Pemikiran Yahudi Maleakhi 3:22: Akeidat Yitzchak & HaEmunot veHaDeot

The upshot of all this (David's outpourings in Psalm 119) is that mitzvah performance must become as automatic to us as life itself. Therefore, the Mishnah in Avot 3, 10, says that "whosoever forgets part of his studies has sinned gravely," since the Torah has provided memory joggers. The word "Talmud" in that Mishnah refers to knowledge of the commandments and their performance. Unless a person has tried and failed to remember, he is guilty of a sin. If he did the latter, he is subject to the saving grace of pen yassuru mi -levavcha, lest they depart from your heart, as long as he did not contribute to forgetting them. (Deut. 4,9) G-d lays tefillin, phylacteries, or created the rainbow, so that His memory should be jogged by visible symbols. If, in the words of the Midrash, it is good enough for Him to jog His memory, it is certainly incumbent upon us to do so. The concept of "G-d’s Torah is perfect," (Psalms 119,8) implies that the law of G-d is beyond blemish at any time in history; nothing in it can therefore be devoid of purpose at any time. This is so even if the application of a particular commandment is restricted to certain individuals such as priests. Even the occurrence of a million to one shot such as a ben sorer umoreh, an obstinate gluttonous teenager whose parents take him to Court to be executed, or a commandment which by definition could only be performed once in history in the desert, has significance far beyond that unique opportunity to perform it. David assures us in the first of the Psalms that he who truly desires Torah and studies same, is like a tree securely planted next to a never failing water supply. Such a tree will not wilt etc. If this is true of the person who studies Torah, how much more must Torah itself be meaningful in all its details. This is the reason that the mitzvot of the tabernacle and priestly garments which are of limited duration, emphasize again and again "it is an eternal statute in front of Me forever," or the use of the word tzav. The Talmud in Kiddushin 29, states that any commandment associated with the word tzav is a commandment that applies forever. Examination of those laws reveals that there are many instances where this rule simply does not stand up in the light of history. We must understand the Talmud to mean that though the details of the commandments in question helped us fulfil them at times when they proved physically capable of fulfilment, we derive the major benefit from these commandments through the lessons we learn from the concepts that these mitzvot represent. It is these concepts that remain valid forever. This is the meaning of Deuteronomy 29,8, "observe the words of the covenant, carry them out so that you will gain insights from all that you do." Similarly Deut.4,6, "it is your wisdom and your insight." Unfortunately, as the Rambam already observes in his "Moreh," most people never concern themselves with such matters and want to get close to the king without ever having seen the king's palace, as it were. Granted that performance of the mitzvah, since it is G-d’s command, is praiseworthy. Nevertheless it is far from the ultimate that we are capable of achieving. Whatever the tabernacle teaches is as relevant today as ever, just as basic concepts do not lose their relevance because they cannot always be applied instantly. If the Torah commands that we help an enemy load his beast, thereby teaching important moral lessons, these lessons do not lose their relevance because we have no enemies or because we never encountered an enemy in circumstances where this commandment could be performed. David says in Psalms 51, 19, "the (real) sacrifice to G-d is a broken spirit." It is the spirit in which G-d is approached that matters. The Talmud Menachot 106, explains the verse in Leviticus 7,37, "this is the teaching of the Torah concerning the total offering, the gift offering and the peace offering," as meaning that he who labours studying the laws of these offerings, does not actually have to bring them in order to achieve the personality development that these offerings are meant to help us achieve. The idea is that just as performance plays its part in awakening the mind to what, why and how one is doing, so the study of the laws pertaining to these observances accomplishes the same thing. We should not therefore bemoan earlier times when through the performance of mitzvot such as yovel, the Jubilee year, we could come closer to G-d. Let us look now at the "memory" element surrounding the commandments of the priestly vestments. Concerning the ephod, apron it states "Aaron should wear the names of the children of Israel before G-d on his shoulders as remembrance." Concerning the choshen, the breastplate, we find a similar quote. A similar purpose is common to all the priestly garments. Clothing as such is symbolic of acquired traits. Already in the wording of the commandments there is a reference to the concepts of midot, character traits, which we discussed at the beginning of this chapter. (Leviticus 6,3) mido bad; or in Judges 3, 16, "under his madim;” or in Psalms 133,2, "descending according to midotav." So we observe the term midah being used for garments, illustrating the essential nature of garments, at least when worn by priests. The first impression that one receives when meeting another person is that of the clothes he wears. It suggests his occupation, certain of his behavioral traits etc. Even our prophets in praising the Lord, use the simile " You are garbed in Splendour." (Psalms 104, 1) Or, "resplendent in His garments" (Isaiah 63, 