנב באברה pönschuldig, denn auch אבדה ist ein פקדון, und dessen Berger sogar ein שומר שכר (weshalb טוען טענת גנב באבדה nur bei der Behauptung eines solchen Diebstahls möglich ist, hinsichtlich dessen er auch als שומר שכר ersatzfrei wäre. Siehe B. K. 63 b u. 57 a). Siehe zu Kap. 21, V. 37. —

Dass in diesem Satze zugleich die allgemeine Regel מודה בקנס פטור ausgesprochen ist, ist bereits zu V. 3 bemerkt. Es heißt darum auch wohl nicht אשר ירשיעון האלהי׳, wo es sich dann nur auf den vorliegenden Fall, auf das schon vorhin genannte Gericht beziehen dürfte, sondern: אשר ירשיעון אלהי׳, wenn ihn ein Gericht verurteilt, im Gegensatz zu dem freien Selbstgeständnis.

Hinsichtlich der Lehre vom Diebstahl ist noch V. 6 der Ausdruck וגנב מבית האיש zu bemerken, in welchem für die Lehre vom Diebstahl die Klausel enthalten ist: ולא מבית הגנב, der Dieb, der aus dem Hause eines Diebes ein gestohlenes Gut stiehlt, ist frei von der Doppelpön: אין הגונב אחר הגנב משלם תשלומי כפל. Dieser Satz dürfte eine willkommene Bestätigung unserer Auffassung der כפל-Pön bringen. Wer ein Gut nur durch Höhnung des Prinzips der schützenden allgemeinen Rechtsachtung in seinen Besitz gebracht, kann es nicht selbst weiter unter den Schutz desselben stellen.

In die das Problem unseres Textes einleitenden Worte: כי יתן איש אל רעהו כסף או כלים וגו׳ sind noch einige die Persönlichkeit der Parteien, sowie das Objekt der Klage betreffende Bestimmungen niedergelegt: כי יתן אש וגו׳ bedingt die rechtsfähige Mündigkeit des Klägers, אן נתינת קטן כלום, daher der Satz: אין נשבעין על טענת חרש שוטה וקטן, und wird von gewichtigen Autoritäten dieser Satz ganz allgemein, sowohl für מודה במקצת ,שבועת שומרין als für עד אחד verstanden (Schebuoth 38 b, siehe Ch, M. 96, 1).

Durch die das Objekt der Klage bezeichnende Zusammenstellung כסף או כלים, wo כלים als Plural mindestens zwei, und als "Geräte" Objekte von einiger Bedeutung, דבר חשוב, bezeichnet ( — das geringste Gerät, dessen Geldeswert ein verschwindender wäre, z. B. eine Nadel, hat durch seinen Gerätzweck Bedeutung, ist: דבר חשוב —), und durch die Übertragung dieser Eigentümlichkeiten von כלים auf כסף ergibt sich der Satz, dass, obgleich sonst unter כסף auch die geringste Kupfermünze, eine פרוטה, verstanden wird, und diese Wertgröße ausreicht ein Objekt zur gerichtlichen Verhandlung zu bilden, hier doch, wo es einen gerichtlichen Eid provozieren soll, das Objekt der Klage entweder zwei כלים, oder wenn die Klage sich auf Geld oder Geldeswert, z. B. Waren oder Früchte, bezieht, diese mindestens einen Wert von zweien der geringsten Silbermünzen, d. i zwei Gera (גרה Schmot 30, 13), chald. Maah (מעה) repräsentieren müssen, und zwar muß nach רב's rezipierter Erklärung, das Schwurobjekt zwei Maah sein: כפירת טענה שתי כסף, so dass, wenn der Eid durch הוראה במקצת erfolgt, die Klage mindestens שתי כסף ופרוטה betroffen haben muss, wo dann durch das Zugeständnis der שוה פרוטה der Eid die abgeleugneten שתי כסף betrifft; daher der Satz der Mischna: הטענה שתי (Schebuoth 38 a u. 39 b). Ebenso muss, dem Wortlaut כסף וההוראה בשוה פרוטה unseres Textes gemäß, nach welchem כסף או כלים zunächst bei שבועת שומרין, bei den Reinigungseiden der Hüter steht und nur durch עירוב פרשיות (nicht עיקור פרשיות wie ש׳׳אר treffend bemerkt) auch auf andere Klagefälle übertragen wird, nach der von רא׳׳שund רמ׳׳א (CH. M. 88, 5) adoptierten Auffassung auch שבועת שומרין außer bei כלים, die, wie bemerkt, einen Selbstwert haben, ein Schwurobjekt von mindestens dem Werte zweier Maah haben. Jedoch טענת מלוה והעדאת עד אחד, wo der Eid durch das die Forderung des Klägers unterstützende Zeugnis eines Zeugen hervorgerufen wird, da genügt zum Klag- und Schwurobjekt der Wert einer Peruta =1/64 des Wertes von zwei Maah (Schebuoth 40 a). Eine Einsicht in das Motiv dieser Bestimmungen wäre zu wünschen. Dass das Objekt des Schwures mehr als das für eine gewöhnliche Gerichtsverhandlung ausreichende Minimum einer Peruta betragen soll, dürfte aus der Heiligkeit des Eides entspringen. Wenn das Objekt zu irrelevant ist, dürfte es an שבועת שוא grenzen, dass der Kläger auf den Eid besteht und der Verklagte nicht lieber durch Zahlung einer Geringfügigkeit der Eidesleistung entgeht. Bei dem Teilgeständnis, מודה במקצת, und ebenso bei dem Hütereide, שבועת שומרין, liegt gegen die Wahrhaftigkeit des Schwörenden hinsichtlich des Inhalts des. Eides nicht das Geringste vor. Die Präsumtion hinsichtlich des von dem ersten abzuschwörenden Klageteils sowie hinsichtlich des vom letzteren zu beschwörenden Vorganges ist völlig in der Schwebe. Das Gesetz beruhigt sich nur nicht bei seiner bloßen Behauptung, weil beim ersten hinsichtlich des Klageobjektes und beim letztern hinsichtlich des Klagegrundes die Klage eine beschränkte Begründung erhalten. Allein hinsichtlich der von dem Beklagten zu beschwörenden, sachlichen oder faktischen Behauptung liegt gegen denselben nichts vor. Es kommt bei dieser, bei מודה במקצת und שבועת שומרין daher die Relevanz des streitigen Objektes in Betracht. Allein bei dem die ableugnende Behauptung des Beklagten geradezu als unwahr erklärenden Zeugnis eines Zeugen, steht dem Inhalt des zu leistenden Schwurs dies Zeugnis geradezu entgegen. Ein Zeuge zeiht den Beklagten hinsichtlich seiner Behauptung der Unwahrheit und der Unrechtfertigkeit, die Persönlichkeit des Beklagten ist durch das Zeugnis geradezu angegriffen, seiner Persönlichkeit steht die Persönlichkeit des Zeugen gegenüber, und diese persönliche Beziehung lässt die Rücksicht auf den Wert des Objektes völlig verschwinden; sobald es nur überhaupt einen gerichtlichen Nennwert (פרוטה) hat, wird es durch die belastende Aussage eines Zeugen so relevant, dass der Beklagte seine Persönlichkeit durch Berufung auf Gottes Entscheidung im Eide zu rechtfertigen hat.

Es gibt eine Auffassung, es ist dies auch die des רמב׳׳ס und כ׳׳י, nach welcher auch שבועת שומרין zum Schwurobjektwert nur den einfachen Wert einer Peruta erfordert, und demnach der Wert von zwei Maah nur bei מודה במקצת erfordert wird. Auch für diese Auffassung dürfte sodann das Motiv in der oben gedeuteten Richtung zu finden sein. Ist gleich bei dem Hüter die Persönlichkeit des Beklagten nicht in dem Grade, wie durch Zeugnis eines Zeugen kompromittiert, so ist sie es doch jedenfalls in weit höherem Grade als beim Teilgeständnis. Während beim Teilgeständnis hinsichtlich des abgeleugneten Teils, dem der Schwur gelten soll, gar nichts vorliegt, so ist beim Hüter, sei es durch Zugeständnis oder durch Zeugen, jedenfalls konstatiert, dass der Beklagte hinsichtlich des Objektes, dem der Schwur gilt, eine Verpflichtung eingegangen, die noch nicht von ihm erfüllt worden. Er hat das Objekt zur Bewahrung und Rückgabe empfangen, und hat es nicht zurückgegeben. Diese nichtstreitigen Fakta kompromittieren jedenfalls die Persönlichkeit des Hüters in dem Grade, dass dem gegenüber die Rücksicht auf den Objektwert also schwinden kann, dass er die Umstände, die nach seiner Einrede ihn von der Rückgabe dispensieren, zur Aufrechthaltung seiner kompromittierten Persönlichkeit zu beschwören habe, sobald das Objekt überhaupt nur einen gerichtlichen Nennwert besitzt. Auch hier dürfte die persönliche Rücksicht ergänzen, was dem Gegenstande an objektivem Werte abgeht.

כי יתן איש אל רעהו חמור או שור IF A MAN GIVE UNTO HIS FELLOW-MAN AN ASS OR AN OX — The first section (v. 6—9) speaks of the gratuitous bailee and therefore (since the chattels are kept for the use of the bailor only) Scripture frees him of liability for theft, as it is written, (v. 6) “[If a man shall give … to keep] and it be stolen out of the man’s house, if the thief be not found, then the owner of the house shall approach the judges” to take an oath (cf. Rashi v. 7). You may learn from this that he (the bailee) frees himself from liability by this oath. This section (v. 9—12), however, speaks of a “bailee for payment” (שומר שכר) who is therefore not free from liability if the object has been stolen, as it is written, “but if it be certainly stolen from him, he shall pay [unto the owner thereof]” (Bava Metzia 94b). However, for any loss over which he has no control — if, for instance, the animal died a natural death or has been injured by a wild beast, or forcibly seized by robbers, and אין רואה NO ONE SEEING IT that could testify in this matter

חמור או שור או שה, under normal circumstances the poor people assume guardianship of such animals against payment of a fee.

ומת או נשבר, when death or injury was caused by ferocious beasts. Just as the verse speaking of מתה or נשבה speaks of the entire animal being lost (destroyed), the same applies to the word נשבר as the entire animal becoming useless, seeing it had been killed by another beast. We find something parallel in Kings I 13,28 where a donkey and lion are described as standing beside the carcass of the prophet without violating it. The relevant words in our verse are אין רואה, that no one witnessed what happened.

The first section deals with a שומר חנם . . . Rashi means that we cannot say it is the opposit way, as reason dictates that it is this way, [since in the first section he is not held responsible for theft].

V. 9. Wir haben schon oben zu V. 6 bemerkt, dass VV. 9 —12 vom bezahlten Hüter handelt, der gegen Zahlung die stete persönliche Gegenwart dem zu hütenden Gegenstande zusagt, daher auch für גנבה ואבדה, wenn das Tier in seiner Abwesenheit gestohlen worden oder sich verlaufen hat, Fälle, die in der Regel durch seine Gegenwart vermieden worden wären, ersatzpflichtig, und nur bei מיתה, wenn das Tier eines natürlichen Todes gestorben, oder aus einem diesem ähnlichen, unabwendbaren Unfall zu Grunde gegangen, אונסין, frei ist. Wir haben dort auch bemerkt, wie diesem Hüterverhältnis sowohl die hier exemplifikatorisch genannten Gegenstände, als auch der Ausdruck מעמו, im Gegensatz zu dem מבית האיש beim שומר חנם, entsprechen.

חמור או שור או שה, “a donkey, an ox or a lamb;” this paragraph speaks of guarding a neighbour’s belongings in return for payment. This obligates the guardian to accept additional responsibility for keeping it safe. The animals mentioned need to be fed by its keeper, so that it is normal for him to charge a fee for this. If the purpose of his accepting this assignment is to protect these animals against marauding wild beasts such as wolves, he is expected to prevent this.

Hier werden nun drei Arten der Unfälle statuiert: 1) מת ,נשבר ,נשבה (V 9) entschieden vis major, unabwendbare Vorgänge, für welche er in keinem Falle einzustehen hat; 2) גנבה ואבדה (V. 11), die er jedenfalls ersetzen muss; und 3) טרפה, das, zweifelhafter Natur, zwischen beiden steht und ihm den Nachweis auferlegt, dass er es nicht habe retten können.

ומת, “and it died {from natural causes;”

נשבר :ומת או נשבר או נשבה wird in der מכילתא mit ששברתו חיה erläutert, also eine Verstümmelung oder Tötung durch ein Raubtier. Es lässt diese Erklärung die Frage offen, dass dieser Fall damit unter den Begriff טרפה fiele, der erst V. 12 besonders besprochen wird, und zwar nach Erläuterung der מכילתא selbst eine besondere Kategorie durch den zweifelhaften Charakter des Vorfalls bildet. Näher dürfte es liegen, unter נשבר Beinbruch oder sonst einen durch Fall zugezogenen Bruch zu verstehen, wie עורת או שבור (Wajikra 22, 22 ), הנשברת (Jechesk. 30. 22.—34 u. 4, 17). Kön. I. 13, 26 kommt allerdings שבר vom Zerrissenwerden durch ein Raubtier vor, ebenso das. 28. Jedenfalls spricht נשבר und נשבה ebenso wie מת von אונסין גמורין, von Unfällen, deren Verhütung völlig außer Macht des Hüters steht. נשבה ist die gewaltsame Wegführung durch לסטים מזויין, bewaffneten Räuber.

או נשבר, or it was seriously injured by marauding beasts;

אין רואה, der im folgenden Verse statuierte Reinigungseid ist nur zulässig, wenn der Unfall an einem Orte geschehen, wo keine Zeugen vorauszusetzen sind. Ist aber die Örtlichkeit eine solche, dass, wenn der Unfall geschehen, dabei die Gegenwart von Zeugen vorauszusetzen ist, so hat der Hüter Zeugen für seine Behauptung zu bringen, und kann sich nicht durch einen Eid der Ersatzpflicht entziehen: אין רואה שבועת ד׳ תהי׳ בין שניהם הא יש רואה יביא ראיה ויפטר (B. M. 83 a).

או נשבה, “or it was kidnapped by force;”all these examples are listed as categories of force majeure, an act of G-d, against which the keeper of these animals had been powerless. If the keeper is willing to swear before a court that he had not been negligent and thereby contributed to the loss, he is considered as having exonerated himself. If he had not been paid for his “safekeeping,” all he had to do was to claim it had been stolen, and he would not have had to render an oath.

אין רואה, “there had not been a witness,” (to substantiate the keeper’s claim). These words apply only to the claim of the animals having been kidnapped by armed robbers. The reason these words were not used in verse 6 is that the expression “stealing,” is only used when the act had not been witnessed.

שבעת ה׳ תהיה THEN SHALL THE OATH OF THE LORD BE BETWEEN THEM BOTH — i. e. he (the bailee) must take an oath that the case was as he says (that it died or was injured or captured), and also that he had not previously put forth his hand against it (the object), using it for his own purposes. For if he had thus “put forth his hand” and afterwards some accident, as described, happened to it he is held liable for loss by accident (Bava Metzia 94b), since he has broken the terms of the contract. —

בין שניהם, between them both. The Torah implies that both the person rendering the oath and the one causing the oath to be sworn are punishable should the owner be aware that the keeper plans to swear falsely.

שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם, as a result, the trustee is not held responsible for accidents, i.e. superior force against which he could not have prevailed.

אם לא שלח ידו במלאכת רעהו, “that he did not lay his hand on the property of his fellow;” the Torah refers to the object held in trust for his fellow (compare Ibn Ezra). This is also the opinion of Onkelos who translates these words as לא יושיט ידה במא דמסר ליה חברה, “he did not stretch out his hand against what his friend had given him.” The reason such a deposit is described by the Torah as מלאכה, is that a person’s wealth is often referred to as his מלאכה; one example is found in Genesis 33,14 where Yaakov explains that he has to travel more slowly than his brother Esau due to his “wealth” moving slowly. His wealth consisted primarily of his flocks and herds.
The major point our verse makes is that the person to whom the deposit has been entrusted must not make any use of it whatsoever. If the deposit consists of beasts of burden the trustee must not use them for his own purpose; if they consist of vessels he must not use them for his own purposes either. Using such vessels would also fall under the heading מלאכה. Vessels have been manufactured for precisely the use called מלאכת תשמיש. Our sages in Baba Metzia 41 stated that the trustee who made any kind of use of deposits of vessels entrusted to them even if they did not deteriorate in value by such use, will henceforth be liable for anything which happens to such vessels. Two scholars, Rav and Levi disagree with one another on that subject, one saying that the word שלח ידו implies that the item under discussion loses value as a result of such use. The other scholar says that it does not need to lose value in order to fit the description in our verse. The decision in the Talmud is that it does not need to lose value in order for the trustee to become liable for any damage from that point on.

He is liable for those accidents. Why must he take an oath that he did not lay his hand on it, in order to be exempt for accidents? Because it deals with a שומר שכר , whose oath comes to support his claim that he is exempt from payment since an accident happened. Yet, when is he exempt when accidents occur? [Only] if he did not lay his hand on it [i.e., he did not make personal use of it].

V. 10. שבועת ד׳ תהי׳ בין שניהם . Er hat ganz die bereits zu V. 7 bemerkten drei Reinigungseide zu schwören: שאינו ברשותו ,שלא שלח בו יד ,שלא פשע בה, letzteren natürlich nur bei der Behauptung נשבה. In die Bestimmung der Eidesauflage mit dem Satze: שבועת ד׳ תהי׳ בין שניהם, sind noch wichtige allgemeine Lehren hinsichtlich des gerichtlichen Eides niedergelegt. 1) מלמד שהשבועה חלה :שבועת וגו׳ בין שניהם על שניהם Schebuoth 39 b). "die Schwere des Eides ruhet auf beiden", d. h. nach) Raschi: ein etwaiger Meineid wirft auch auf den Kläger die Verantwortung, dass er so unvorsichtig gewesen, sich mit einem Unrechtschaffenen einzulassen, und er so die Entweihung des göttlichen Namens durch einen Meineid indirekt veranlasst hat, שלא דקדק למסור ממונו ביד נאמן ובאו לידי חילול השם. (Nach סמ׳׳ע Ch. M. 87. § 20, 61 hätte er sich in dem Augenblicke, in welchem er seinen Gegner zum Meineid bereit sieht, mit ihm vergleichen sollen). Und ebenso läge bei einem wahren Eide, nach der Ansicht des von הל׳ שבועות) הגהות מ׳׳מוניות, Kap. 11, 6) zitierten R. Chananel, nicht nur auf dem den Eid unnötiger Weise provozierenden Kläger das Vergehen des שבועת שוא, sondern auch der Schwörende trüge eine gleiche Schuld, daß er mit einem Manne in Verbindung getreten, der unnötiger Weise einen Eid provoziert, שנתגלגלה על ידו, und somit er ebenfalls indirekt den unnötigen Eid veranlaßt habe. הגהו׳ מיימוני׳ selbst jedoch sind nicht der Ansicht, dass in solchem Falle den Wahrheit Schwörenden irgend eine Verantwortung treffe, und so scheint es auch aus Temura 3 b, wenn man nicht annehmen will, es sei dort bloß die Möglichkeit von מלקות für שבועת אמת negiert. Im Jeruschalmi (Schebuoth 6, 5) wird das בין שניהם dahin verstanden, dass bei jeder gerichtlichen Eidesleistung jedenfalls einer nicht frei von Schuld ist, beim Meineid der Schwörende, beim wahren Eid der Gegner. Gleichwohl schließt die Verhandlung dort mit der Mahnung, selbst zur Leistung eines wahren Eides sich nicht leicht zu entschließen: בין .זכאי בין חייב לשבועה לא תיעול

'שבועת ה, “the oath of the Lord, etc.;” Rashi explains this verse as follows: if the party in charge of the animal entrusted to him for safe keeping has illegally made use of it, as a result of which this animal came to harm, he is liable although normally anyone who looks after a friend’s property without being paid compensation is not liable for anything but the result of his negligence. Elsewhere, in the Talmud, tractate Baba Metzia folio 41, Rashi adds that even if the safe keeper had already returned the animal in question to its owner, seeing that he had illegally made use of it while it was under his care, any accident that will befall that animal will be considered as the result of that offense he had committed. According to Rabbeinu Tam, -Rashi’s grandson,- this presents a difficulty, seeing that in our verse the Torah had written that no one had witnessed the accident that had happened to said animal, i.e. we de do not even know if the circumstances were such that they could be attributed to the safe-keeper’s illegal actions. [All we know is that it occurred while the safe-keeper had not been present, as he should have been. Ed.] According to Rabbeinu Tam, the wording of the Torah implies that if the safe-keeper had witnesses who had seen that he had not been negligent or done something illegal as a result of which the accidents had become possible, he is not held responsible. According to Rashi what use would it be for the safe-keeper if there even was “proof” that he had not been at fault, seeing that the Torah requires the safe-keeper to swear an oath that he had not done anything which according to Torah law was not permissible? According to Rashi, even a true oath would not be helpful for the person who had sworn it, so why should he use the name of the Lord in vain? Besides, how could the “witnesses” know if the accused had ever committed an illegal use of what had been entrusted to him for safekeeping, if that person had in the meantime replaced the animal in the pen where he had kept it locked up? Considering all this, Rabbeinu Tam concludes that in such situations the safe-keeper is considered as innocent of wrongdoing.

שבועת ה' תהיה בין שניהם, “the oath of the Lord shall be between the two of them;” that death occurred accidentally and not through negligence by the keeper. If the death had occurred in a place where there are people, the keeper would have to pay as his oath is not accepted in such circumstances. Had he told the truth, witnesses would have come forward to support his claim of innocence.

ולקח בעליו AND THE OWNER OF IT SHALL ACCEPT IT — i. e. shall accept the oath (Bava Kamma 106a),

ולקח בעליו, the owner of the dead animal must accept the trustee’s oath, and he is free from paying any damages to the owner.

[The watchman need not make restitution] to him at all. [Rashi explains this, so] we do not think that he is exempt from the double restitution mentioned above, yet he must still pay for the item itself. Therefore Rashi explains that he is exempt from making any restitution to him at all.

2) מכילתא) שלא ישביענו הדיין בעל כרחו :בין שניהם): der Eid beruht nur zwischen den Parteien, dem Gerichte steht kein Zwang zum Eide zu. Will der Beklagte lieber zahlen als schwören, oder will der Kläger ihm den Eid erlassen, so hat das Gericht nicht zum Eide zu nötigen. 3) ולא בין היורשין :בין שניהם: der Eid hat nur zwischen den ersten Parteien selbst, nicht aber zwischen deren Erben einzutreten, d. h.: den Erben kann die Einrede der Unwissenheit vor der Eidespflicht und deren Konsequenzen schützen. Wenn z. B. der Erbe wegen einer Schuld des Vaters eingeklagt wird und derselbe einen Teil der Schuld eingesteht, hinsichtlich des Restes jedoch seine Unwissenheit behauptet — מנה לי ביד אביך חמשין ידענא חמשין לא ידענא — so kann er natürlich nicht den Rest abschwören, da er nichts darüber zu wissen behauptet, allein es hat dann für ihn die Unfähigkeit, den Eid zu leisten, nicht die Folge, die sie für den Vater gehabt haben würde. Wenn dieser, der Selbstschuldner, einen Teil der Forderung zugesteht, so kann er dem Rest der Forderung als מודה במקצת nur durch einen Eid begegnen. Kann er diesen Eid wegen seiner Einrede לא ידענא nicht leisten, so muss er die Schuld zahlen nach dem eben hier in diesem Problem niedergelegten Grundsatze: כל המחוייב שבועה ואינו יכול לשבע משלם. Den Erben aber schützt die Einrede der Unwissenheit vor der Zahlungspflicht aus Eidesunfähigkeit, da er als Erbe nichts von den Verbindlichkeiten des Vaters zu wissen braucht, und liegt dem Kläger der volle Beweis ob (Schebuoth 47 a).

בין שניהם, “in order to release the keeper from responsibility.”

ולא ישלם AND HE — the bailee — SHALL NOT PAY HIM (the bailor) anything, not even the capital (קרן).

אם לא שלח ידו. Siehe zu V. 7.

אם לא שלח ידו, “if he (the keeper) had not done something inappropriate, but that death had occurred by accident.

ולקח בעליו ולא ישלם, dieser für den Fall des Problems selbstverständliche, und darum ja auch oben V. 7 nicht stehende Zusatz gibt noch besonders durch die Fassung, in welcher er gegeben ist, die allgemeine Grundregel für den gerichtlichen Eid: מי שעליו לשלם לו שבועה: כל הנשבעין שבתורה נשבעין ולא משלמין (Schebuoth 45 a); dass nämlich durch einen Eid nur eine Forderung zurückgewiesen werden: נשבע ונפטר, nie aber eine Forderung begründet werden kann: ולקח בעליו .נשבע ונוטל heißt es hier, der Eid ist ein Klageobjekt, kein Klagemittel, der Kläger erlangt den Eid, er kann aber nichts vermittelst eines Eides erlangen. ולקח בעליו ולא ישלם der Eid vertritt die Stelle der Zahlung, mit ihm wird einer Forderung genügt, keine Forderung zur Zahlung gebracht. Es dürfte aber dieser oberste Kanon gerichtlicher Eide tief in dem Wesen des Eides begründet sein und ebenso tief in dem Boden wurzeln, der unser ganzes Rechtsleben trägt. Der Eid ist eine unmittelbare Appellation an Gottes Gericht, er unterstellt den Fall der Gottesentscheidung, wo er für menschengerichtliche Entscheidung nicht reif geworden. Nur als entlastende Ergänzung der Einrede überlässt er dem göttlichen Gerichte die Entscheidung und das Einschreiten, das menschliche Gericht zieht sich vor dem göttlichen zurück. Als belastende Ergänzung des Klagebeweises würde er jedoch, im geraden Widerspruch mit seinem Wesen, das menschliche Gericht zur Entscheidung und zum Einschreiten bringen, statt dem göttlichen Gerichte die Entscheidung anheimzulassen. Unser ganzes kriminal- und zivilrechtliches Leben wird ferner von dem großen Grundsatze getragen, dass für jeden Menschen die Präsumtion (חזקה) der Unschuld, und für jeden Besitz die Präsumtion des Eigentums festzuhalten ist, bis das Gegenteil erwiesen worden. Zivilrechtlich gestaltet sich dieses Prinzip zu der Formel: המוציא מחברו עליו הראיה, der Forderung liegt der Beweis ob, מי בעל- דברים יגש אליהם. (Schmot 24, 14), wer eine Klage hat, hat dem Gerichte seine Sache bis zur Evidenz darzutun. Jeder Kläger fordert eine Veränderung des status quo, und zwar soll das Gericht diese Veränderung schaffen, sie soll eine Gerichtstat sein. Jeder sittlichen, somit auch einer gerichtlichen Handlung muss die Überzeugung der Rechtgemäßheit vorangehen. Es muss somit dem Gerichte die Unrechtmäßigkeit des angegriffenen Bestehenden und die Rechtmäßigkeit der geforderten Veränderung evident sein, ehe es diese Änderung bewirkt, eine Evidenz, die im Zivilgericht nur durch Geständnis des Beklagten oder durch Zeugnis zweier Zeugen, in seltenen Fällen auch durch indizierende Kombination (z. B. חזקה אין אדם פורע תוך זמנו B. M. 5 b, oder wo ausnahmsweise auch der Klage der innere Evidenzgrund, מגו, zugute kommt: מגו להוציא, oder das ברי ושמא bei איני יודע אם החזרתיו לך B. M. 118), als erbracht dasteht. Bei einer unvollständig erwiesenen Klage, als welche wir alle drei Eidesfälle, עד א׳ ,מודה במקצת und שבועת שומרים, erkannt haben, kann daher nur dem Beklagten auferlegt werden, seinen angegriffenen Besitzstand gegen die, durch den freilich nicht ganz erwiesenen, aber immerhin doch nicht ganz zurückgewiesenen Angriff erwachsene, Supposition der Schuld durch Aufrufung Gottes als Zeugen und Richters seine Rechtfertigkeit zu verteidigen; es kann aber der Kläger nicht seinen sachlich nicht hinlänglich begründeten Angriff durch Einsatz der Rechtfertigkeit seiner Person ergänzen. Daher ja auch selbst bei מודה במקצת wenn die Supposition der Schuld durch dem Zugeständnis inhärierende Gründe, wie bei משיב אבדה (Gittin 51 a u. b, siehe רשבא das.), oder, nach einigen, auch wenn sie durch dem Beklagten zur Seite stehenden einen Zeugen, עד א׳ מסייעו (Ch. M. 75, 2) aufgewogen wird, dem Beklagten der Eid zu erlassen ist.

מן התורה gibt es daher kein נשבע ונוטל. In fünf Fällen ward jedoch später aus allgemeinen Zweckmäßigkeitsrücksichten dem Kläger ein Eid auferlegt: השכיר ,והנגזל והנחבל ,ושכנגדו חשוד על השבועה ,וחנוני על פנקסו (siehe Schebuoth 44 b)

V. 11. ואם גנב יגוב. Diese Erweiterung des Begriffs schließt auch אבדה ein: לרבות אבדה, wenn das Tier sich verlaufen. Wird doch auch mit התגנב das Sichwegstehlen, sich den Blicken eines andern heimlich entziehen, ausgedrückt (Sam. II. 19, 4). Hier, beim Hüter, liegt umsomehr auch diese Bedeutung in dem Ausdruck גנב, da damit alle jene Unfälle bezeichnet sind, die in der Regel durch seine persönliche Gegenwart verhütet bleiben, zu deren Abwendung er daher in aller ersten Linie bestellt ist. Jeder in seiner Abwesenheit, auch selbst während seines Schlafes, geschehene Unfall, der unter den Begriff "Diebstahl" fällt, d. h. der in der Regel nur ungesehen unternommen wird, also auch z. B. Einbruch, selbst wenn er durch eine solche Übermacht verübt worden, der er, wenn er darauf zugekommen, unmöglich gewachsen gewesen wäre und daher als אונס dasteht, macht den bezahlten Hüter verantwortlich, weil angenommen wird, es wäre der Einbruch gar nicht unternommen worden, wenn er gegenwärtig und wach geblieben wäre. Diese absolute Verantwortlichleit für alles unter den Begriff גנבה Fallende dürfte ebenfalls in dem begrifferweiternden Ausdruck ואם גנב יגנב ausgesprochen sein, im Gegensatz zu dem folgenden אם טרף יטרף וגו׳: wird es auf irgend eine Weise ihm entwendet, so hat er es jedenfalls zu bezahlen, wird es aber auf irgend eine Weise zerrissen, so hat er den Fall dem Gerichte durch Zeugnis vorzubringen, das entschieden Zerrissene aber hat er nicht zu bezahlen.

ואם גונב יגנב מעמו ישלם, “but if that animal had (only) been stolen from him (the keeper)” [and no violence or threat of violence had been involved] he has to compensate the owner.

אם טרף יטרף IF IT BE TORN IN PIECES — by wild beasts.

