הלכה על שמות 20:8
Shulchan Shel Arba
The second meal is the aspect of “zakhor” – “Remember!”264From the commandment in the 10 commandments to remember the Shabbat in Ex 20:8. which is Rahamim – Compassion, for whom we make the Kiddush of the Day, which is called Kiddusha Raba – “the Great Kiddush”265B. Pesahim 106a. because at night – shamor!, and in the day zakhor! which is Compassion, and the meaning of “for today is the Sabbath of the Lord.”266Ex 16:25.
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Shulchan Shel Arba
Another interpretation: He blessed it with light. When the sun set on the evening of Shabbat, the Holy One Blessed be He sought to hide the light and gave honor to Shabbat, as it is written, “and God blessed it, etc.”289Gen 2:3.With what did He bless it? With light. Everything began to praise the Holy One Blessed be He, as it is written, “Everything under the heavens, He made it sing.”290Job 37:3: Literally, “He lets it loose [yishrehu] beneath the entire heavens; His lightning [oro] to the ends of the earth.” The midrash treats yishrehu as if it were from the word “shirah” – “song.” Why? “His light [spread] to the ends of the earth.”291Genesis Rabbah 11:2.
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Shulchan Shel Arba
Now that I have explained to you the topic of Kiddush, I will explain the topic of Havdalah, so that nothing will be missing from your table whether it is an ordinary day or Shabbat, for indeed Havdalah is a way of honoring Shabbat, to remember the day of Shabbat both when it comes and goes, as our rabbis z”l taught in a midrash, “’Remember the Sabbath day’279Ex 20:8. – remember it both at its entrance and its departure.”280Maimonides, Sefer Ha-Mitzvot, M”A 155, and in Hilkhot Shabbat 29a. And know that Havdalah with its four blessings is hinted at in the first parshah of Genesis: the first blessing – borei pri ha-gafen – “who creates the fruit of the vine” – is hinted at in the first verse in the word ha-aretz – “the land”281Gen 1:1. – which is the garden and the vine in the garden, and this is the wine preserved in its grapes from the six days of creation.282B. Berakhot 34b. The wine that will be served at the messianic banquet at the end of time comes has been preserved in the grapes of the first vine God created in the six days of creation.The second blessing: “atzei besamim”– “spices from a tree”283Technically, one needs to specify in the blessing the type of spice: atzei besamim – “spices from a tree,” such as cinnamon or nutmeg; esvei besamim, “spices from grasses,” such as mint or tarragon. However, taking into account that not everybody knows how to tell the difference between types of spices, the more inclusive formulation minei besamim– “different kinds of spices” was instituted, to avoid having people say the wrong blessing (Chavel). is hinted in the expression, “a wind [ru’ah] from God sweeping over the water,”284Gen 1:1. because smell – re’ah – is sensed by means of the wind – ru’ah. The third blessing: bore’ me’orei ha-esh – “who creates the lights of fire,” is what is written in “Yehi ‘or” – “Let there be light!”285Gen 1:3: “’Or” and “me’orei” are from the same Hebrew root that means “light.” The fourth blessing – Ha-mavdil – “Who separates” is what is written in “and God separated [va-yavdel] the light.”286Gen 1:4. And just as we found the act of separation – Havdalah – in the Holy One Blessed be He at the beginning of His rule with the creation of the world and its renewal, so we found in Him the sanctification – kiddush287Its root, kadosh, in its adjectival and verbal forms means literally to “be set apart” or “to set apart.” – of the day of Shabbat on which work is forbidden, which is written: “God blessed the seventh day and declared it holy [va-yikadesh ‘oto].”288Gen 2:3. What follows is more or less a quotation from Genesis Rabbah Parshah 11, with some omissions. He “blessed” it providing an extra portion of the manna for it and “declared it holy” by prohibiting the gathering of manna on it.
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Shulchan Shel Arba
They taught that R. Simon bar Yohai says, Shabbat came before the Holy One Blessed be He and said, “Master of the Universe, everything has a partner, but I don’t have a partner. I am astonished.” The Holy One Blessed be He replied, “The assembly of the people of Israel shall be your partner.” And when they stood at Mt. Sinai, He said to them, “Remember what I said to Shabbat. The assembly of Israel shall be your partner. So I am saying, “Remember Shabbat and make it holy.”298Ex 20:8: “make it holy” – likadshehu also has the connotation of marriage, as in the expression kiddushin. So in effect God is saying, “Remember Shabbat, that you’re married to him!”