1) Secondly, people wear different sets of clothing for the Sabbath and weekdays. Even in ancient times, Esau had "his precious clothes" (Genesis 27, 15) or (Ruth 3,3) Ruth who put special garments for a special occasion. By wearing different clothing on the Sabbath, every Jew signals that he assumes different character traits on the Sabbath. In Hilchot Derech Eretz, the halachah stipulates that ordinary clothing be worn for the performance of mundane tasks, whereas festive clothing should be worn when performing mitzvot between man and His Maker. This is the meaning of Isaiah chapter 58. Compare also chapter 63. Thirdly, just as man is never completely nude, so he is never completely devoid of mitzvot. Therefore, all of Israel, priests and ordinary Israelites alike, have the duty to be garbed in special garments. This is why a whole nation is referred to as a kingdom of priests, to imbue all garments with a reminder of the symbolic significance of garments as such. Therefore, the Torah says in connection with the tzitzit, fringes, "when you see it, you will remember the commandments" (Numbers 15,39). "A garment adorned with tzitzit will remind you of all the commandments of G-d to carry them out, ibid." Whenever white garments are mentioned by our sages, it refers to the moral condition of the wearer of such garments. For instance, we have the parable of the king who invites his servants to partake of a meal in his palace without specifying the date and hour the meal is to take place. The intelligent servants remained within the vicinity of the king’s palace, saying that it would be foolish to roam around elsewhere since they had no urgent business elsewhere. The foolish ones carried on business as usual, citing as their reason that they would not receive any food for which they had not worked. Suddenly, the king issued a summons for his servants to attend the party. The intelligent ones entered the palace suitably attired, whereas the foolish servants arrived dirty and dishevelled. The king was well pleased with the first group, of course, but was very angry at the second group. Therefore, he seated the first group and left the second group to remain standing and watch the others partake of the feast. This is how Rabbi Meir's son-in-law explained the following verse in Isaiah 65, 13, "My sons will eat, and you will starve; My sons will drink, but you will remain thirsty." Another version explains the meaning of Kohelet 9,8, "at all times your garments should be white, and oil should be on your head," as referring to tzitzit and tefillin respectively. The Aggadah in Baba Batra 74, concerning the meal of the righteous in the future, featuring salted meat of the female leviathan and well aged wine, may also be understood allegorically as referring to the garments worn by the tzaddikim in their lifetime, namely Torah and Mitzvot. More about this Aggadah in chapter 60.

Now that I have set forth these preliminary points, I consider it appropriate to append to them a discussion regarding the abrogation of the Torah, as this is its proper place. And I say: The Children of Israel have already received a firm tradition that the commandments of the Torah, concerning which the prophets declared to them that they would not be abrogated, and they affirmed having heard this in an explicit declaration, which dispels all thought and all reasoning to the contrary.
Subsequently, I have examined the scriptures and found therein indications to this effect, firstly, that the majority of commandments are written with the phrase "for your generations". Furthermore, there is the pronouncement (Deuteronomy 33:4), "Torah Moses commanded us, an inheritance for the congregation of Jacob." Moreover, our nation is only a nation by virtue of its Torah. And since the Creator declared that the nation shall endure as long as the heavens and the earth endure, it is necessarily implied that its Torah must endure for as long as the heavens and the earth, as He stated (Jeremiah 31:35), "Thus saith the Lord, who giveth the sun for a light by day, and the ordinances of the moon and of the stars for a light by night… If those ordinances depart from before me, saith the Lord, then the seed of Israel also shall cease…"
Furthermore, I have observed in the later prophecies, a warning concerning the observance of the Torah of Moses until the Day of Judgement, preceded by the mission of Elijah the Prophet, as He stated (Malachi 3:22), "Remember ye the law of Moses my servant, which I commanded unto him in Horeb for all Israel, with the statutes and judgments." (Malachi 3:23), "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the coming of the great and dreadful day of the Lord."
I have noticed individuals from our nation who adduce proof against the abrogation of the Torah from general principles. And I say: When the Creator commands in the Torah, it cannot escape being one of four possibilities. Either He explicitly states that it is everlasting, in which case its abrogation is inconceivable. Or He establishes it for a specific period, as if He said "Do this for a hundred years," and its abrogation before a hundred years is impossible, and after the hundred years it is already fulfilled and abrogation does not apply. Or it is contingent upon a place, as if He said "Do this in Egypt," and in Egypt its abrogation is impossible, and if He commands it elsewhere, outside of Egypt, there is no abrogation. Or it is caused by a reason, as if He said "Do this, because the waters of the Nile are flowing," and before the waters of the Nile cease, its abrogation is impossible, and if He commands it after the waters have ceased, it is not abrogation.