IF IT BE TORN IN PIECES — “by a wild beast. ‘Y’VIEIHU EID’ — let him bring witnesses that it has been torn in pieces by accident, and then he will be free from paying.” This is the language of Rashi.
But one may wonder. Why did Scripture mention specifically here [in the case of the animal being torn to pieces by a wild beast], the necessity of having witnesses, since in this [very same section of the law of the paid guardian] it has already said above, [in the cases where the animal dies, or is hurt, or captured], The oath of the Eternal shall be between them both²²⁴Verse 10. [i.e., between the owner of the animal and the guardian], and the law in all cases is alike: if there are witnesses that the animal died, or was hurt, or captured, he is free from paying and so also if it was torn in pieces by a wild beast, and if there are no witnesses he must take an oath in all cases, and if he does so, he does not pay? Perhaps Scripture speaks of the customary manner, for when an animal dies in his master’s crib²²⁵Isaiah 1:3. or it goes up to the top of a crag and is hurt, there is usually no man seeing it; so also if it was captured by armed bandits who came upon it and took it from the flock and went away [there are usually no witnesses]. But when a lion or bear attacks, a multitude of shepherds is called forth against it,²²⁶Ibid., 31:4. and therefore Scripture says that he should bring the shepherds to court, and [upon their testimony] he will be freed from the liability of payment.
Or we may explain that Scripture intends to establish the law enunciated by Isi ben Yehudah,²²⁷Baba Metzia 83a. who says, “No-one seeing it — he is free [from payment but he must swear]; but if there are witnesses who could testify in this matter, let him bring the witnesses and only then will he be free.” And the explanation thereof is as follows: If the accident happened [to the animal entrusted to his guardianship] in a place where people are present the whole day, we do not rely upon his oath but instead he must bring witnesses, and where an animal is torn in pieces by a wild beast, it is generally the case [that other people are present besides the guardian], and therefore Scripture required him to bring witnesses.
Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra explained: y’vieihu eid — “let him bring part of the torn animal as witness, two legs, or a piece of an ear²²⁸Amos 3:12. in proof of his statement.” And I have seen it explained thus in the Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai:²²⁹In Hoffman’s edition of that Mechilta, p. 147. — See Vol. 1. p. 603, Note 245. “Aba Shaul said, he should bring the carcass, as it is said, Thus saith the Eternal, as the shepherd rescueth out of the mouth of the lion, two legs etc.”²²⁸Amos 3:12.

יביאהו עד, we already explained that whenever the Torah uses the word עד in the singular mode what is meant are two witnesses who are acceptable to the court. אם טרוף יטרף, by some wild beast; presumably someone did witness the occurrence seeing there must have been other shepherds in the vicinity. What kind of testimony is expected of these witnesses?

יביאהו עד, any part of the carcass of the animal which had been devoured by a predator is acceptable as evidence of what had happened to it. We have a verse in Amos 3,12 describing the situation, כאשר יציל הרועה מפי הארי שתי כרעים או בדל רוזן, “as a shepherd rescues from a lion’s jaws two shank bones or the tip of an ear.”

אם טרוף יטרף, “if it is thoroughly torn;” the Torah describes the animal’s death as due to the kind of accidental death that the guardian could neither have foreseen nor prevented. This frees him from the need to compensate the owner, if his claim can be substantiated. The same rule applies if that beast had been kidnapped by armed thugs, or if it died of natural causes. In the event that the custodian claims that the animal in his charge had been killed by a predator, and there are no witnesses, he has to swear an oath in support of his claim. The Torah describes a scenario of, say, a lion attacking a sheep in a flock. Usually, there are more than one shepherd in the vicinity who can testify to what occurred. If the animal sustained a fracture or died of natural causes, this would likely have happened in the privacy of the custodian’s house so that there is hardly a chance to produce a witness testifying to the innocence of the custodian. Hence the Torah writes: אין רואה, there is no outside witness. Ibn Ezra understands the line יביאהו עד, “let him bring a witness,” not as an unreasonable demand, but as referring to part of the mutilated animal. It can be determined by examining the remains how this animal met its death.

He shall bring [two] witnesses. . . There are those who ask: Why are two witnesses needed? One witness [supporting his claim] would exempt him from the oath, and consequently he would also be exempt from having to pay. The answer is: Rashi holds that a single supporting witness does not exempt [from an oath. Rather, a single opposing witness makes one liable for an oath]. Therefore he needs two witnesses. (See Choshen Mishpat ch. 87)

(Exodus 22:12) "If it were torn (by a wild beast), let him bring ed." This ("ed") is its hide. These are the words of R. Yoshiyah. Even though there is no proof for this (interpretation), there is support for it in (Amos 3:12) "Just as a shepherd can rescue from the mouth of a lion (just) two legs or the cartilage of an ear, etc." R. Yochanan b. Yoshiyah says: "If it were torn, let him bring ed." — Let him bring witnesses ("edim") that it was torn, and he will be exempt from paying. R. Yonathan says: "let him bring him ad the torn (beast)": Let him lead the owner to ("ad" = until) the torn beast, and he will be exempt from paying. "For the torn beast he shall not pay": There is a torn beast for which he pays, and there is a torn beast for which he does not pay. Which is a torn beast for which he does pay? A beast torn by a cat, a fox, or a marten. Likewise, wherever it is possible for him to rescue (the beast, and he does not), he is liable to pay. And which is a torn beast for which he does not pay? A beast torn by a wolf, a lion, a bear, a tiger, a leopard, or a snake. Since the Torah writes (9) "and it die, just as he is not liable to pay in an instance of (natural) death, so, in all instances where he cannot rescue the beast, he is not liable to pay. Thus, "For the torn beast he shall not pay."

V. 12. טרפה steht in der Mitte zwischen מיתה und מיתה .גנבה kann er nie verhindern, es ist גנבה ,אונס גמור kann er immer durch seine Gegenwart verhindern. טרפה ist zweifelhaften Charakters, es gibt Anfälle von Raubtieren, denen ein Hüter gewachsen, die auch schon durch seine bloße Gegenwart verhütet werden; es gibt aber auch solche, die völlig als אונס zu begreifen sind. Daher יביאהו עד (vergl. oben: Kap. 18, 19. והבאת אתה את הדברים וגו׳, und 22: והיה כל הדבר הגדול יביאו אליך; ebenso Sam. I. 27, 11: להביא גת. Chron. I. 21, 2: ספרו את ישראל וגו׳ והביאו אלי): hat er es, den ganzen Vorgang, durch Zeugnis dem Gerichte darzustellen, damit dieses beurteile, ob durch ihn Rettung möglich gewesen wäre. Stellt es sich entschieden als טרפה, als dem Raubtier unrettbar verfallen heraus, so ist er ersatzfrei. (מכילתא, so auch B. K. 10 a: יביא עדים שנטרפה באונס.) — In ähnlicher Weise unterliegt es auch bei andern unter der Hand von Hütern zu Grunde gegangenen Gegenständen, z. B. bei Lastträgern, המעביר הביות ממקום למקום der richterlichen Erkenntnis, ob der Unfall als unverschuldetes אונם, oder als Fahrlässigkeit zu behandeln ist (B. M. 82 b). Als דרך טובים und אורחות צדיקים wird aber dort gelehrt, armen Lastträgern nicht nur keine Ersatzpflicht aufzulegen, sondern ihnen auch noch ihren Tagelohn zu gewähren. — Es tritt bei solchen Beurteilungen auch noch der weitreichende Grundsatz: תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס in Anwendung, d. h. eine hinsichtlich des wirklich eingetretenen Unfalls genügende Vorsicht befreit nicht von der Ersatzpflicht, wenn dieselbe hinsichtlich anderer, wenngleich nicht eingetretener, jedoch möglich gewesener Fälle als Fahrlässigkeit zu beurteilen ist, und es, wenn auch nur entfernt, anzunehmen ist, eine solche pflichtgemäße Vorsicht hinsichtlich nicht eingetretener Fälle hätte auch dem wirklich eingetretenen Schaden vorgebeugt. Es hätte z. B. ein nichtbezahlter Hüter den Gegenstand wohl normal vor Dieben, nicht aber vor Feuersgefahr geschützt, er wird gestohlen, der Diebstahl wäre aber wahrscheinlich nicht möglich gewesen, wenn der Gewahrsam auch pflichtgemäß feuerfest gewesen (B. M. 42 a).

אם טרוף יטרף יביאהו עד, “if it had sustained fatal injuries, he must produce the torn animal as proof (in order to be exonerated) The “proof” referred to are the remains of the animal or animals in question. The condition of these remains will speak for themselves. This is what the shepherds do when having to account for animals missing from the flocks under their care. We have proof of this from Amos 3,12, 'כאשר יציל הארי מפי הדוב שתי כרעים או בדל אוזן וגו, “as the shepherd saves from the mouth of the bear, or a leg or part of the ear, etc.” If this was not what is meant, why would the prophet mention such small parts of an animal?

יביאהו עד THEN LET HIM BRING WITNESSES that it has been torn in pieces by accident and he shall be freed from liability.

הטרפה, that the situation in which the animal had been mauled or eaten was the kind of accident which the shepherd guarding it could not have been prevented by exercising greater care.

But who whispered to you to come to these conclusions? The Re’m explains: But who whispered to you to differentiate between torn apart by a lion and torn apart by a cat, when the Torah only writes a general phrase: “If it was torn apart”? True, it is written הטריפה with a ה , implying that a distinction is to be made. Nevertheless, from this we cannot know what sort of tearing apart makes one liable and what sort of tearing apart causes one to be exempt. Therefore we need the hekeish [that Rashi mentions].

Dem bezahlten Hüter steht der Mieter gleich, שוכר כשומר שכר, die Benutzung des Gegenstandes wird als Äquivalent für das Mietgeld und die zu leistende Hut betrachtet, im Gegensatz zu einer andern Ansicht, die die Benutzung gegen das Mietgeld aufgehen lässt und die Hut als frei übernommene Leistung beurteilt (B. M. 80 b).

הטרפה לא ישלם HE SHALL NOT PAY THAT WHICH HAS BEEN TORN — It does not say טרפה לא ישלם “one which has been torn he shall not pay for” — but it says “the torn one”, (the one mentioned here, viz., that which was torn without him being able to prevent it). Because there is a torn beast for which he has to pay and a torn beast for which he has not to pay. For an animal torn by a cat, a fox or a marten he has indeed to make restitution; but for one torn by a wolf, a lion, a bear or a serpent he is not liable to pay. But how do you come to make such a distinction (lit., who whispered to you to draw such a conclusion)? Because, you see, it states, “and if it die or be injured, or be captured”. Now what is the characteristic of natural death? One cannot save from it! Thus, also, the injury and the capture must be such that he was unable to save the animal from it (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:12).

לא ישלם, the shepherd does not have to make restitution. If, however, the predators had eaten the animal under discussion due to insufficient supervision on the part of the shepherd, the shepherd has to make restitution. (compare Baba Metzia 93) In determining a reasonable fight which the shepherd has to put up against predators, Rashi quoting the Mechilta says that a solitary wolf is not something against which the shepherd is defenseless, neither are two dogs. Naturally, smaller animals and rodents are not considered as posing a threat to man.

וכי ישאל איש AND IF A MAN BORROWS — The purpose of this verse is to tell you that the borrower is liable for loss from whatever cause even from accident.

וכי ישאל, an animal to perform work for him.

Employed by the borrower to do his work. Rashi adds the phrase “employed by the borrower to do his work” so we will not think that when the verse says “with him,” it means that they are physically together in a certain place. Therefore Rashi explains it as “to do his work.” [Consequently, the verse is saying that the law is the same] whether the borrower and owner are doing the work in different places or in the same place, or even if the owner is with the borrower but in a different work [not connected to the ox. We know this last case] because the [next] verse says, “If the owner is with him,” implying any work done with him [see Rashi there].

V. 13. שואל, der Entleiher, von dem diese Stelle spricht, bildet den geraden Gegensatz zum שומר חנם. Der unbezahlte Hüter leistet alles umsonst, der Entleiher genießt alles umsonst. Hinsichtlich der Hut hat daher jener die geringste Verantwortung und ist nur bei פשיעה, Fahrlässigkeit, ersatzpflichtig. Dieser dagegen ist, wie hier ausgesprochen, selbst bei שבורה ומתה, also selbst für durchaus unabwendbare Unfälle ersatzpflichtig, חייב באונסין; er ist nur frei, wenn מתה מחמת מלאכה, wenn der Gegenstand in Folge der ihm gestatteten Verwendung leidet oder zu Grunde geht.

'וכי ישאל איש וגו, “and if someone borrows, and it is injured or dies, ”while its owner is not present.

בעליו אין עמו THE OWNER THEREOF NOT BEING WITH IT (lit., with “him”) — i. e. if the owner of the ox is not employed with the borrower in his work (Bava Metzia 95b).

ונשבר או מת, it suffers either death or becomes otherwise defunct.

בעליו אין עמו וגו׳. Die Halacha lehrt, dass sich dieses עמו nicht auf den geliehenen Gegenstand, sondern auf die Person des Entleihers bezieht, und damit gesagt sei: nur wenn der Darleiher im Augenblick des Leihens in keinem Dienstverhältnis zu dem Entleiher gestanden, ist dieser für jeden das entliehene Gut betreffenden Unfall ersatzpflichtig. War aber im Momente des Leihens der Darleiher in einem bezahlten oder unbezahlten Dienstverhältnis zum Entleiher, so übernimmt derselbe keinerlei Verantwortung für das Gut und ist selbst für Fahrlässigkeit nicht ersatzpflichtig; שאילה בבעלים פטור, selbst פשיעה בבעלים פטור היה עמו בשעת שאילה אין צריך להיות עמו בשעת שבורה ומתה היה עמו בשעת שבורה ומתה צריך להיות עמו בשעת שאילה (B. M. 95 a). Diese bei שואל ausgesprochene, jedoch eben der Halacha zufolge (das. a) für alle vier Hutverhältnisse geltende Bestimmung ist vielleicht unter allen Bestimmungen des jüdischen Zivilrechts diejenige, deren Motiv sich am meisten einer auch nur annähernden Einsicht entzieht, und scheint ihr gegenüber der Wortlaut einen so einfachen Inhalt zu geben, dass sich dem oberflächlichen Gedanken wohl kaum irgendwo ein größerer Kontrast zwischen dem Schein des Wortlautes und der Wirklichkeit der Halacha darstellen dürfte. Was ist natürlicher, als das בעליו אין עמו und das אם בעליו עמו dahin zu verstehen: ist der Eigentümer bei dem Unfall nicht gegenwärtig, so hat der Entleiher zu ersetzen, war aber der Eigentümer bei dem Unfalle gegenwärtig, so hat er nicht zu ersetzen! Und was ist dem gegenüber unbegreiflicher, als die Bestimmung: wenn jemand von einem zu ihm in Dienstverhältnis (עמנ במלאכה) Stehenden etwas leiht, mietet oder zur Hut übernimmt, ist er von jeder Ersatzpflicht frei! So hebt schon שו׳׳ת חות יאיר (223, Ende) das Auffallende dieser Halacha und ihr gegenüber das Einfache des Wortlautes als ein noch ungelöstes Problem hervor: והנה בגוף הדין תמהתי כל ימי אחר שפקודי ד׳ ישרים וכלם נכוחים בטוב טעם וישרים למוצאי דעת וכו׳ ומי יתן ואדע לקרב הדבר הזה אל השכל וכו׳ וכי משום המשאיל במלאכתו של שואל ילקה באבדון ממונו ביד שואל כי לולי דרז׳׳ל ל׳׳ק דהיה י׳׳ל פירוש הכתוב עמו ר׳׳ל אצל דבר ששאל לחבירו והיה לו להשגיח עליו וק׳׳ל ,עכ׳׳ל.

שלם ישלם, the borrower has to pay the lender for the value of that animal. The reason for this all encompassing responsibility of the borrower is that he had the complete use of the animal while it was under his care. The lender could claim that the death or harm occurred while the borrower had overworked that animal.

בעליו אין עמו, according to the plain meaning of the text: “its owner is not present supervising the work the animal performed.” According to Baba Metzia 95 even if the owner was engaged with different work, as long as the owner is present while the death or injury occurred, the borrower is not liable for damages.

Betrachten wir jedoch den Fall näher, so dürfte sich vielmehr herausstellen, dass der so einfach geglaubten Auffassung des Wortlautes ein solcher Widersinn innewohnt, dass sie unmöglich die Meinung des Textes sein kann. Nach dieser Auffassung soll der שואל nur dann ersatzpflichtig sein, wenn der Eigentümer des Tieres bei dem diesem zugekommenen Unfall nicht gegenwärtig gewesen. War aber der Eigentümer selbst bei dem Unfall gegenwärtig, hat somit, wie שו׳׳ת חות יאיר erläutert, selbst auf sein Gut achten können, so wäre der שואל ersatzfrei. Abgesehen davon, dass, wenn jemand einem andern sein Gut in Hut übergibt, er eben damit sich der Hutaufgabe entledigt, diese vielmehr völlig dem Hüter obliegt, und sich gar kein Rechtsgrund denken lässt, weshalb dieser in Gegenwart des Eigentümers weniger zur Hut verpflichtet und weniger verantwortlich wäre, als in dessen Abwesenheit, so darf man ja nicht übersehen, dass hier ja שבורה ומתה, somit ja gerade solche Unfälle genannt sind, deren Abwendung, wie der natürliche Tod, völlig außer Macht irgend eines Menschen steht, die ja eben den Begriff אונסין גמורין repräsentieren, hinsichtlich deren daher die Anwesenheit oder Abwesenheit des Eigentümers oder irgend eines anderen Menschen völlig gleichgültig ist! Unmöglich kann daher das Gesetz haben sagen wollen: stirbt das Tier eines natürlichen Todes in Gegenwart des Eigentümers, so ist der Hüter frei, stirbt es aber eines natürlichen Todes ohne dass der Eigentümer gegenwärtig ist, so hat der Hüter es zu ersetzen. Es wäre dies völlig widersinnig und kann eine solche Meinung dem Gesetze nicht supponiert werden. Eine solche Auffassung wird zwar (B. M. 95 b) von רב המנונא vorgeführt, jedoch ganz entschieden verworfen. Wenn vielmehr, der Halacha zufolge, die Bestimmung בעליו עמו für alle Hutverhältnisse Anwendung hat, so begreift sichs, warum der Text sie zunächst erst beim שואל ausspricht, weil eben dort die Ersatzpflicht selbst für אונסין גמורין, für שבורה ומתה auszusprechen war, in Zusammenhang mit welchen die Bestimmung בעליו אין עמו nicht missverständlich auf die Gegenwart beim Unfall bezogen werden kann, jener irrtümlichen Auffassung daher vorgebeugt ist. Und dürfte deshalb hier auch der Fall נשבה nicht erwähnt worden sein, weil bei dem gewaffneten Räuberüberfall allerdings die Abwehr denkbar sein kann, und dieser nicht so entschieden den Charakter אונס גמור trägt.

Es bleibt daher nichts anderes übrig, als an der Hand der Halacha den Text also zu verstehen, wie ihn R. Aschi (B. M. 96 a) erklärt: Wenn jemand etwas von seinem Nächsten, aber nicht zugleich den Nächsten borgt. Diese schon implizite gegebene Klausel wird durch das בעליו אין עמו noch besonders verdeutlicht, dass also der Eigentümer des geborgten Gutes nicht auch bei dem Borger in Benutzung steht. Es kann auch demnach das בעליו אין עמו sowie אם בעליו עמו fortgesetztes Objekt zu וכי ישאל bilden: wenn jemand etwas von seinem Nächsten, nicht aber dessen Eigentümer entborgt etc. etc. Ganz so wie das Problem der Mischna B. M. 94 a:השואל את פרה ושאל בעליה עמה וכו׳. Jedenfalls steht die Gesetzesbestimmung fest, dass, wenn der Eigentümer des zu hütenden Gutes in dem Momente der Übergabe desselben an den Hüter bei diesem mit seiner Person in irgend einem Dienstverhältnisse steht, dem Hüter aus der Entgegennahme des Gutes keine der hier für die verschiedenen Hüterbeziehungen stipulierten Ersatzpflichten erwachsen, und diese selbst bei offenbarer Fahrlässigkeit, פשיעה בבעלים, nicht eintreten.

Es handelt sich nur darum, eine Einsicht in die Motive dieser eigentümlichen Bestimmung zu versuchen. Vielleicht sind folgende Erwägungen nicht ganz ungeeignet, eine solche Einsicht zu vermitteln.

Betrachten wir die den ארבעה שומרים auferlegten, die Ersatzpflicht erzeugenden Verantwortlichkeiten, so dürfte einerseits deren Größe in keinem adäquaten Verhältnis zu dem kompensierenden Nutzen stehen, andererseits die Art sämtlicher Verschuldungen eine solche sein, die außer dem Hüterverhältnis keine Ersatzpflicht nach sich zieht. Man vergleiche die Größe des gewöhnlichen Hüterlohnes mit dem möglichen, zum Ersatz kommenden Werte des anvertrauten Gegenstandes, die unentgeltliche Benutzung eines Tieres auf einen Tag mit der Verpflichtung, es zu ersetzen, selbst wenn es eines ganz natürlichen Todes im Hause des Entleihers stirbt, die Verantwortung des bezahlten Hüters selbst bei nächtlichem Diebstahl aus bestverschlossenem Gewahrsam etc. etc. Und selbst פשיעה, grobe Fahrlässigkeit, würde, außer dem Hutverhältnis, wohl moralische, כדי לצאת ידי שמים, nicht aber gerichtliche Ersatzpflicht nach sich ziehen. Es sind alle dahin gehörigen Vergehen keine direkten Beschädigungen, sondern nur גרמא, nur indirekte Veranlassungen, die sich מן התורה der richterlichen Kognition entziehen; z. B. הפורץ גדר בפני בהמת חברו, wenn einer freventlich die Mauer eines Viehstalles einreißt, ist er gerichtlich nur wegen der zerstörten Mauer zu verfolgen, hinsichtlich des verlaufenen Viehes jedoch פטור בדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים (B. K. 55 b) u. dergl. Es scheint daher, es habe das Gesetz mit Aufstellung der Bestimmungen über die "vier Hüter" den scharfen Begriff der Verpflichtung gezeichnet, die ein jeder, bei Eingehung eines solchen Verhältnisses, stillschweigend übernimmt. Gehört doch das שומר-Verhältnis zu der sogenannten freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit, deren Verpflichtungen auf freiem, gegenseitigem Kontrakte beruhen. Ist doch namentlich das ארבעה שומרים-Gesetz die Hauptgrundlage aller sozialen Wechselbeziehungen. Bis hinauf zum Fürsten stellt sich alles im weiteren Sinne unter dem Begriff שומר dar. Überall sind es Vertrauens- und Leistungsbeziehungen, die zur Verwirklichung kommen. Dem gewissenhaften Rechtsbewusstsein zeichnet hier das Gesetz die ganze Schärfe der Obliegenheit und Verantwortung, die selbst eine freiwillig übernommene, unbezahlte Leistungsverpflichtung z. B. im שומר חנם stillschweigend übernimmt, und überlässt es der positiven, feststellenden Vereinbarung bei Übernahme einer derartigen Obliegenheit, wenn jemand das Maß seiner Verpflichtungen beschränkter feststellen will: מתנה שומר חנם להיות פטור משבועה והשואל להיות פטור מלשלם וכו׳ (B. M. 94 a). Es ist dies keine wider eine Bestimmung des Gesetzes verstoßende und darum rechtsungültige Kondition — מתנה על מה שכתוב בתורה, — nicht nur weil ohnehin כל המתנה וכו׳ בדבר שבממון תנאו קיים, in reinen Geldsachen jede Stipulation zulässig ist, sondern, wie es dort heißt: מעיקרא לא שעבד נפשיה, weil er von vornherein keine weiterreichende Verpflichtung eingegangen.

Es scheint nun das Gesetz zu supponieren, dass, wenn jemand dem andern seine Person zu Gebote gestellt hat und ihm sodann auch eine Sache übergibt, er stillschweigend dem andern keine größere Verantwortung für die Sache auferlegt, als dieser hinsichtlich der Person ihm gegenüber übernommen hat. Es ist z. B. der Arbeitgeber juridisch nicht zur Entschädigung zu verhalten, wenn der Arbeiter in seinem Dienste an seiner Person Schaden gelitten. Übernimmt er daher von seinem Arbeiter ein Gut zur Obhut, so übernimmt er stillschweigend auch für diese Sache keine größere Verantwortung. Hier muss also umgekehrt eine weitergehende Verpflichtung bei der Übernahme durch positive Stipulation festgestellt werden.

Für die Wahrscheinlichkeit dieser Auffassung dürfte der Umstand sprechen, dass ein einziges Verhältnis der Hutverpflichtungen stillschweigend selbst בבעלים aufrecht bleibt, und dies ist שליחות יד, dass, wenn der Hüter an das anvertraute Gut auch nur Hand gelegt hat, um es widerrechtlich für sich zu benutzen, er damit den Hütercharakter verliert, als גזלן dasteht und חייב באונסין, jedenfalls ersatzpflichtig wird. שליחות יד בבעלים חייב (B. M. 41 b, קצות חשן 346, 1). Nun ist שליחות יד ein direktes sich an der Sache Vergreifen, das auch außer dem Hutverhältnis gerichtliche Folgen nach sich ziehen kann, das aber insbesondere durch einen Vergleich mit hinsichtlich der Person obliegender Verantwortung nicht stillschweigend beseitigt sein kann, da ein tatsächliches Vergreifen an der Person des Arbeiters unbedingt auch juridisch straffällig ist. (Vergl. רא׳׳ש B. M. 17. 21 zu 57 b). In dieser Ausnahme dürfte daher das von uns vermutete Motiv des שאילה בבעלים-Prinzips eine sehr einleuchtende Bestätigung finden.

:אם שכיר הוא בא בשכרו ist das Tier ein gemietetes, so ist es dem zur Hut verpflichteten Mieter nur gegen Bezahlung in Benutzung gekommen, es ist bei ihm also der Nutzen nicht einseitig, es ist nicht כל הנאה שלו, wie beim שואל, sondern er ist נהנה ומהנה, der Nutzen ist gegenseitig wie beim שומר שכר, es liegt ihm daher auch eine dem שומר שכר gleiche Verantwortung ob, er ist חייב בגנבה ואבדה und פטור באונסין .(מכילתא)

אם בעליו עמו BUT IF THE OWNER THEREOF BE WITH IT (lit., with “him”) — whether he be employed in the very kind of work for which the animal has been borrowed, or whether he be employed in any other work of the borrower — provided that he (the owner) was employed by the borrower when the loan was effected it is not necessary, in order to free him from restitution that he should be employed by the bailee at the time when the injury or death took place (Bava Metzia 95b).

אם בעליו עמו, during the time the animal performs the work for which it has been loaned out.

אם בעליו עמו לא ישלם, if its owner be present he does not have to pay. We have to consider whether the party exonerated by the Torah in this paragraph is free from restitution only by a human tribunal or whether he is exonerated also vis-a-vis Heaven, i.e. in the Hereafter. Suppose the owner of the universe, G'd, Who has entrusted the soul He has planted in a human body for safe-keeping in his body will demand an accounting from the body when He reclaims an unsullied soul at the death of the person to whom He has entrusted the soul. We read in Deut. 4,9: "you shall guard your soul very carefully." When G'd will reclaim His souls He may find that they have either been "stolen," or "broken," or "captured," or "died." All of these four kinds of "damages" are applicable to souls and may be the result of the person equipped with the respective soul committing various transgressions. [In order to understand what the author refers to the reader has to remember that the author has adopted the concept that each commandment in the Torah corresponds to a specific organ, bone, or sinew of the human body. Non-performance of a commandment is equivalent to maiming that part of the body. Ed.] Some people have their souls "stolen" from them when the person is involved in an encounter with impurity; others lose their soul when involved in a deliberate act of transgression; in such an instance the person is considered as having destroyed the limb or organ charged with performance of that particular commandment. Sometimes a person is guilty of a transgression for which the penalty is כרת, premature death and/or permanent severance from his people. Still others may commit violations punishable with death by a human tribunal. Such sins cause the death of the soul (compare Genesis 17,14). In other cases the soul is merely taken "captive" as per Zohar volume two page 95. When G'd -the owner of the deposit- demands its return in the condition He has deposited it, the spirit is supposed to return to G'd as stated by Solomon in Kohelet 12,7. Our sages in Shabbat 152 interpret this to mean as G'd saying: "give it to Me as it was given to you." Can the keepers, i.e. human beings, decline liability for damage to their soul by basing themselves on the wording in our verse: "if its owner was present, the keeper does not have to pay?" The sages in Baba Metzia 97 state that it is possible for the borrower to escape liability for what he has borrowed if he asks the owner of the article he wishes to borrow to first let him drink some of his water. If the owner agrees, he is considered as in the category described in our verse as having worked with the consent of the owner. The same ruling is applicable to "keepers" (seeing their liability is generally on a lower level than that of the borrower). Seeing that G'd has provided man with his food and drink before man begins to be active on earth, He should be considered as in the category of the lender described in the Talmud, and man should be free from liability for his mistakes.

אם שכיר הוא, if the animal in question had been hired by the one working it

At the time of the injury or the death. [Rashi knows this] because it says [in the previous verse]: “If a man borrows something from his neighbor, and it becomes broken or dies; if the owner is not with him. . .” This implies that the owner was not with him either at the time he borrowed and at the time of breaking and death. For the phrase, “if the owner is not with him” refers back to both stages. And then, “he must make full restitution.” This means that if he was with him during only one of these times, he does not have to make restitution. However, it says [in our verse]: “If the owner is with him, then he need not make restitution” — [implying that] the reason [for no restitution] is that the owner was with him at both stages. And this means that if he was with him at one stage but not at the other, he is liable. Thus, the verses seem to contradict each other. To resolve this, we must say [as Rashi did,] that the previous verse exempts the borrower even if the owner was with him at one of the two stages. That is, he was with him at the time he borrowed, although he was not with him at the time of breaking and death. And the verse that holds the borrower liable, is in the case where the owner was with him at the time of breaking and death but not at the time he borrowed. And we cannot say the other way around, because reason dictates that the time he borrows is the key stage — for that is when the borrower becomes obligated to feed the animal. [See Bava Metzia 96a.]

אם בעליו , “if its owner” was present at the time his animal died (and was aware that it had not been overworked) the borrower is free from paying any compensation.

אם שכיר הוא IF IT BE HIRED — i. e. if the ox has not been borrowed but hired, בא בשכרו THEN IT CAME FOR ITS HIRE into the hand of this hirer and not by way of loan. For he does not get the entire benefit of the transaction since he is using it only because he has paid hire for it and consequently the owner benefits also; therefore the law applicable to a borrower does not apply in his case — that he should be held liable for loss by accident. Scripture, however, does not state explicity what his (the hirer’s) law actually is — whether he has to be treated as the gratuitous bailee (שומר חנם) or as the bailee for payment (שומר שכר), and therefore the Sages in Israel differ in their opinion as to how the hirer (שוכר) has to make restitution. R. Meir says he is responsible only as a gratuitous bailee, whilst R. Judah says, even as a bailee for payment (Bava Metzia 80b).

