אָ֘כֹ֤ל דְּבַ֣שׁ הַרְבּ֣וֹת לֹא־ט֑וֹב וְחֵ֖קֶר כְּבֹדָ֣ם כָּבֽוֹד׃
Makan madu terlalu banyak tidaklah baik, tetapi menyelidiki kemuliaan mereka adalah suatu kemuliaan.
Eight Chapters
Chapter IV
Concerning the Cure of the Diseases of the Soul1To this chapter, in which the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean (Μεσότες, balance) is applied to Jewish ethics, M. later supplemented H. Deot, I, 1—7; II, 2, 3, 7; and III, 1. Cf. Eth. Nic. II, 5—9; III, 8—14; IV. Although M. follows Aristotle in defining virtue as a state intermediate between two extremes, the too little and the too much, he still remains on Jewish ground, as there are biblical and Talmudical passages expressing such a thought. Such passages are Prov. IV, 26, "Balance well the track of thy foot, and let all thy ways be firmly right"; ibid., XXX, 8, "Neither poverty nor riches give thou unto me"; Eccles. VII, 16, "Be not righteous overmuch; neither show thyself overwise" (quoted in H. Deot, III, 1); etc. In Moreh, I, 32, M. interprets "neither show thyself overwise" and "To eat too much honey is not good" (Prov. XXV, 27) as a warning against attempting to exceed the limits of one's intellectual powers, and as an admonition to keep knowledge within bounds. In the Palestinian Talmud (Ḥagigah, II, 77 a bot.), there is found an interesting passage which sums up well the thought of this chapter, and it is curious that M. did not refer to it. It reads, "The ways of the Torah may be likened to two roads, on one of which fire and on the other snow is encountered. If one go along one path, he will be burned to death, and if he proceed along the other, he will perish in the snow. What, then, should one do? He must go between the extremes." A similar passage is found in Tosefta Ḥagigah 2 (cf. Yer. Ḥagigah, p. 20), "They make it incumbent upon man to go between the extremes, and not to incline to this side or to that." See, also, Soṭah, 5a, "he (the scholar) in whom there is pride deserves excommunication, and also he in whom there is no pride at all." For a discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of the Μεσότες, see Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, vol. I, pp. 251—262. For that of M., see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr, XLVI, pp. 11—12; Rosin, Ethik, p. 26, n. 1; p. 79 ff.; Lazarus, Ethik, vol. I, Abhang XIV (Eng. ed. vol. I, p. 273 f.); Wolff, Acht Capitel, Introd., pp. XIII—XIV; Yellin and Abrahams, Maimonides, pp. 78—83; Cohen, Charakteristik, etc., in Moses ben Maimon, I, p. III ff.; A. Löwenthal in JE., II, p. 101; Lewis, in Aspects of the Hebrew Genius, (London, 1910) pp. 82—83. On the mean in Jewish religious philosophy, see Rosin, Ethik, pp. 10, 12, 14, 19, 24; H. Malter, JQR (new series) vol. I, p. 160, n. 15.