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Chofetz Chaim
And there is no distinction in this between [reporting him to have transgressed] an absolute negative commandment or an absolute positive commandment of the Torah, which is well known to be forbidden, in which instance he will certainly be shamed before the hearer, but even if it is something which many Jews are not careful about, in which instance he will not be greatly demeaned, such as saying about one that he does not want to learn Torah or that something which he said is false and the like (unless there be some benefit in this, such as apprising his friend that something is false, intending only his benefit, as will be explained below in Principle 10) — even in such instances, it is forbidden. For in any event, according to his [the speaker's] words, he is a man that does not fulfill the Torah. And it is even forbidden to speak against him in the branches of the mitzvoth, such as that he is stingy and does not honor the Sabbath as he should (this [the honoring of the Sabbath] being included in the positive commandment of "Zachor" [i.e., "Remember [Zachor] the day of the Sabbath to sanctify it" (Shemoth 20:8)], as explained in Charedim].) Or even if he maligns him for violating a general edict of the Rabbis, as when they [the Rabbis] rule that ab initio this and this should not be done. And [it is forbidden] even if not spoken to his face, and even if it is true, he [the speaker himself] having seen him do this thing.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol II
Diverse aspects of the Sabbath experience find expression in the various biblical texts which serve as the basis of this commandment. The Decalogue is recorded twice in the Torah. The first presentation of the Ten Commandments in Exodus 20 occurs in conjunction with the narrative concerning the receiving of the Torah at Mount Sinai; the second is contained in the valedictory of Moses and recorded in Deuteronomy 5. The two versions differ radically with regard to the formulation of the commandment concerning Sabbath observance. In Exodus 20:8 the Torah reports that the first tablet contained the exhortation: "Zakhor et yom ha-Shabbat le-kadesho—Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy." The underlying rationale of the commandment follows immediately: "Six days shall you labor and do all your work; but the seventh is a Sabbath unto the Lord your God…for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that is in them and He rested on the seventh day…." In this context Shabbat is firmly rooted in the creation of heaven and earth and it is the act of creation which we are bidden to remember through observance of the Sabbath. The word zakhor—remember—has a historical flavor, referring to events of the distant past; we are told to refer back to past history, to the six days in which God created heaven and earth. Thus the Sabbath stands as an eternal memorial to the very first Shabbat—Shabbat Bereshit—the Sabbath of creation.
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Peninei Halakhah, Women's Prayer
Before reciting the psalm, there day is invoked according to the format: “Today is the first day from Shabbat,” in order to fulfill the mitzva of remembering Shabbat every day of the week (based on Ramban on Shemot 20:8; Arizal as cited in Kaf Ha-ḥayim 132:26).
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol V
Helkat Ya'akov further asserts that such matters constitute prohibited "weekday activities." Helkat Ya'akov also contends that, in the eyes of the untutored, use of such devices also appears to involve activities prohibited on Shabbat. Moreover, Helkat Ya'akov regards such matters as a violation of the commandment to "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy" (Exodus 20:8) that mandates that "your actions on Shabbat shall not be as [your actions] on a weekday."7Cf., Shabbat 113a and 113b. The Gemara cites the verse “and you shall honor it, not doing your wonted ways, nor pursuing your business, nor speaking thereof” (Isaiah 58:13) rather than Exodus 20:8 and proceeds to interpret the verse as follows: “ ‘And you shall honor if’—that your Sabbath clothing should not be as your weekday clothing; ‘nor doing your wonted ways’—your Sabbath gait should not be as your weekday gait; ‘nor pursuing your business’—your business is prohibited [but] the business of Heaven is permitted; ‘nor speaking thereof’—your Sabbath conversation should not be as your weekday conversation.” Those comments are cited with apparent approbation by Minḥat Yizḥak.8See also Minḥat Yiẓḥak, I, no. 107 and III, no. 38. Shevet ha-Levi, on the other hand, dismisses the notion that the use of an answering machine on Shabbat might constitute a prohibited form of commercial activity with a reductio ad absurdum: Were use of answering machines forbidden, making a mailbox available for delivery of mail on Shabbat should also be forbidden for the identical reason.