לא ישלם, the borrower. The reason is that under most circumstances, the animal has been loaned after both parties had agreed what kind of work it would be used for. Its status therefore is similar to that of a gift on the understanding that it would be returned. When one makes this kind of gift one does not draw up a list of conditions pertaining to the precise use the gift may be made of. If such a list of conditions had indeed been drawn up the nature of the entire transaction would have been nullified, it would no longer be classified as a temporary gift at all, but the owner would remain effectively the owner, so that non return, even deliberately, would not constitute a dereliction resulting in his being entitled to compensation from the “borrower.” The presence of the owner during any accident which had befallen the loaned animal is taken by the Torah as proof that he had never relinquished any part of his ownership, hence he is not entitled to compensation. One does not get compensation for losing what belongs to one.

בא בשכרו, the risks involved were accepted by the party renting out the animal for work. The situation is not comparable to the case of the party who had received the animal on loan as a friendly gesture. As a result of this difference the party hiring such an animal is not responsible for accidents. He shares the same degree of responsibility which the Torah imposed on the trustee who gets paid for looking after other people’s property. If the animal had been stolen or disappeared due to negligence, the fact that the man who hired it had paid for this does not relieve him of responsibility for preventing theft or disappearance. There are differences of opinion regarding the degrees of liability between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah in Baba Kamma 45.

If the ox was not borrowed. . . Rashi adds the word “ox,” to teach that “hired” is describing the ox hinted to above (v. 13): “If a man borrows something. . .” Yet, if “hired” in our verse refers to that, [then a question arises:] how can the ox be both borrowed and hired? Therefore Rashi adds [the word אלא ] and says, “The ox was not borrowed but rather ( אלא ) hired.” This teaches that this verse is negating the first case (v. 13), where it was borrowed, and saying that [in our case] it is not borrowed but rather hired.

I am duty bound to tell the human soul not to rely on such convoluted reasoning for either of two reasons. 1) In our verse the Torah tells us explicitly that "keepers" are liable in accordance with all the rules applicable for the various categories of such guardians listed in Baba Metzia 94. The Talmud even says that the owner of the object entrusted to an unpaid keeper may stipulate that the unpaid keeper assumes all the liabilities of a person who borrows with a view to using the object under his care. This is so in spite of the general rule that one may not impose conditions which override those stipulated in the Torah, as in this case only financial dealings are involved. Above-named restriction does not apply in matters concerning money. In practice this means that the owner may hold the borrower (or guardian) responsible even if the latter had undertaken to perform tasks with the borrowed object with the knowledge (read consent) of the owner. We find an example of this in Makkot 3 where the lender of a long term loan stipulated that the law of Shmittah (automatic cancellation of past-due loans) not be invoked against him, and that the loan in question would be due after the Shmittah year. The Talmud explains the reason for this as being that all financial conditions mutually agreed between two parties are binding. In our instance, G'd has made it plain in His Torah that violating His laws will result in retribution. Moreover, He has even made the Israelites render an oath concerning their obligation to live up to the commandments of the Torah.

אם שכיר הוא, “if said borrower had paid for the use of the animal while under his care,” the plain meaning of the text is that the subject of the word: שכיר, is that the party who had lent the animal was himself not the owner but had rented it. Our sages, however, understand the meaning to be that the borrower had paid a fee to the owner for using the animal. The Torah decrees that the liability for death or disabling harm is that of the owner must bear the burden of the loss as he had received compensation for letting the borrower use it. He had used his animal for his own purposes by lending it out.

Into the hands of the lessee. The word בא [ בא בשכרו , “it comes. . .”] expresses that one thing comes into another, and our verse is “short” [and does not state what the ox comes into]. Therefore, Rashi had to explain that “it came into the hands of the lessee.” And in order to tell us the reason why the lessee’s law is unlike that of the borrower, who is liable even for accidents, Rashi explains that the ox did not come as a borrowed item, [thus the lessee does not gain all the benefit from this arrangement. His use of the ox] is in return for its rental fee, [thus the lessor benefits as well]. According to this, the words בא בשכרו are reversed, as it should have said בשכרו בא , thereby emphasizing the verse’s point: that the ox came through its rental price rather than through borrowing it [free of charge]. And since the point being made is that the lessee does not pay for accidents, and it does not teach us what is his law, the Sages disagreed as to what law is he subject: whether he is like a שומר חנם or a שומר שכר .

The second reason that man cannot avail himself of the legislation which exonerates negligent behaviour of the borrower in the presence of the lender has to do with the principle that only a few of man's trespasses are subject to judicial prosecution on earth. In principle, it is the Supreme Judge who has the prerogative to sit in judgment of human activities and to adjudicate such cases fairly. Who is to say that a person who is guilty of negligent dealings with his neighbour's property will not be judged by the Supreme Judge Himself? We have hundreds of instances of violations which are subject to G'd's judgment only, human judges not having been accredited to deal with such violations of the Torah! The best proof of this concept is the fact that there are many violations concerning which the Torah has specifically stated that the transgressor will not be held liable by a court on earth but will be judged either by G'd directly while still alive, or at least in the Hereafter. I have explained this in detail on Exodus 21,12 on the words מות יומת. You will find for instance, that when "keepers" have been negligent with property owned by the Temple treasury they are not subject to penalties by a human court. Even Maimonides who held keepers liable in cases where lands, documents or slaves are involved, appears to hold that this is so only vis-a-vis human owners. When the property is owned by Heaven or its representatives, no action is taken against the offending party. You may conclude that the reason that no action is taken is because such people are guilty of something more serious than is subject to earthly judges' jurisdiction.

וכי יפתה AND IF A MAN ENTICE [A VIRGIN] — i. e. if he speaks kindly to her until she submits to him. Thus does also the Targum take it: ארי ישדל “if a man persuades”, the root שדל (the Pael conjugation) in Aramaic being the equivalent of פִּתָּה in Hebrew.

AND IF A MAN ‘Y’FATEH’ — “speaks to her emotions [until she submits to him]. And so did Onkelos render it arei y’shadeil, the term shidul in Aramaic being like pitui [persuasion, seduction], in the Sacred Language. ‘MAHOR YIMHARENAH’ (HE SHALL SURELY PAY A DOWRY FOR HER) TO BE HIS WIFE — he shall assign her a marriage portion as is the manner of a man to his wife by writing her a kethubah (marriage contract), and he shall marry her.” Thus far is Rashi’s language.
But this is not correct, for the term pitui [does not mean “speaking to her feelings,” as Rashi put it], but winning over another person’s will by falsehood. A similar usage of the term is found in these verses: ‘yifteh l’vavchem’ (your heart will be deceived);²³⁰Deuteronomy 11:16. ‘vayift’ (and he seduced) my heart secretly;²³¹Job 31:27. if my heart ‘niftah’ (have been enticed) unto a woman.²³²Ibid., 9. This is why people whose minds are not adroit in discriminating matters, and whose hearts can be easily bent by a few words at the beginning of a discussion, are called p’ta’im (simple-minded ones), just as it is said, ‘peti’ (the simple-minded) believeth every word,²³³Proverbs 14:15. and he who seduces a virgin in order to have sexual relations with her, bends her will to his desire by words of falsehood, and is therefore called m’fateh (seducer).
Onkelos, however, divided the term pitui into two meanings. Thus here he translated it: y’shadeil, which is an expression for cunning and effort that a person exercises towards another in order to do with him as he pleases, regardless of whether this effort is by means of words or deeds. Thus Onkelos translated: ‘vayei’aveik’ a man with him²³⁴Genesis 32:25. See Vol. 1, pp. 404-405 where Ramban discusses in brief the same theme as here. — v’ishtadeil (and a man ‘wrestled craftily’ with him). And Yonathan ben Uziel²³⁵See Vol. 1, p. 127 Note 152. translated: ‘v’shovavticho’ (and I will turn thee about), and put hooks into thy jaws²³⁶Ezekiel 38:4. — ‘v’ishtadlinoch.’ And in the Targum of the Scroll of Ruth we find: Where hast thou gleaned to-day? ‘v’anah asit’ (and where wroughtest thou)?²³⁷Ruth 2:19. It is of interest to note that Ramban refers to “the Targum of the Scroll of Esther” instead of ascribing it as he had done in the preceding reference to the Targum on the Book of Ezekiel. This indicates that Ramban held them to be of different authorship. Such indeed is the prevailing opinion in modern scholarship (see P. Churgin, Targum Kethuvim, pp. 140-151). — ‘u’lan ishtadalt l’me’bad’ (and where have you ‘endeavored’ to work)? — And she said: The man’s name with whom ‘asithi’ (I wrought) to-day is Boaz,²³⁷Ruth 2:19. It is of interest to note that Ramban refers to “the Targum of the Scroll of Esther” instead of ascribing it as he had done in the preceding reference to the Targum on the Book of Ezekiel. This indicates that Ramban held them to be of different authorship. Such indeed is the prevailing opinion in modern scholarship (see P. Churgin, Targum Kethuvim, pp. 140-151). is translated in the Targum: ‘d’ishtadalith imei’ (with whom I ‘endeavored’). For all effort involving skill, with which a person attempts to achieve something, is called hishtadluth (endeavoring). Thus the Rabbis have said in the Mishnah:²³⁸Aboth 2:5. “And where there are no men, hishtadeil (strive) to be a man.” And in the Gemara²³⁹Berachoth 58a. we find: “A man should always yishtadeil (strive) to go out to welcome kings of Israel.” And in Scripture it is written: and he [i.e., the king] ‘mishtadar’ (labored) to rescue him,²⁴⁰Daniel 6:15. — employing every skill [to save Daniel].
In my opinion, associated with this term [hishtadluth — striving] is the expression, rebellion ‘v’eshtadur’ (and sedition) have been made therein,²⁴¹Ezra 4:19. meaning, rebellion and “much striving.” For even in the Sacred Language these letters [the lamed and the reish of y’shadeil, y’shadeir] interchange. Thus we find: mazaloth (constellations)²⁴²II Kings 23:5. and mazaroth;²⁴³Job 38:32. niml’tzu (sweet),²⁴⁴Psalms 119:103. and nimr’tzu (forcible);²⁴⁵Job 6:25. ‘mifl’sei’ (the balancing of) the clouds,²⁴⁶Ibid., 37:16. and ‘mifr’sei’ (the spreadings of) the clouds.²⁴⁷Ibid., 36:29. Similarly in Aramaic: va’alu (and behold),²⁴⁸Daniel 7:8. and va’aru.²⁴⁹Ibid., Verse 7. Sharshereth (chain)²⁵⁰Further, 28:14. is termed by the Sages shalsheleth.²⁵¹Mikvaoth 10:5. There are Mishnaic texts where it is written, “hishtadeir [instead of hishtadeil — both terms meaning ‘strive’] to be a man.”²³⁸Aboth 2:5. It is for this reason that Onkelos renders ki y’fateh — arei y’shadeil (he will endeavor); he will attempt by devious means to invest the virgin with a sense of trust in him, by many ruses, until she submits to him. And since seduction may be achieved in many ways — sometimes with words, sometimes with money, sometimes by falsehood to mislead her, and sometimes even by truth, as when he really wishes to marry her — therefore Onkelos did not use a precise term for it, but rendered it as an expression of “endeavor.” However, in the verse, lest your heart be ‘yifteh,’²³⁰Deuteronomy 11:16. he used the other meaning and translated it: ‘dilma yit’ei,’ for there it means, “perhaps you will be misled.”
And that which the Rabbi [Rashi] explained: “‘Mahor yimharenah’ (he shall surely pay a dowry for her) to be his wife — he shall assign her a marriage portion as is the manner of a man to his wife, by writing her a kethubah (marriage contract)” — this is not correct, for if the seducer marries her, he pays no penalty,²⁵²Verse 16, and Kethuboth 39a. and if he divorces her after the marriage, there is no monetary obligation upon him by law of the Torah, since a kethubah is a matter of Rabbinic ordinance. Rather, mohar means gifts — the gifts which a man sends to his betrothed, jewels of silver and jewels of gold²⁵³Genesis 24:53. and clothes for the wedding ceremony and marriage, these being called sivlonoth in the language of the Rabbis.²⁵⁴Kiddushin 50a. Thus they said: “Mohari go back [upon the death of the wife].”²⁵⁵Baba Bathra 145a. This applies to a case where the marriage was not consumated (Even Ha’ezer 50, 4). And Onkelos rendered the verse, And Shechem said… Multiply upon me greatly ‘mohar’ and gift²⁵⁶Genesis 34:12. — “multiply upon me greatly moharin [in the plural] and gifts,” and Shechem would not have vowed to write Dinah many kethuboth. Instead, mohar means gifts, as I have explained. It is possible that the word is derived from the expression ‘m’heirah chushah’ (hasten, stay not),²⁵⁷I Samuel 20:38. because the mohar is the first thing which hastens the wedding, as the groom hurries and sends these presents ahead of him in eager haste and then he comes to his father-in-law’s house to make the wedding or the feast, just as the Sages have spoken of “parties of sivlonoth” (when presents are presented to the betrothed).²⁵⁸Pesachim 49a. The meaning of ‘mahor yimharenah’ to be his wife is then, that the seducer should send her presents and necessities for the wedding in order to become his wife. There is thus a hint here that both the seducer and the seduced can prevent the marriage, since Scripture uses such language rather than saying expressly that he should take her to him as his wife; for there is no commandment upon him to marry her unless he so desires, and if he does not want her to begin with, he is to pay fifty shekels of silver.²⁵⁹Deuteronomy 22:29. As explained further on in Ramban, this fine [stated in the case of a violator] applies also to a seducer — if he or she refuses marriage. After that Scripture states²⁶⁰Verse 16 here. that if the father refuses to give her unto him, he shall pay him money according to the ‘mohar’ which men give to virgins whom they marry. The reason for this fine is that the seducer has spoiled her reputation in the eyes of young men, thus the father will have to give her many presents and they will not give her any dowry, therefore it is right that the seducer should pay it. Our Rabbis have said²⁶¹Mechilta here in the verse, and Kethuboth 10a. that the amount of this mohar was determined by Scripture in the case of the violator to be fifty shekels of silver,²⁶²Deuteronomy 22:29. the law of the violator and of the seducer being alike in this respect. Scripture, however, did differentiate between them in that in the case of the violator it says, and she shall be his wife… he may not put her away all his days,²⁶²Deuteronomy 22:29. the reason [for this distinction between the violator, who must marry the maiden whom he has raped, and is forbidden to divorce her ever, and the seducer, who does not have to marry the seduced girl, but may instead pay the penalty mentioned in the Torah], is that usually it is handsome young men²⁶³Ezekiel 23:6. who seduce virgins, and the beautiful daughters of prominent families, [in the hope of marrying them]. But since it is not proper that he should gain from his sin, [i.e., that the girl should have to marry the seducer], therefore He explained that he cannot marry her against their will [hers and that of her father], but instead must pay them. Also, because she too sinned in this matter, He did not impose it on him to have to marry her against his will, but instead it is enough if he pays the penalty [of the fifty shekels of silver], and if he marries her with her consent and that of her father, she has the same status in relation to him as all women, having no claim to a kethubah from him by law of the Torah [but only by Rabbinic ordinance]. Similarly, it is usually the sons of prominent families who rape the daughters of those less-known families who have no power against them. Therefore He said in the case of the violator, and she shall be his wife²⁶²Deuteronomy 22:29. — against his will. And in the opinion of our Rabbis,²⁶⁴Kethuboth 39b. there too [in the case of the violator] the maiden and her father can withhold consent, as it would not be correct that he should marry her against her will, and thus do her two evils. Sometimes she may be of a more honorable family than he, and it is inconceivable that she should be further disgraced by his sinful act. The fair law is thus that the decision as to the marriage of the raped maiden be left to her discretion and that of her father, and not to the violator; instead, [if she desires it] he must marry her against his will,²⁶⁵“Even if she be lame, even if she be blind, and even if she is afflicted with boils” (ibid., 39 a). in order that violent men should not take liberties with the daughters of Israel.
Now this law of seduction only applies to a na’arah,²⁶⁶A na’arah is a maiden between the age of twelve years and a day and twelve and a half. After that she counts as a bogereth — past her maidenhood. The period of yalduth (childhood) is from three years and a day to twelve years and a day. as does the law of violation [which applies only to a girl between the ages of twelve years and a day, and twelve and a half], for there Scripture expressly stated, if a man find a ‘n’arah’ that is a virgin,²⁶⁷Deuteronomy 22:28. but here He did not mention na’arah. The reason for this is that the term na’arah mentioned there [in the case of a violator], is used in order to exclude the bogereth [a woman who has passed the stage of maidenhood], who is considered an adult woman, whereas a girl who is a minor [between the ages of three years and a day and twelve years and a day], is also included under the terms of the law of violation. But here [in the case of seduction], it was not necessary to exclude a bogereth, for it is self-understood that one who seduces a bogereth pays nothing, as he did it with her mature consent. Besides, a father has no rights at all in his daughter after the days of her maidenhood, as it is written, ‘bin’ureihah’ (in her maidenhood) in her father’s house,²⁶⁸Numbers 30:17. and here He said, If her father utterly refuse to give her unto him,²⁶⁰Verse 16 here. thus indicating that he [the father] can give her to him as a wife, seeing that he has the authority to take her betrothal-money, and this applies only when she is a minor or a na’arah,²⁶⁶A na’arah is a maiden between the age of twelve years and a day and twelve and a half. After that she counts as a bogereth — past her maidenhood. The period of yalduth (childhood) is from three years and a day to twelve years and a day. just as the Rabbis interpreted:²⁶⁹Kiddushin 3b. “All benefits which accrue during maidenhood belong to her father.”²⁷⁰There was no need for Scripture here to write na’arah to exclude a bogereth from the law of seduction, since the verse if her father utterly refuse etc. could not possibly speak of a bogereth. Hence it is self-understood that the section deals here with a na’arah, and there was no need to mention it. But in the case of violation etc. But in the case of a violation it was necessary to write na’arah, in order to exclude a bogereth²⁶⁶A na’arah is a maiden between the age of twelve years and a day and twelve and a half. After that she counts as a bogereth — past her maidenhood. The period of yalduth (childhood) is from three years and a day to twelve years and a day. from that law, because we might have thought that if she were a bogereth he should pay the fifty shekels of silver to her, [instead of to her father; it was therefore necessary to state] that it is a Scriptural decree [that if she is a bogereth he is free from that penalty], the reason being that since she is in full control of herself, she should guard herself against such a mishap.
Now Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra explained mohar as being an expression of “binding” [that he should bind her to him as a wife], similar in usage to the verse, Let the idols of them be multiplied ‘acheir maharu’ (who bind themselves to another god).²⁷¹Psalms 16:4. It is generally translated: “that make suit unto another.” According to Ibn Ezra: “that bind (or connect) themselves with another god.” Ramban’s own interpretation of that verse follows later in the text. But this is not correct; instead, the meaning of mohar is as I have explained it on the basis of the words of our Rabbis, of blessed memory. And in my opinion acheir maharu²⁷¹Psalms 16:4. It is generally translated: “that make suit unto another.” According to Ibn Ezra: “that bind (or connect) themselves with another god.” Ramban’s own interpretation of that verse follows later in the text. means, “those who are ‘hasty’ in thought, [from the root maheir — fast] and follow another god precipitately, without consideration and without knowledge.” In the writings of the grammarians²⁷²R’dak in Sefer Hashorashim, root acheir. [acheir maharu is explained as meaning]: “those who give mohar (gifts) to another god,” meaning that they bring him sacrifice and offering.

אשר לא ארשה, for if the girl had been betrothed to someone the penalty would be death by stoning as spelled out in Deuteronomy 22,24.

מהר ימהרנו לו לאשה, “he shall make all the preparations required to marry her.” Nachmanides understands this as the seducer (groom) sending the girl the customary gifts סבלונות, a groom sends prior to the wedding. These are expensive gifts, not boxes of chocolate or a bunch of flowers. They are items that the bride needs as part of her outfits to prepare her for a dignified wedding ceremony. The wedding canopy would usually be erected after the bride had received these gifts from her husband to be. The reason why the Torah phrased this procedure in the way it did, instead of writing: “he must marry her forthwith,” is because it is not the seducer’s duty to marry her unless she has indicated her willingness to become his wife. If she does not agree to marry her seducer, the latter must still send her these gifts, as by seducing her he has greatly diminished the chances that another young man would want to marry this girl whose virginity has been jeopardized. Such a girl‘s father would have to tempt prospective suitors with a much larger dowry in order to make them consent to marry his daughter. Our sages say that the value of the mohar described in our verse is 50 shekel (Ketuvot 38), similar to the amount payable by a rapist to the father of the girl whom he had raped. The difference in law between the rapist and the seducer is merely that the former cannot ever divorce his wife (whom he had raped before she became his wife) against her will The seducer has a choice both in marrying his “victim” and eventually divorcing her if he so desires. The reason suggested for this rule is that it is not uncommon for young men to seduce girls who are of marriageable age. It would not be appropriate that the sinner should benefit by his deed in forcing marriage of his “victim” against her will. We must not forget that the girl who allowed herself to be seduced had been guilty of frivolous conduct also. This is why the Torah did not apply the same harsh rules to him that it applied to the rapist who forced himself on his victim. It suffices that he is made to pay a hefty financial fine. Moreover, rapists, as a rule, force their attentions on girls who are minors, and it would not be fair to force such a victim to be married to her violator against her will. If we were to do this she would become a victim of the same person a second time. Both she and her father can object to the rapist marrying her, whereas the rapist himself has no choice in the matter. In both situations the Torah limits these rules to when the girl in question is not yet older than 12 and a half years. In the verses dealing with rape this is spelled out in detail, i.e. הנערה (Deut. 22,28) Fully adult girls, (12 and a half+ receive the compensation themselves, not their father). In our verse here the Torah does not need to write the word נערה to indicate that this is the oldest girl to whom this legislation applies, seeing that if she were older the father would not be in the picture as the recipient of the fine stipulated by the Torah. She would not herself qualify as a potential recipient of a fine, seeing no crime had been committed against her interests. All she had had to do was to decline the invitation to engage in intimacies with the man in question.

He must set aside a dowry for her. Rashi explains [as he does] because if מהר ימהרנה denoted מְהִירוּת (speed) rather than מוֹהַר (dowry), then there should be a patach under the mem [ מַהֵר יְמַהֲרֶנָּה ]. Because in all of Scripture, מְהִירוּת is written in the verbal form that has a dagesh [i.e., in the pi’el form].

V. 15 u. 16. Aus dem im V. 16 ausgesprochenen Umstande, dass die Verheiratung des Mädchens von der Verfügung des Vaters abhängt, sowie aus der ergänzenden Gleichstellung mit dem Dewarim 22, 18 besprochenen Falle, wo die Person des Mädchens durch נער bezeichnet ist, wodurch, wie wir bereits zu Bereschit 24, 16 bemerkt, überall קטנה mit inbegriffen und בוגרת ausgeschlossen ist, steht es fest, dass hier von einem Mädchen die Rede ist, das noch unter Disposition des Vaters steht, also vor erlangter geschlechtlicher Volljährigkeit. Wir haben somit den Fall der Verführung eines unmündigen, noch unter Obhut des Vaters stehenden Mädchens. Die V. 16 statuierte Pön, קנס, ist dem Vater zu zahlen, wie in der zitierten Parallelstelle V. 29. ausdrücklich die Bestimmung lautet: ונתן וגו׳ לאבי הנערה חמשים כסף, und dürfte sich der ganze Fall somit unter dem Begriff des Diebstahls, גנבה, darstellen. Wie die allgemeine Rechtsachtung eine solche sein soll, dass jeder sein Eigentum, ihr vertrauend, ruhig außer Augen lassen kann, und der Dieb den höhnenden Missbrauch dieses Vertrauens durch קנס zu büßen hat: so sollen auch Väter die Unschuld ihrer Töchter nicht durch Schloss und Riegel verwahren müssen, sie sollen sie der allgemeinen Sittlichkeitsachtung anvertrauen können, und derjenige, der, dieses Vertrauen missbrauchend, durch Verführung die Sittenreinheit ihres Kindes stiehlt, der hat als Dieb an der Unschuld ihres Kindes, das Verbrechen wie ein Dieb durch Pön, קנס, zu büßen, wenn nicht durch Heirat das Unrecht gesühnt wird.

.כי יפתה איש, “if a man seduces, etc.” having concluded dealing with the subject of stealing animals or chattel, the Torah turns next to the subject of “stealing someone’s heart;” such a thief is called: .מפתה

מהר ימהרנה HE SHALL SURELY GIVE HER THE MARRIAGE PRICE — He shall assign her a marriage portion as is the practice of a man to do to his wife, i. e. he shall write her a Ketuba (marriage contract providing for a marriage portion) and shall marry her (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:15:3).

מהר ימהרנה כמהר הבתולות, 50 shekel, just like someone raping a virgin. The penalty money is to be given to the victim’s father as spelled out in Deuteronomy 22,29. Seduction results in the same compensation as rape.

As is the law regarding a man and his wife. [Rashi is explaining that the dowry comes only with their marriage,] rather than him giving it to her immediately as a fine. For otherwise, why does it say [in the next verse], “If her father utterly refuses to give her to him, he must give the weight of silver. . .”? But he already gave her the fine!

אשר לא אורשה. Dem nichtjüdischen Eherechte fehlt der Begriff אירוסין, darum haben wir auch kein deutsches Wort dafür. Verlobung entspricht ihm nicht. Verlobung ist nur das Gelöbnis, sich ehelichen zu wollen, allein begründet noch kein eheliches Verhältnis. Ein Vergehen der Verlobten ist kein Ehebruch. Eine ארוסה gehört aber persönlich bereits ausschließlich dem Manne an, sie ist ihm durch קידושין angetraut, aber noch nicht mit ihm vermählt, das Vergehen einer נערה מאורסה ist sogar geschärfter Ehebruch; es fehlt nur das Übergehen in das Haus eines Mannes, das erst durch נשואין vollzogen wird. Die Etymologie von ארש, siehe Jeschurun Jahrgang Vlll, Seite 277. Da nach der als Halacha rezipierten Ansicht des R. Akiba (Ketubot 38 a) das Gesetz auch dann seine Anwendung findet, wenn das Mädchen bereits einmal eine Verlobte war, .ארוסה שנתארמלה או נתגרשה, sobald sie nur jetzt keine ארוסה ist, so ist אשר לא אורסה im Präsenz zu übersetzen. Nach der entgegenstehenden Ansicht wäre es reines Präteritum: die noch nicht verlobt war.

אשר לא אורשה, “who had not been betrothed.” If the girl had been betrothed the penalty would be death by stoning.

מהר. ימהרנה, als Wurzel von מהר , eilen, zugleich verwandt mit מחר, wovonמחיר : das Erwerbmittel, das Tauschmittel (undמחר , der für den fortgehenden eintretende andere Tag: morgen) scheint מהר im Kal: ein Ziel eifrig anstreben zu bedeuten, und zwar speziell: die engste Aneignung einer Person, die eheliche Verbindung erstreben. Übertragen auf das Verhältnis zur Gottheit: אחר מהרו (Ps. 16, 4), die sich mit einem andern Gott zu verbinden gestrebt haben. Daher מֹהַר, das, was der Mann der Frau für deren Verbindung mit ihm aussetzt: das Ehegut, das, was nach dem jüdischen Eherechte der Mann der Frau in der כתובה verschreibt. Selbst nach der überwiegend rezipierten Ansicht, dass כתובה דרבנן, scheint das, was später allgemeine Rechtsordnung, תנאי ב׳׳ד, geworden, ursprünglich Sitte gewesen zu sein, die nur später zur allgemein bindenden Rechtsschuld erhoben wurde. In beiden Fällen, hier und Dewarim 22, 18, wird die hier nach dem מהר zu bemessene Pön an die Stelle einer eigentlich einzugehenden Eheverbindung auferlegt, und besteht die Pön nur darin, dass, was sonst, sei es nach Brauch oder nach Recht, bei Auflösung einer Ehe durch Tod oder Scheidung der Frau zu leisten wäre, hier statt der Eingehung der Ehe zu leisten ist. In der zitierten Stelle wird die zu leistende Pön auf fünfzig Schekel fixiert. Nach den Mischna Pea 8, 8 niedergelegten Ansätzen: מי שיש לו מאתים זוז לא יטול לקט וגו׳, "wer zweihundert Sus ( — d.i. fünfzig Schekel Landesmünze סלע מדינה, die nur 1/8 der tyrischen Währung, כסף צורי, in welcher alle Silbermünzen der תורה zu verstehen sind, an Gehalt hatten —) im Vermögen hat, darf nichts aus Armenmitteln nehmen", würden die fünfzig Schekel der תורה ausreichen, um das Notwendigste an Alimenten und Kleidung für eine Person auf acht Jahre zu bestreiten. Also auch um ohne Geschäftsverdienst vom Kapital zu leben, sicherte eine solche Summe auf eine geraume Reihe von Jahren die Existenz. Als Betriebskapital dürfte es als fürs ganze Leben ausreichend betrachtet werden, da, ebendas. 9, ein Betriebskapital von fünfzig Sus, also der vierte Teil, als genügend zur selbständigen Ernährung erklärt wird: מי שיש לו חמשים זוז והוא נושא ונותן בהם הרי זה לא יטול. Nehmen wir an, dass ein also ausgestattetes Mädchen erst mit dem zwanzigsten Jahre völlig fähig sein würde, sich durch irgend einen Geschäftsbetrieb selbständig zu ernähren, so würde es von dem Zeitpunkte an, mit welchem es nach jüdischer Rechtsnorm aus der engern Beziehung zum väterlichen Hause tritt und mehr auf sich hingewiesen ist, also in der Regel von zurückgelegten zwölf und ein halb Jahren, sieben Jahre vom Kapital zehren können und dann noch eine hinreichende Summe in Händen haben, um sich davon durch eine Erwerbstätigkeit ferner zu ernähren. Es konnte also der Vater damit ihre Zukunft für alle Zeit sicher stellen.

מהור ימהרנו לו, “he must make her his wife by paying the accepted price for brides. The reason for this is in order to restore her dignity in the eyes of her peers, so that she will not be married by another man at bargain basement prices reducing her status permanently, and being permanently reminded of her inferiority. Since she had not reached the age of 12 and a half, she had been too young to realise the consequences of being seduced. After having gone through the formalities, her husband can divorce her, seeing he had not raped her but she had consented.

כמהר הבתולת AS THE MARRIAGE PRICE OF THE VIRGINS — which is limited to fifty shekels in the case of one who outrages a virgin, for it is said, (Deuteronomy 22:29) “Then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel’s father fifty shekels of silver” (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:16:2; Ketubot 10a).

כמהר הבתולות, “according to the dowry customary for virgins.” Rabbi Yehudah hachassid concludes from this verse that we have a hint that the ketuvah, document of financial security given to a virgin by her bridegroom, at the wedding, in the event that she is divorced without having given cause, or is widowed, amounts to two hundred zuz. He based himself on the defective spelling of the word: כמהר which should have been spelled כמוהר, with the letter ו in the middle. As it is written it could serve as initials for the words כמה מהר הבתולות ר, “how much does the dowry of a virgin amount to? 200 (zuz)”

אם מאן ימאן אביה לתתה לו, if her father steadfastly refuses to let her be married to her seducer, her seducer must nonetheless pay the price paid for virgins who become married for the first time. That price is 50 shekel, and this is the reason why the word: ישקל “he must weigh it,” is used here. [We are familiar with this expression from when Avraham weighed the silver pieces to Efron in Genesis 23,16 in order to acquire Sarah’s burial plot, the cave and field of Machpelah. Ed.] This is also the amount of compensation paid for having raped a virgin. (Ketuvot 38)

מכשפה לא תחיה THOU SHALT NOT SUFFER A WITCH TO LIVE — This does not mean that you may kill her but she shall be put to death by the court. Both men and women who practise witchcraft are included in this law but in using the feminine term מכשפה Scripture speaks of what is usually the case; for it is women who mostly practise witchcraft (Sanhedrin 67a).

