תלמוד על במדבר 30:14

MISHNAH: A woman’s husband went overseas and some persons¹The language of the Mishnah implies that the wife was told (maybe by hearsay), not that she received testimony that would stand up in court. This is clear from the following Mishnaiot and the discussion at the end of Halakhah 2. came and told her, your husband died. If she remarried²Without having her husband declared dead by a competent court. That a woman may remarry even if her husband’s death is not confirmed by two independent witnesses of sterling character (Deut. 19:15) is a rabbinic institution. and then the husband returned, she has to leave both husbands³It is clear that she has to leave the second husband since her marriage to him was invalid by biblical standards. As pointed out by both Talmudim, this shows that the rules of the Mishnah are rabbinical., she needs a bill of divorce from both of them, she has neither ketubah nor usufruct nor used clothing from either of them, and if she took anything she must return it. Any child from either of the men is a bastard; neither of them may defile himself for her. Neither man has any claim on what she finds or earns, or on invalidation of her vows⁴Num. 30:14.. If she was the daughter of an Israel, she is disabled from priesthood, the daughter of a Levite from tithe, the daughter of a Cohen from heave. The heirs of neither man inherit her ketubah⁵If the deceased husband had sons from different wives, before the inheritance is distributed the ketubah of each wife should be given to her sons; only the remainder is distributed among all sons.. If they died⁶Before the divorce documents were executed and there are no children., the brothers of both of them perform ḥalîṣah but not levirate.

HALAKHAH: “These are the vows which he can dissolve,” etc. It is written⁵Num. 30:14. The verse ends: “Her husband shall confirm it or her husband shall dissolve it.”: “Any vow and any oath of prohibition to mortify.” That covers only vows which contain mortification. Vows regarding the relations between him and her, from where? “Between a man and his wife⁶Num. 30:17. One opinion in this Halakhah (Notes 11 ff.) and the consensus in the Babli (79b) hold that the dissolution of vows of mortification is permanent since it is expressly sanctioned by the verse but that dissolution of a vow regarding marital relations, which is the result of an indirect inference, is valid only as long as the marriage continues. Such a dissolution would be automatically voided for the divorcee or widow. The Mishnah mentions only vows the husband can permanently dissolve..” So far the husband; the father from where? Since the husband can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her, so the father can dissolve only vows of mortification and matters between him and her⁷This argument seems to be taken out of thin air. It is explained in Sifry Num. 155: V. 17 reads “These are the principles which the Eternal commanded to Moses between a husband and his wife, between a father and his daughter, in her adolescence, in her father’s house.” Now this verse is really an appendix to the laws governing the married wife. It is concluded that the restrictions which apply to the husband in relation with his wife in his house also apply to the father in relation to the adolescent daughter in his house..

Some baraita implies that the agent of a person acts in his stead, and some baraita implies that the agent of a person does not act in his stead²³Everybody agrees that there exist situations in which an agent acts with the full authority of a principal and others where only the person himself can act. The question is, what is the normal case and what is the exception?. “If he definitively will substitute²⁴This seems to be a quote from Lev. 27:10, but there the masoretic text is הָמֵר יָמִיר. If the word יְמִירֶנּוּ is not a slip of the scribe’s pen, the reference might be to יַחֲליפֶנּוּ (“he himself may exchange it”) in the same verse. There is no explicit baraita in rabbinic literature which would invalidate substitution by agent; the double expression is always interpreted as an addition in R. Aqiba’s system. In Sifra Beḥuqqotay Pereq 9(6), the double expression is interpreted to include a woman for her own sacrifice and an heir for an inherited one. Since the agent is not mentioned, he is excluded. In the Babli, Temurah 2a, the statement of Sifra is characterized as R. Meïr’s., if he himself will dissolve²⁵Num. 30:14. This does not refer to an infinitive construction but to the use of the word יְפֵרֶנּוּ instead of the simple יָפֵר. In R. Aqiba’s system, suffixes always carry a special meaning. The argument is explicit in the Babli, Nazir 12b, where the Tanna R. Joshia quotes Num. 30:14 to prove that a husband cannot delegate his power over his wife’s vows to an attorney. R. Jonathan holds that an agent always can act for his principal..” We may hold that a person’s agent cannot act in his stead because Scripture excluded him. “He shall lean his hand,²⁶Lev. 1:4;3:2,8,13;4:24,29,33, a necessary action to validate a sacrifice. The repetition of his hand in all these verses is taken in the Babli, Menaḥot93b, as proof that any agency is impossible for animal sacrifices.” not the hand of his son nor the hand of his slave nor the hand of his agent²⁷This formulation is in Sifra Wayyiqra Pereq 4(2).. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but [in this case] Scripture excluded him. “His master shall pierce his ear with an awl²⁸Ex. 21:6, speaking of the Hebrew slave; cf. Chapter 1:2.;” “his master” but not the latter’s son, “his master” but not the latter’s agent²⁹Mekhilta dR.Ismael,Neziqin 2 (ed. Horovitz-Rabin p. 253), dR.Simeon ben Ioḥai Mišpaṭim 6:6.. We may hold that a person’s agent can act in his stead but Scripture excluded him. Some Tannaïm state: “He shall pierce”, to include the agent. This follows Rebbi Aqiba. Following Rebbi Ismael? “His master”, anybody acting on his master’s authority³⁰This opinion is not found in any parallel source..