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment of the sanctification of Shabbat with words: To speak words on the Shabbat upon its entry and also its departure - that there be in them cognizance of the greatness of the day and its stature and its positive distinction from the other days before it and after it; as it is stated (Exodus 20:8), "Remember the Shabbat day, to sanctify it," meaning to say, remember it with a memory of [its] holiness and greatness. And in explanation, our Sages told us (Pesachim 110a) that we are commanded to say these things upon wine - as so does the explanation come: remember it over wine. And the content is that we place into a cup a reviit or more of pure or mixed wine - but not less than this (Pesachim 108b). And it is known that the [proportions of the] mixture is one part pure good wine to three parts water. And we recite the blessing of the Kiddush (sanctification) of Shabbat upon it, according to the wording that is known among the Jews. And so [too], at the departure of Shabbat, we recite the blessing over the wine in honor of the day - and that blessing of the conclusion of Shabbat is called Havdalah (Berakhot 52a).
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol V
Rabbi Kessler states, not without reason, that he does not understand the distinction formulated by Rabbi Woszner. This writer would express the distinction in a somewhat different manner. As stated by the Gemara, Shabbat 120b, the verse "you shall not do any work on the Sabbath day" (Exodus 20:8) serves to establish that labor is forbidden on Shabbat only if the labor is performed by means of a physical "act" (ma'aseh). A physical act is generally defined as an act involving movement of the body.
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Arukh HaShulchan
It is correct that when you say "and chose us" to remember standing at Mt. Sinai , concerning 'chose us", as it is written "lest you forget the things....the day you stood before the Eternal Your God at Horeb(Deuteronomy 4:9)." And when you say, "Your great name, " remember the incident of Amalek that The Name is not whole until one wipes out the descendants of Amalek, as it is written, "Remember what Amalek did to you ..."(Deuteronomy 25:16)" And when you say, "To acknowledge You" remember that the mouth was created to acknowledge Him who is blessed and not to speak words of gossip. And remember the incident of Miriam, as it is written, "Remember what the Eternal your God did to Miriam...(Deuteronomy 24:8)" And when you say "In love" remember concerning what is written, "Remember how you provoked the Eternal your God in the wilderness (Deuteronomy 9:7)." And when you read, "And when you remember all of God's commandments", remember that Shabbat is equal to all the commandments, as it is written, " Remember the Sabbath day (Exodus 20:8)." As it is said, never forget the Sabbath day. And like Amram of blessed memory: From one Sabbath to the next Sabbath. And therefore in the Psalm of the day we read: "This is the first day of the Sabbath....." And when we say, "from the four corners of the earth," place the corners of the tallit that are upon his shoulders to fall downward. (Magen Avraham, small paragraph, Bet, and we are not concerned with this. See Pri Etz Chayim, Gate of the Recitation of the Shma, Chapter 3, and you will understand what we are not accustomed to. And be precise and find easy.)