THOU SHALT NOT SUFFER A SORCERESS TO LIVE. In connection with all those who are guilty of death, He has said above: moth yumoth (he shall be surely put to death),²⁷³Above 21:15-17. meaning he is liable to death, and it is a positive commandment upon us to slay him, based upon the verse which says, And thou shalt put away the evil from the midst of thee,²⁷⁴Deuteronomy 17:7. Ramban is here intimating that this verse is the basis for the one commandment of the execution of all four modes of death penalties. Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (Rambam) counted them as four separate commandments. See my translation, “The Commandments,” Vol. I, p. 240. or it may be that this obligation on us is derived from the very expression yumoth (he shall be put to death) which He used in these cases.²⁷⁵This opinion corresponds closely to that of the author of ‘Hilchoth Gedoloth’ which Rambam in his Sefer Hamitzvoth criticised, and Ramban in his notes to that work defended. See “The Commandments,” Vol. II, p. 420. But here, however, He did not say, “a sorceress shall be put to death,” but in this case He warned us in a stricter manner by means of a negative commandment, that we should not suffer her to live.²⁷⁶See ibid., pp. 285-286. The reason for this is that the sorceress is defiled of name and full of tumult,²⁷⁷Ezekiel 22:5. and fools are mislead by her, therefore He was more stringent and admonished us with a prohibition. We find a similar severity in relation to all those who cause snares for many people, such as that which He said in the case of the misleader after idols, neither shalt thou spare, nor shalt thou conceal him,²⁷⁸Deuteronomy 13:9. and in the case of a murderer He said, And ye shall take no ransom for the life of a murderer, that is guilty of death.²⁷⁹Numbers 35:31.

מכשפה לא תחיה. Seeing that it is the custom of women engaging in witchcraft to practice their art in hidden places such as caves as we find in the case of the 80 witches executed by Shimon ben Shetach in Ashkelon on a single day. (Sanhedrin 45). The unusual formulation לא תחיה is meant to tell the authorities not to despair of bringing these culprits to justice in spite of their practicing their craft in hideouts. They should be hunted down until found.

מכשפה לא תחיה, “Do not allow a witch to remain alive. Contrary to other examples of people guilty of the death penalty, where the Torah describes their fate in positive terms, i.e. “you must execute them,” in this instance the Torah chooses a negative way of describing its objective writing “must not be allowed to live.” In practice this appears to mean that failure to execute someone guilty of a capital offence is accounted merely as the failure to observe a positive commandment, i.e. negligence by the court, whereas here failure to execute a witch is described as the violation of a negative commandment, i.e. an act of insubordination against G’d. The reason the practice of witchcraft is so abhorrent in the eyes of G’d, is that these people not only sin but cause all those whom they mislead into believing in their powers to abandon their faith in the true G’d; in other words they present themselves as G’d’s competition. Another such category of sinner is the מסית, the person who actively solicits others to abandon the faith of his fathers. There the Torah categorically demands that no possible ameliorating circumstances be allowed to be presented in defense of the accused. (compare Deut. 13,7-12) In our case, the wording of the Torah implies that all means of killing such a witch must be employed if it proves impossible to convict her by the normal legal processes and the stringent demands of testimony normally applied in prosecutions that can result in the death penalty

But she must be put to death by the court. [Rashi is explaining that] it is not like, “You shall not allow any soul to live” (Devarim 20:16), where [it means that] any person may kill that individual. Rather, a witch is put to death by the court. And the Sages disagreed as to what method of death is the witch punished; some say it is death by the sword, as [described in the verse,] “You shall not allow any soul to live,” and some say it is death by stoning, as [described] in (Shemos 19:13), “Neither man or beast shall be allowed to live.”

(Exodus 22:17) "A witch you shall not allow to live": Both a man and a woman. R. Yishmael says: It is written here "You shall not allow to live," and elsewhere (Devarim 20:16) "You shall not allow to live. Just as there, (the death is) by the sword, so, here, by the sword. R. Akiva says: It is written here "You shall not allow to live," and elsewhere (Exodus 19:13) "Whether beast or man it shall not live." Just as there (the death is) by stoning, so, here, by stoning. R. Yishmael rejoined: I derive "You shall not allow to live" from "You shall not allow to live," and you answer me from "You shall not allow to live" to "it shall not live!" R. Yossi Haglili says: It is written here "A witch you shall not allow to live," and (Ibid. 18) "Whoever lives with a beast shall be put to death." They are juxtaposed to teach that just as the second (is killed) by stoning, so, the first. R. Yehudah says: It is written (Leviticus 20:27) "And a man or a woman, if there be in them an ov or a yidoni" (shall be stoned). Now "ov" and "yidoni" are types of witchcraft. Why were they singled out for special mention? To teach that just as these are (killed) by stoning, so all (types of) witches are (killed) by stoning. We have heard the punishment. Whence do we derive the exhortation? From (Devarim 18:10) "There shall not be found among you one who passes his son or daughter through fire, a diviner, a soothsayer an enchanter or a witch."

VV. 17 — 19. כשף .מכשפה scheint einerseits verwandt ישב mit und קשב zu sein, andererseits mit כזב. Der מְכַשֵף will die Welt gestaltenden Kräfte und Mächteמיַשב undמְקַשֵב sein, will sie "beschwichtigend bannen" und sie "seinem Geheiße gehorsam machen"; er ist aber mit allem diesem מְכַזֵב, "übt mit allem dem nur Täuschung".

מכשפה לא תחיה, “You must not allow asorceress to remain alive.” The reason why this apparently unrelated subject follows on the heels of how to deal with seducers is that people who seek ways and means to gratify their illegal sexual urges, turn to sorceresses to help them do so.

Whether they are male or female. . . [Rashi knows this] because regarding אוב וידעוני , which are types of witches, the Torah made no difference between man and woman. For it is written, “Man or woman” (Vayikra 20:27). (Rashi, Sanhedrin 67a)

לא תחיה. Hier und V. 18 und 19 wird die gerichtliche Todesstrafe auf drei verschiedene Weisen ausgedrückt: יחרם ,מות יומת ,לא תחיה und dürften damit drei Arten von Motiven charakterisiert sein, aus welchen die gerichtliche Todesstrafe hervorgehen kann. לא תחיה: das Verbrechen, isoliert betrachtet, und isoliert begangen, mag an sich nicht todeswürdig sein, allein du, d. h. die nationale Gesamtheit und deren Repräsentanz, das Gericht, darfst den Verbrecher nicht leben lassen; sein Tod erfolgt aus Rücksicht auf den verderblichen Einfluss, den das Verbrechen auf die Gesamtheit übt. מות יומת: der Verbrecher hat an sich durch sein Verbrechen, ohne Rücksicht auf dessen Einfluss auf die Gesellschaft, das Leben verwirkt. יחרם: der Verbrecher hat durch sein Verbrechen die Berechtigung der Existenz in Mitte der menschlichen Gesellschaft eingebüßt. הרם, eigentlich Netz (Habakuk 1, 16). החרים eigentlich: in ein Netz tun, völlig außer Zusammenhang mit den andern Existenzen bringen, also: durch Tötung ausscheiden. Betrachten wir die drei Verbrechen, die hier als Typen für diese drei Kategorien aufgestellt sind, so dürften sie sich als ihrem innersten Wesen nach den gefundenen Voraussetzungen entsprechend begreifen lassen. כישוף, nach der von uns adoptierten Maimonidischen Auffassung: כזב, nichts als Täuschung, nichts als eine vorgebliche Meisterung der göttlichen Weltordnung, wäre mehr eine zu belächelnde Torheit oder ein zu bemitleidender Wahnwitz als ein zu bestrafendes Verbrechen, wenn es nicht von so tief entsittlichendem Einfluss auf die Gesellschaft wäre. כישוף ward stets nur im Dienste der Unsittlichkeit und des Verbrechens geübt. Für das dem Willen der Gottheit Gemäße konnte man dem Beistande göttlicher Waltung vertrauen. Nur für das, womit man sich im Widerspruch mit dem göttlichen Willen wusste, konnte man sich veranlasst sehen, einen Schleichweg zu wünschen, auf welchem man trotz des göttlichen Willens, ohne den Beistand und wider den Gang seiner Waltung, seine Ziele erreiche, und diesem Wunsche kam die Prätension des מכשף entgegen, die (Sanhedrin 67 b) treffend in der Erklärung des Wortes מכשף als Abbreviatur also ausgesprochen ist: שמכחישין בפמליא של מעלה, welches ebensowohl heißen kann: sie leugnen die Unterordnung aller Weltkräfte unter die Hoheit des göttlichen Willens, als: sie wollen angeblich die Gott allein unterstehenden und seinen Willen vollbringenden Weltkräfte paralysieren. Um das an sich Lächerliche eines solchen Vorgehens zu bezeichnen, steht daher auch hier das einzige Mal מכשף weiblich: מכשפה, während es sonst in תנ׳׳ך immer männlich vorkommt. Der מכשף, dessen vorgebliche Kunst ja auch sonst ein altes Weib zu üben pflegte, und die sich schon dadurch als lächerliche Torheit ankündigt, verdiente als solcher nicht den Tod, also nicht מות יומת, gleichwohl: לא תחיה wegen des Geist und Sittlichkeit tötenden Wahns, den er verbreitet.

לא תחיה, an unusual way of describing the death penalty, has to be understood as translated by Onkelos, i.e. instead of only violating a positive commandment when allowing a sorceress not to be executed, any court failing to execute her is also guilty of transgressing a negative commandment, a much greater sin. If someone reads this word as tichyeh, with the vowel chink, [when the line would mean “she shall not live,”] he errs. We must be active in preventing her from living, i.e. the court must execute her. The death penalty of stoning is applied. The Torah compliments anyone who takes the first step in bringing about the legal execution of a sorceress. The longer she is allowed to remain alive, the longer she can practice her nefarious trade.

Den geraden Gegensatz bildet שוכב עם בהמה. Die soziale Welt ist durch das Verbrechen nicht direkt berührt. Gleichwohl ist es an sich das Verbrechen der konkretesten tiefsten Entartung, daher: מות יומת.

זבח לאלהים. Nach dem hermeneutischen Kanon, dass, wo ein umfassender Gattungsbegriff durch eine spezielle Art desselben ausgedrückt wird, diese exemplifikatorisch für die ganze Gattung zu verstehen sei, דבר שיצא מן הכלל ללמד ללמד על הכלל כלו יצא, repräsentiert hier זביחה den ganzen Begriff aller für die dem einen Einzigen in seinem Gesetzesheiligtum darzubringenden Opfer vorgeschriebenen Handlungen, alle עבודות פנים, also המנסך ,המקטר ,המזבח, worunter auch הזורק begriffen ist (Sanhedrin 60 b). Wer eine dieser dem Ausdruck der Hingebung an den einen Einzigen bestimmten Opferhandlungen, oder eine diesen in dieser Beziehung gleichbedeutende השתחויה irgend einer andern Gottheit zuwendet, selbst wenn diese Gottheit sonst nicht auf diese Weise verehrt wird, אפי׳ שלא כדרכה, und selbst wenn er sich damit nicht dem Dienste des einen Einzigen entziehen will, vielmehr Ihm nur noch irgend etwas göttlich beiordnet, שיתוף, — (ja, nach dem Wortlaute der בין שהוא עובדה בכך בין שאינו עובדה בכך :מכילתא, selbst wenn er gar nicht die wirkliche Verehrung der ע׳׳ז beabsichtigt, sobald er nur eine עבודת פנים einem andern zuwendet) — der hat eben damit tatsächlich das Grundprinzip verleugnet, in welchem die jüdische Gesamtheit wurzelt, und: יָחרם, ist damit der Ausscheidung aus dieser Gesamtheit durch Vernichtung seines Daseins verfallen (das.) Die Todesart aller dieser drei durch ihre Bezeichnung verschieden motivierten Strafen besteht in סקילה, und wird sich diese gesetzliche Tatsache für die nähere Betrachtung der vier verschiedenen Todesarten des jüdischen Gerichtes fruchtbar erweisen. — Der Begriff שיתוף, d.h. dass nicht nur eine gänzliche Verleugnung Gottes, sondern auch nur eine Schmälerung seiner alles andere ausschließenden Einzigkeit durch Beigesellung irgend eines anderen Wesens in göttlicher Verehrung, einer gänzlichen Verleugnung gleich verpönt ist, ist im Texte durch die Beifügung בלתי לד׳ לבדו ausgesprochen; es hat das Gesetz damit, wie es Sanhedrin 60 b heißt: ריקן העבודות כולן לשם המיוחד, alle Gottesverehrungen ausschließlich dem einen Einzigen vindiziert, und selbst die bloße Zusammenstellung Gottes, des einen Einzigen, mit irgend einem andern Gegenstande in einem die Gottesverehrung berührenden Zusammenhange der Rede, ist nach diesem Grundsatze verboten, כל המשתף שם שמים ודבר אחר נעקר מן העולם (das.23 a. תוספו׳ das). Das נעקר מן העולם scheint eine buchstäbliche Umschreibung des יחרם zu sein.

כל שכב עם בהמה מות יומת — All who have carnal connection with beasts, whether men or women, shall surely be put to death — by stoning, for it states of such, (Leviticus 20:16) “their blood is upon them” (cf. Rashi on Exodus 21:17) (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:18)].

(Exodus 22:18) "Whoever lies with a beast shall be put to death": What is the intent of this? It is written (Leviticus 20:15) "And a man who cohabits with a beast shall be put to death" — by stoning. You say by stoning, but perhaps, by one of the other death penalties in Scripture? It is, therefore, written (Ibid.) "and the beast shall you kill." It is written here "kill," and elsewhere (Devarim 13:10) "kill." Just as there, stoning (is indicated), so, here, stoning. We have heard the penalty. Whence is the exhortation (derived)? From (Leviticus 18:23) "And you shall not cohabit with any beast." This tells me only of the punishment and the exhortation for the active agent. Whence do we derive the punishment for the passive agent? From (our verse) "Whoever lies with a beast shall be put to death." Scripture (hereby) equated the passive agent with the active one. Just as the second is to be stoned, so, the first. We have heard the punishment. Whence the exhortation (for the passive agent)? It is, therefore, written (Devarim 23:18) "and there shall not be a (male) harlot among the children of Israel," and (I Kings 14:24) "And there was also a (male) harlot in the land. They did according to all the abominations of the nations which the L rd drove out."

כל שוכב עם בהמה מות יומת, “anyone indulging in carnal relations with an animal must be executed legally.”After dealing with a minor girl who had been too young to understand what she had been guilty of, the Torah turns to animals which have no mouth with which to protest being raped.

מות יומת, that person will be executed by stoning. In Leviticus 20,16 the Torah elaborates further by decreeing that both parties involved in such an activity will be killed. The Torah there spells out that both the human being and the animal are perceived as having forfeited their lives, i.e. דמיהם בם, in the event that the animal initiated this sin.

לָאֱלֹהִים means TO IDOLS — If the word (a noun) were punctuated לֵאלֹהִים, with Tzéré under the first ל it would be necessary to define it more closely by adding the adjective אחרים = strange (gods — idols); now, however, that it says לָאֱלֹהִים it is not necessary to define it more closely by adding the word אחרים. For wherever ל or ב are prefixed to a word if it (the prefix) be punctuated with Chataph (שוא), as e. g., לְמֶלֶךְ a king, לְמִדְבָּר, to a desert, לָעִיר, to a city, it must be explained to which king, to which desert, to which city. The same is the case if the ל or ב has a Chirik instead of a Sheva which happens when they are placed before a word beginning with Sheva, as e .g., in לִמְלָכִים for kings, לִרְגָלִים, for festivals, (quoted from Mishnah Rosh Hashanah 1:1) it is necessary to state for which kings or festivals, and if he does not state this, all kings and festivals are implied by these words. Similarly here: the word לַאלֹהִים “to gods”, would imply “all gods”, including even Him of Whom the term אלהים is used in a holy sense (i. e. the Most High God). When, however, it (the prefix) is vowelled with Patach (or Kametz if the following letter cannot take Dagesh), as לַמֶּלֶךְ and לַמִּדְבָּר and לָעִיר it is quite plain which king one is speaking of, and similarly in the case of לָעִיר “to the city”, it is quite plain of which city one is speaking. In the same way, לָאֱלֹהִים, to the gods, means to those gods which in another passage you have been forbidden to worship. A similar instance is, (Psalms 86:8) אין כמוך בָאֱלֹהִים, “there is none like unto Thee among the gods” — because he did not more closely define it by the addition of some word like אחרים, it was necessary for him to vowel the ל with Patach (Kametz).

HE THAT SACRIFICETH ‘LO’ELOHIM YOCHARAM’ (SHALL BE UTTERLY DESTROYED). “Lo’elohim means to the idols, for since the word is voweled with a patach,²⁸⁰The patach and kamatz are in this sense alike, as both indicate the definite article — “those gods which in another place you have been forbidden to worship.” The word lo’elohim is voweled with a kamatz. it means those gods which in another place you have been warned not to worship.” This is Rashi’s language. Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra commented that in accordance with the plain meaning of Scripture, this command is not directed to Israel, as they had already been warned in the second of the Ten Commandments against the worship of idols. Instead it was said to “the stranger” mentioned in the following verse, that he may live in our land only on condition that he should not sacrifice to his gods as he was wont to do. — But he [i.e., Ibn Ezra] openeth his mouth in vanity.²⁸¹Job 35:16. Here in the sense of “worthless” or “unsubstantial.” For in the Ten Commandments He warned against idolatry by a prohibition, and here He explained the punishment and the law that we are to apply to he who transgresses that commandment, just as He did in the case of Thou shalt not murder; Thou shalt not commit adultery,²⁸²Above, 20:13. for these are the ordinances which He set before them [with respect to these commandments].²⁸³See Ramban above 21:12 (towards the end) for further explanation. Thus He is hereby declaring that one who sacrifices to idols is guilty of death, for the term yocharam means death by the court. Similarly we find, All ‘cheirem’ that may be ‘yocharam’ of men may not be ransomed; he shall surely be put to death.²⁸⁴Leviticus 27:29. See Ramban there for full explanation. But here he merely brings proof from this verse that the word yocharam signifies death by the court. He uses the term yocharam [of the root cheirem — unlawful, anathema], because he who sacrifices to that which is anathema, deserves destruction, similar to that which is said in the verse, And thou shalt not bring an abomination into thy house, and be ‘cheirem’ (accursed) like unto it; thou shalt utterly detest it, and thou shalt utterly abhor it; for it is an accursed thing.²⁸⁵Deuteronomy 7:26.
It is possible that the verse includes the slaughterer and the animal slaughtered, to tell us that they both go to cheirem (destruction), thus hinting that it is forbidden to derive any benefit from that which has been offered to the idols. It mentioned sacrificing, but the same law applies to bowing down before the idol, and to all other acts of worship performed in the Sanctuary,²⁸⁶Such as offering incense and libation. Since these acts are performed in the worship of G-d, they come under the terms of this law, so that he who performs them in the worship of the idols is liable to death by the court. but other acts of worship — such as sweeping it, or besprinkling it, or putting his arms around it, or kissing it — are not punishable by death, provided that the idol is not usually worshipped in that manner, but if it is the customary way of worshipping it, he is liable to death under all circumstances, even if excreting to Baal Peor.
The correct interpretation of the term lo’elohim with the lamed voweled with a patach, [or a kamatz as in this instance], is that it refers to the angels of above who are called elohim in many places of Scripture, as it is written: There is none like unto Thee among ‘elohim,’ O Eternal;²⁸⁷Psalms 86:8. He is G-d of ‘elohim’ and Lord of lords;²⁸⁸Deuteronomy 10:17. Bow down to him, all ye ‘elohim.’²⁸⁹Psalms 97:7. They are also called eilim (the mighty ones),²⁹⁰Above, 15:11. as I have already mentioned.²⁹⁰Above, 15:11. And He said here, save unto the Eternal only, because those who sacrifice to His angels think that thereby they do His will, and that the angels will be the intermediaries to obtain His favor for them, and that it is as if they sacrifice to G-d and His ministers; therefore He said [that sacrifices must not be brought] save unto the Eternal only.²⁹¹See also Ramban above, 20:3. Inherent in this interpretation is also a profound secret, from which one can understand the concept of offerings, and the student learned in the secrets of the Cabala can understand it from that which we have written elsewhere.²⁹²In Seder Shemoth 5:3. and Seder Yithro 18:13. Onkelos hinted at it here.²⁹³Onkelos rendered the verse thus: “save unto the name of the Eternal only.” With this translation Onkelos indicated that the intention of the sacrifice is to the proper Name of G-d (Abusaulah, and Ma’or V’shamesh). We shall yet allude to it in Torath Kohanim²⁹⁴Leviticus 1:9. — For the term Torath Kohanim see Seder Yithro Note 590. with the help of G-d, may His Name forever be blessed to all eternity.

זובח לאלוהים, to all the deities simultaneously. This is forbidden even though the worshipper includes Hashem in the address to which the sacrifice is tendered.

זבח לאלוהים, the vowel patach under the letter ל makes it clear that an alien deity is meant. If the meaning were a sacrifice to G’d, the vowel under the letter ל would be a tzeyreh

זובח לאלוהים, “someone offering sacrifices to gods, etc.” The use of the vowel patach (kametz) under the letter ל is proof that the Torah refers to known deities, the ones which had been previously mentioned, and whose worship had already been forbidden.

He must be put to death. [Rashi is explaining] that this instance of יחרם [does not mean “dedicated, rather it] means “death”, as in: “Any condemned person ( חרם ) who has been banned shall not be redeemed; he shall surely be put to death” (Vayikra 27:29). (Rashi, Sanhedrin 60a)

זובח לאלוהים; according to the plain meaning of the text, the Torah does not speak of an Israelite, as the Israelites had all been warned repeatedly against offering sacrifices to deities. Exodus 20,3, had made this abundantly clear. The Torah refers here to a convert to Judaism who is mentioned subsequently in verse 20 in a different context. Concerning such a person the legislation against having carnal relations with animals applies also. It was necessary to spell this out as it was a common practice among Arameans. (Syrians)

יחרם means SHALL BE PUT TO DEATH — Why is this verse with its predicate יחרם said at all? Was not the death penalty for him (the idolator) stated in another passage: (Deuteronomy 17:5) “Thou shalt bring forth that man or that woman [who have done that evil thing … and stone them]”? But the reason is: because Scripture does not specify there for what form of worship he (the idolator) is liable to death and it merely states, “and hath gone and served other gods” — now, in order that you might not say that any kind of worship offered to idols is punishable with death, Scripture comes and definitely tells you here: “one who sacrificeth unto any god [shall surely be put to death]”, to teach you that all kinds of worship which have a certain characteristic of “sacrifice” are meant here. What is this characteristic of sacrifice? It is an act of worship performed in honour of the Lord in the “Interior” (i. e. in the Temple)! So I mean to include as punishable by death anyone offering incense and libation since these are also acts of worship performed in the Temple, and that one is liable for these acts if he performed them in honour of any idol, whether this be the usual way of worshipping it or whether this be not the usual way of worshipping it. But other forms of adoration which are shown to some idols but which are not peculiar to the worship of the idol which one happens to be worshipping, — if, e. g., one sweeps the place before the idol in its honour, or one lays the dust in front of it by sprinkling water there, or one embraces or kisses it, — are not punishable by death (cf. Sanhedrin 60b).

יחרם, the person will be executed and the offering itself is prohibited for any use whatsoever. Just as the false deities are to be banished totally, so those who believe in them. (compare Deuteronomy 7,26 )

לאלוהים, to the ones concerning which I said in the Ten Commandments לא יהיה לך אלוהים אחרים, “you must not have any other deities.” (20,2)

יחרם, “he shall be destroyed.” The individual is to be executed. The reason why the Torah chose the unusual term יחרם here is a play on words, seeing that the individual has seen fit to deify “dead” gods, he too is to be equated to the deities whom he had worshipped. We find that the Torah indulges in such play on words, for instance when describing how we are to relate to certain forbidden foods, living creatures of a lower order; or the offering of such creatures as sacrifices. In Deut. 7,26 the Torah forbids the presentation of such living creatures as sacrifices to the Lord, the reason being given כי חרם הוא, ”it is something that is viewed as slated for destruction.” People who are so misguided will wind up exactly where these sacrifices wind up, i.e. יהיה חרם כמוהו. He who deifies these creatures as substantive will wind up losing his own substance, just as these gods that never had any substance. The verse also implies that such gods are totally out of bounds, i.e. one must not derive direct or indirect benefit from them. Nachmanides writes that actually the vowel ל under the latter ל before the word אלוהים frequently indicates that the word אלוהים following is a celestial being such as an angel. He quotes numerous examples. Offering a sacrifice to an angel, as was the intention of Manoach in Judges 13,15 is equally prohibited. The only address for sacrifices is the attribute Hashem. The Torah had to make this plain, as many well meaning people believe that by honouring angels they also honour their Creator. They consider the angel as being a go-between man and G’d, whose task it is to inform man of what is pleasing to G’d. Their error consists in their assumption that by presenting gifts to intermediaries they are actually serving G’d. In order to prevent such errors from being practiced by Jews, the Torah had to make plain that Hashem is the only address for such offerings.

Or is not the usual way of worshipping it. Because the verse did not say, “He who worships a god through slaughtering must be condemned,” we learn that [the law applies] even when this is not the usual way of worshipping it. (Rashi, Sanhedrin 60a)

בלתי ה' לבדו, offerings may only be offered to the Lord, (His attribute of the fourlettered ineffable name). This teaches that if one were to serve both Hashem and another deity as did the people who converted having been transplanted after the destruction of the kingdom of the Ten Tribes by the Assyrians (Sancheriv), [conversion inspired by fear of the Jewish G-d, did so without abandoning their former deities. They are referred to in the Talmud as Kutim, or geyre arayot, converts afraid of lions which ravaged the region to which they had been transplanted. Ed.] (Compare Kings II 17,33) The Torah decrees that anyone following such a practice is to be treated as a fully fledged idolater, and punished accordingly. This is why the Torah stresses the word: לבדו, “Him exclusively.”

לה' לבדו, excluding any possible partner.

His penalty is not death, but he transgresses a negative precept. Rashi means that this applies [only] if it is not the usual way of worshipping it. Whereas if it is the usual way, we derive from “How did these nations worship. . .” (Devarim 12:30), that all [usual] ways are punished with death, as Rashi explained the verse, “How did these nations worship. . .”

וגר לא תונה — means, do not vex him with words (referring to the fact that he is a stranger); contrarier in old French Similar is, (Isaiah 49:26) “And I will feed them that vex thee (מוניך) with their own flesh”.

AND A STRANGER SHALT THOU NOT WRONG, NEITHER SHALT THOU OPPRESS HIM; FOR YE WERE STRANGERS IN THE LAND OF EGYPT. There is no reason why all strangers [from countries outside the land of Egypt] should be included here because of our having been strangers in the land of Egypt! And there is no reason why they be assured for ever against being wronged or oppressed because we were once strangers there! Now Rashi explained that this is a reason for the prohibition against annoying a stranger. G-d warned against vexing him with words, for “if you vex him he can also vex you, by saying to you, “You also descend from strangers.’ Do not reproach your fellow man with a fault which is also in you.” Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra explained the verses: “Remember that ye were strangers as he is now.” But there is in all these comments no real reason for the law.
The correct interpretation appears to me to be that He is saying: “Do not wrong a stranger or oppress him, thinking as you might that none can deliver him out of your hand; for you know that you were strangers in the land of Egypt and I saw the oppression wherewith the Egyptians oppressed²⁹⁵Above 3:9. you, and I avenged your cause on them, because I behold the tears of such who are oppressed and have no comforter, and on the side of their oppressors there is power,²⁹⁶Ecclesiastes 4:1. and I deliver each one from him that is too strong for him.²⁹⁷Psalms 35:10. Likewise you shall not afflict the widow and the fatherless child,²⁹⁸Verse 21. for I will hear their cry,²⁹⁹Verse 22. for all these people do not rely upon themselves but trust in Me.” And in another verse He added this reason: for ye know the soul of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.³⁰⁰Further, 23:9. That is to say, you know that every stranger feels depressed, and is always sighing and crying, and his eyes are always directed towards G-d, therefore He will have mercy upon him even as He showed mercy to you, just as it is written, and the children of Israel sighed by reason of the bondage, and they cried, and their cry came up unto G-d by reason of the bondage,³⁰¹Above, 2:23. meaning that He had mercy on them not because of their merits, but only an account of the bondage [and likewise He has mercy on all who are oppressed].

וגר לא תונה, "You shall not wrong a stranger, etc." Rashi says that if the Jew were to remind the stranger of his idolatrous past, he has to be prepared to be reminded by the stranger of his own unsalutary past. Ibn Ezra says that we must remember that we were once no better than the stranger. Nachmanides disagrees with both these interpretations and says that we must remember that G'd will respond to the oppressed just as He responds to our own outcries when warranted.

לא תונה, do not wrong him with words. In Leviticus 25,14 the Torah refers to similar legislation when applying to monetary matters. The same legislation applies to not wronging fellow Jews who are not converts, of course. The reason the Torah chose the convert as the example of the victim in our verse is that converts have much less of a chance to protect themselves against abuse of any kind, seeing they have no family to stand up for them if a wrong has been committed against them. Not only this, it is so easy to wrong a convert by mentioning what his parents do and what he himself used to do before he converted.

