Pemikiran Yahudi Bilangan 30:3: Akeidat Yitzchak

Man attains his ideal state via a threefold process. 1) He must fulfil his duties towards himself. 2) He must fulfil his duties towards his fellow man. 3) He must fulfil his duties towards G'd. The prophet Michah, in chapter six, describes man's tasks as follows: "What is it that the Lord asks of you, except a) to do justice, b) to practice loving kindness, and c) to walk humbly with the Lord your G'd." Duties towards oneself are easily understood, therefore the prophet refers to them by the word mishpat. When Manoach was told about the impending birth of Samson, he asked the angel "what is the mishpat of the boy, and how is he to be treated? (Judges 13,11) He meant "how can one ensure the boy's survival?" Duties towards oneself are to ensure one's survival. Performance of duties towards one's fellow man consists of putting acquired good character traits to practical use. David asked his son Solomon (Chronicles I 28,9) "and you my son Solomon, know the G'd of your father, serve Him with a perfect heart and a willing soul." Our sages display a negative attitude towards people who make vows. Prompt fulfilment of the vow is equated with offering a sacrifice on a private altar at times when private altars are forbidden. (Gittin 56) The reason is that though there clearly is a good intention, the venue is unwelcome. This is so when the subject of the vow is a devar mitzvah, something desirable in the eyes of G'd. When the subject matter of the vow is merely a devar reshut however, i.e. something merely permissible, the vow itself is viewed as reprehensible, since it presupposes that by accepting the gift, G'd indicates His need of it. What could be more laughable? Since vows are subject to annulment, the question why some famous vows have never been annulled is in order. Why was the vow of Yiphtach who offered the life of the first living thing that would come towards him when he would return from war victorious, and which resulted in his own daughter being that sacrifice, not annulled? Our sages blame the pride of both Yiphtach and the High Priest Pinchas. Supposedly, each waited for the other to make the first move. Both were punished for their pride. Pinchas no longer enjoyed the ear of G'd. (Chronicles I 9,20) Yiphtach's body was scattered all over the place, as parts of it were buried in different part of Gilead. (Judges 12,7) In the case of the aftermath of the pilegesh be-givah, Judges chapter twenty one, one must ask why the annulment procedure was not used to cancel the vow to kill all the men of Yavesh Gilead? Surely, this would have been even more important than to save the life of a single person, the daughter of Yiphtach at the time? Surely a lesson could have been learned from the former event? Also, why was the vow not to give daughters in marriage to the the remnant of the tribe of Benjamin not annulled? One of the main reasons for this national paralysis, could have been the absence of a central authority at that time. After all, the era has been characterised by the book of Judges as "in those days, there was no king in Israel." (Judges 19,1) Again, at the end of the book of Judges (Judges 21,25) we read "in those days there was no king in Israel; everyone did what was right in." When an entire nation had vowed a vow, only an even greater authority can absolve from such a vow. Since many of the people had died since the vow had been made, it could not even have been annulled by an equal number of people. (Moed Katan 17) For that reason they had to resort to the subterfuge described there, i.e. letting the young men of Benjamin kidnap their brides to be. (see commentary by Kimchi) All of the above illustrates the severity of the laws concerning vows, once they have been made. Surely then it is preferable not to make vows in the first place. Man's tendency not to make payment promptly when he pledges a donation, is a sign that he overestimates his own value, and his effort to compensate for this when the time comes to make payment. The Torah, therefore, provides objective valuations, so that the person who promised a value to the temple treasury that equals his own value, would not shortchange the temple treasury. When the vow concerns a devar mitzvah, a duty that had to be fulfilled anyways, even if no vow had been made at all, the Torah warns "do not be tardy to pay it, the Lord will surely demand it from you." (Deut 23,22) For that reason the Torah continues: "if you fail to make vows, this will not be counted a sin against you."