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol V
R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, III, no. 96, and Be-Ẓel ha-Hokhmah, I, no. 31, sec. 8, similarly rule that a person traveling by plane from west to east on Tish'ah be-Av may break his fast as soon as he experiences nightfall58Iggerot Mosheh explicitly asserts that, conversely, a person traveling east to west on a fast day must continue fasting until nightfall occurs in the place in which he finds himself. Cf., however, R. Elijah Zlotnick, Pri Eliyahu, III, no. 17; and R. Samuel ha-Levi Woszner, Teshuvot Shevet ha-Levi, VII, no. 76 and VIII, no. 261. See also Yisra’el ve-ha-Zemanim, I, no. 46, chap. 4. even though he has not fasted a full twenty-four hour period.59R. Eliezer Rotter, Mevakshei Torah, no. 25 (Sivan, 5759), p. 384, in discussing the situation of a person travelling during the night proceeding a fast day from west to east e.g., from Israel to the United States, reports that R. Joseph Shalom Eliashiv informed him that the traveler must observe the fast from the time that the fast begins in his place of arrival and hence, if the plane flies the route which takes the traveler over Greenland, where it is day, and then south, where it is again night, the period of daylight may be ignored. This writer assumes that the terminology in which this ruling is conveyed is imprecise and that the essence of Rabbi Eliashiv’s response was that commencement of the fast is not determined by the time at the point of embarkation but at the place where the traveler finds himself and hence, travelling from west to east, it will never be earlier than the time of daybreak in the United States. If so, that position is unremarkable. However, Rabbi Eliashiv’s ruling with regard to the period of overflight in an area in which it is already day is subject to challenge. Presumably, a person who crosses the halakhic dateline to an area in which it is Shabbat would, according to Ḥazon Ish, be required to observe the period he spends on that side of the dateline as Shabbat even if he intends to recross the dateline the same day. The same principle would apply to determining the onset of the eighth day for purposes of circumcision of an infant,60See R. Elijah Posek, Koret ha-Brit (Lemberg, 5653), 262:2 and R. Shabbetai Lipschutz, Brit Avot (Munkαcs, 5674), no. 10, kuntres aḥaron. for determining the proper time for a woman's immersion in a mikveh61See Teshuvot Be’er Mosheh, VII, Kuntres Elektrik, no. 116. and for various other halakhic matters.62The gloss of Dagul me-Revavah to Shakh, Yoreh De‘ah 195:4 is of seminal importance in establishing the principle that halakhic provisions dependent upon completion of a period of a day or of a multiple number of days do not require expiration of a full twenty-four hour period or periods. In each of those cases there is no reason why a person may not embark upon a trip in which such a phenomenon will occur. That would also appear to be the case with regard to crossing the dateline in circumstances in which the duration of the traveler's observance of Shabbat or of his fast will be diminished.63However, some authorities maintain that it is improper to cross the halakhic dateline in order to avoid observance of the Sabbath. See Teshuvot Ereẓ Ẓevi, no. 44, who cites a comment of the Mekhilta cited by Ramban, Exodus 20:8, “ ‘Remember [the Sabbath day]’ before it comes,” as establishing an obligation to assure in advance that the seventh day be observed as the Sabbath. See also Teshuvot Bnei Ẓion, I, no. 14, sec. 21 and R. Chaim Kanievsky, cited by Ta’arikh Yisra’el, no. 1, note 42, s.v. ve-od.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol VI
According to this analysis, hal'itehu la-rasha is not at all an independent principle of Halakhah justifying a course of action. Rather, it is a rationale explaining why legislation was not promulgated in a particular instance. Hal'itehu la-rasha explains only why transgressors were not shielded from further transgression; hal'itehu la-rasha52There may well be entirely different grounds to justify the student’s course of action in the case of the poisoned sandwich. The Gemara, Ketubot 86a and Ḥullin 132b, declares that a person may be compelled to fulfill a commandment, e.g., the miẓvah of sukkah or of the four species, by means of physical force, if necessary, “until his life departs.” There is considerable controversy with regard to whether the recalcitrant person may be beaten only within an “inch of his life” since, if he dies, he certainly will not fulfill the commandment, or whether he may be beaten until he expires. Rambam, Sefer ha-Miẓvot, introduction, shoresh 14; idem, Commentary on the Mishnah, Ketubot 49a; Ramban, Commentary on the Pentateuch, Leviticus 20:8; Ḥiddushei ha-Ran, Bava Meẓi’a 61b and Ḥullin 132b; R. Meir Simchah ha-Kohen of Dvinsk, Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Mamrim 4:3, state that lethal force may be employed. However, Rabbenu Yonah, cited by Shitah Mekubbeẓet, Ketubot 86a, maintains that deadly force may not be applied in order to compel fulfillment of a miẓvah. See also R. Meir Eisenstadt, Teshuvot Amudei Esh, no. 1, klal 15. Amudei Esh endeavors to explain Rambam’s use of the term “until he dies” as a metaphor for weakness. Cf., Rambam, Guide for the Perplexed, Part I, chap. 12. Or Sameaḥ asserts that, “when it is certain to us” that duress will not accomplish the desired result, not even a hair on the head of the would-be transgressor may be disturbed.