כי גרים הייתם בארץ מצרים, “for you had remained strangers in the land of Egypt.” Nachmanides writes that not all proselytes have become potentially fit for conversion because we, the Israelites, were strangers only in the land of Egypt. Personally, (Nachmanides speaking) I think that the moral/ethical message here is that we must not taunt the proselyte, reminding him of his lack of illustrious ancestors, seeing that we ourselves not so long ago were no better than he while we were idol worshipping aliens in Egypt. I, the Lord, have saved you from there because I took note of your pitiful state. Similarly, any proselyte will certainly also enjoy My full protection a soon as he turns to Me complaining about being discriminated against. G’d promises similar immediate attention to the pleas of widows and orphans. Their claim for Divine assistance is based on the circumstances in their lives preventing them from taking the kind of initiatives that promise to improve their social and economic status among their peers. Elsewhere the Torah writes:ואתם ידעתם את נפש הגר “you know the mental state of the stranger,” meaning that his mentality is devoid of self-confidence, and that he is therefore liable to cry out to G’d for help at frequent intervals. (compare Exodus 23,9)

וגר לא תונה, “and you must not take advantage of a stranger.” The word תונה refers to disadvantaging him with words, whereas the following word ולא תלחצנו refers to physically taking advantage of his status such as robbing him of money which is his (Mechilta Nezikin section 18). The Torah writes many times about the need to treat a proselyte fairly seeing that he is alone in a country in which he has no roots, no family who could protect him. The word גר for a stranger is derived from גרגיר, an isolated berry at the far end of a solitary branch. People have a habit of insulting strangers and belittling them. G’d therefore warns us not to think that such a stranger has no one who takes up his complaints. The Lord Himself will fight his fight for him. The Torah reminds us that we of all people should have empathy for strangers seeing we had been taken advantage of in Egypt because we were strangers. G’d implies that just as He took pity on us as we had no one else to turn to, He will do the same for such strangers if the need arises. Interestingly, the Torah (23,9) did not write אתם ידעתם את הנר, but ואתם ידעתם את נפש הגר. “you know the soul (feelings) of a stranger,” You are aware that every stranger has low self-esteem, and he has no one to turn to except Me.” The Torah mentions immediately afterwards that we must not oppress widows or orphans, both of whom have been bereaved of their human protectors. Both categories are often taken advantage of by callous people. Baba Metzia 59 describes them as prone to weeping. Seeing that the “gates of weeping are never locked,” i.e. G’d is ready to respond to people who feel so wretched that they turn to G’d with their tears, G’d warns offenders that He, personally, will exact retribution from people who exploit the weakness of either widows or orphans. To avoid becoming the object of such retribution we must be especially careful not to give widows or orphans cause to complain to G’d against us. Isaiah 58, 7 and 10 warns: “share your bread with the hungry, take the wretched poor into your home, when you see the naked clothe him....offer your compassion to the hungry and satisfy the famished creature.” He means that if you have bread you can give the poor do this; if you do not have what to share at least display some sympathy for the suffering creatures so that they will regain hope and confidence. The reason the Torah speaks about כל אלמנה, “every widow,” is to include wealthy widows in the commandment not to take advantage of them. She too is prone to shedding tears and is liable to feel embittered.

He, too, is capable of abusing you. And consequently, “for you were strangers” just refers back to “You must not abuse,” which means “abusive words.” But “for you were strangers” is not the reason for “nor oppress a stranger,” which means “robbing him of his money.” For the fact that we were strangers is not the reason to refrain [from robbing him].

(Exodus 22:20) "And a stranger you shall not afflict and you shall not oppress him": You shall not afflict him with words and you shall not oppress him in money matters. Do not say to him: "Yesterday you worshipped the deity of Nevo, and (the flesh of) swine is still between your teeth, and you would dare contend with me!" And whence is it derived that if you taunt him he can taunt you in return? From "And a stranger you shall not afflict … for you were strangers in the land of Egypt" — whence R. Nathan derived "Do not attribute a blemish of your own to your neighbor." Beloved are the strangers, for in many places you are exhorted concerning them: "And a stranger you shall not afflict", (Devarim 10:19) "And you shall love the stranger", (Exodus 23:9) "And you have known the soul of the stranger." R. Eliezer says: Because a stranger's past is to his disadvantage, Scripture exhorts concerning him in many places. R. Shimon b. Yochai says: It is written (Judges 5:31) "And His lovers are like the rising of the sun in its might", and it is written (Devarim 10:18) "And He loves the stranger, etc." Now who is greater? One who loves the King or one whom the King loves? Certainly, one whom the King loves. Beloved are the strangers, for by every epithet that Israel is called, the strangers are called. Israelites are called "servants," as it is written (Leviticus 25:55) "For unto Me the children of Israel are servants." And the strangers are called "servants," as it is written (Isaiah 56:6) "… to love the name of the L rd and to be servants unto Him." Israelites are called "ministers," as it is written (Ibid. 6:6) "And you, 'priests of the L rd' shall you be called; 'ministers of our G d' will it be said of you." And the strangers are called "ministers," as it is written (Ibid. 56:6) "… and the strangers who join the L rd to minister unto Him." Israelites are called "lovers," as it is written (Ibid. 41:8) "the seed of Abraham, My lover." And the strangers are called "lovers" (i.e., beloved), as it is written (Devarim 10:18) "And He loves the stranger." "Covenant" is written of Israel, viz. (Genesis 17:13) "And My covenant (i.e., circumcision) shall be in your flesh." And it is also written of strangers, viz. (Isaiah 56:4) "and they hold fast to My covenant." "Acceptance" is written of Israel, viz. (Exodus 28:38) "for acceptance for them before the L rd." And "acceptance" is written of strangers, viz. (Isaiah 56:7) "their burnt-offerings and their sacrifices for acceptance upon My altar." "Watching" is written of Israel, viz. (Psalms 121:4) "He neither slumbers nor sleeps, the Watcher of Israel." And "watchers" is written of the strangers, viz. (Ibid. 146:9) "The L rd watches the strangers." Abraham called himself a stranger, viz. (Genesis 23:4) "A stranger and a sojourner am I with you." David called himself a stranger, viz. (Psalms 119:19) "I am a stranger in the land," and (I Chronicles 29:15) "For we are strangers before You and sojourners as all of our ancestors. As a shadow are our days upon the earth, without a prospect." And it is written (Psalms 39:13) "For a stranger am I with You, a sojourner as all of my ancestors." Beloved are the strangers (i.e., the proselytes), as witness Abraham's not being circumcised until the age of ninety-nine. For if he were circumcised at twenty or thirty, a stranger could become a proselyte only if he were younger than thirty — wherefore the L rd prolonged commanding him until he was ninety-nine, so as not to bar the door to future proselytes. And thus do you find (the L rd's esteem for the stranger-proselyte) in the four classes who respond before Him who spoke and brought the world into being, (Isaiah 44:5) "One shall say: 'I am the L rd's'; another shall call in the name of Yaakov; another shall mark his arm 'of the L rd'; and in the name of Israel he shall be called": "I am the L rd's" — these are the fearers of Heaven, untainted by sin. "another shall call in the name of Yaakov" — these are the minors (who died in childhood), the sons of the wicked in Israel. "another shall mark his arm 'of the L rd'" — these are the penitents. "and in the name of Israel he shall be called — these are the righteous strangers (i.e., the proselytes).

V. 20. וגר לא תונה וגו׳ steht in engem Zusammenhange mit dem vorangehenden Verse. Dort war gesagt: Selbst der eingeborene Jude von der reinsten unmittelbarsten Abstammung geht der Existenz in der jüdischen Gesamtheit verlustig, sobald er nur im geringsten von der Reinheit des Grundprinzips der jüdischen Gottesanerkenntnis abweicht. Dem gegenüber heißt es nun hier: Und ein im Heidentum geborener Mensch, sobald er sich durch Anerkennung des jüdischen Gottesprinzipes dem Judentum anschließt, hat die vollste Gleichstellung und Gleichberechtigung im jüdischen Kreise vor dem jüdischen Gesetze zu beanspruchen. Durch diese Zusammenstellung ist der große, wiederholt zum Ausdruck kommende Grundsatz sanktioniert, dass nicht Abstammung, nicht Heimat, nicht Besitz, überhaupt nichts Äußerliches, Zufälliges, dem eigentlichen innern Wesen des Menschen Fernstehendes, sondern ganz allein der geistig sittliche Wert der Menschenpersönlichkeit die Menschen- und Bürgerwürde und daraus die Berechtigung als Mensch und Bürger bedingt. Es wird dieser Grundsatz noch besonders durch die Motivierung: כי גרים הייתם במצרים vor Verletzung sicher gestellt. Es scheint nämlich dieser Satz nicht gleichbedeutend mit dem ואתם ידעתם את נפש הגר וגו׳ des V. 9 des folgenden Kapitels zu sein. Es heißt vielmehr absolut: כי גרים הייתם וגו׳, euer ganzes Unglück in Mizrajim war, dass ihr dort "Fremdlinge" gewesen, als solche, nach der Anschauung der Völker, kein Recht auf Boden, Heimat, Existenz hattet, denen gegenüber man daher alles für erlaubt ansah. Als Fremde waret ihr rechtlos in Mizrajim, daraus wuchs euer עבדות und ענוי, euer Sklaventum und Elend. Hütet euch darum, so lautet die Warnung, in eurem Staate das Recht von irgend anderem, als dem reinen Menschtum abhängig zu machen, das jeder Mensch als solcher in sich trägt. Mit jeder Kürzung dieses Menschenrechts ist dem ganzen ägyptischen Greuel Menschen misshandelnder Willkür Tür und Tor geöffnet.

1. YOU SHALL NOT OPRESS: since he does not know the matters of the land, it is an easy thing to oppress him.

וגר לו תונה, “and you must not oppress a convert;” the reason why this verse follows that about converts serving both Hashem and their previous deities, is that G-d wishes to go on record that although He finds serving another deity as something repulsive, He does love converts and appreciates that they distanced themselves from their former religion.

ולא תלחצנו NOR OPPRESS HIM — by robbing him of money (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:20).

ולא תלחצנו, to perform work for you seeing he has no “redeemer” who looks out for his interest. G’d mentioned this to remind the Israelites who also had no one in Egypt to plead their case. (Exodus 3,9)

The term גר . . . a person who was not. . . Rashi is explaining that all Yisrael were גרים , even Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov, [not just the Bnei Yisrael in Egypt]. For the term גר means someone who is not a native citizen of that country. [And about the Avos it says (Bereishis 21:34), ויגר (“He sojourned”), which comes from the same root as גר .]

Once we remind ourselves that the souls of the Jewish people are the very root of sanctity seeing that Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and their offspring were part of G'd's heritage, we can understand that Jews do not react to insults heaped upon them by the Gentiles. We do not even view such people as in the category of אדם. It is this attitude vis-a vis the Gentiles that provides the background for Jews belittling Gentiles, even those Gentiles who have ceased worshiping idols. As a result the Torah saw fit to tell us why we must not remind strangers of their idolatrous past. We are not to tell such people that they are rooted in the domain of the קליפות, i.e. that their intrinsic worth is inferior to ours. When the Torah reminds the Jewish people: "for you were strangers in the land of Egypt," this should be understood according to my comment on Genesis 46,3 and Exodus 20,2. I have demonstrated there that while the Jewish people resided in Egypt their own souls were mired deeply in the same moral morass that the souls of the Egyptians found themselves in.

ינה לא תונה (lautverwandt mit כנע: erniedrigen, demütigen, כנה: nicht beim rechten Namen nennen, גנה, rabbinisch: beschimpfen, vielleicht auch mit קנה: seiner Macht unterwerfen, erwerben), heißt: an materiellen oder ideellen Gütern rechtswidrig gekürzt werden, daher a. im Güterverkehr, bei Kauf und Verkauf: übervorteilt werden, (Wajikra 25, 3) אונאת ,וכי תמכרו ממכר וגו׳ אל תונו איש את עמיתו; b. im Umgang: mit Worten gekränkt werden, וגר לא תונה ,אונאת דברים hieße demnach vollständig: Einem Fremdlinge sollst du weder in Worten noch Handlungen zu nahe treten. Es wird jedoch B. M. 58 b zunächst als אונאת דברים aufgefasst. Wir werden zu VV. 21 u. 22, die ja in engem Zusammenhange mit V. 20 stehen, auf den Wechsel des Numerus in der Anrede aufmerksam zu machen haben. Wir glauben, dass der Singular der Anrede entweder an das Individuum als solches, oder an die Nation als Gesamtheit, zunächst auch in ihrer Repräsentanz gerichtet ist, während der Plural immer die Nation in allen ihren einzelnen Gliedern, somit in ihrem gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhange, in ihrer gesellschaftlichen Verbindung im Auge hat. Vergl. Bamidbar 10, wo durch eine Signaltrompete die Häupter der Nation, durch zwei jedoch die ganze Gemeinde in allen ihren Gliedern berufen wird. Es dürfte demnach auch hier zunächst der Staat als solcher vor Kränkung des Fremden gewarnt werden. Er soll keine אונאה an dem Fremden üben, soll ihm seiner Fremdlingsschaft willen nicht mehr Lasten und nicht weniger Rechte als dem Einheimischen zuerkennen, ולא תלחצנו und ihn in keiner Weise in der freien Ausübung seiner Nahrungstätigkeit beschränken. Aus Bamidbar 22, 25. und Kön. II. 6, 32 wissen wir, daß להץ zunächst eine Raumbeschränkung, Einzwängung bedeutet. Also wörtlich: Du sollst ihn nicht beengen, einschränken.

2. FOR YOU WERE STRANGERS. And from this law, each one should love each other, and thus this was the custom that our rabbis said three should love each other: the strangers and so on. And even though they sacrificed to other gods, since they converted, everything was forgiven by the One on Most High.

לא תלחצנו, “do not abuse him.” We must not abuse the converts by using them to perform menial labour. Seeing that by definition they are unfamiliar with the ways of the Israelites, our culture, etc., it would be too easy to take advantage of their ignorance by assigning to them degrading work.

כי גרים הייתם FOR YE WERE STRANGERS — If you vex him he can vex you also by saying to you: “You also descend from strangers”. Do not reproach thy fellow-man for a fault which is also thine (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:20). Wherever גר occurs in Scriptures it signifies a person who has not been born in that land (where he is living) but has come from another country to sojourn there.

כי גרים הייתם, due to your personal experience of such a status, you, better than anyone else, know that seeing that the oppression of strangers is a great wrong, the punishment for violating such a commandment is equally harsh. (compare Exodus 23,9)

כל אלמנה ויתום לא תענון YOU SHALL NOT AFFLICT ANY WIDOW, OR FATHERLESS CHILD — That is also the law regarding any person, but Scripture is speaking of what usually happens and therefore mentions these in particular, for they are feeble in defensive power (i. e. they have no one to protect them) and it is a frequent occurrence for people to afflict them (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:21).

ANY WIDOW — even a rich one of quite considerable wealth — YE SHALL NOT AFFLICT, for her tears are frequent and her soul is depressed. He states, If thou afflict ‘otho’²⁹⁹Verse 22. [“him” in the singular], meaning any one [who is a widow or a fatherless child]. Therefore it is written after that, and your wives shall be widows,³⁰²Verse 23. in punishment for your causing the cry of the widow, and your children fatherless,³⁰²Verse 23. in punishment for the cry of the orphan.
This punishment [And My wrath shall glow, and I will kill you with the sword etc.]³⁰²Verse 23. is not counted by our Rabbis amongst those brought upon people who are liable to death by the hand of Heaven, as listed in the Beraitha,³⁰³See Seder Bo Note 209. “These are the people who are liable to death by the hand of Heaven” taught in Tractate Sanhedrin.³⁰⁴Sanhedrin 83a. The reason for this is that the death mentioned here is unlike the usual death of people by the hand of Heaven, of whom it is said, and they die therein, if they profane it;³⁰⁵Leviticus 22:9. and ye die not.³⁰⁶Numbers 18:32. But here the punishment is that they will die by the enemy’s sword, or he shall go down into battle, and be swept away³⁰⁷I Samuel 26:10. without anyone knowing it, and their wives will thus have to remain forever widows, and their children always be fatherless.

לא תענון אם ענה תענה אותו; if, in the process of oppressing an orphan your intention was only to oppress him alone; if your “oppressing” him was in the nature of disciplining him in order to ultimately bestowing loving kindness on him after he responded to your rebuking him, your disciplining him is considered an act of loving kindness. [the author interprets verse 22 starting with the word אם as an alternative, moderating what has been written in verse 21. Ed.]

לא תענון, as in Exodus 1,11. The Torah employs the most likely scenarios as the examples it chooses.

כל אלמנה ויתום לא תענון, “Do not oppress any widow or orphan.” The word כל, “every,” is meant to include wealthy widows and well to do orphans. It teaches that contrary to appearances, such people are keenly aware of the loss of companionship and moral support they have sustained, and that cannot be compensated for simply by earthly possessions. The Torah addresses people generally, society, hence the word תענון, is in the plural mode. Ibn Ezra comments that the penalty for someone witnessing such oppression without protesting the behaviour of the party guilty of it, is the same as the person actually guilty of such oppression of the orphan and widow.

(Exodus 22:21) "Every widow and orphan you shall not afflict": This tells me only of widow and orphan. Whence do I derive (the same for) all men? It is, therefore, written "lo ta'anun", (the additional "nun" implying an extension of plurality). These are the words of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva says: Widow and orphan are more vulnerable to affliction. Scripture speaks of the common instance.

V. 21. אלמנה von אלם: stumm sein, יתום von יתם, lautverwandt mit dem rabb. גדם, handverstümmelt, קטם, abknicken. Die Witwe hat in ihrem Manne den Mund verloren, sie hat keinen Vertreter mehr; die Waise hat in dem Vater ihre Hand verloren, sie hat keinen Halt und keinen Führer mehr. עַנֵה (siehe 1. B. M. 16, 6): jemanden sein עוני, seinen abhängigen Zustand fühlen lassen, seine Schwäche und Schutzlosigkeit missbrauchen. Es heißt: כל אלמנה וגו׳, nicht nur arme, auch reiche Witwen und Waisen sind leichter als andere Misshandlungen ausgesetzt. — לא תענון, während die Zurücksetzung und Minderberechtigung Fremder in den meisten Staaten legal ist und hiervor daher im vorigen Verse der im Singular angeredete jüdische Staat zu warnen war, gibt es wohl kaum eine Gesetzgebung, die die Rechtskränkung von Witwen und Waisen sanktioniert. Allein in der Gesellschaft, in dem Verkehr von Menschen mit Menschen sind sie, die des Vertreters, der Stütze und des Führers Beraubten, der Beeinträchtigung und der Demütigung ausgesetzt. Darum wendet sich hinsichtlich ihrer das Gesetz zunächst an die Gesellschaft: לא תענון, "missbrauchet ihre Schwäche nicht, lasset sie nicht ihren Schwächezustand fühlen!"

כל אלמנה ויתום לא תענון, “Do not oppress any widow or orphan.” The word כל in this verse has to be understood as in Exodus 20,10: לא תעשה כל מלאכה, not as meaning: ”do not do ail the work,” but as: “do not do any work.”Compare also Exodus 20,4: תמונה, “do not make for yourself any likeness;” it does not mean that you are only forbidden to make for yourselves likenesses of all] that is on heaven or earth.” The Torah mentions the proselyte as he has no family in Israel and therefore no one who can advise him or protect him. He belongs to the weakest members of society. Next the Torah mentions widows and orphans, who though natural born Israelites either have lost their protectors or had never had any.

לא תענון, the reason why the Torah used the plural mode when exhorting us not to exploit this group of people, something most unusual, is because so many people are in the habit of doing just that when they face weak people. The Torah includes therefore all the people who witness such exploitation and do not protest it, are included in this prohibition. This is why also the penalty for people guilty of this has been written in the plural mode. וחרה אפי והרגתי אתכם, “My anger will flare up and I will kill you;” (verse 23)

אם ענה תענה אתו IF THOU AFFLICT THEM IN ANY WISE — This is an elliptical phrase — the text threatens but breaks off and does not specify immediately the punishment which will fall upon those who do this. We have the same in, (Genesis 4:15) “Therefore whosoever slayeth Cain …” it threatens but does not specify the punishment. So, here, too: “If thou afflict them in any wise”, — this is a threat, as much as to say: “in the end you will get your deserts!” Why are you certain to get them? “Because (כי) if (אם) they cry at all unto Me, I will surely hear their cry”.

IF THOU AFFLICT HIM IN ANY WISE. “This is an elliptical verse; it threatens, but does not explain the punishment needed to complete the sense of the verse. It is like the verse, therefore, whosoever slayeth Cain,³⁰⁸Genesis 4:15. which does not explain what the punishment is. Here too, if thou afflict him in any wise, is an expression of determination to inflict punishment, as if to say: ‘In the end you will get your deserts. Why? For if he cry unto Me I will hear him, and I will avenge him.’” This is Rashi’s language. But it is not correct [to interpret a verse on the basis of such a long omission, in order to complete the sense]. The witness he brings [i.e., the verse about Cain] also does not testify to that [kind of long omission]. But it is possible that the word ki [generally translated “for”], here means “if,” for this is one of the usages of the word ki,³⁰⁹Rosh Hashanah 3a. The verse here reads: ki im tza’ok yitzak, and is generally translated: “for if he cry.” But with the word ki understood as “if”, the verse would read: “if if he cry,” as explained further on in the text. and the verse thus states: “if if he cry at all unto Me, I will surely hear his cry,” the repetition of the word “if” being used in order to show the gravity and importance of the matter, similar in usage to these phrases; hamiblie ein k’varim [generally translated: “Was it because there were no graves…?” — but literally: “was it because there were ‘no no’ graves…?”];³¹⁰Exodus 14:11. harak ach b’Mosheh [generally translated: “hath the Eternal indeed spoken only with Moses”, but literally: “‘only only’ with Moses].”³¹¹Numbers 12:2.
The correct interpretation appears to me to be that He is stating: “If thou afflict him in any wise, if he will only just cry at all unto Me I will at once hear his cry: he does not need anything else at all, for I will save him and avenge his cause from you. And the reason for this is that you oppress him because [you think] he has no one to help him against you, but behold he has more help than anyone else. For other people will try to find saviors to save them, and helpers to avenge their cause, and perhaps they cannot profit nor deliver,³¹²I Samuel 12:21. while this one will be saved by the Eternal merely through his crying out, and He will take vengeance from you, for The Eternal is a jealous and avenging G-d.”³¹³Nachum 1:2. There are many verses to a similar effect. Thus, that which He said, Rob not the weak, because he is weak, neither crush the poor in the gate; for the Eternal will plead their cause,³¹⁴Proverbs 22:22-23. means: “rob not the poor merely because he is poor and has no helpers, nor crush the poor in your gates, for the Eternal will plead on their behalf.” Similarly He said, And enter not into the fields of the fatherless, for their Redeemer is strong;³¹⁵Ibid., 23:10-11. the Eternal of hosts is His Name,³¹⁶Jeremiah 50:34: Their Redeemer is strong, the Eternal of hosts is His Name. for they have a Redeemer Who is stronger and closer to them than all people have. Here also He said, that just by his cry, the fatherless will be saved. Likewise: For as the rain cometh down and the snow from heaven, and returneth not thither, except it water the earth, and make it bring forth and bud, and give seed to the sower and bread to the eater; so shall My word be that goeth forth out of My mouth; it shall not return unto Me void, except it accomplish that which I please.³¹⁷Isaiah 55:10-11. In both phrases [except it water — except it accomplish] He is stating that they³¹⁸I.e., the rain and the snow. will do nothing else other than to water the earth immediately, and so also will My word do that which I please. Thus the meaning of the word ki [ki im hirvah — ki im asah: except it water — except it accomplish] has the sense of “but.” And so also: ‘ki im’ (but) I will depart to mine own land, and to my kindred.³¹⁹Numbers 10:30.

If you do mistreat him. The verse should have really said “If you mistreat them,” since it is speaking of all three categories mentioned above. It uses the singular to hint that sometimes the mistreating of the orphan alone causes both him and his mother—the widow—to cry out to Hashem. Thus the oppressor incurs a double punishment. Alternatively, since Hashem is the “Father of orphans,” if one mistreats an orphan one mistreats Him as well, so to speak. This causes His attribute of judgment to cry out in heaven at the same time that the orphan cries out on earth.

אם ענה תענה אותו, If you afflict them in any way, etc." Why did the Torah have to write the word אותו, "him," and did not merely write אם תענהו, using the pronoun ending? We would have known that the subject of the verse is the orphan just mentioned. Perhaps we can best explain this with the help of the Mechilta on the words לא תענון. The author writes that but for the word לא תענון in verse 21, I would have thought that this injunction applies only to widows and orphans. Whence do I know that one must not treat people generally in an exploitative manner? This is why the Torah writes לא תענון. Thus far the Mechilta. Since the words לא תענון apply to people as a whole, the word אותו in verse 22 is needed to tell us that the special penalty in store for people transgressing this commandment spelled out in verse 23 applies only if the violation was committed against either a widow or an orphan.

אם ענה תענה אותו, “if you as an individual will be guilty of oppressing such an unfortunate person, etc.” the Torah addresses every such individual not only as a member of society, but in his capacity as a heartless individual.

But does not make clear his punishment. The word כי always gives a reason for the point made before it. Thus we must say this is a “short” verse [since it omitted the point that the reason explains]. It is as if the verse is saying: “If you do mistreat him, in the end you will get yours. Why? When he cries out to Me. . .” This is as Rashi himself explained.

V. 22 u. 23. אותו !אם ענה תענה אותו: zunächst sich auf יתום beziehend, dem Sinne nach aber ebenso אלמנה einschließend. Wehe, wenn auch du, der Staat, sie misshandeln, sie inne werden lässest, dass sie ihren Vertreter und ihre Stütze verloren! Wehe, wenn Witwen und Waisen in der Gesellschaft leiden und nicht einmal bei den staatlichen Vertretern der Gesamtheit Recht und Beistand finden, wie Jesaias 1, 13 geklagt wird: יתום לא ישפטו וריב אלמנה לא יבא אליהם. Wehe, wenn sie erst zu mir aufschreien müssen; bei mir finden sie gewiss Gehör, und ich lasse den Staat und die Gesellschaft es büßen, von denen der Schwache erst an Gott appellieren muss. —

אם ענה תענה אותו, “if you nonetheless oppress him, etc;” Rashi points out that at this point the penalty for such behaviour has not been spelled out, but it is spelled out when the victim complains to G-d about the treatment that he had to endure. The verse has two sections, the second one commencing with: “your wives will become widows, etc.”

Wie jüdische Gewissen und jüdische Richter diese Warnung verstanden, lehrt R. Jischmaels und R. Schimeons Zwiegespräch, als sie zusammen zur Erleidung des Märtyrertodes hinausgeführt wurden. רבי לבי יוצא, sagte auf dem Wege R. Schimeon zu R. Jischmael: "Rabbi, mein Herz geht mir aus," שאיני יודע על מה אני נהרג, "denn ich weiß nicht, weshalb ich den Tod zu erleiden habe". Darauf R. Jischmael zu R. Schimeon: מימיך בא אדם אצלך לדין או לשאלה ועכבתו עד שתהא שותה כוסך ונוטל סנדלך או עוטף טליתך אמרה תורה אם ענה תענה אחד עינוי מרובה ואחד עינוי מועט אמר לו ניחמתני רבי ,vielleicht ist einmal jemand der Rechtsentscheidung oder der Gesetzesbelehrung willen zu dir gekommen und du hast ihn warten lassen, bis du fertig getrunken, deine Sandalen genommen, dein Tuch übergeworfen, das Gesetz spricht: Wenn du irgendwie ihn seine Abhängigkeit fühlen lässest, die Größe der Demütigung ist gleichgültig." — "Du hast mich getröstet," antwortete R. Schimeon (מכילתא).

כי אם צעוק יצעק, “but if you do mistreat them;” this is a reference to the orphan, as he, being a minor does not even have a concept of what such discrimination means and he does not know how to show people what he feels, as opposed to the widow who had not always been mistreated while her husband had been alive.

שמוע אשמע צעקתו, “I will most certainly respond to his outcry;” for people guilty of oppressing him should have been punished by the court; the Torah proceeds to describe that G-d will apply penalties which reflect the sin of the sinner so that he will know why he has been punished. (Rash’bam)

והיו נשיכם אלמנות AND YOUR WIVES SHALL BE WIDOWS [AND YOUR CHILDREN FATHERLESS] — From what is implied in the words, “I will kill you with the sword” do I not know that “your wives shall be widows and your children orphans”? But the explanation of the latter words is not that implied by your question; it is quite a different curse: that the wives will be “fettered” for life — “as living widows” (Rashi is imitating a Biblical phrase, II Samuel 20:3, used in a somewhat similar sense) — that there will be no witnesses who can testify to the death of their husbands, and so they will be forbidden to re-marry. In which case the children will be destitute orphans, for the court will not allow them to take possession of the chattels of their fathers, since they do not know whether they have died or have only been taken captives (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:23; Bava Metzia 38b).

שמוע אשמע צעקתו וחרה אפי. I will have pity with the one who cries out to Me complaining against the harsh and unfair treatment he has to endure. G’d’s reaction to a Jewish individual guilty of such behaviour will be similar to His reaction to the prolonged abuse suffered by the Israelites at the hands of the Egyptians. Anyone guilty of such oppression of orphans or widows will bring about this kind of suffering for his own family members.

'והיו נשיכם וגו a warning of the punishment being made to fit the crime.

והיו נשיכם אלמנות, “your own wives will become widows, etc.” This will be the penalty exacted as a result of widows complaining to G’d.

וחרה אפי, “and My anger shall blaze forth.” This is the same attribute of Justice which smote the Egyptians because they maltreated you taking advantage of the fact that you were strangers. The words והרגתי אתכם בחרב are aimed at those guilty of abusing the stranger whereas the words והיו נשיכם אלמנות are the warning to the people taking advantage of widows. The words ובניכם יתומים, are aimed at people abusing orphans. Each offense will be punished by the מדה כנגד מדה principle, punishment fitting the crime. All the time you are careful not to offend the sensibilities of any of the three groups of naturally sensitive people, any part of the attribute of Justice which would be turned against you (for other sins) will be reversed and will express itself instead as an arm of the attribute of Mercy (Sotah 16). This will enable you to enjoy many years on the land, both you and your children in the presence of your G’d. Practice of righteousness saves from death as we know from Proverbs 10,2. We also have a promise in chapter 12,28 of Proverbs: “there is life in the path of righteousness, there is no death on its path.” Practicing charity is considered a greater ethical/moral achievement than offering of sacrificial animals to G’d as we read in Proverbs: 21,3 “G’d prefers the performance of righteousness to the presentation of sacrificial offerings.”

"and my wrath shall burn": R. Yishmael says: Burning of wrath is mentioned here, and elsewhere (Devarim 11:17) "And the wrath of the L rd shall burn in you." Just as there, withholding of rain and exile are indicated, here, too, these (are understood). And just as here "by the sword," so, there by the sword. "and your wives will be widows, and your children, orphans": From "and I shall kill you by the sword," do I not know that your wives will be widows, and your children, orphans? Why need this be written? (They will be widows) as in (II Samuel 20:3) "And they were bound up in living widowhood (never to remarry) until the day they died." Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If when you do not do what is just, your wives will be widows, then, if you do what is just, how much more so will you not be widows, etc.! As it is written (Zechariah 7:9) "Judge a true judgment," (Ibid. 8:16) "Truth and a judgment of peace shall you judge in your gates," (Isaiah 56:1) "Thus said the L rd: Guard justice and do righteousness, for My salvation is sure to come" — how much more so (if you do this,) your wives will not be widows, and your children, orphans! And thus is it written (Devarim 6:2) "So that you fear the L rd your G d, etc.", and (Ibid. 11:19) "And you shall teach them to your sons," followed by (21) "so that your days be prolonged," and (Isaiah 65:22) "For as the days of the tree (of life) will be the days of My people", (Ibid. 23) "they will not labor in vain; they will not give birth for panic (i.e., to have their children die in their lifetime). For they (their children) will be seed blessed of the L rd, and their children (will always be) with them", and (Ibid. 48:19) "and your seed will be as the sand, and your offspring as its (the sea's) offspring (in its abundance)", (Ibid. 66:22) "for just as the new heavens and the new earth which I will create (in those days) will endure before Me … so will endure (eternally) your children and your name (Israel)", and (Ibid. 59:20) "And the redeemer (the Messiah) will come to Zion, and to those who repent of sin in Yaakov", and (Ibid. 21) "And now, this is My covenant with them, says the L rd: My spirit which is upon you, etc." How much more so will your days be prolonged in this world and you will see children and children of children, and you will merit life in the world to come!