And when it is said to them, behold, here is a fifth possibility, which is the Torah, which is limited by time, and people will not cease from doing it until they are commanded to do another in its place, they say, this too, if it were the case, would be for a part of time, because the measure would be known, either to God in truth, or to men until the time of the second commandment. And in both cases, abrogation in Egypt is impossible, and the time of the Torah would be partial in conception from the beginning of the commandment. And some say, this fifth possibility is not conceivable, because general and partial Torahs only exist so that nothing remains unspecified.
I have seen that one who deems abrogation possible bases this on seven assertions, and considers them to be matters of reasoned contemplation, and their intellect to be sound. And I deem it proper to mention them and to address the responses to them. And I say, firstly, his analogy to life and death. He argues, just as it is proper to give life with wisdom and to bring death with wisdom, so too may He give the Torah with wisdom and abrogate it with wisdom. However, it becomes clear to me that there is a great difference between them. For He only gives life in order to bring death, but He did not give the Torah in order to abrogate it. For death is the path of passage to the world to come, which is the ultimate purpose. He did not give the Torah in order to abrogate it, for if the Torah were given in order to be abrogated, it would be impossible for any Torah to exist without abrogation, and the first would be abrogated by the second, and the second by the third, ad infinitum, and this is false. Furthermore, if this were the case, the second Torah would necessarily contain contradiction and opposition. To explain this, the second Torah would have a purpose other than itself, by virtue of being a Torah, and this is the nature of every Torah. And it would also be the purpose by virtue of abrogating the first, and this is the nature of every abrogator, that it is the primary purpose. And this is a subtle argument.
The second assertion is his analogy to the deceased, who were commanded by the Torah, and the removal of the Torah from them at death. And I have observed that death necessarily removes the Torah from the deceased, since commandment and prohibition no longer apply to them. And there is no analogy between what is possible to dispense with and what is impossible to dispense with. And if abrogation were impossible to dispense with, the contradiction I mentioned regarding the abrogation of every Torah would return.
The third assertion is his analogy to one who performs work on one day and rests on another, and fasts on one day and eats on another. And this too is from the necessity of things, for since man is not capable of fasting every day, nor of resting every day, it would not be proper for the Creator to command him thus. However, it is possible for man to observe the Torah in every generation.
The fourth assertion is his analogy to the one who enriches and impoverishes, heals and blinds, each of which He does at a time when it is good to do so. And I have considered what difference there is between these matters. For all prosperities are designated as reward for one who serves Him, and all afflictions are designated as reward for one who disobeys Him. However, the Torah is not designated as a reward for service, nor for disobedience. And if this arguer were to argue thus, it would be detrimental to the first Torah, because it would be abrogated to be a reward for something that preceded it, since there is no Torah before it.
The fifth assertion is his analogy to the date that ripens after being green, and similar examples. And all of these, I have considered them, and behold they are necessitated either by nature and natural disposition, or by habit. However, the Torah is not so. For if it were so, the abrogation of every Torah would be necessitated, and the contradiction would return.
The sixth he said: Just as work on the Sabbath was permissible according to reason, but the Divine decree invalidated the permission by prohibition, so too is it possible that a Divine decree may reinstate its permissibility. And I say: In this matter, this analogy would be conclusive, if reason necessitated work on the Sabbath, and then one could say that the Divine decree invalidated that necessity. However, this is not the case. For man does not cease to perceive in his reason that it is permissible for him to abstain from work every Sabbath and other days, whether for bodily rest, or for pleasure he may derive from it, or for both together. And thus it is stated in the Torah regarding what is permissible by reason, and it said to him, "The Sabbath is for your bodily rest," and that you may acquire thereby the benefit of reward, and it does not invalidate anything, even though it is termed everlasting, for it is conceivable in his reason that a wise man might command him to rest on a particular day, and give him a dinar for each day.
The seventh he said: Just as it was proper that the Torah of Moses should be different from the Torah of Abraham, so too would it be proper that there be a Torah other than Moses', different from his Torah. And when we examine the Torah of Moses, we find in it the Torah of Abraham in truth, but Moses added commandments and the Sabbath, due to innovations that arose among his people, like one who is saved on a particular day and vows to fast on that day perpetually. And when this is deemed fitting by him on his own accord, it is also deemed fitting that his Creator should command him. And if this addition is abrogation, then whoever volunteers in prayer, or in fasting, or in charity, has already abrogated his Torah. And if the Author of the Torah permitted him this, He has already permitted him to abrogate his Torah. And the consequences for his initial assertions are similar to this. And all of these, may God have mercy on you! are trivialities, none of which stand up to scrutiny.