Halakha Hakim-hakim 4:4: Shulchan Arukh, Choshen Mishpat, Abudarham, Gray Matter I & Sefer HaChinukh

A woman is ineligible to judge.¹⁵B.K. 15a (v. parallel passages) : ‘In the School of Eleazar it was taught: Now these are the ordinances which thou shalt set before them (Ex. XXI, 1), — the Scriptural text places a woman on the same level with a man as regards all the judgments of the law’ (i.e., with respect to civil suits). Tosaf. s.v. אשר raises the question that before them refers only to those who are eligible to judge but not to those who are judged (v. Torah Temimah a.l.). Cf. Git. 88b: ‘before them, but not before laymen,’ and a woman is ineligible to judge, for the Mishna Nid. 49b states that ‘Whoever is fit to judge is fit to testify’ and since a woman is unfit to testify (v. B.K. 88a; Sheb. 30a), it follows that she is unable to judge. Consequently, the above passage that equates man and woman as regards all the judgments of the law refers to woman only from the point of view of being judged in cases where she has monetary claims against another person, but she herself may not act as Judge. As to Deborah, the prophetess concerning whom it is stated that She judged Israel at that time (Judges IV, 4) whence we see that a woman may judge, it may be said that it was permissible only on account of a Divine order, or that she merely taught the Law. But the text serves as no precedent that a woman may judge. , also Y. Yoma VI, 1(43b); Y. Sheb. IV, 1(35b) where it is stated that a woman may not judge because she is ineligible to testify. Cf. also Yad, Melakim I, 5 and RIDBaZ a.l.; Sifre to Shofetim XVII, 15. Although a woman may not judge, nevertheless, a learned woman may instruct law and offer legal directives (cf. supra on Deborah and Sefer ha-Ḥinnuk § 83 and § 152; Sha‘are Teshubah to O.Ḥ. § 461, n. 17 — P.Tesh.

VaYhi B-Shallaḥ: Judges 4:4–5:31

Finally, Rav Moshe claims that the Ramban (Shevuot 30a s.v. Vechein) and the Rashba (Shevuot 30a s.v. Velo) may also disagree with the Rambam, based upon their analysis of the status of Devorah. Devorah both judged individual people and led the nation like a queen (see Shofetim 4:4-5). The Ramban and Rashba do not appear to view the prohibition against a queen as applicable to Devorah's judiciary role (although the prohibition raises a problem for Devorah's role as a national leader). They do assert that women are disqualified from serving as judges,³It is accepted as the Halachah in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 7:4, that a woman may not serve as a dayan. While the Pitchei Teshuvah (C.M. 7:5) cites a dissenting opinion, he personally accepts the Shulchan Aruch's view. It should be noted that the Pitchei Teshuvah also cites prominent authorities that permit a female expert in Halachah to rule on halachic questions. but they do not connect this with women's disqualification from serving as queen.