Man attains his ideal state via a threefold process. 1) He must fulfil his duties towards himself. 2) He must fulfil his duties towards his fellow man. 3) He must fulfil his duties towards G'd. The prophet Michah, in chapter six, describes man's tasks as follows: "What is it that the Lord asks of you, except a) to do justice, b) to practice loving kindness, and c) to walk humbly with the Lord your G'd." Duties towards oneself are easily understood, therefore the prophet refers to them by the word mishpat. When Manoach was told about the impending birth of Samson, he asked the angel "what is the mishpat of the boy, and how is he to be treated? (Judges 13,11) He meant "how can one ensure the boy's survival?" Duties towards oneself are to ensure one's survival. Performance of duties towards one's fellow man consists of putting acquired good character traits to practical use. David asked his son Solomon (Chronicles I 28,9) "and you my son Solomon, know the G'd of your father, serve Him with a perfect heart and a willing soul." Our sages display a negative attitude towards people who make vows. Prompt fulfilment of the vow is equated with offering a sacrifice on a private altar at times when private altars are forbidden. (Gittin 56) The reason is that though there clearly is a good intention, the venue is unwelcome. This is so when the subject of the vow is a devar mitzvah, something desirable in the eyes of G'd. When the subject matter of the vow is merely a devar reshut however, i.e. something merely permissible, the vow itself is viewed as reprehensible, since it presupposes that by accepting the gift, G'd indicates His need of it. What could be more laughable? Since vows are subject to annulment, the question why some famous vows have never been annulled is in order. Why was the vow of Yiphtach who offered the life of the first living thing that would come towards him when he would return from war victorious, and which resulted in his own daughter being that sacrifice, not annulled? Our sages blame the pride of both Yiphtach and the High Priest Pinchas. Supposedly, each waited for the other to make the first move. Both were punished for their pride. Pinchas no longer enjoyed the ear of G'd. (Chronicles I 9,20) Yiphtach's body was scattered all over the place, as parts of it were buried in different part of Gilead. (Judges 12,7) In the case of the aftermath of the pilegesh be-givah, Judges chapter twenty one, one must ask why the annulment procedure was not used to cancel the vow to kill all the men of Yavesh Gilead? Surely, this would have been even more important than to save the life of a single person, the daughter of Yiphtach at the time? Surely a lesson could have been learned from the former event? Also, why was the vow not to give daughters in marriage to the the remnant of the tribe of Benjamin not annulled? One of the main reasons for this national paralysis, could have been the absence of a central authority at that time. After all, the era has been characterised by the book of Judges as "in those days, there was no king in Israel." (Judges 19,1) Again, at the end of the book of Judges (Judges 21,25) we read "in those days there was no king in Israel; everyone did what was right in." When an entire nation had vowed a vow, only an even greater authority can absolve from such a vow. Since many of the people had died since the vow had been made, it could not even have been annulled by an equal number of people. (Moed Katan 17) For that reason they had to resort to the subterfuge described there, i.e. letting the young men of Benjamin kidnap their brides to be. (see commentary by Kimchi) All of the above illustrates the severity of the laws concerning vows, once they have been made. Surely then it is preferable not to make vows in the first place. Man's tendency not to make payment promptly when he pledges a donation, is a sign that he overestimates his own value, and his effort to compensate for this when the time comes to make payment. The Torah, therefore, provides objective valuations, so that the person who promised a value to the temple treasury that equals his own value, would not shortchange the temple treasury. When the vow concerns a devar mitzvah, a duty that had to be fulfilled anyways, even if no vow had been made at all, the Torah warns "do not be tardy to pay it, the Lord will surely demand it from you." (Deut 23,22) For that reason the Torah continues: "if you fail to make vows, this will not be counted a sin against you."