ובניכם יתומים, “and your children will become premature orphans.” This will be the result of an orphan complaining to G’d about being treated unfairly. This type of retribution is quite different from death sentences handed out by a heavenly court of law. Concerning such penalties the Torah employs such syntax as ומתו בו כי יחללוהו, “they will die on account of having profaned it or Him.” (Leviticus 22,9) Examples of how such decrees are carried out would be soldiers dying in battle, (i.e. before having completed a normal life cycle).

אם ענה תענה אותו, Rashi comments on that line in verse 22 that it contains an abbreviated dire warning without spelling out the kind of penalty resulting. The penalty mentioned in verse 23 refers only to G’d’s response to a complaint by the injured party, whereas no mention is made of the penalty imposed when the injured party did not complain to G’d about being maltreated. Nachmanides writes that Rashi is not correct, but that the words אם ענה תענה אותו, have to be understood as in lieu of the words “if he will complain to Me” preceding the punishment of the offender in time, that G’d threatens that He will immediately respond to the complaint if the oppressed orphan even before he has finished complaining. The apparently illogical sequence of this line underlines the immediacy of G’d’s response. The reason for G’d’s “haste” in responding to the outcries of widows and orphans is that whereas ordinary people try to mobilize their social contacts or their wealth to help them over temporary difficulties, the orphans and widows have no such means to fall back on. Only G’d will avenge the wrong done to them

אם כסף תלוה את עמי IF THOU LEND MONEY TO ANY OF MY PEOPLE — R. Yishmael said: wherever אם occurs in Scripture it is used of an act the performance of which is optional, except in three instances, of which this is one (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:24:1; cf. Rashi on Exodus 20:22 - the translation therefore is: “When thou lendeth etc.”).

THOU SHALT NOT BE TO HIM AS AN EXACTOR — that is, a creditor. He is saying that the lender should not behave to the borrower like a creditor who is a sort of lord over the borrower, as it is written, and the borrower is a servant to the lender,³²⁰Proverbs 22:7. but instead you should behave to him exactly as if he had never borrowed from you; neither shall you lay upon him interest, whether interest of money, interest of victuals.³²¹Deuteronomy 23:20. Rather, the loan to him should be an act of goodness; you should not take from him any mark of honor because of it, nor are you to derive any monetary benefit from it.

אם כסף תלוה, if this is an Israelite on whom the promise that “there will not be a destitute person among you” has not been fulfilled. (compare Deuteronomy 15,4) The individual in need of a loan is the one who became subject to another promise (threat) written in the Torah in Deuteronomy 15,11 כי לא יחדל אביון, “there will never be a total absence of destitute people, etc.” When such a situation arises the victim will require a loan.

אם כסף תלוה, If you lend money, etc. Rabbi Yishmael says in the Mechilta that the word אם in any other verse in the Torah means that something is optional. In this case the word אם means "when" and not "if." We need to understand the whole concept of G'd employing the word אם to describe things which may or may not occur. Why does G'd not phrase legislation in a definitive manner? Perhaps the Torah wants to provide an answer also to those who ask why some people seem to enjoy far more riches than they can possibly need in their lives. Such a questioner may well point to our patriarch Jacob (Genesis 28,20) who asked G'd for the necessities of life, i.e. bread to eat, and clothes to wear." While we can understand that depriving man of his necessities may have morally rewarding results seeing that the person so deprived may be punished for wrongdoing and may turn to prayer in order to expiate his guilt, what is the educational value of giving someone excess wealth? Our verse provides the answer to this question. Generally speaking, G'd in His great kindness provides generously for the needs of all His creatures. He allocates a fixed amount for these needs. When a person has not qualified for receiving his needs at the hands of G'd directly because he is guilty of sinful conduct, G'd does not recall the amount that would have been allocated to such a person, but He redirects it to someone else. As a result, the person who does not receive his livelihood from G'd directly, either suffers deprivation or is forced to receive his livelihood through another channel. Receiving one's livelihood by means of a fellow human being instead of at the hands of G'd is demeaning for the recipient. When G'd re-allocates the channels by which such a sinful person receives his livelihood, He practices two virtues. 1) By punishing the person in question in this world for his sins, the sinner is encouraged to rehabilitate himself. 2) G'd gives the wealthy person an opportunity to use his wealth constructively by performing charitable deeds.

לא תהיה לו כנושה, when the time comes to repay the loan do not press the creditor to accept a pledge as collateral instead of repaying it, (compare Kings II 4,1) or Isaiah 50,1 who describes מי מנושי אשר מכרתי אתכם לו? “which of the creditors was it to whom I sold you off?” Every creditor who faces an insolvent debtor takes a pledge as collateral to secure the loan owed him. The Torah compares such a procedure to imposing interest on an overdue loan; therefore,

One of My people has priority. [You might ask: Is it not obvious that a Jew has priority over a gentile]? The answer is: [The law applies] even if the gentile is giving interest and the [Jewish] poor person is not. Even so, “one of My people has priority.”

V. 24. אם כסף תלוה וגו׳. Vergleichen wir die Stellen, in welchen לוח außer dem Darlehnverhältnisse vorkommt, so stellt sich überwiegend die Bedeutung eines freien persönlichen, dem sich Anschließenden in einer wesentlichen Beziehung förderlichen Anschlusses an die Person eines anderen heraus. So: der Anschluss des liebenden Gatten an die Gattin (Bereschit 29, 34), der Anschluss des Leviten an die Priester in der Teilnahme am Tempeldienst, der Anschluss des Proselyten und der Völker an Israel und an Gott (Jesaias 14, 1 u. 56, 3, 6; Esther 9, 27). הַלְוֶה, im Hiphil, würde demnach heißen: die Person eines andern zu dessen Förderung der eigenen Persönlichkeit anschließen, einen andern sich anschließen, ihn an der eigenen Persönlichkeit teilnehmen, ihn in diesem Anschluss nicht Selbständigkeit verlieren, sondern gewinnen lassen, כסף: durch Geld, indem man ihm von seinem Gelde zum Gebrauch gibt. Das eigentliche Objekt ist der לוה, hier: העני ,עמי, die daher auch mit את konstruiert sind. כסף ist das Mittel, wie חרב תאכלו (Jes. 1, 20) u. f. Wörtlich hieße es daher: wenn du mein Volk, den dir verbundenen Armen, durch Geld dir enger anschließest usw. את עמי וגו׳, offenbar ist את העני Apposition zu את עמי, du leihest dem Armen, allein indem du dem Armen leihest, du "meinem Volke", in dem עני עמך, in dem mit dir national verbundenen, auf deinen Beistand hingewiesenen Armen soll dir "עמי" "meine Volksgesellschaft" gegenwärtig sein. Gegen sie übst du Pflicht, indem du ihm leihest. (Vergl.: מלוה ד׳ חונן דל Prov. ולקחתי אתכם לי לעם .(19,16, lautet die Urbestimmung Israels, eine Volksgesellschaft Gottes (עַם von עמם, wovon עִם) zu bilden, eine Volksgesellschaft, die ihre gegenseitigen Beziehungen unter der Herrschaft des göttlichen Gesetzes sich gestalten, nicht den Tempelgottesdienst, sondern das soziale Leben die Gott verherrlichende Offenbarungsstätte sein lässt. Die urwüchsigste Blüte aus dieser Bestimmung, die unmittelbarste Konsequenz, zugleich Grundstein und Bekenntnistat der Bestimmung עם ד׳ zu sein, ist dies ganze הלואה-Gesetz; nur von ihr aus erschließt sich sein Begriff. Es ist nicht der abstrakte Rechtsgedanke, es ist die Idee der durch die Gotteshörigkeit aller unserer Güter sich aufbauenden jüdischen Volksgesellschaft, die es konstruiert, es ist nicht משפט, es ist צדקה, der jüdische Pflichtbegriff, der in ihm zur Verwirklichung kommt.

אם כסף תלוה, “if you lend money, etc.;” Rabbi Yehudah hachassid says that the reason this verse commences with the word אם, “if,” instead the word כאשר, “when,” is that there are occasions when this is not a commandment but something that is voluntary, such as when the borrower has a reputation of not repaying a loan.

אם כסף, the reason why the law to extend loans to the needy has been written here is that the three categories of people mentioned previously, i.e. the proselyte, the orphan and the widow are the ones most in need of borrowing money.

את עמי TO ANY OF MY PEOPLE — If thou hast to choose between lending money to My people and a heathen, My people come first; if between a poor man and one who is better off, the poor man comes first; if between thine own poor (poor relatives) and other poor of thy city, thine own poor come first; if between the poor of thine own city and the poor of another city, the poor of thine own city come first (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:24:3; Bava Metzia 71a). And this is how the above explanation is implied in the text: “If thou lend money” — את עמי “lend it to My people”, and not to a heathen; and to which one of My people? את העני, to the poor; and to which poor? עמך to him that is with thee (i. e. who is with thee in relationship and is with thee in thy city). [Another explanation of את עמי is: Thou shalt not treat him disrespectfully when lending him money, for he is עמי — though in need he is still “My people”!

לא תשימון עליו נשך as a device to extend the period for repayment.

This is the true meaning of: "when you lend money to My people, the poor who is with you." The Torah suggests that if we find ourselves in possession of more than we need, we are to lend it to someone whom the Torah, i.e. G'd, describes as עמי, "My people." The meaning of this verse is that if you become aware that you have more money than you need for your personal requirements it is clear that the excess had originally belonged to someone else, i.e. "the poor amongst you." This is a clear hint that you should open your hand to lend to the poor part of what used to be his, or had been intended for him. Perhaps the Torah even hinted to the wealthy person that when he extends a loan to the poor he should not credit himself with being a superior person seeing that the loan only represents a partial return to the poor of what had originally been intended for him by G'd Himself. This may also be the reason why the Torah says: "do not act as if you were his creditor." The word נשה is related to נשיאות, a superior status or posture; the Torah reminds the lender that what he lends to the poor was the property of the poor in the first place. This is why the Torah goes on to speak about the prohibition to charge interest on the loan.

Zuerst: לא תהיה לו כנשה. Wir haben schon zu (Bereschit 32, 33) entwickelt, wie נשה die Einbuße an Kraft, Recht oder Gütern an einen andern bedeutet. Daher auch der Ausdruck für eine unbefriedigte Forderung. Derjenige daher, der auf Grund einer solchen stattgehabten Einbuße mit der Rückerstattungsforderung an den andern herantritt, heißt נשֶה ב־. Indem es hier nun nicht לא תהיה בו כנשה, sondern לו כנשה heißt, so fordert hier das göttliche Gesetz nicht nur, dass a. der Gläubiger nicht in dem vollen Ausmaß des ihm nach dem nackten Rechtsbegriffe Zustehenden gegen den Schuldner auftreten soll, sondern auch b, dass er überhaupt auch außergerichtlich seinem Schuldner nicht als Gläubiger erscheine, es in seinem Benehmen nicht hervortreten lasse, dass er eine unbefriedigte Forderung an ihn habe. Daher das Verbot, den unbemittelten oder augenblicklich zahlungsunfähigen Schuldner einzuklagen oder sonst zur Zahlung zu drängen. Daher selbst für das Gericht die Bestimmung, den Schuldner nicht, wie man sagt, aufs Stroh legen, sondern für ihn dieselbe Rücksicht eintreten zu lassen, die das Gesetz Wajikra 27, 8 אם מך הוא מערכך וגו׳ für den Fall statuiert, dass jemand durch die völlige Lösung einer dem Heiligtum angelobten Schätzung, מך, ruiniert werden würde, dass ihm nämlich an Lebensmitteln, Kleidung, Bett und Handwerksgeräten ein dem Notwendigsten entsprechendes Quantum zu lassen ist, מסדרין לבעל חוב (Ch. M. 97, 2. 23 f). Daher aber endlich das große von R. Dimi gelehrte jüdische Wort: כי אתא רב דימי אמר מנין לנשה בחברו מנה ויודע שאין לו שאסור לעבור לפניו ת׳׳ל לא תהיה לו כנושה רבי אמי ורב אסי דאמרי תרויהו כאילו דנו בשני דינין שנא׳ הרכבת אנוש לראשנו באנו באש ובמים ,wer an den andern eine Forderung hat und weiß, daß er unvermögend ist, darf nicht an ihm vorübergehen (damit er nicht, wie es erläutert wird, bei ihm das beschämende Gefühl errege, eine Schuld zu haben, die er nicht tilgen kann), denn es heißt: du sollst ihm nicht wie ein Schuldforderer sein. R. Ami und Assi fügen hinzu: täte er es, so wäre er, als hätte er an ihm zwei Todesarten vollzogen, als hätte er ihn mit Feuer und Wasser überschüttet, denn es heißt (Ps. 66, 12): "Du hast uns in Menschenobmacht gegeben, in Feuer und Wasser sind wir gekommen". Während somit in außerjüdischen Kreisen der Schuldner vor dem Gläubiger sich nicht sehen lässt, ist dem jüdischen Gläubiger gesagt, den Anblick des Schuldners zu vermeiden, um diesem das kränkende Gefühl der Beschämung zu ersparen!

לא תהיה לו כנושה, “do not treat him (the borrower who is tardy in repaying same) like a creditor;” some commentators understand the expression נשה as “forgetting,” as when Joseph said in Genesis 41,51: כי נשני אלוקים, “for G-d has enabled me to forget, etc.;” the meaning of our verse then would be that you are not allowed to act towards the debtor like someone who constantly reminds him not to forget to pay back the loan. He does so by reminding the borrower for how long he had deprived his creditor by making him wait for getting his money back. He is also reminded by the Torah not to impose interest payments for the overdue period.

את העני עמך Look at thyself as though thou art the poor man (Midrash Tanchuma 6:15)].

לא תשימון עליו נשך. Während die erste Vershälfte sich an den Darleiher, der ja in der Regel nur ein Individuum ist, im Singular wendet, wird hier die Gesamtheit in allen ihren Gliedern, somit in dem Begriff als Gesellschaft, als עם, angeredet, und dieser Begriff noch durch das ן paragogikon hervorgehoben: ihr, die jüdische Gesellschaft als solche, sollte dem Schuldner keinen Zins auflegen. Es ist damit sofort gesagt, dass das jüdische Gesetz den Zins vom Standpunkte des allgemeinen Rechtes keineswegs an sich als ein Unrecht betrachtet. Nicht dem Rechtsbegriffe, wohl aber dem Prinzipe, auf welchem die jüdische Gesellschaft beruhen soll, widerspricht er. Dürfte sich der jüdische Darleiher rein als נשה, als ein solcher betrachten, der mit voller Freiwilligkeit die Benutzung seines Geldes auf gewisse Zeit einem andern Individuum eingeräumt, so dürfte er sich auch dieses zeitliche Opfer seines Vermögens oder des Nutzens aus seinem Vermögen bezahlen lassen. Allein das soll er eben nicht. Es ist weder ausschließlich sein Geld, das er geliehen, noch stand der Entschluss zum Darlehen lediglich in seinem Belieben. Sein Geld ist zugleich Gottes Eigentum, und das Darlehen ist Pflicht, und der Anleiher ist kein bloßes Individuum, ist "עמי", ist ein integrierendes Glied der Gottesgemeine, die eben Gott durch die Zaubermacht der "Pflicht" erbaut wissen will. Als Gott den ägyptischen Sklaven zuerst als Menschen und Mann wieder mit Eigentumsrecht bekleidete, kittete er sofort die zum freien Besitz Erstandenen nicht durch die Gewalt der Not, sondern durch das Gebot der Pflicht zur Gesellschaft an einander, nicht hat der relativ Minderbegüterte den Vermögenden aufzusuchen, der Mehrhabende hat sich nach dem Nachbar umzusehen, dem sein Überfluss zugute kommen könne, und noch weit mehr und in einem weit höheren Sinne, als der Arme des Reichen bedarf, ist dem Reichen der Arme ein Bedürfnis. Dieser findet in jenem nur die Stütze seiner leiblichen Not, jener aber in diesem den Gegenstand zur Lösung seiner höchsten geistig sittlichen Bestimmung, Gott den Tribut der Huldigung zu leisten, den er an jeden uns verliehenen Groschen geknüpft. Indem Gott uns zu Besitzenden machte, hat er sich die Disposition über unsern Besitz vorbehalten, und hat zunächst עמו, die durch den Geist Seines Gesetzes zu schaffende Volksgesellschaft zum Benefiziaten eingesetzt. Das ist der Geist der Zedaka, des jüdischen Pflichtbegriffs, der bis auf heute das Wunder des jüdischen Volksdaseins geschaffen, dessen höchste Potenz aber eben הלואה, die Darlehenspflicht ist (siehe zu Dewarim 15, 8). Das ist aber auch der Geist, vor welchem das Zinsrecht weicht.

לא תשימון עליו נשך, “you must not impose interest payment on him (the borrower). The reason that here the Torah again uses the plural mode, is that loans always involve several people, the lender, the borrower, and the witnesses to the transaction. All of these are guilty of the transgression to charge or pay interest for loans from Israelites to other Israelites if they are silent parties to it.

לא תהיה לו כנשה THOU SHALT NOT BE UNTO HIM AS AN EXACTOR — you shall not demand the debt of him forcibly. The comparative כ of כנשה suggests thou shalt not be like a נשה: if you know that he has no money do not appear in your attitude towards him as though you had lent him, but as though you had not lent him — it means as much as, do not humble him.

So ist die Pflicht des zinsfreien Darlehens ein Fels des Granitbodens, auf welchem die jüdische Volksgesellschaft ruht; ihre Erfüllung ist aber auch zu gleicher Zeit eine jener großen Bekenntnistaten, durch welche Gott unsere Gotteshuldigung in lebendigen Tatopfern besiegelt wissen will. Je weniger die Zinsforderung dem natürlichen Diktate des Rechts widerspricht, je mehr vielmehr der einfache Rechtsbegriff ihr das Wort redet, je weniger Unrecht in dem Anspruch auf Zinsen liegt, umsomehr tritt das Zinsverbot in die Reihe jener Gesetze ein, die wie Schabbat, Schemita, Jobel, der Herrschaft Gottes über Welt und Israel Zeugnis und Denkmal sein sollen. Wie die Verzichtleistung auf Werktätigkeit am Schabbat, auf Ackerbestellung und Schuldeinforderung im Schemitajahr, auf Anrecht an erworbenen Gütern und Personen im Jobel, Gott als den eigentlichen Herrn und Eigentümer der Welt und der Menschenkräfte, des Landes und Vermögens, der Personen und Güter proklamieren: so hat Gott die Verzichtleistung auf jeden sonst berechtigten Zinsanspruch aus Darlehen als eine laute Bekenntnistat eingesetzt, mit welcher wir Ihn als den eigentlichen Herrn und Eigner auch unseres ganzen beweglichen Eigentums, auf Grund der uns mit der ägyptischen Erlösung von Ihm nur bedingungsweise, zum Aufbau eines von Ihm geleiteten Volkslebens, gewährten Selbständigkeit und Begüterung zu bekennen haben. Darum schließt auch das ausführlichere Gesetz über das zinslose Darlehen (Wajikra 25, 38) אני ד׳ אלדיכם אשר הוצאתי אתכם מארץ מצרים לתת לכם את ארץ כנען להיות לכם לאלדים, wo ausdrücklich auf die Unterordnung unter den göttlichen, in seinem Gesetze ausgesprochenen Willen, als Bedingung und Ziel der verliehenen Freiheit und begüterten Selbständigkeit hingewiesen wird. Daher auch R. Joßis Satz: Siehe, wie blind die Zinsdarleiher sind. Nennt sonst einer den andern gottlos, so geht er mit ihm aufs Leben, sie aber bringen Zeugen und Schreiber, Feder und Tinte und lassen schreiben und unterzeichnen: der und der hat den Gott Israels geleugnet, כפר באלקי ישראל! (B. M. 71 a).

נשך is what is called in Rabbinical Hebrew רבית (from רבה to increase). It is called נשך “biting”, because it resembles the bite of a snake: it bites, inflicting a small wound in a person’s foot which he does not feel at first, but all at once it swells and distends the whole body up to the top of his head. So it is with interest: at first one does not feel the drain it makes on him and it remains unnoticed until the interest mounts up and suddenly makes the person lose a big fortune (Exodus Rabbah 31:6).

Dass bei dem Zinsverbot nicht bloß die konkrete Wirkung des Darlehnzinses auf die sozialen Zustände in Betracht zu ziehen ist, dass ihm vielmehr wesentlich der Charakter einer Bekenntnistat innewohnt, das, dünkt uns, ist schon durch den Umstand evident, dass nicht nur das Zinsnehmen, sondern in gleichem Grade auch das Zinsgeben verpönt ist (Dewarim 23, 20 u. 21). Gleichwohl ist der Einfluss des Zinsverbotes auf die ganze Gestaltung der sozialen Zustände ein unberechenbarer. Wenn durch die vorangehenden Gesetze der Rechtsungleichheit begegnet ist, die Geburt und Schicksal in die Reihen der Volksgesellschaft zu bringen pflegen, so ist mit dem Zinsverbot dem fruchtbarsten Faktor der sozialen Ungleichheit, dem Gelde, der verderblichste Einfluss genommen, die Übermacht des Kapitals gebrochen. Wird dieses Verbot in seinem gesetzlichen Ernst aufrecht erhalten, so ist jedes Kapital an sich völlig tot und unfruchtbar und kann nur durch Vermählung mit der Arbeitskraft nutzbringend werden. Mit ihm ist die Arbeit zum ersten und eigentlichen Faktor der sozialen Wohlfahrt erhoben. Das Kapital ist gezwungen, die Ebenbürtigkeit der Arbeitskraft anzuerkennen. Der Besitzende muss entweder selbst sein sonst totes Kapital durch eigene Arbeitstätigkeit zum Fruchterträgnis beleben, oder er muss sich mit der Arbeitskraft des Unbemittelten, Gewinn und Verlust teilend, assoziieren und in seinem eigenen Interesse das Interesse der Arbeit fördern. Jeder Notstand der Arbeit wird in einem noch höhern Grade zum Notstande des Kapitals, und nie kann das Kapital aus dem Ruin der Arbeit eine Blüte ziehen. Jenem schreienden Kontraste, wo neben der mächtigen Opulenz das Elend der Arbeit wuchert, ist mit diesem Gesetze der Boden der Möglichkeit entzogen.

Wir haben bereits bemerkt, dass das jüdische Gesetz dem Zins an sich keineswegs die natürliche Berechtigung abspricht und ihn nur aus dem Prinzipe der jüdischen sozialen Volksvereinigung positiv verbietet. Wenn aber eine moderne Anschauung Geld als ein Nutzungsobjekt betrachten und den Darlehnszins unter den Begriff des Mietzinses, (שכירות), für dessen temporär gestattete Benutzung bringen möchte, somit unter die Kategorie des Mietzinses für ein vermietetes Haus, Tier u. dergl., den ja auch das jüdische Gesetz gestattet: so dürfte diese Anschauung wohl übersehen, dass der vermietete Gegenstand fortwährend Eigentum des Vermieters bleibt, der Mieter in der Tat das Eigentum des Vermieters benutzt, resp. abnutzt und bezahlt, während das angeliehene Geld sofort Eigentum des Anleihers wird, מלוה להוצאה נתנה, wofür er nur den Wert dem Darleiher schuldet, der Anleiher somit nur aus einem Objekte seines eigenen Eigentums Nutzen zeiht. (Vergl. ב׳׳מ 69 b.)

Wenn aber das jüdische Gesetz das zinsfreie Darlehen zur höchsten Pflicht sozialer Genossenschaft erhebt und den Schuldner gegen Härte, ja gegen Beschämung, abseiten des Gläubigers schützt, so macht es andererseits pünktliche und ordnungsmäße Rückzahlung dem Schuldner zur Pflicht, verbietet ihm jede leichtsinnige oder gewagte Verwendung sich dadurch in die Notwendigkeit zu versetzen, ein dringender Gläubiger zu werden. (CH. M. 97, 4).

אם חבל תחבל IF THOU TAKE TO PLEDGE — The root חבל never signifies “taking a pledge” at the time when the loan is transacted, but it means taking the goods of the debtor when the date of payment arrives and he does not pay (Bava Metzia 114b). [חבל תחבל — Scripture bids you take the pledge repeatedly — even many times (that is, repeatedly to defer the time of payment). The Holy One, blessed be He, says as it were: “How much do you owe Me! See, your soul ascends night by night to Me and renders account of its doing and so becomes My debtor, and should be kept as a pledge; and yet I return it to you every morning. Thus, too, you should do: take the pledge and restore it, take it again and again restore it!”) (Midrash Tanchuma, Mishpatim 16)].

אם חבול תחבול שלמת רעך, "If you take your neighbour's garment as a pledge, etc." The moral/ethical message of this verse may be to awaken a person in whose hand the garment of the king (G'd) has been entrusted. Proverbs 27,10 states: רעך ורעת אביך אל תעזב, "do not forsake your friend or the friend of your father." The person in question is supposed to relate to said garment in the manner described in Shabbat 152. The return of the soul to G'd is compared there to a king who had distributed Royal garments to his servants. The intelligent ones folded these garments and placed them in a chest for safe-keeping. The fools wore them and performed their daily routines while wearing them. When the day came when the king asked that his gaments be returned, the intelligent servants returned them in good condition, ironed, etc. The fools returned the garments soiled, crumpled, etc. The king rejoiced when he observed the care taken by his intelligent servants, while he was angry at the foolish servants. He sent the former back to their homes in peace whereas he made the fools spend a long time in jail while the garments were being cleaned. We have already explained that man's soul is part of G'd's light. The Psalmist describes G'd as garbed in light (Psalms 104,2). G'd ordered that if the item (soul) He had given man as a pledge had become soiled, i.e. that man had committed sins while "wearing" the soul, there would come a time when he has to return this pledge (i.e. his death, described in our verse as "sunset"). Psalms 90,3 speaks about "the soul returning to dust, or broken-hearted." Our sages in Kohelet Rabbah 2, understand the word דכא as the dismay of death; man was given an opportunity to repent until the day he died, i.e. until the day his sun set.

אם חבל תחבל, even when you take such a pledge with the approval of the court, (compare Deuteronomy 24,11 according to which even the official of the court overseeing such a procedure is not allowed into the house of the debtor, and the debtor must himself bring you such a pledge to serve as collateral) the pledge must not consist of chattels which the debtor cannot do without. All of these considerations are included in the words “do not be like creditor to him.”

אם חבול תחבול שלמת רעך עד בא השמש תשיבנו לו, “If you take your neighbour’s garment in pledge you must return it to him before the sun sets.” The verse speaks of a garment worn by day (Mechilta Nezikin 19). [The meaning is that if you took such a garment (as collateral, with the court’s approval) but during the day, you have to give it back and take it only after sunset when the owner does not need it. Ed.]
Shemot Rabbah 31,10 writes as follows on our verse: here the Torah describes the meaning of Jeremiah 6,30: “they are called ‘rejected silver,’ for the Lord rejected them.” You find that when the Israelites were exiled from Jerusalem that their captors led them in iron collars. Their enemies said: “their G’d has already despised them as He said concerning them that they are rejected silver.” Just as silver needs refinement before it can be trans-formed into usable vessels, and it has to be melted down and be refined again in order to make a different vessel out of it, eventually it will be used up and returned to the soil as it is of no further use, this is what happened to Israel who are of no further use.” As soon as Jeremiah heard this he exclaimed: “Have you then rejected Yehudah? Have You spurned Zion?” (Jeremiah 14,19) The matter is best explained by means of a parable. A king punished his wife, striking her; her friend said to him: ‘how long will you keep on hitting her? If you want to divorce her, go on striking her until she dies; if however, you intend to take her back eventually, why are you so exact in your demands of her?” The king replied: “even if my entire palace were nothing but a sword, I would still not divorce her.” This is what Jeremiah said to G’d: “If You want to divorce us, keep hitting us until our memory is wiped out.” This is what he meant with the words “Have you utterly despised us, etc.?” If not, why do You inflict punishments for which there is no cure?” G’d answered him: “I will not divorce Israel until the time comes when I will destroy My Universe.” This is what is reflected in the words of Jeremiah 31,37: “Thus said the Lord: ‘if the heavens above could be measured and the foundations below could be fathomed, only then would I reject all the offspring of Israel for all they have done- declares the Lord.’ In spite of their being wayward I have made a pledge to them when I said: “I will give My sanctuary to be amongst you.” Instead of reading the word משכני to mean “My sanctuary,” you can also read it to mean משכוני, “My pledge, My collateral.” This is what Bileam had in mind when he referred to the Tabernacle saying מה טובו אהליך יעקב משכנותיך ישראל, “how goodly are your tents o Yaakov, your “pledges” o Israel” (Numbers 24,5). When the Tabernacle (Temple, Sanctuary) is in ruins its concept remains as the pledge that Israel is not permanently out of favour with its G’d. G’d, so to speak, said to Israel: “I do not offer you as a collateral, (captive) to the Gentiles because I love them but because your sins against Me.” This is what the prophet meant when he quoted G’d as saying: “where is the document of divorce of your mother whom I dismissed? And which of My creditors was it I sold you off to? You were only sold off for your sins, and your mother dismissed for your crimes.”
The Midrash continues elaborating on the words אם חבול תחבול, saying: “when the Israelites transgress the commandments I will sell them as two pledges. (this is a reference to the destruction of both the first and the second Temple). How long will they be in the pawnshop? עד בא השמש, “until the Messiah will arrive.” Of that Messiah it is written (Maleachi 3,20) “a sun of victory will shine to bring healing to those who revere My name.” It has also been written (Psalms 72,17) ”while the sun lasts may his name (Messiah) endure.” When that time arrives the Jewish people will be taken back by G’d as His “wife.” Thus far the Midrash.
It is well known that the people of Israel have been described as ריעים, “companions” of the Lord as we read in Psalms 122,8: “for the sake of My kin and friends.” The Holy Temple has been compared to G’d’s “mantle” (reading the word Shlomoh as Salmoh instead, i.e. with the letter ש having the dot on its left side). By the same token Solomon himself referred to the Temple as יריעות, (Song of Songs 1,5) a word which can mean either “draperies” or be a reference to this companionship we mentioned. Moses has referred to it asלבנון in Deut. 3,25 where he says: “this good mountain and the Lebanon.” Onkelos translates the word לבנון as בית מקדש, “the Holy Temple.” Yuma 39 understands the words “this good mountain” as a reference to Jerusalem whereas “Lebanon” is a reference to The Temple Mount and the Sanctuary.

But rather the security. . . from the borrower. This is why the verse says afterwards, “[you must return it to him] till sunset.” Whereas if you took it at the time of the loan, you need not return it.

V. 25. Es dürfte noch der Entscheidung bedürfen, in welchem Sinne der Begriff Pfand durch חבל, ursprünglich: Strick, seinen Ausdruck findet, ob, weil das Pfandobjekt "vinkuliert", für den Gläubiger gebunden bleibt, von dem Schuldner nicht zum Nachteil des Gläubigers veräußert werden kann, oder weil er selbst zum Mittel wird, den Schuldner dadurch zur Zahlung "gebunden zu halten". Ähnlich ist der andere Ausdruck für Pfand: עבוט, auch mit עבות, Strick, lautverwandt. Die näheren Bestimmungen des Pfändungsrechtes sind Dewarim 24, 6. 10 f. niedergelegt. Sie sind von der möglichsten Schonung der Persönlichkeit und der Achtung des Hausrechts diktiert. Hier heißt es: אם חבל תחבל, in welcher Weise du auch zu dem Pfand gekommen, selbst auf ganz gesetzliche Weise (B. M. 31 b). Der Begriff חבל setzt übrigens ein Einschreiten des Gläubigers voraus, der durch den Akt sich das Objekt oder den Schuldner "binden" will. Die hier folgende Bestimmung hat daher nur auf Pfändung für eine bereits erhaltene Schuld bezug, משכון שלא בשעת הלואה; übergibt der Schuldner im Momente des Darlehens ein Objekt zum Unterpfand, משכון בשעת הלואה, so ist der Gläubiger zu der hier gebotenen zeitweiligen Rückgabe nicht verpflichtet.