Keẓot ha-Ḥoshen 3:1 rules that only a bet din comprised of ordained judges competent to impose capital punishment is authorized to use physical force to enforce specific performance with regard to fulfilling a commandment. The postion of Keẓot is reflected in the work of an early-day authority, R. Eliezer of Metz, Sefer Yere’im, I, no. 169, and Ramban, Exodus 20:8. Netivot ha-Mishpat 3:1 disagrees in maintaining that judicial authority is not required for this purpose but that every Jew is empowered and obligated to secure observance of commandments even, if necessary, by use of force. Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Mamrim 4:3, concurs in that position but maintains that, when duress is warranted in execution of a divorce, only a bet din can compel such action because execution of a divorce requires acquiescence. See also R. Chaim of Volozhin, responsum no. 2, s.v. uba-zeh, published as an appendix to R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik, Teshuvot Bet ha-Levi, I. Cf., the distinctions made by Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 177, sec. 3 and Ḥiddushei ha-Rim, Ḥoshen Mishpat 1:28 as well as R. Shimon Shkop, Sha’arei Yosher, sha’ar 7, chap. 5.
In his response to Netivot ha-Mishpat, the author of Keẓot ha-Ḥoshen, Meshovev ha-Netivot 3:1, distinguishes between positive commandments and negative prohibitions: Enforcement of positive obligations, he maintains, requires judicial authority but a properly constituted bet din may apply coercive measures even to the point of death. However, prevention of transgression of a negative commandment, he asserts, is a private obligation and hence the force applied may not be lethal in nature. This is also the position of R. Joseph Babad, Minḥat Ḥinnukh, miẓvah 8, sec. 10, and miẓvah 55, sec. 20. See also R. Jonathan Eibeschutz, Urim ve-Tumim 4:1 and Teshuvot Maharya, II, no. 164 as well as Sedei Ḥemed, Asifat Dinim, ma’arekhet heh, no. 4. Cf., however, R. Chaim Palaggi, Ḥikkekei Lev, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, no. 19.
Teshuvot Radvaz, IV, no. 1,329, (258) seems to rule that physical force may be used only by a person having authority over the would-be transgressor, e.g., a father or a master. See the terminology employed by Rema, Ḥoshen Mishpat 421:13. However, R. Ya’akov Yesha’ya Blau, Pitḥei Ḥoshen, V, chap. 2, notes 19 and 20, understands Radvaz’ comments as being consistent with the position of Yam shel Shlomoh cited later in this note. See also Sedei Ḥemed, Asifat Dinim, ma’arekhet heh, no. 4. However, R. Naphtali Zevi Judah Berlin, Ha’amek She’elah, Parashat Va-Yeshev, She’ilta 27, sec. 6, asserts that physical force may not be used but that, post factum, at least in the case of a master vis-à-vis his slave, there is no liability. See also sources cited by Pitḥei Ḥoshen, V, chap. 2, notes 19 and 20.
Thus, virtually all authorities agree that physical force may be employed to prevent transgression of a negative commandment. Accordingly, physical force would be warranted in order to identify a thief and thereby prevent further acts of theft. In the case under discussion, although a lethal poison was administered, the student was entirely confident of the ability of the already prepared antidote to avert a fatal result. Administration of the poison coupled with its antidote certainly constituted physical force — but non-lethal force is warranted in order to prevent prospective infraction of the prohibition against theft.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to be mindful of the comment of R. Shlomoh Luria, Yam shel Shlomoh, Bava Kamma 3:9, to the effect that, although technically correct, physical force of any kind should not be employed other than by designated authorities. The danger of, and possible abuses arising from, private parties taking the law into their own hands are readily apparent. is not an invitation to entice malfeasors to further transgression and certainly not a license to cause them physical harm.53For a discussion of why theft is deemed a more grievous transgression than orlah and kerem reva’i see Teshuvot Be’er Mosheh, V, no. 162, sec. 9 and cf., Be-Ẓel ha-Ḥokhmah, I, no. 27. Teshuvot Shevet ha-Levi, II, no. 1, cites R. Meir Arak, Minḥat Pittim, Yoreh De’ah, no. 1, who explains that theft is a more serious transgression because it is a sin against both God and man whereas orlah and kerem reva’i are only sins against God.