After having dealt with matters which are likely to face a person as soon as he grows up, the Torah continues with matters which do not usually occur until confidence in one's own manhood has been firmly established. We refer to conduct of wars outside one's own boundaries. Since special Divine protection is needed in view of the danger accompanying such an undertaking, the soldiers' conduct must be such as to warrant Divine protection. Therefore, even a person whose impurity is due only to involuntary nocturnal emission of semen, must leave the camp until he has purified himself. Such natural occurrences as bowel movements, must be covered up so as not to defile the camp. A military camp observing such high standards of purity, will surely be able to qualify for G'ds protective cover. It goes without saying that in other matters of licentiousness common amongst gentile soldiers, Jewish soldiers are expected to observe strict self discipline. Since the heavenly food provided by G'd during the forty years they were in the desert, was absorbed by the body totally, there had been no need for these last regulations for the Jewish encampments in the desert during those years. Since the capture of prisoners of war as well as slaves fleeing from their owners are frequently a corollary of warfare, the Torah legislates at this point that slaves who have escaped from gentile masters must not be returned to their former owners. This applies even to a gentile slave who is the property of a Jew residing outside the land of Israel. Since it was the practice of other nations to put prostitutes at the disposal of their soldiers, the Torah forbids such practice even in that context. The prohibition, of course, extends to all situations, since we already know that the moral standards among the Jewish soldiers was such that this injunction would be quite superfluous were it to apply only to them. The term "prostitute" applies even if the woman in question is the exclusive sex partner of one soldier, or civilian male. Since she does not enjoy the benefit of marriage, i.e. no formal responsibilities having been entered into by her male partner, their sexual union is no better than intercourse with a harlot. To underline the negative view taken of harlotry, the Torah emphasizes that the proceeds of such unions are not acceptable as sacrifices in the holy Temple. This is so even if the sacrifice represents fulfilment of a specific vow. Since the conditions of war frequently result in part of the population becoming temporarily or permanently impoverished, it is at such times that borrowing will most likely occur. The Torah therefore warns against charging interest to a fellow Jew. It is irrelevant if such interest payments are in cash or produce, or even labour. Interest of any kind must not be charged or paid on loans between Jews. Similarly, during war, people are apt to make vows to call Heaven's protection down on themselves at such dangerous times. The reason G'd insists on such vows being paid on time- although He surely is not in need of them,- is that even without the express vow, the soldier owes thanks to G'd for having safely survived whatever it was that had motivated him to make that particular vow. Therefore the Torah says "if you cease (or fail) to make a vow,”- while you do not commit a sin,- the only situation when not making such a vow is not a sin, is when you were not too miserly to make such a vow. (23,23) The reason the Torah stipulates the apparently obvious demand to honour one's promises, (23,24) is to ensure that these promises are couched in such language as not to violate various laws about unnecessary oaths etc. Concerning the utterance of such oaths, the Torah uses both the term tishmor, i.e. avoid doing so, and ve-assita, carry out. Do not utter things that are forbidden, carry out undertakings you have vowed. In verse twenty six, which deals with the prohibition of helping oneself to some of the neighbour's ears of corn etc., the Torah must correct the impression that private property is not inviolate. Having made concessions to besieging armies regarding the destruction of trees, even certain fruitbearing trees belonging to civilians, the Torah stresses that even a labourer must not do more than still his immediate hunger from the produce of his employer. Dealing now with the previously discussed "attractive female prisoner of war," the Torah tells us that should the marriage fail at one stage or another, the husband must divorce her in the same manner as he would any wife of Jewish origin. Since a bill of divorce cancels a previous marriage contract, the woman forthwith is forbidden to her former husband in the event that she remarries. The obvious intent of this legislation is to prevent a kind of legalised wife swapping by using the institution of marriage and divorce as a mere legal formality. The Torah describes such a practice as an abomination with potentially the gravest consequences to our tenure in the holy land. In reply to the question by a gentile, why the wife of an apostate Jew requires a bill of divorce, since we could simply consider her a widow seeing her husband has abandoned the religion under the auspices of which he had married her, the answer given was that a Jew cannot change his basic status. Once a Jew, always a Jew, regardless of one's efforts to abandon the religion of one's people. This answer proved unacceptable to the gentile, the more so since we accept gentiles as proselytes, and Jewish law considers such a proselyte like a new born child whose life commenced at the time of his conversion. Also, all contact with his former family is considered as having been severed, i.e. former relatives such as father, brother etc are not recognised in Jewish law. We suggest a different answer, one that may evoke a more responsive chord amongst the gentiles. Union of man and woman contains three elements. 1) The purely biological function, i.e. procreation. 2) A typically human manner of sexual union common to all civilisations, a relationship in which by mutual consent similar relationships with other potential partners are excluded. The patent advantage of this arrangement is in removing doubt about the paternity of children from such unions. 3) Entering into such a marriage under special conditions. In the case of the Jewish religion, ring, document (ketuvah) etc; in the case of Christian marriages, the priest joining the hands of the couple etc. The man who changes his religion does not sever the bonds of his marriage, since the union was based on their common humanity, not on their common Jewishness. The reason we demand a proper document of divorce is that the woman is still Jewish, and anyone wishing to marry her could not do so until she was free to marry under Jewish law. What follows are all situations that are more likely to occur during unsettled times such as during a war. Therefore, dealing with them at this point is appropriate. The prohibition of kidnapping and selling fellow Jews into slavery under pain of the death penalty is restated here, since the same practice if it involves gentile prisoners of war during wartime may be permissible.