אם חבול תחבול, “if you will take a pledge,” (as a security for an overdue loan) the repetition of this verb is to tell the lender that the value of the pledge is not to exceed the value of the debt; G–d is telling the lender that he must remember how much he himself owes G–d at any given time. If he is conscious of that, He in turn, will remember this every evening when his soul rises to heaven and He restores that soul to him in the morning. If he fails to deal fairly with the borrower, G–d will remember this in His dealings with the lender and treat his soul as a pledge.

אם חבול תחבול, “if you have taken as a pledge,” (security for overdue loan) the pawn had been collected by the court’s messenger with the court’s permission. This is clear from Deuteronomy 24,11, where the Torah commands the creditor to remain outside the borrower’s house when collecting or returning it. This is an example of what has been discussed in verse 24: “do not treat him like a creditor.”

עד בא השמש תשיבנו לו RESTORE IT UNTO HIM TILL THE GOING DOWN OF THE SUN — Restore it unto him for the whole day until the sun-set, and at night-fall you may take it again till the day-break of the next morning. Scripture speaks here of garment which is worn during the day and which is not required during the night (Bava Metzia 114b).

עד בא השמש , you may hold on to this garment only during the night when the wearer has no need for it. (based on Baba Metzia 114).

A garment worn by day. The Nachalas Yaakov explains: Since it is written [in the next verse], “With what shall he lie down?” it is obvious that it is referring to a garment worn by night. [Thus we might think that this verse, too, is the same.] And when it is written, “You must return it to him till sunset,” it means before sunset, as in the verse, “Before ( עד ) I came to you” (Bereishis 48:5). Or [it could mean] that till sunset the garment remains in your hand, and then you should return it to him. Therefore, Rashi [needed to] explain that it is referring to “a garment worn by day.” [Rashi knows this] since he explained in Parshas Ki Seitzei that “and he will lie down in his garment” (Devarim 24:13) [refers to a garment worn by night. Thus, this verse must refer] to a garment worn by day. And [here, following our verse,] it concludes: “With what shall he lie down?” to also include [various types of other] garments [and bedding] used at night. You might ask: What does the lender gain by taking the security from him, if he has to return it [every day]? The Gemara (Bava Metzia 114b) already answered: If he lends with a security, the shmittah year does not release the loan. Furthermore, [if the borrower dies,] the security will not be considered as moveable possessions of the orphans. Therefore these possesions cannot be collected by the creditor.

The reason the Torah repeated the words חבול תחבול, is that every Israelite has three levels of soul known in ascending order as נפש, רוח, נשמה. Our verse refers to all three levels of his soul. When the Torah speaks of אם חבול, it refers to the נשמה. The word תחבול refers to the רוח; whereas the words שלמת רעך refer to the נפש. The Torah repeats this division when it defines the nature of these respective levels of pledges, i.e. the words כי היא כסותה לבדו, "for that is his only covering," refer to the נשמה. The words היא שמלתו לעורו, "it is the garment of his skin," refer to the רוח level of man's soul; finally, the words במה ישכב, "wherein he shall sleep," refer to the נפש level of man's soul. The latter is the remnant of the soul which remains with man even while he is in the grave as we know from Job 14,22: ונפשו עליו תאבל, "and his soul will mourn him."

עד בא השמש וגו׳. Es ist wohl vorauszusetzen, daß חבל תחבל als ein gerichtlicher Akt, in der Regel am Tage vorgenommen war. Daher: wenn du am Tage das Kleid deines Schuldners als Pfand genommen, sollst du es ihm bis zum Sonnenuntergange wieder zurückgeben und es erst abends fortnehmen. Es ist klar, dass hier von כסות יום von einem Tagekleide die Rede ist. Vergleichen wir ohnehin die Stellen, in welchen שלמה vorkommt, so ist nicht eine, die entschieden an etwas anderes, als an ein "Kleidungsstück" denken lässt. Hierauf weist auch die Verwandtschaft mit צלם, die Figur, hin, somit ein der Menschenfigur angepasstes Kleid, während שמלה sowohl dieses als auch in den Stellen: Bereschit 9, 23; Dewarim 22, 17; Richter 8, 25; Sam. I. 21, 10 u. Prov. 30, 4 entschieden ein Tuch zum Zudecken, Einwickeln, ein Betttuch, somit ein Gewand überhaupt bedeutet. Darauf weist auch wohl סמל, womit שמלה verwandt ist, hin, das auch wohl mehr eine unvollkommene Darstellung einer Figur, so תמונת כל סמל, Dewarim 4, 16 bedeutet. Daher wird in der מכילתא das שמלתו לעורו des folgenden Verses als: Hemd erklärt. Wenn es daher in der korrespondierenden Stelle Dewarim 24, 13 ושכב בשלמתו und nicht בשמלתו heißt, so ist wohl darunter ein Nachtkleid, כסות לילה, zu verstehen, und nicht etwa ein Bettgewand, und wäre damit selbst die Rückgabe eines Nachtkleides für die Nacht zur Pflicht gemacht, obgleich das Bedürfnis nach einem solchen nicht so dringend erscheint, da ja ein sonst für den Tag bestimmtes Kleid auch zur Nachtbekleidung dienen kann. כסות und שמלה bezeichnen wohl die beiden Zwecke der Kleidung: schützende Bedeckung und Verhüllung des tierischen Leibes.

תשיבנו לו, “you have to restore it to him;” you may argue that if this is the procedure to be followed then the borrower can drag out repayment until the day he dies? We therefore have to understand this verse as follows: the agent of the court did not secure this pledge until after the loan had already become overdue, and he had handed it to the lender. The rule of restoring such a pledge for immediate use by the borrower is valid only for thirty days. This is the period that the court intervenes in the matter. When the thirty days have elapsed and the loan has not been repaid, the lender is entitled to sell this pledge.

The Torah goes on to say: "it will be if he cries out to Me;" here the Torah returned to the requirement to give back the soul to G'd in the condition it had been received and assures man that he does not need to despair. If he cries out to G'd, i.e. if he is truly penitent, ושמעתי, G'd assures him: "I will listen for I am gracious." G'd assures man that he will wipe out his sins.

The words: תשיבנו לו, “restore it to him,” the subject is the pledge, seeing that the word חבול is masculine.

כי הוא כסותה FOR THAT IS HIS RAIMENT — i. e. his upper garment;

AND I WILL HEAR FOR I AM GRACIOUS — showing favor and accepting everyone’s supplication even though he is unworthy, the word chanun (gracious) being derived from the word chinam (for nothing). And the meaning of the verse is that you should not think: “I will not take the righteous man’s garment as a pledge, but the garment of a man who is not righteous I will take as a pledge and not return to him, for G-d will not hear his cry.” Therefore He said, for I am gracious and I hear the cry of all who beseech Me.

ושמעתי כי חנון אני, even though the debtor cannot complain to Me about you, seeing he owes you repayment for a loan, if he nonetheless cries out to Me complaining about his economic situation which causes him to be practically naked seeing you took his clothing as security for his overdue loan, I will give him part of what I had intended to give you as recognition of your supplying his needs. If you had been granted more financial means than you needed, the only reason was so that you could use your excess to assist the needy.

ושמעתי כי חנון אני, even though the creditor has obtained the pledge legally, and he does not have to return it except in exchange for payment of the loan it secures, the Torah expects you to do more than the law requires, something known in Talmudic parlance as לפנים משורת הדין. G’d warns that although from a legal standpoint He should ignore the pleas of the debtor, He will nonetheless listen to his plea as He is compassionate by nature. When discussing G’d’s attitude to the pleas of a widow or orphan in verse 22 the Torah describes this as not only based on His compassion but on legal considerations. Hence the words: “for I am compassionate” do not appear in that context.

ושמעתי כי חנון אני, “I shall listen for I am compassionate.” G’d is concerned that the reader should not conclude that G’d’s concern for the property and comfort of the righteous does not also extend to the not so righteous, such as in the legislation not to take as a pawn for a loan which is overdue certain necessities. (compare Deut. 24,17) Some commentators interpret the line והיה כי יצעק אלי to mean that if the individual in question was in the habit of thanking the Lord for the acts of kindness he had experienced that had been performed by you, such as not taking your bedclothes as a security for a loan, He in turn would respond to the prayer when he asks for help.

.ושמעתי כי חנון אני , “I shall listen for I am compassionate.” Nachmanides interprets these words to mean: “in order that no man should reason that the poor man whose garment was taken as a pledge was not worthy in the eyes of G’d and taking his garment would therefore not be sinful even if he did not return it to him at the time he is need of it.“ This person might reason that G’d would not answer his outcry seeing he was not worthy. G’d therefore goes on record that He would listen to such an outcry not because it was necessarily justified or that the petitioner was worthy, but because G’d Himself is compassionate. The word חנון is derived from חנם, “for free, without recompense.” It is similar to Exodus 33,19 וחנותי את אשר אחון, “I will show grace to whoever I decide to show grace.” According to Berachot 7 this means that G’d reserves the right to listen to people who entreat Him regardless of merits we are aware of.

V. 26. במה ישכב. Da das vorhergehende von Tagesbedeckung spricht, so muss mit dieser Frage eine andere Kategorie von Gegenständen, das Bedürfnis für die Schlafstätte, מצע, die Unterlage, wie es in der מכילתא erläutert wird, bezeichnet sein. Es muss daher damit eine neue Gedankenreihe angedeutet sein, etwa: "Worauf auch soll er schlafen?" Auch diese Frage hast du dir vorzulegen und danach zu handeln. Das Objekt für den Tagesbedarf hast du für den Tag, das für den Bedarf der Nacht für die Nacht zurückzugeben.

והיה כי יצעק אלי, “and it will come to pass that if the borrower cries out to Me,” (complaining about unfair treatment) the borrower’s complaint to Me will sound as follows: “we have both been created by You as equals. Why should the lender sleep comfortably each night with a pillow to rest his head on, while I have to rest my head on a stone?” At first glance the wording of the Torah describing G–d’s response, i.e. “I will listen for I am gracious,” to the borrower’s complaint does not appear to fit his complaint; This is why I, (author) have decided to interpret the verse differently. It appears to relate to what was written previously in verse 25, where the Torah commanded the lender to restore the pledge (pillow) by nightfall, so that he can also rest his head on a pillow. G–d’s response is to be understood as follows: “if the borrower in his prayers mentions that you have treated him with consideration, I too will consider your own problems having due regard for the empathy you have shown the borrower.” This is spelled out clearly in Deuteronomy 15,10, where the subject of how to relate to destitute people is discussed at greater length.

כי היא כסותה לבדה “for it is her only blanket to cover herself with (at night).” The same is the case if she has only one garment to wear during the daytime. If she possesses more than one of each of those items, the lender need not return the pledge every evening and morning for exchanging one against the other.

שמלתו means HIS SHIRT (the שמלה for the skin);

כי חנון אני, I will therefore display My compassion for anyone who has no one else to turn to. It is in your own interest then to demonstrate your compassion by returning his pledge to him when he is in need of it. If you will do this you will ensure that I will not withdraw My compassion from you. This, in turn, will enable you to extend loans to other needy people.

Wir haben oben zu V. 24 die gesetzliche Vorschrift bemerkt, auch bei gerichtlich beizutreibender Zahlung dem unvermögenden Schuldner das Nötige an Bett, Kleidung etc.etc. für seinen Leibesbedarf zu lassen, מסדרין לבעל חוב. Dabei tritt somit das Bedürfnis der Rückgabe nicht ein. Hier aber spricht es von einer Pfändung, die nicht bereits Zahlung bewirkt, sondern die Zahlung sicher stellen soll. Es wird das Pfand nicht als Zahlung, sondern als Sicherheit hingenommen. Gleichwohl gewinnt der Gläubiger schon insofern ein Anrecht an das Pfand, dass nunmehr die Schuld im Erlassjahr nicht aufgehoben wird und das Pfandobjekt nicht den Erben verfällt, sondern eventuell für den Gläubiger als Zahlungsmittel bleibt (Ch. M, 97, 16). — כסותה mit ה femin.: fühle seine Schwäche!

והיה כי יצעק אלי, “it will be that if the borrower will cry out to Me in prayer,” (accusing you of inhuman conduct) if the borrower had died from frost during the night because you had not given him or her back her only blanket then I will pay the lender back for such harshness. An alternate explanation of the line כי חנון אני: even though it cannot be expected that the lender, who had demonstrated empathy by lending the poor borrower his money in the first place, should now be expected to restore the security deposit to the borrower who had not repaid him,I will pay heed to his prayer because I am compassionate; you, on the other hand, instead of emulating My attributes, have acted brutally. The Torah had not used this statement of G-d reminding the reader of His being compassionate in connection with the treatment of orphans and widows, as their mistreatment had been forbidden by law, not merely by an appeal to the people’s good nature.

במה ישכב WHEREIN SHALL HE LIE DOWN — These words are used to include amongst the articles which must be returned to him during the day the couch and its coverings on which he rests during day-time (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:26:3).

Diese Rückgabe des Pfandes zur jeweiligen Zeit des Bedarfs ist eine lästige Pflicht, um so bedeutsamer ist ihre gewissenhafte Übung, auf die daher die Schilderung eines pflichtgetreuen Mannes (Jecheskel 18, 7) mit den Worten hinblickt: חבלתו חוב ישיב, "sein Pfand gibt er mit der Pünktlichkeit einer Schuld zurück".

אלהים לא תקלל THOU SHALT NOT EXECRATE GOD — Here you have the prohibition of blasphemy (the penalty being stated in Leviticus 24:16) and the prohibition of cursing a judge (who is also termed אלהים, cf. Exodus 22:7) (cf. (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:27:1 and Sanhedrin 66a).

THOU SHALL NOT CURSE ‘ELOHIM.’ Onkelos translated it as referring to a judge, that one is not to curse him if he should hold him guilty in a lawsuit. Lo takeil [Onkelos’ rendition of the Hebrew lo t’kaleil — thou shalt not curse], is the Aramaic expression for “cursing.” Thus: “Meikal l’hu (they curse him): May the Eternal cut off to the man that doeth this, him that calleth and him that answereth.”³²²Malachi 2:12. — Yerushalmi Shabbath III, 7. There are many similar expressions, in the language of the Talmud Yerushalmi.

אלוהים לא תקלל, even though you may feel that the judge has judged you unfairly, you must not curse him. The reason is that no individual can judge his own guilt or innocence objectively.

אלוהים לא תקלל ונשיא בעמך לא תאר. The Torah again selected the most likely scenario of someone cursing people in authority. People who lose in litigation are apt to curse the judge ruling against them. We find a similar verse in Kohelet 10,20 where Solomon writes: “don’t revile a king even among your intimates.” Another verse in which the Torah refers to a spectacle arousing curses is found in Deuteronomy 21,23 where the Torah refers to the body of a judicially executed person being buried by nightfall. The reason given is that seeing such a body evokes curses against the judges who had convicted the victim.

אלוקים לא תקלל, “You shall not revile G’d; nor shall you curse a legally appointed dignitary of your people.” This is a warning not to curse a judge who has found you guilty in litigation.

אלוהים לא תקלל, “you shall not curse a judge.” This is a warning for the party who has been convicted of a crime or sin not to curse the judge who convicted him. This subject follows the subject of the need to extend loans to fellow Jews as on occasion disputes arise over whether a loan has been repaid, the debtor either denying he had received it or the lender claiming that he had not been repaid. Such disputes are submitted to judgment. It is quite possible that the party whose claim is rejected (if he feels that he has been wronged) will curse the judge who has wronged him. This is why the Torah has to warn that one must not engage in such conduct.

The prohibition against cursing judges. [Rashi’s two explanations appear in] Sanhedrin 66a: R. Yosei holds that אלהים is a mundane word and the verse is a prohibition against cursing a judge, and R. Akiva holds that אלהים is a sacred word, and the verse is a prohibition against cursing Hashem. And according to both views, we learn both laws from our verse — since it is not written תקל , [rather it is written תקלל ,] which Rashi explains as implying two curses. And the word אלהים [which is plural] also contains two meanings. Therefore we apply תקלל to both of them [i.e., to Hashem and judges]. (Nachalas Yaakov)

V. 27. קלל .לא תאור ,לא תקלל, Gegensatz von כבד schwer und Ehre, dürfte sich zunächst auf das "Gewicht", d h. auf den Einfluss und die äußere Stellung eines Menschen beziehen, wörtlich: wünschen, dass jemand "leicht" werde, sein "Gewicht" einbüße. ארר hingegen, verwandt mit ערר, vereinsamen, unfruchtbar werden, verdorren, und חרר, verglühen, wünscht Unsegen und Untergang der Person. Im Richter steht nicht sowohl das Individuum, als das Amt im Wege, während beim der Vorzug an Reichtum und persönlicher Würde ein Dorn im Auge ist. Darum נשיא ist der dem Richter zugewandte Fluch durch קללה, der des נשיא durch מארה ausgedrückt. Jenem flucht der Trotz, diesem der Neid. — בעושה מעשה עמך ,נשיא בעמך (Sanhedrin 85 a), wenn der Fürst sich mit seiner Handlungsweise nicht aus dem Volke eximiert, mit seiner Handlungsweise im Volke steht, sich, dem Volke gleich, dem Gesetze unterordnet.

NOR CURSE A ‘NASI’ OF THY PEOPLE — nasi means the one who is “lifted up” above his people, namely, the king. He thus mentioned that one is not to curse him in case he declares him guilty in a trial before him.
In the opinion of our Rabbis in the Gemara,³²³Sanhedrin 66a. Thou shalt not curse ‘Elokim,’ constitutes an admonition against blaspheming the Name of G-d, even by one of the substituted names [such as: Gracious and Merciful etc.].³²⁴See Mishneh Torah, Mada, Hilchoth Yesodei Hatorah 6:5. Thus He warned against cursing the King on high, blessed be He, and also the monarch that reigns on earth. The Rabbis have also said in the Gemara³²³Sanhedrin 66a. that included in the term Elokim, is the Glorious Name,³²⁵Deuteronomy 28:58. — I.e., the Tetragrammaton. as well as the judge who sits in the seat of G-d³²⁶Ezekiel 28:2. on earth. But it has not been explained whether the term nasi includes the head of the Great Sanhedrin,³²⁷The Great Sanhedrin consisted of seventy-one judges, and sat in the court of the Sanctuary. A small Sanhedrin of twenty-three judges was to be found in every city. who is called nasi in the Gemara.³²⁸Sanhedrin 19b. Harav Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon said³²⁹In his Book of the Commandments, Negative Commandment 316 (See Vol. II of my translation, p. 290). that he is included under the term of this prohibition. And so it also appears to me, on the basis of a question that Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi³³⁰Rabbi Yehudah Hanasi, the redactor of the Mishnah, was Chief of the Sanhedrin of his generation. — The question he asked concerning himself was whether he had, in the eyes of the Law, the status of a nasi so that [in the time of the Sanctuary] the law of a special sin-offering for the prince (see Leviticus 4:22-26) applied to him as well, since he was the nasi of the Sanhedrin, or perhaps because he had his counterpart in the Diaspora — the Exilarch — his authority was no longer unique as that of a king, and therefore his sin-offering is to be like that of any individual Israelite. It is thus obvious that the office of the Chief of the Sanhedrin as such is included under the term nasi. asked about himself:³³¹Horayoth 11b. “A person in my status, am I to bring a sa’ir³³²A male goat. See Leviticus 4:23. The individual Israelite brings a female goat as a sin-offering (ibid., Verse 28). etc.?” If so, He is stating: “Do not curse any ruler of the people, who holds a position of supreme authority over all Israel, whether that position be in the secular sphere of government or in the rule of Torah,” for the head of the Sanhedrin is the highest position in the authority of the Torah.

ונשיא בעמך לא תאור, cursing the legitimate authority of a country, its official rulers, will frequently result in the whole population experiencing the negative fallout of such curses. Compare what Solomon has to say on this in Proverbs 24,21 “fear the Lord my son, and the king; do not associate with those who keep changing.” [the author appears to read into above verse that hereditary royalty is to be obeyed in preference to elected rulers who are elected only for a limited period of time, and can be replaced by the will of the people even during their term of office. Ed.]

ונשיא בעמך לא תאור; not to curse the king if he imposed some penalty on you. Not only the king, any legitimate official is meant. Even a member of a religious court, i.e. one dealing with ritual matters, is included in this prohibition.

אלוקים לא תקלל, “Do not curse G-d or a judge;” the reason why this verse has been inserted here is because maybe the lender transgressed the law to restore a pledge under the circumstances defined in the Torah, and in his frustration, the borrower curses the judge who had permitted him to take that pledge as security for the loan, even though the judge had acted according to the law.

ונשיא בעמך לא תאור, “neither shall you put a curse on legitimately installed authorities in your land.” Usually only wealthy people rise to the position of chieftain, and usually such people are prepared to extend loans to the needy. It stands to reason that the legislation about pledges is directed at them therefore. The borrower is warned not to forget that he has been a beneficiary of that rich man’s possessions when he obtained the loan. It would be the reverse of gratitude if he were now to curse that chieftain.

מלאתך [THOU SHALT NOT DELAY TO OFFER FROM] THY FULLNESS — The duty which falls upon you as soon as your crop becomes fully ripened: this refers to the first fruits (בכורים).

M’LEIATHCHA V’DIM’ACHA’ (OF THE FULNESS OF THY HARVEST, AND OUT OF THE OUTFLOW OF THY PRESSES) THOU SHALT NOT DELAY TO OFFER. We find the word m’leiah with reference to seed, thus: lest there be forfeited ‘ham’leiah’ (the fulness) of the seed which thou hast sown,³³³Deuteronomy 22:9. and again: ‘v’kamleiah’ (and as the fulness) of the winepress,³³⁴Numbers 18:27. meaning wine and oil, just as it is said, and the vats shall overflow with wine and oil.³³⁵Joel 2:24.
It appears to me in connection with these terms, that fruits of the field and vineyard are called t’vuah [of the root bo — come in] because the farmers “bring” the whole crop in together to the homes. It is also called asif (the ingathering): ‘osef’ (the ingathering) shall not come;³³⁶Isaiah 32:10. and the feast of ‘ha’asif’ (the ingathering).³³⁷Further, 23:16. This is why produce is called m’leiah (fulness), because a gathering-together into one place of a mass of material or people is called milui (fulness): though there be called forth against him ‘m’lo’ (a multitude of) shepherds;³³⁸Isaiah 31:4. even they are ‘malei’ (in full) cry after you;³³⁹Jeremiah 12:6. together against me ‘yitmalo’un’³⁴⁰Job 16:10. — they gather themselves and come. Similarly, and his seed shall become ‘m’lo’ nations³⁴¹Genesis 48:19. — means an assembly and multitude of nations.
It is further possible that produce is called m’leiah (full) as a substitute term for a blessing — that the granaries shall be full of corn, and the vats shall overflow with wine and oil,³⁴²Joel 2:24. and the reaper fills his hands, and the binder of sheaves his bosom,³⁴³See Psalms 129:7. and gathers grapes in the vintage. For when their portion is cursed³⁴⁴Job 24:18. Scripture says, Let them be as the grass upon the housetops, which withereth afore it springeth up; wherewith the reaper filleth not his hand, nor he that bindeth sheaves, his bosom,³⁴⁵Psalms 129:6-7. but when their portion is blessed, it is called m’leiah (full). And in that case dim’acha [literally: “your tear”] is an allusion to wine and oil, a usage borrowed from dim’ath ha’ayin (tear of the eye), because the drops from the grape and olive resemble the tear of the eye. Or it may be that all moisture that falls in globules — even drops of water — are called dim’ah (tear), such as: and mine eyes shall run down ‘dim’ah’ (with tear),³⁴⁶Jeremiah 13:17. and it is not a term used only for tears. And the intention of the verse is, that when you gather in the crops of the field, and the granaries will be full of corn,³⁴²Joel 2:24. and you press the grapes and olives to extract their juice, and the vats shall overflow with wine and oil,³⁴²Joel 2:24. you should not delay them in your possession, but right at the beginning you are to give your tithings to Me, just as He said, The first fruits of thy corn, of thy wine, and of thine oil… shalt thou give him — [i.e., the priest].³⁴⁷Deuteronomy 18:4.
In the opinion of our Rabbis,³⁴⁸Mechilta here on the Verse. of blessed memory, thou shalt not delay means that: “you are not to set aside last what should be first, [and set aside first what should be last].” Now here He did not explain [the correct order of the gifts], for here He mentions the commandments in a general way, and afterwards He explained them in detail. The Rabbis arranged the order of the gifts as follows: first-fruits, the heave-offering, the First Tithe, and the Second Tithe.³⁴⁹The first-fruits are brought to the Sanctuary and then given to the priest. The heave-offering is given to the priest, the First Tithe to the Levite, and the Second Tithe is eaten by the owner in Jerusalem. See “The Commandments,” Vol. II, pp. 145-146, for full discussion of this commandment. This order they established on the basis of the following interpretation with reference to these gifts, just as we have been taught:³⁵⁰Terumoth 3:7. “How do we know that first-fruits come before the heave-offering, being that this one is called by Scripture terumah (heave-offering) and reshith (the first), and the other is also called terumah and reshith?³⁵¹Deuteronomy 12:6 speaks of first-fruits as terumath yedchem (the heave-offering of your hand); they are called reshith in this Scriptural section (further 23:19). The heave-offering is called terumah in Numbers 18:8, and is called reshith in Deuteronomy 18:4. First-fruits have priority because they are the first [to grow] of all produce. The heave-offering comes before the First Tithe, because it is called reshith (the first),³⁵¹Deuteronomy 12:6 speaks of first-fruits as terumath yedchem (the heave-offering of your hand); they are called reshith in this Scriptural section (further 23:19). The heave-offering is called terumah in Numbers 18:8, and is called reshith in Deuteronomy 18:4. and the First Tithe comes before the Second Tithe because it contains in it reshith” [since the Levite who receives the First Tithe must give a tenth of it as terumah to the priest].
Onkelos translated m’leiathcha v’dim’acha: “bikurach (your first fruit), v’dim’ach.”³⁵²Onkelos thus left the Hebrew word v’dim’acha untranslated. As explained further it is a term denoting the priest’s share of the produce — in other words, the terumah [or the heave-offering]. According to Onkelos the verse thus refers to the first-fruits and the heave-offering. And Rashi explained: “M’leiathcha — this means the duty which falls upon you when your crop becomes fully ripened, and it refers to the first-fruits. V’dim’acha means the heave-offering. But I do not know what the term dim’a means.” It is similarly stated in the Mechilta:³⁴⁸Mechilta here on the Verse. “M’leiathcha means the first-fruits which are taken from the full crop, and dim’acha means the heave-offering.” Perhaps in the same way that according to the Rabbis the first-fruits are called in this verse m’leiah (fulness), because they are taken from the full crop, so the heave-offering is called dim’ah [literally: “tear” or “outflow,” as explained above], because it is set aside from wine and oil, [as liquids], not from the fruit. Scripture mentioned only these two kinds of produce, [wine and oil], in order to hint at the law that the heave-offering only has to be set aside from them when in the form of wine and oil, there being no obligation upon the owner to anticipate and set it aside when they are still grapes and olives.
Thus He only mentioned these commandments here by way of allusion, as if to say, “Be careful to keep these commandments about which I will command you further,” in a similar manner to that which He said above, and I will appoint thee a place whither he may flee.³⁵³Above, 21:13. This was in order to write down these commandments in the book of the covenant³⁵⁴Further, 24:7. which He mentions in a subsequent section, and Scripture explains them all again in another place, [each one in detail].

מלאתך, the heave for the priest of your grain harvest. The word מלאה appears to be borrowed from Genesis 41,22 where the good ears of corn in Pharaoh’s dream are described as such.

מלאתך ודמעך אל תאחר, a reference to Deuteronomy 18,4 where the Torah warns not to be tardy in bringing the first fruit to Jerusalem as a gift to G’d. In chapter 22,9 such crops are called מלאה.

מלאתך, “your fullness offering, etc.” Nachmanides writes that this word is applied also to seed as in פן תקדש המלאה הזרע, (Deut. 22,9) “lest the growth of the seed that you plant become forbidden.” The expression is also found in connection with the יקב, the winery, i.e. the wine press or the oil press. Apparently, produce from field or vine is called both תבואה because it is “brought” home to be stored, and it is also called מלאה as it has to be gathered and collected, to wit סוכות is the festival called חג האסיף the holiday of ingathering. We encounter the expression מלא רועים referring to a gathering of shepherds. (Isaiah 31,4) It is also possible that they are called מלאה as an expression symbolizing the blessing represented by the farmer filling his granaries and vats.

מלאתך ודמעתך לא תאחר, “do not delay your fullness-offering and your priestly heave-offering. This verse is a warning concerning the heave-offerings of liquids, i.e. oil and wine. The word מלאתך refers to the liquid made from grapes as described by Numbers 18,27 וכמלאה מן היקב, such as the “flow from the vat,” whereas the word דמעתך describes the liquid secured from the olives which are being squeezed much as tears are the product of one’s squeezing one’s eyes. This is why the product of the olives is called דמעך, “your tear.”

When your grains reach their full ripeness. [Rashi is saying: The meaning is] not that [it is a collective obligation, and] every person must not delay. Therefore he explains that it means: “When your grains reach their full ripeness,” meaning, when you have [such grains, do not delay them].

(Exodus 22:28) "Your fullness and your dema (terumah) you shall not delay": "Your fullness" — bikkurim (first-fruits, which are taken from fully ripened grain). "you shall not delay": You shall not give second-tithe before first-tithe, first-tithe before terumah, or terumah before bikkurim. __ But I do not know which takes precedence — terumah to bikkurim or bikkurim to terumah? Would you say that? Bikkurim takes precedence because they are called by four names — "first," "bikkurim," "terumah," and "dema." (They take precedence) to terumah, which is called by only three names — "first," "terumah," and "ma'aser," which, in turn, takes precedence to ma'aser, which is called by only two names. And first-tithe, which is called by two names — "first" and "ma'aser" — takes precedence to second-tithe, which is called by only one name ("ma'aser"). From here they ruled: If one gives terumah before bikkurim or first-tithe before terumah or second-tithe before first-tithe — even though he transgresses the negative commandment "Your fullness and your dema you shall not delay," what is done is done (i.e., he has fulfilled his obligation.)