Good deeds are such as are equibalanced,2השױם, the equidistant (equivalent to the Aristotelian ίσον, the exactly equal, the normal, or equibalanced); cf. Moreh, II, 39, “It is clear, then, that the Law is normal (משוױה) in this sense; for it contains the words, ‘Just statutes and judgments’ (Deut. IV, 8); but ‘just’ is here identical with ‘equibalanced’ (שוױם).” maintaining the mean between two equally bad extremes, the too much and the too little.3הממוצעים, the mean (Aristotelian μέσον). Nic. Eth., II, 6, “By an objective mean, I understand that which is equidistant from the two given extremes, and which is one and the same to all, and by a mean relatively to the person, I understand that which is neither too much nor too little.” Virtues are psychic conditions and dispositions which are mid-way between two reprehensible extremes, one of which is characterized by an exaggeration, the other by a deficiency.4Cf. ibid., “Virtue, then, is a disposition of the moral purpose in relative balance, which is determined by a standard, according as the thoughtful man would determine. It is a middle state between two faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side, and defect on the other; and it is so, moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other side exceed, what is right, both in the case of the emotions and the actions; but virtue finds, and, when found, adopts the mean.” Cf. H. Deot, I, 4, and II, 2. Good deeds are the product of these dispositions. To illustrate, abstemiousness is a disposition which adopts a mid-course between inordinate passion and total insensibility to pleasure. Abstemiousness, then, is a proper rule of conduct, and the psychic disposition which gives rise to it is an ethical quality; but inordinate passion, the extreme of excess, and total insensibility to enjoyment, the extreme of deficiency5הקצה הראשון, is the extreme of excess (Aristotle's ὐπερβολή), and הקצה האחרון the extreme of deficiency (ἔλλειψις). Cf. H. Deot, I, 5; III, 1; ואתרחק לצד האחרון עד שלא יאכל בשר ולא ישתה יין וכ׳, where צד האחרון clearly means the extreme of the too little., are both absolutely pernicious. The psychic dispositions, from which these two extremes, inordinate passion and insensibility, result—the one being an exaggeration, the other a deficiency—are alike classed among moral imperfections.
Concerning the Cure of the Diseases of the Soul1To this chapter, in which the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean (Μεσότες, balance) is applied to Jewish ethics, M. later supplemented H. Deot, I, 1—7; II, 2, 3, 7; and III, 1. Cf. Eth. Nic. II, 5—9; III, 8—14; IV. Although M. follows Aristotle in defining virtue as a state intermediate between two extremes, the too little and the too much, he still remains on Jewish ground, as there are biblical and Talmudical passages expressing such a thought. Such passages are Prov. IV, 26, "Balance well the track of thy foot, and let all thy ways be firmly right"; ibid., XXX, 8, "Neither poverty nor riches give thou unto me"; Eccles. VII, 16, "Be not righteous overmuch; neither show thyself overwise" (quoted in H. Deot, III, 1); etc. In Moreh, I, 32, M. interprets "neither show thyself overwise" and "To eat too much honey is not good" (Prov. XXV, 27) as a warning against attempting to exceed the limits of one's intellectual powers, and as an admonition to keep knowledge within bounds. In the Palestinian Talmud (Ḥagigah, II, 77 a bot.), there is found an interesting passage which sums up well the thought of this chapter, and it is curious that M. did not refer to it. It reads, "The ways of the Torah may be likened to two roads, on one of which fire and on the other snow is encountered. If one go along one path, he will be burned to death, and if he proceed along the other, he will perish in the snow. What, then, should one do? He must go between the extremes." A similar passage is found in Tosefta Ḥagigah 2 (cf. Yer. Ḥagigah, p. 20), "They make it incumbent upon man to go between the extremes, and not to incline to this side or to that." See, also, Soṭah, 5a, "he (the scholar) in whom there is pride deserves excommunication, and also he in whom there is no pride at all." For a discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of the Μεσότες, see Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, vol. I, pp. 251—262. For that of M., see Jaraczewski, ZPhKr, XLVI, pp. 11—12; Rosin, Ethik, p. 26, n. 1; p. 79 ff.; Lazarus, Ethik, vol. I, Abhang XIV (Eng. ed. vol. I, p. 273 f.); Wolff, Acht Capitel, Introd., pp. XIII—XIV; Yellin and Abrahams, Maimonides, pp. 78—83; Cohen, Charakteristik, etc., in Moses ben Maimon, I, p. III ff.; A. Löwenthal in JE., II, p. 101; Lewis, in Aspects of the Hebrew Genius, (London, 1910) pp. 82—83. On the mean in Jewish religious philosophy, see Rosin, Ethik, pp. 10, 12, 14, 19, 24; H. Malter, JQR (new series) vol. I, p. 160, n. 15.
