פירוש על ויקרא 17:8

אשר יעלה עלה [WHOSOEVER MAN THERE BE ….] THAT OFFERETH (lit., bringeth up) A BURNT OFFERING — This is intended to declare one who burns the limbs of sacrifices outside the fore-court to be liable to the penalty of excision just the same as him who slaughtered a sacrifice outside the fore-court; so that if one person slaughtered a sacrifice outside the fore-court and another brought it up on the altar to burn it both are liable to excision (cf. Sifra, Acharei Mot, Chapter 10 6; Zevachim 106a).

ואליהם תאמר, "And to them you are to say, etc." According to Rabbi Yishmael in Zevachim 107 we are dealing here with an example of a phenomenon known as ערוב פרשיות, i.e. that the Torah writes a verse in a paragraph dealing with one subject whereas that verse really had its place in a different paragraph dealing with another subject matter. In our case our verse teaches that whereas so far the prohibition against שחוטי חוץ was presumed to apply only to the act of slaughtering outside and not to burning up the remains of the animals outside the sacred precincts, our verse comes to include also the burning up of the remains of such animals in all instances where these animals had been slated to be burned up on the altar. According to the first Mishnah in Zevachim chapter 13 if one slaughtered the sacrificial animal within the sacred precincts but burned the remains outside those precincts one is just as guilty as if one had slaughtered the animal outside the permitted perimeter. This prohibition applies even if the remains of that animal had not been meant to be burned up on the altar at all. Compare Rashi on the Mishnah.

Outside [the Temple Courts]. Because you might ask: What does “who will bring a burntoffering” come to prohibit? If it is to prohibit slaughtering sacrifices outside, it already said “Each and every person etc. who will slaughter” above, (verse 2) in this parsha. Rashi explains that it comes “to make liable one who burns limbs outside as one who slaughters outside.” I.e., even though someone already slaughtered it outside and disqualified the sacrifice, and you might have thought that someone who offered it after this invalid slaughtering would incur no transgression because the first person had already disqualified it. The verse teaches that they both transgressed and are both are liable.

מבית ישראל, from the house of Israel, etc. The Torah had to write the words "from the house of Israel" and could not content itself with writing the pronoun ואליהם at the beginning of this verse which would have created the impression that it referred to the matters discussed earlier in the paragraph. The word איש איש would have referred to two people who commit a sin jointly such as slaughtering an animal intended for the altar outside the sacred perimeter as we have already discussed. The Torah was afraid that an exegete would use the repetition of the word איש to include Gentiles. The Talmud in Menachot 73 when explaining the word איש איש in Leviticus 22,18 uses the repetition to mean that free-willed offerings by Gentiles are acceptable for the altar of the Temple. In order to prevent us from interpreting the additional word איש in our context in a similar manner the Torah had to add the words מבית ישראל. Burnt-offerings and peace-offerings are acceptable only from Israelites. This in turns leads us to interpret the other meanings we have attributed to the extra word איש in our chapter. Once the Torah was worried about our misinterpreting the word איש איש, so that it had to add the words מבית ישראל, the Torah next had to worry that the words מבית ישראל would lead us to interpret that even proselytes could not offer burnt-offerings and peace-offerings. This is why the Torah had to add the words: "and from amongst the proselyte who lives amongst you."

At this point there was a need to write all these words of an inclusive nature. Were it not for these additional examples of inclusive letters, etc. we would be tempted to interpret that the Torah did not include anything which was not spelled out specifically. This is true even according to Rabbi Yossi who holds that the Torah used the ordinary human syntax. Perhaps Rabbi Yossi Haglili holds that the principle of the Torah using ordinary human syntax applies only when there is some evidence that the Torah does not want us to use a specific extraneous word exegetically. [The Talmud in Baba Metzia 31 deals with numerous phenomena of the Torah repeating a word, such as :,שלח תשלח, הוכח תוכיח, הקם תקים, עזוב תעזוב and others. In all these instances the extra word is used exegetically, no one claiming that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax. Ed.] Although the Talmud queries the right of Rabbi Yossi Haglili who fails to use the extra word איש exegetically in one context to use it exegetically in other contexts, this would hold true were it not for the fact that the Talmud found an alternate expression to arrive at the same הלכה by using the word דם שפך exegetically instead of the extra word איש. Whenever the result of interpreting the extra word איש is not in conflict with known הלכות, we do not resort to the principle that "the Torah merely used ordinary human syntax." Tossaphot on Baba Metzia 31 point out that it is unreasonable to suppose that the rabbis were unable to find some exegetical use for the repetition of the word איש in every case where it appears, or for that matter, for any of the many examples where the Torah repeats a word, albeit in a slightly modified form. While it is true that Tossaphot there address the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, the same applies to the opinion expressed by Rabbi Yossi Haglili. The main thrust of the argument of those who hold that the Torah uses ordinary human syntax is that we fall back on that principle only where exegetical use of the word would bring us into conflict with accepted הלכות. It can be demonstrated that even Rabbi Shimon frequently accepts that principle although he does use repetitions exegetically.