See Teshuvot Emek Halakhah, II, no. 4, who seeks to demonstrate that Rambam’s limitation of the principle is compelled by an analysis of the situation with regard to orlah and to kerem reva’i presented by the Mishnah. Emek Halakhah argues that, if hali’tehu la-rasha is a rule of general application there is no reason to caution against orlah and kerem reva’i even during the sabbatical year. Fruit whose status is doubtful, i.e., the fruit may possibly be prohibited, is also forbidden and hence, if the principle hal’itehu la-rasha were to apply, there would be no need to mark such fruit. Accordingly, reasons Emek Halakhah, Rambam must have deduced that hal’itehu la-rasha applies only during the years in which the produce is not ownerless and is occasioned by the more serious transgression of theft. Of course, that argument fails if, as postulated by Tuv Ta’am va-Da’at, hal’itehu la-rasha does not apply in situations in which all transgression can be prevented; accordingly, it is in the seventh year, during which the only possible infraction is orlah or kerem reva’i, that notice in the form of marking the fruit as orlah or kerem reva’i is required.
Keẓot ha-Ḥoshen 3:1 rules that only a bet din comprised of ordained judges competent to impose capital punishment is authorized to use physical force to enforce specific performance with regard to fulfilling a commandment. The postion of Keẓot is reflected in the work of an early-day authority, R. Eliezer of Metz, Sefer Yere’im, I, no. 169, and Ramban, Exodus 20:8. Netivot ha-Mishpat 3:1 disagrees in maintaining that judicial authority is not required for this purpose but that every Jew is empowered and obligated to secure observance of commandments even, if necessary, by use of force. Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Mamrim 4:3, concurs in that position but maintains that, when duress is warranted in execution of a divorce, only a bet din can compel such action because execution of a divorce requires acquiescence. See also R. Chaim of Volozhin, responsum no. 2, s.v. uba-zeh, published as an appendix to R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik, Teshuvot Bet ha-Levi, I. Cf., the distinctions made by Ḥatam Sofer, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 177, sec. 3 and Ḥiddushei ha-Rim, Ḥoshen Mishpat 1:28 as well as R. Shimon Shkop, Sha’arei Yosher, sha’ar 7, chap. 5.
In his response to Netivot ha-Mishpat, the author of Keẓot ha-Ḥoshen, Meshovev ha-Netivot 3:1, distinguishes between positive commandments and negative prohibitions: Enforcement of positive obligations, he maintains, requires judicial authority but a properly constituted bet din may apply coercive measures even to the point of death. However, prevention of transgression of a negative commandment, he asserts, is a private obligation and hence the force applied may not be lethal in nature. This is also the position of R. Joseph Babad, Minḥat Ḥinnukh, miẓvah 8, sec. 10, and miẓvah 55, sec. 20. See also R. Jonathan Eibeschutz, Urim ve-Tumim 4:1 and Teshuvot Maharya, II, no. 164 as well as Sedei Ḥemed, Asifat Dinim, ma’arekhet heh, no. 4. Cf., however, R. Chaim Palaggi, Ḥikkekei Lev, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, no. 19.
Teshuvot Radvaz, IV, no. 1,329, (258) seems to rule that physical force may be used only by a person having authority over the would-be transgressor, e.g., a father or a master. See the terminology employed by Rema, Ḥoshen Mishpat 421:13. However, R. Ya’akov Yesha’ya Blau, Pitḥei Ḥoshen, V, chap. 2, notes 19 and 20, understands Radvaz’ comments as being consistent with the position of Yam shel Shlomoh cited later in this note. See also Sedei Ḥemed, Asifat Dinim, ma’arekhet heh, no. 4. However, R. Naphtali Zevi Judah Berlin, Ha’amek She’elah, Parashat Va-Yeshev, She’ilta 27, sec. 6, asserts that physical force may not be used but that, post factum, at least in the case of a master vis-à-vis his slave, there is no liability. See also sources cited by Pitḥei Ḥoshen, V, chap. 2, notes 19 and 20.