V. 28. מלאתך ודמעך. Temura 4 a wird תרומה :דמעך ביכורים :מלאתך erklärt und das Verbot לא תאחר dahin erläutert, dass מלאה) בכורים) nicht nach der דמע( תרומה) gegeben werden solle, dass überhaupt die gesetzliche Reihenfolge der in den Tempel, dem כהן, dem לוי zu gebenden, oder für den eigenen Genuss in Jerusalem zu reservierenden Spenden von den Früchten vorschriftsmäßig einzuhalten sei, מעשר שני nicht dem ראשון ,מעשר ראשון nicht der תרומה ,תרומה nicht den ביכורים vorangehen sollen. ביכורים werden מלאה genannt, weil deren Pflicht schon במלאה eintritt, d. h. sofort bei der "Ackerfülle", wenn der reife Ertrag noch den Acker füllt; schon vor dem Schnitte (vergl. פן תוקדש המלאה). Warum דמע :תרומה heißt, ist unerklärt. Raschis Erklärung, weil תרומה מדמעת, weist schon תוספו׳ das. Temura 4 a zurück, da diese Eigentümlichkeit nur דרבנן sei. Ohnehin dürfte sich schwerlich dieser Ausdruck für תרומה zur Unterscheidung von ביכורים eignen, da auch eine Mischung von ביכורים in חולין dieselbe Wirkung hat. תוספו׳ teilt eine andere Erklärung mit, nach welcher תרומה deshalb דמע (Träne) heißt, weil תרומה auch in flüssigem Zustande, z. B. als Wein gegeben werden kann, während zu ביכורים nur die Früchte in natura, Trauben, taugen. Auch dieser Umstand erscheint sekundär und wenig geeignet, ein spezifisches Unterscheidungsmerkmal zu bilden. Vielleicht findet der Ausdruck in folgendem seine Erklärung. ביכורים und תרומה unterscheiden sich charakteristisch darin, dass die Pflicht zu ביכורים mit der Reife der Frucht am Halm und am Baum eintritt, während die Pflicht zur תרומה erst mit vollendeter Menschenarbeit an der Frucht, גמר מלאכה, sich einstellt. (Temura 4 a. scheint sowohl in Raschi, als תוספו׳ ein Druckfehler sich eingeschlichen zu haben. Raschi erläutert: ולהכי קרי לביכורים מלאה משום דלאלתר שנתמלאה התבואה ונגמרת מלאכתה הוקבעה לביכורים. Dieses מלאכתה dürfte zu streichen, sein. Nicht die künstliche Vollendung, sondern die natürliche Vollendung bringt die ביכורים-Pflicht. So auch Raschi im Pentateuch-Kommentar z. St.: חובה המוטלת עליך כשתתמלא תבואתך להתבשל והם ביכורים). ביכורים-Pflicht tritt daher ein, wenn die Natur, תרומה, wenn der Mensch seine Arbeit an der Frucht vollendet hat. ביכורים heißen daher מלאה nach dem Moment, wo die Frucht, von Menschenhänden unberührt, noch den Acker füllt. מלאה heißt die ganze Ertragsfülle des Feldes (Dewarim 22, 9, wo מלאה erläutert wird: הזרע אשר תזרע ותבואת תרומה הכרם aber: דמע. Wie der Traubensaft דם ענבים, Traubenblut, heißt, so heißt er hier, bezeichnend: Traubentränen. Es gibt vielleicht keine Frucht, die also vom Menschen "misshandelt" wird, wie die Traube. Sie wird "getreten" und "gepreßt". (Heißt ja vielleicht auch Wein darum: יין von יון, gleichbedeutend mit ינה: Erpressung leiden). Zur Vergegenwärtigung des Begriffs גמר מלאכה, der vollendeten künstlichen Menschenarbeit an der Frucht, im Gegensatz zu מלאה, der noch unberührten Frucht auf dem Halm und am Baum, gibts wohl kaum einen besseren Repräsentanten als den Wein, und keine treffendere Bezeichnung als: דמע, die Träne. —

מלאתך, “your fullness;” a difficult word to translate; our sages understand it as “the first tithe, t’rumah for the priest, to be lifted from your harvest.” The word also occurs in Deuteronomy 22,9: פן תקדש המלאה הזרע אשר תזרע, “lest the seed you have sown will not be allowed for your use.” (grain harvest) ודמעך, “and the corresponding t’rumah of the harvest of your liquid crop (grapes and olives) will be denied you for use.” The word דמע, literally meaning: “tear,” is applicable to olives and grapes as they release their insides in drops, like tears, when being squeezed in the vat. We also find the expression תירוש used for grain products in Numbers 18,12, כל חלב יצהר וכל חלב תירוש ודגן, “all the best of the new oil, wine and grain’” where the Torah instead of speaking of grapes and olives, lumps them all together under one heading, the heading being: something liquid. [Whisky and other alcoholic גrinks are made from grain. Ed.] When the offering of firstling fruits is discussed, seeing that these fruit are offered “as is,” in their original state, any expression hinting at liquids would be inappropriate.

ודמעך means THE HEAVE OFFERING, — thus do our Rabbis explain it (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:28), but I do not know what the expression דמע means (i. e. I do not know how it comes to have the meaning of (תרומה).

ודמעך, the parallel heave from your oil and grape harvest.

ודמעך, a reference to the harvest of the olive groves and the vineyards, the drops of the fruit being compared in appearance to human tears.

ודמעך, “your priestly heave-offering.” A reference to grape and olive harvests, the juice of which is perceived as flowing out like tears, a little at a time. Ibn Ezra understands the word מלאתך as the grape harvest that due to its abundant moisture needs to be transferred to vessels for storage before irretrievable loss of juice occurs. The word דמעך, refers to the olive harvest in his opinion, as oil drips very slowly, drop by drop similar to tears.

Do not alter their order of separating them. We cannot say [that the verse means simply] not to delay giving the first fruits, because the Torah does not expressly set any time-limit on them. Therefore we must say [as Rashi did, that] it means: do not delay it until after the next mitzvah [i.e., separating terumah].

בכור בניך, das Gesetz steht schon oben (Schmot Kap. 13) und wird noch ergänzt (Bamidbar. 18, 15 f) durch die Bestimmung der Auslösung am dreißigsten Tage. Im Zusammenhange mit dem vorangehenden מלאתך ורמעך und dem folgenden כן תעשה וגו׳ dürfte hier eben auf diese Bestimmung hingeblickt sein. Wie die ביכורים- und תרומה-Pflicht erst mit dem Stadium der Reife und dem der Vollendung eintritt, so tritt auch die durch den Akt der Auslösung ihren Ausdruck gewinnende Weihe (נתינה) der Erstgeborenen erst mit dem dreißigsten Tage ein, mit welchem das Menschenkind die erste Periode der Lebensreife zurückgelegt hat. Ist doch für jede zweifelhafte Existenz die Erreichung des dreißigsten Tages das kritische Symptom für die Lebensfähigkeit. Mit dem dreißigsten Tag ist das Kind auch äußerlich als בן קיימא dokumentiert. Daran schließt sich denn

לא תאחר, “Do not put off;” to give Me My share. The Torah speaks of giving G-d the respective firstling offerings which are due Him seeing that He treats the Jewish people as His firstborn son. They are: ראשית אדמתך, the first ripened parts of produce grown from the earth (23,19), the first produce of your kneading bowls, (bread or cake, Numbers 15,20). An alternate explanation of this phrase: “do not be late in offering Me what is legally Mine, even if you are still poor;” this is why the commandment of “giving” G-d the first born son and the firstborn males of his ritually pure livestock, followed immediately, as they represent the first results of his virility. (compare Deuteronomy Numbers 21,17).

לא תאחר THOU SHALT NOT DELAY — i. e. thou shalt not alter the prescribed sequence of separating them from the crops, setting aside last what should be first and setting aside first what should be last — i. e. that one should not set aside the heave-offering before the first fruit nor the tithe before the heave-offering (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:28).

בכור בניך תתן לי, to perform all kinds of sacred duties. This includes service in the Temple, teaching Torah, something which in later periods became the foremost occupation of the priests, commented upon by Maleachi 2,7 with the line כי שפתי כהן ישמרו דעת והתורה יבקשו מפיהו, “for the lips of a priest guard knowledge, and men seeking rulings from his mouth, for he is a messenger of the Lord of Hosts.”

לא תאחר, do not be tardy in discharging this obligation but offer them as the first of all your tithes. The same applies to the redemption of the first born males for which the Torah stipulated that this be done at the completion of the first month after the baby is born.

לא תאחר, “do not delay in offering.” Our sages understand this to mean that they are not to be offered in reverse order. (Terumot 3,6) [such as tithes being given before the terumah to the priests. Ed.] According to the plain meaning of the text the Torah simply warns not to eat of any of these fruit before the requisite gifts have been set aside enabling the farmer and ordinary individuals to eat from all this. The reason why the Torah speaks about redeeming the firstborn, calling it a gift to G’d, in the same breath, is that just as the harvest of what grows in the field and orchard must be freed for secular use only after the various tithes have been set aside, the same rule applies to the “harvest” of the union of husband and wife, the first born male child.

By redeeming him for five sela’im. Rashi means: not that you shall give the child itself to Me. [That cannot be,] because in Parshas Korach (Bamidbar 18:15) it is written, “But you must surely redeem the firstborn of man.”

בכור בניך תתן לי, “you are to give Me the firstborns of your sons.” The emphasis is here on the word: “your firstborn,” as opposed to one of the sons born later. The same principle that applies to the first of your harvests applies to the first products (male) of your virility. The Torah repeats that the same applies to the firstborn of your domestic animals, i.e. cattle and sheep. At the same time, you must not be in such a rush that you slaughter these animals during the first seven days of their lives, as during those days they have not yet shed the ritual impurity status that applies to any creature that has undergone the traumatic experience of having to leave its mother’s womb. Prematurely born animals do not qualify for the purposes of this legislation as they are treated as if blemished. (B’chor shor)

בכור בניך תתן לי THE FIRST BORN OF THY SONS SHALT THOU GIVE UNTO ME — by redeeming him from the priest by the payment of five Sela’im. Scripture, it is true, has already given an ordinance concerning him (the firstborn) in another passage (Numbers 18:16), but it is stated here again in order to bring it into juxtaposition with the next verse: “Likewise shalt thou do with that of thine ox”, and to illustrate the latter command by the former. How is it in the case of a human being? He (the father) redeems it after thirty days, for it is said, (Numbers 18:16) “and those that are to be redeemed, from a month old shalt thou redeem”! So, too, has the owner of small cattle to look after it for 30 days and only afterwards must he give it to the priest (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:28 and Bekhorot 26b).

You must do likewise with your oxen. . . The Nachalas Yaakov says that there is a mistake in our text of Rashi. It should [continue after “You must do likewise,”] and say: “with your sheep.” Firstly, because Rashi concludes with: “the smaller cattle” [which means sheep and goats]. And there is another reason that is mentioned there [in Nachalas Yaakov.]

שבעת ימים יהיה עם אמו SEVEN DAYS IT SHALL BE WITH ITS DAM — This is an admonition for the priest (for the Israelite himself does not sacrifice the firstborn animal) that if he wishes to bring his offering of this at an earlier date (i.e. in the case of the Israelite having given it to him before the thirtieth or fiftieth day) he is not allowed to offer it before it is eight days old because it is then “short in time” (i. e. too young for sacrifice; cf. Leviticus 22:27).

כן תעשה לשורך לצאנך, that you shall give to Me the firstborn which is not a prematurely aborted fetus. Our sages have said (Shabbat 135) that “a human baby which remains alive for 30 days is considered viable, not in the category of נפל, prematurely aborted. In the case of animals the parallel period is eight days.”

This is a warning to the kohein. However, a person may consecrate his animal [as a sacrifice] even if it is only one day old. This warning, [i.e.,] negative commandment, is part of the positive commandment of “Seven days it shall remain. . .” [and thus is judged as a positive commandment].

V. 29. כן תעשה וגו׳ mit der Bestimmung, dass ebenso auch die Übergabe des erstgeborenen Tieres an den כהן erst nach Zurücklegung einer entsprechenden Periode zu geschehen hat, die (Bechoroth 26 b) für שור auf fünfzig und für צאן auf dreißig Tage bestimmt ist. Aus dieser Verschiedenheit erklärt sich auch die unverbundene Nebeneinanderstellung כן תעשה לשורך לצאנך ohne Konjunktion . Bis dahin hat der Besitzer eines בכור's sich der Fütterung und Fürsorge des בכור's zu unterziehen, חייב ליטפל בו. Ist jedoch das Tier opfertüchtig und will es der כהן früher darbringen, so darf es ihm auch innerhalb dieser Frist gegeben werden. Daher die folgende Bestimmung: שבעת ימים. Wie dreißig Tage für den Menschen, so sind sieben Tage für das Tier die erste Periode, deren Zurücklegung in zweifelhaften Fällen über die Lebensfähigkeit entscheidet. Auch wo dieser Zweifel nicht vorwaltet, erhält die Lebensfähigkeit mit Erreichung dieses Alters erst ihr äußerlich erkennbares Merkmal. Dieses Motiv dürfte daher für Menschen und Tiere der Bestimmung zu Grunde liegen, dass der erstgeborene Mensch nicht vor zurückgelegtem dreißigsten Tag ausgelöst, so wie das Tier nicht vor zurückgelegtem siebten Tage zum Opfer dargebracht werden kann. Diese Bestimmung ist hier für בכור ausgesprochen, Wajikra 22, 27 für alle Opfer. Vor zurückgelegtem siebten Tage heißt das Tier in Beziehung zur Opfertüchtigkeit מחוסר זמן. (Siehe משנה למלך 3.8 ,הל' איסורי מזבח.)

ביום השמיני תתנו לי ON THE EIGHTH DAY THOU SHALT GIVE IT ME — One might think that it is obligatory to offer it on that day! Scripture, however, uses here the words “eighth day” and uses them again later on, (Leviticus 22:27) “and from the eighth day and henceforth it shall be favourably accepted”, in order to suggest an analogy. Now what is the meaning of the “eighth day” mentioned in the latter passage? It intends to declare the first-born fit for sacrifice from the eighth day and henceforth (i. e. it is intended to fix the earliest possible time on which it may be sacrificed). This, too, in the purpose of the word שמיני used here: to declare it fit for sacrifice from the eighth day and henceforth. The text therefore implies: “on the eighth day thou mayest give it to Me” (and not “thou shalt give it to Me”) (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:29:3).

This is the intended meaning of it. . . Rashi means that since there is a gezeirah shavah of “the eighth day,” thus we understand that “On the eighth day you must give it to Me” means that you are permitted, but not obligated.

ואנשי קדש תהיון לי AND YE SHALL BE MEN OF HOLINESS UNTO ME — If you will be holy and keep yourselves aloof from the loathsomeness of carrion and Trefa you are Mine, if not you are not Mine (cf. Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:30:1).

AND YE SHALL BE HOLY MEN UNTO ME. The reason for the expression in this verse is that until now He mentioned only the ordinances and admonished them about repulsive matters,³⁵⁵Such as those described above in Verses 17-21. but now when He is about to begin the law of forbidden food, He prefaced it by saying, And ye shall be holy men unto Me. For in order to preserve his physical life man should [be able to] eat anything which serves that purpose, and the prohibitions concerning certain foods are only a means of guarding the purity of the soul, in order that one should eat clean things which do not give rise to harshness and coarseness in the soul. Therefore He said, And ye shall be holy men unto Me, that is to say: “I want you to be holy men so that you will become suitable for Me, to cleave to Me, for I am Holy; therefore do not defile your souls by eating abominable things.” And similarly He said, Ye shall not make yourselves detestable with any swarming thing that swarmeth, neither shall ye make yourselves unclean with them, that ye should be defiled thereby. For I am the Eternal your G-d; sanctify yourselves therefore, and be ye holy; for I am Holy.³⁵⁶Leviticus 11:43-44. Swarming things thus make the soul detestable, but the treifah³⁵⁷See above, Note 189. is not detestable, however abstention from eating it adds holiness.

ואנשי קודש תהיון לי, the manner in which you will prove that you all are men of holy purpose is that you will allow your firstborns to be devoted to the service of Me and you will hand over the tithes, etc., stipulated as “My gifts,” [in matters of specific ritual, seeing that every Jew has to serve Hashem. Ed.] Initially, it was the task of the firstborn to teach the common people the details of Jewish law and ritual. When they do this the result will be והתקדשתם והייתם קדושים, “you will sanctify yourselves and remain holy” (Leviticus 20,7).

ואנשי קודש, do not eat matters which are proscribed [טמא not strictly in a halachic sense, Ed.] such as something treifah. The Torah in Deuteronomy also links the prohibition of eating animals which died of causes other than ritual slaughter (נבלה) as linked to your being עם קדוש “a holy nation.”

ואנשי קודש, “and “holy” people, etc. The reason that the Torah suddenly refers to the status of holiness, sanctity, is that up until now in this portion when we spoke about laws governing interpersonal relations this consideration did not enter the ordinances revealed in our chapter. Now, when forbidden foods are mentioned, the rationale which serves as the background to such legislation is the fact that Jews are spiritually on a higher level than gentiles, i.e. they are in varying degrees “holy.” A person is to eat the kind of food that not only assures his physical health, but also that which contributes to his spiritual health. This “spiritual health” is referred to generally as טהרה, ritual purity. Avoidance of the foods mentioned by the Torah is intended to forestall the body of Jews becoming gross, uncouth, something which the intake of certain animals prohibited by the Torah would facilitate, even if the same animal when healthy, unblemished, is fit to be consumed. The Torah’s message is that Hashem desires us to maintain a level of spirituality that enables us to cleave to Him in the desired manner.

ואנשי קדש תהיון לי, “and people of holiness shall you be for Me.” Actually we would have expected to find the word קדושים, “holy” in the plural, seeing the subject are אנשים, “men,” in the plural. The verse alludes to the fact that the spiritual concept כנסת ישראל, the community of Israel as a collective unit, is the true strength of Israel. The reason this concept is called קדש, holy, is that it is a direct derivative of the emanation חכמה which has its origin in the letter י of the tetragrammaton, the name י-ה-ו-ה. This is the reason the Torah had to add the word לי, “for Me,” The meaning of the word לי in this verse is similar to the meaning of the word לי in Exodus 25,2 ויקחו לי תרומה, “they shall take a heave-offering for Me,” (i.e. bring contributions for the construction of the Holy Tabernacle.”) Israel are considered as if sanctified for the Holy Name of Hashem. Seeing that their spiritual level is so high, they are not to eat meat of diseased or mutilated animals as that meat is the product of the destructive powers rampant in the universe, the power which opposes sanctity and holiness.
The Torah adds the word בשדה, “in the field,” in order to underline the origin of such treifah meat. Esau’s predominantly evil nature had been described by the Torah as איש שדה, “a man of the field,” i.e. he represented the murderous instincts of Kayin the first murderer, whose evil deed was described by the Torah as occurring בשדה, “in the field” (Genesis 4,8). This is another reason that the dogs are entitled to eat this meat as their characteristic is close to that of Esau’s.

From the abhorrence of neveilah and tereifah. . . Rashi adds the word “if”, [“If you will be holy. . .], because it says afterwards, “And you must not eat flesh that was torn off in the field.” Rashi adds this so we will not explain “Be men of holiness” as a command, saying: “So shall you be. . . to Me.” [Rather, the meaning is as follows.] Because there are many things which, whether we do them or not, God does not distance us from being His, therefore the verse had to say here that if you do not abstain from the abhorrence of neveilah etc, then “you are not Mine.” This is the main message of the verse; it does not merely teach us the prohibition [of eating tornoff flesh].

V. 30. Es heißt nicht: אנשים קדושים, sondern אנשי קדש, Menschen, die einem heiligen Berufe angehören, man ist noch nicht קדוש, wenn man nicht טרפה isst, allein man kann es leichter werden. מאכל טרפה steht der Erreichung unserer heiligen Bestimmung im Wege; die geistig-sittliche Höhe, die wir alle erreichen sollen, wird demjenigen, der טרפה isst, schwerer zu erklimmen. Dieses Motiv ואנשי קדש וגו׳, womit das טרפה-Verbot, das erste Speisegesetz der sinaitischen Gesetzgebung, eingeleitet wird, schlägt alles nieder, was man über das Diätetische, Klimatische, Temporelle etc. dieser Gesetze in abrogatorischer Absicht gesprochen und spricht. Nicht unsere leibliche Gesundheit, sondern unsere geistige und sittliche Reinheit und Tüchtigkeit, unsere קדושה, unser Bereitsein, Bereitwerden und Bereitbleiben für alles Göttliche und Reine, ist der ausgesprochene Zweck des Gesetzgebers mit diesen Gesetzen, wie dies hier, so wie Wajikra Kap. 11., Kap. 20, 25 f. u. Dewarim 14, 21 bei ausführlicher Erteilung derselben überall ausdrücklich hervorgehoben ist.

ובשר בשדה טרפה, “flesh from animals that were found in the field torn,” you must not eat; eating such flesh is an even greater sin than eating the flesh of animals that died of natural causes but had not undergone ritual slaughter. The probable reason is that such torn carcasses may have become infected by harmful bacteria transmitted by the marauding beast that had caused their death. It is therefore to be left untouched on the field where found. Animals that died a natural death may be sold by you to human beings, as opposed to the dogs to which you may feed the remains of animals which had died a violent death. By selling the carcass of an animal which died from natural causes to human beings blessed with a brain, you do not expose such a human being to potential poisoning. The reason why the Torah inserted this verse here is because it had previously been speaking of animals which are fit for you to eat.

ובשר בשדה טרפה [NEITHER SHALL YE EAT] ANY FLESH THAT IS TORN IN THE FIELD – The same holds good in case the animal has been torn in the house, only that Scripture speaks of what usually happens mentioning the field because it is the place where it is usual for cattle to be torn. A similar instance is, (Deuteronomy 22:27) “for he found her in the field”, but the same law would apply if he found her elsewhere. Another example is, (Deuteronomy 23:11) “Any man that is unclean by reason of uncleanliness that chanceth him by night”; the same law, however, applies to an uncleanliness that happens by day, but night is mentioned because Scripture speaks of what usually happens (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 22:30:3). The Targum renders ובשר בשדה טרפה by ובשר תליש מן חיוא חיא “flesh that is torn off from a living animal”, i. e. flesh that has been torn off through a laceration caused by a wolf or a lion, from a living beast which is permitted to be eaten (e. g., a stag), or from cattle permitted to be eaten.

ובשר בשדה טרפה, even the kind of treifah which is neither ritually impure nor confers impurity at all. [if this is forbidden, נבלה, animals which die of other causes than ritual slaughter are certainly forbidden as food. Ed.]

The same applies within the house. [Rashi knows this] because elsewhere neveilah and tereifah are written together, to compare them and teach us: just as eating neveilah is forbidden whether it is in the house or in the field, so too concerning tereifah.

טרפה. Dass טרפה nicht ein zerrissenes Tier bedeutet, ist schon durch die Zusammenstellung וחלב נבלב טרפה (Wajikra 7, 24) נבלה וטרפה (das. 17, 15 u. 22, 8) klar, da das Zerrissene unter נכלה begriffen ist. Siehe Kön. I. 13, 24 f.) Die Bedeutung טֶרֶף als Nahrung, und הַטְרִיף: nähren, so wie der allgemeine rabbinische Gebrauch der Wurzel טרף für das, sogar berechtigte, Nehmen verpfändeter Güter aus der Hand des Käufers, טורף לקוחות, und rasches Herausgreifen von Losen aus einer Büchse: טרף בקלפי (Joma IV. 1), alles dieses spricht dafür, dass טרף nicht zunächst die mechanische Zerstörung, sondern den Zweck und die physiologische Bedeutung der einem lebenden Organismus beigebrachten Verwundung ausdrückt. Es heißt nicht sowohl: zerreißen, als: an sich reißen, zur Nahrung nehmen, und das ist der Begriff von טרפה, (Siehe רשי ב׳׳מ מא א׳ ד׳ה זאב טורף) So lange ein lebendiger Organismus unverletzt ist, gehört er in allen seinen Teilen sich selber an, alle Teile stehen im Dienste des Ganzen, im Bunde des organischen Lebens. Eine tödliche Verletzung entreißt dem Körper die lebendige organische Individualität, und gibt, resp. nimmt ihn als Nahrungsstoff für die Elementarwelt oder die Welt anderer Organismen hin. טרפה ist daher: das schon als Nahrungsstoff von einem anderen Reiche ergriffene Tier. Als solcher ist es dem שדה, der sich physisch und chemisch nährenden Natur verfallen, und als Nahrungsstoff der Menschen verpönt, die einem heiligen, sittlich freien Beruf angehören, אנשי קדש sind, deren Nahrungsakt, — ein Akt, der sie scheinbar mit allen anderen Organismen auf gleiche Stufe stellt — selbst eine sittlich freie Tat sein soll. Die Menschen, die אנשי קדש sind, sollen sich nicht mit der Elementar- und der tierischen Welt an einen Tisch setzen. Als Charakteristikum von טרפה ist daher אינה חיה, dass die Verletzung lebensgefährlich ist und das Tier in der Regel nicht zwölf Monate mehr lebt. Acht Verletzungsarten zählt die Überlieferung, durch welche ein Tier טרפה wird, als שבורה ,פסוקה ,נפולה ,קרועה ,נטולה ,חסרה ,נקובה ,דרוסה, Tatzenschlag, Löcherung, organische Mangelhaftigkeit, Verstümmelung, Riss, Fall, Spaltung, Bruch, und werden diese mnemotechnisch in die Merkworte zusammengefasst: ד׳׳ן ח׳׳נ׳׳ק נ׳׳פ׳׳ש. Sie zählt ebenso achtzehn organische Störungen, שמנה עשר טרפות, wie נקובת פסוקת הגרגרת וכו׳ וכו׳ ,הושט, gelöcherte Speiseröhre, gespaltene Luftröhre usw. usw., an welchen die verschiedenen טרפה-Fälle dargestellt werden.

לכלב תשליכון אותו, “you may throw the remains of such torn animals to the dogs.” The first letter ל in the word לכלב has the vowel patach, indicating that the Torah does not speak of just “any dog.” It speaks of dogs which guard your flocks and which therefore have earned this privilege. This is the plain meaning of the verse. The word: אותו, refers to the flesh of said animal, seeing that it is in the masculine singular mode.

לכלב תשלכון אתו YE SHALL CAST IT TO THE DOGS — You may give it to a heathen as well as to the dog. Or, perhaps this is not so, but כלב is to be taken literally? Scripture, however, states with regard to carrion, (Deuteronomy 14:21) “Thou shalt give it to a stranger or sell it unto an alien”, from which it follows by a conclusion à fortiori that you may derive whatever benefit you like from the Trefa (and so you also may give it to heathen). But if this be so, what is the force of Scripture expressly saying “to the dog”? It is to teach you that the dog is to be given preference in this respect and Scripture tells you at the same time that God does not withhold the reward due to any of His creatures. The dog is entitled to reward because it is stated, (Exodus 11:7) “But against the children of Israel shall not a dog move its tongue”, and this happened. The Holy One, blessed be He, said: Give it the reward it deserves (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 32:30:3).

Wir haben bereits bemerkt, dass die Grundbedeutung von טרף nicht: zerreißen, sondern: entreißen, an sich reißen sei, und טרפה nicht das Zerrissene, sondern das Entrissene bedeutet. Übereinstimmend mit dieser Bedeutung des Wortes lässt auch die Überlieferung den Begriff טרפה in weiterer Bedeutung fassen, und begreift darunter: alles seinem organischen Zusammenhang entrissene Fleisch: בשר שיצא חוץ למחיצתו. So umfasst dieser gesetzliche Begriff auch כשר מן החי: dem lebenden Tiere entnommenes oder entfallenes Fleisch; הוציא עובר את ידו: ein vor der שחיטה eines trächtigen Tieres herausgestrecktes Glied des Ungeborenen; בשר קדשים שיצא חוץ למחיצתו: Opferfleisch, das außerhalb der bestimmten Umgrenzung des Heiligtums gebracht worden, קדשי קדשים außerhalb der קדשים קלים ,עזרה außerhalb der Mauern Jerusalems. Es wird in diesen letzten Bestimmungen das Gesetzesheiligtum ideell als ein lebendiger Organismus begriffen, dessen Lebensseele, dem Gesetze, alle ihm geweihten Opferteile angehören. Eine Entfernung derselben aus seinen Räumen entreißt sie dem idealen lebendigen Organismus, dem sie angehören, innerhalb des Zusammenhanges, mit welchem allein ihre Bedeutung und Weihe wurzelt. ועי׳ תוספו׳ מכות יח׳א׳ ד׳ה ולילקי משום בשר דמשום הכי לא הוי לאו שבכללות משום שכולל כל יוצא לבד ושם יוצא חד הוא רק דהוי בכמה דרכים ע׳׳ש.

Dem oberflächlichen Blicke dürften in diesem Abschnitte, VV. 27. — 30, höchst ungleichartige Gesetze zusammengestellt erscheinen. Allein einer eingehenden Erwägung stellen sie sich alle als Ausfluss eines einzigen, nur in verschiedenen Beziehungen zur Verwirklichung kommenden Gedankens dar. Von V. 20.— 26 war der völligen Gleichheit aller Staatsgenossen vor dem Gesetze sowohl, wie vor dem sozialen Pflicht- und Rechtsbewusstsein der gesetzliche Boden gesichert. Es soll weder Geburt und Herkunft, noch Schicksal und Vermögen einen Unterschied hinsichtlich der Rechts- und Menschlichkeitspflichten bedingen, עני ,אלמנה ,יתום ,גר in keiner Weise eine Zurücksetzung erleiden. Innerhalb dieses, auf völlige Gleichheit hinsichtlich der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte gebauten Volksvereins, wird nun gleichwohl, V. 27 f., derjenigen Gliederung Achtung und Anerkennung zu zollen gefordert, die Gott durch den näheren und ferneren Beruf zum Dienste und zur Wirksamkeit für das Gesetz und das Gesetzesheiligtum in seinem Volke gestiftet. Es erscheinen als solche: Richter und Fürst (V. 27). Tempel, Priester und Levite (V. 28), hinsichtlich derer nicht nur die Achtung überhaupt, sondern auch die Beachtung der Rangstufe durch Innehaltung der Reihenfolge in den ihnen zu weihenden Spenden gefordert wird; und wird dann darauf hingewiesen, wie ja selbst innerhalb der eigenen Familie, ja selbst der Herden, eine solche hervorhebende Weihe in der Institution der Erstgeburt (V. 28 u. 29) gegeben ist, ja, wie doch die ganze jüdische Volksgesamtheit in allen ihren Gliedern selbst (תהיון) zu einem heiligen Berufe über die übrige Menschheit und für dieselbe hervorgehoben ist (V. 30) und diese Berufserhebung sich selbst in ihrer, über den unfreien Kreis der physischen und animalischen Welt gehobenen Nahrung aussprechen soll! לכלב תשליכון אותו. —

And that is that He commanded us to redeem the firstborn man, that we should give the money to the priest. And that is His saying, "you shall give me your firstborn sons" (Exodus 22:28). And He explained to us how this giving should be: And it is that we redeem him from the priest; and it is as if [the priest] already acquired him, and we purchase him from him for five sela - and that is His saying, "but surely redeem the firstborn man" (Numbers 18:15). And this commandment is the commandment of redeeming the son. And women are not obligated in it - indeed it is one of the commandments of the son that is upon the father, as it is explained in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 29a). And all of the laws of this commandment have already been explained in Bekhorot. However Levites are not obligated in it. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Firstlings.)