Good deeds are such as are equibalanced,2השױם, the equidistant (equivalent to the Aristotelian ίσον, the exactly equal, the normal, or equibalanced); cf. Moreh, II, 39, “It is clear, then, that the Law is normal (משוױה) in this sense; for it contains the words, ‘Just statutes and judgments’ (Deut. IV, 8); but ‘just’ is here identical with ‘equibalanced’ (שוױם).” maintaining the mean between two equally bad extremes, the too much and the too little.3הממוצעים, the mean (Aristotelian μέσον). Nic. Eth., II, 6, “By an objective mean, I understand that which is equidistant from the two given extremes, and which is one and the same to all, and by a mean relatively to the person, I understand that which is neither too much nor too little.” Virtues are psychic conditions and dispositions which are mid-way between two reprehensible extremes, one of which is characterized by an exaggeration, the other by a deficiency.4Cf. ibid., “Virtue, then, is a disposition of the moral purpose in relative balance, which is determined by a standard, according as the thoughtful man would determine. It is a middle state between two faulty ones, in the way of excess on one side, and defect on the other; and it is so, moreover, because the faulty states on one side fall short of, and those on the other side exceed, what is right, both in the case of the emotions and the actions; but virtue finds, and, when found, adopts the mean.” Cf. H. Deot, I, 4, and II, 2. Good deeds are the product of these dispositions. To illustrate, abstemiousness is a disposition which adopts a mid-course between inordinate passion and total insensibility to pleasure. Abstemiousness, then, is a proper rule of conduct, and the psychic disposition which gives rise to it is an ethical quality; but inordinate passion, the extreme of excess, and total insensibility to enjoyment, the extreme of deficiency5הקצה הראשון, is the extreme of excess (Aristotle's ὐπερβολή), and הקצה האחרון the extreme of deficiency (ἔλλειψις). Cf. H. Deot, I, 5; III, 1; ואתרחק לצד האחרון עד שלא יאכל בשר ולא ישתה יין וכ׳, where צד האחרון clearly means the extreme of the too little., are both absolutely pernicious. The psychic dispositions, from which these two extremes, inordinate passion and insensibility, result—the one being an exaggeration, the other a deficiency—are alike classed among moral imperfections.
Guide for the Perplexed
With reference to the second effect of the act of eating, the verb “to eat” is figuratively used in the sense of “acquiring wisdom,” “learning”; in short, for all intellectual perceptions. These preserve the human form (intellect) constantly in the most perfect manner, in the same way as food preserves the body in its best condition. Comp. “Come ye, buy and eat” (Isa. 55:1); “Hearken diligently unto me, and eat ye that which is good” (ib. 2); “It is not good to eat much honey” (Prov. 25:27); “My son, eat thou honey, because it is good, and the honeycomb, which is sweet to thy taste; so shall the knowledge of wisdom be unto thy soul” (ib. 24:13, 14).
Guide for the Perplexed
The same idea is expressed in the words, “It is not good to eat much honey” (Prov. 25:27); and in the words, “Neither make thyself over-wise: why shouldst thou destroy thyself?” (Eccles. 7:16); comp. “Keep thy foot when thou goest to the house of God” (Eccles. 4:17). The same subject is alluded to in the words of David, “Neither do I exercise myself in great matters, or in things too high for me” (Ps. 131:2), and in the sayings of our Sages: “Do not inquire into things which are too difficult for thee, do not search what is hidden from thee: study what you are allowed to study, and do not occupy thyself with mysteries.” They meant to say, Let thy mind only attempt things which are within human perception; for the study of things which lie beyond man’s comprehension is extremely injurious, as has been already stated. This lesson is also contained in the Talmudical passage, which begins, “He who considers four things,” etc., and concludes, “He who does not regard the honour of his Creator”; here also is given the advice which we have already mentioned, viz., that man should not rashly engage in speculation with false conceptions, and when he is in doubt about anything, or unable to find a proof for the object of his inquiry, he must not at once abandon, reject and deny it; he must modestly keep back, and from regard to the honour of his Creator, hesitate [from uttering an opinion) and pause. This has already been explained.