Thus, virtually all authorities agree that physical force may be employed to prevent transgression of a negative commandment. Accordingly, physical force would be warranted in order to identify a thief and thereby prevent further acts of theft. In the case under discussion, although a lethal poison was administered, the student was entirely confident of the ability of the already prepared antidote to avert a fatal result. Administration of the poison coupled with its antidote certainly constituted physical force — but non-lethal force is warranted in order to prevent prospective infraction of the prohibition against theft.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to be mindful of the comment of R. Shlomoh Luria, Yam shel Shlomoh, Bava Kamma 3:9, to the effect that, although technically correct, physical force of any kind should not be employed other than by designated authorities. The danger of, and possible abuses arising from, private parties taking the law into their own hands are readily apparent. is not an invitation to entice malfeasors to further transgression and certainly not a license to cause them physical harm.53For a discussion of why theft is deemed a more grievous transgression than orlah and kerem reva’i see Teshuvot Be’er Mosheh, V, no. 162, sec. 9 and cf., Be-Ẓel ha-Ḥokhmah, I, no. 27. Teshuvot Shevet ha-Levi, II, no. 1, cites R. Meir Arak, Minḥat Pittim, Yoreh De’ah, no. 1, who explains that theft is a more serious transgression because it is a sin against both God and man whereas orlah and kerem reva’i are only sins against God.
See Teshuvot Emek Halakhah, II, no. 4, who seeks to demonstrate that Rambam’s limitation of the principle is compelled by an analysis of the situation with regard to orlah and to kerem reva’i presented by the Mishnah. Emek Halakhah argues that, if hali’tehu la-rasha is a rule of general application there is no reason to caution against orlah and kerem reva’i even during the sabbatical year. Fruit whose status is doubtful, i.e., the fruit may possibly be prohibited, is also forbidden and hence, if the principle hal’itehu la-rasha were to apply, there would be no need to mark such fruit. Accordingly, reasons Emek Halakhah, Rambam must have deduced that hal’itehu la-rasha applies only during the years in which the produce is not ownerless and is occasioned by the more serious transgression of theft. Of course, that argument fails if, as postulated by Tuv Ta’am va-Da’at, hal’itehu la-rasha does not apply in situations in which all transgression can be prevented; accordingly, it is in the seventh year, during which the only possible infraction is orlah or kerem reva’i, that notice in the form of marking the fruit as orlah or kerem reva’i is required.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That is that He commanded us to tell about the exodus from Egypt on the night of the fifteenth of Nissan - at the beginning of the night - according to the speaker's linguistic abilities. And it is better for one to add upon the telling and stretch out the words, by magnifying that which God did for us, what the Egyptians did to us in terms of injustice and oppression and how God avenged us upon them, and to thank Him, may He be exalted, for all of the good with which He benefitted us. It is like they said, "Anyone who is expansive in his telling about the exodus from Egypt - behold, he is praiseworthy." And the verse that appears about this command is His saying, "And you shall tell your son on that day" (Exodus 13:8). And the explanation (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 12:8) comes [to say], "'And you shall tell your son' - perhaps from Rosh Chodesh [Nissan. Hence] we learn to say, 'on that day.' Perhaps while it is still day. [Hence] we learn to say, 'for the sake of this' - when [this] matzah and bitter herbs are resting in front of you," meaning, you recount [it] at the beginning of the night." And the language of the Mekhilta (Mekhilta DeRabbi Shimon Bar Yochai 13:2) is, "It is implied from its being stated, 'when your son asks you' (Exodus 13:14) - perhaps if he asks you, you tell him, etc. [Hence] we learn to say, 'and you shall tell your son' - even though he does not ask you. I only [know] at the time that he has a son. [If he is] by himself [or] with others, from where [do I know it? Hence], we learn to say, 'And Moshe said to the people, "Remember this day"'" - meaning to say that He commanded them to remember it, just like He said, "Remember the Shabbat day" (Exodus 20:8). And you already know the language of their saying, "And even if we are all sages, all understanding, all knowing the whole Torah, it is a commandment upon us to tell about the exodus from Egypt" (Haggadah). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained at the end of Pesachim (See Parashat Bo; Mishneh Torah, Leavened and Unleavened Bread 8.)
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