ה֛וֹי מֹשְׁכֵ֥י הֶֽעָוֺ֖ן בְּחַבְלֵ֣י הַשָּׁ֑וְא וְכַעֲב֥וֹת הָעֲגָלָ֖ה חַטָּאָֽה׃
Celakalah mereka yang menarik kesalahan dengan tali-tali kesia-siaan, dan menarik dosa seperti dengan tambang kereta!
Pat Lechem
their outlook is confused, what they see as good is bad and vice versa, as in "Woe unto them that call evil good, and good evil; that change darkness into light, and light into darkness" Yeshaya 5:18).
Rav Hirsch
Suchen wir die Bedeutung der Wurzel אפד, so stellt sich uns zunächst die Lautverwandtschaft mit אות ,אוד ,עבד ,עבת dar. Wie עבד ,אות ,אוד, die mechanische, geistige und soziale Vermittlung eines Zweckes bedeuten, so ist auch עבת vorwiegend kein beschränkendes, hemmendes Bindemittel, sondern ein die Dienstbarmachung der Kräfte für einen Zweck bewirkendes Sammeln und Binden derselben. So: קצץ עבות רשעים (Ps. 129, 4), עבות העגלה (Jes. 5, 18), חלם עבתות (Job 39, 10), עבתות (Hosea 11, 4). Und so scheint auch אפד, das Zusammennehmen der Kräfte in den Dienst eines Höhern zu bedeuten und auszudrücken, sowie das Gegürtetsein überhaupt: bereit sein für eine Tätigkeit anzeigt. אפד ist somit innig verwandt mit עבד und das Tragen eines אפד ist der sprechendste Ausdruck für einen עבד לעבוד עבודה, für einen zur עבודה Gegürteten. Daher שאת אפד לפני ד׳ identisch mit Priestersein vor Gott (Sam. I. 2, 28). Daher sich Gott als Diener darstellen durch das Tragen eines אפד ausgedrückt ward (Sam. I. 2, 18; Sam. II. 6, 14). Daher, während der hier angeordnete leinen-wollen-goldene Ephod zur Kleidung des Hohepriesters beim "Dienste" gehörte, die Priester überhaupt wohl außer dem Dienste, ebenso wie in den zuletzt zitierten Stellen Samuel und David, einen leinenen Ephod trugen (Sam. I. 22, 18).
Tosafot Yom Tov
AND POINTLESS OATHS [Heb. shvuat shav]. Rav writes in his second explanation: the tanna calls a false oath a pointless oath. This is based on the Talmud, Shevuot 20b, where Rav Dimi says in the name of R. Yochanan that a pointless oath is when one swears that he has eaten or not eaten, and the opposite is true. Rashi ad loc. explains: shav here means “nothing”, as in the verses “cords of nothingness [Heb. chavlei shav]” (Isaiah 5:10) and “I have struck your children for nothing [Heb. leshav]” (Jeremiah 2:30); in this instance, as well, the oath has left his mouth for nothing. The souce for the prohibition is “Do not mention the name of Hashem, your G-d, in vain [Heb. leshav]” (Exodus 20:7).
I first wondered at this, because the mishna in Shevuot 3:8 asks “What is an oath of shav?” and does not list the case of one who makes an oath about past events. We can answer this as follows. The Talmud there says that Ravin disagrees with Rav Dimi and calls the oath of “I have eaten/I haven’t eaten” a false oath [*see my comments on Temurah 1:1, s.v. sofeg], while a pointless oath is one that involves an obviously false claim, such as “this is a woman” of a man. He holds that one who makes a false oath receives lashes, and the Talmud traces the source for this to the double use of the word shav in the verse in Exodus 20:7: one shav indicates that a pointless oath incurs lashes; the second shav, which now seems unnecessary, indicates that even a false oath incurs lashes. How, the Talmud asks, does Ravin know that a false oath is about a past event? It answers that, since the Torah clearly compares the false oath to the pointless oath, it is reasonable to assume that just as the pointless oath concerns a past event, a false oath concerns a past event. Rashi ad loc. explains that a pointless oath is about a “past event” because it makes a claim that is obviously false, as opposed to an oath about doing or not doing something in the future.
We can similarly say that Rav Dimi would agree that any oath about a past event would follow logically from the classic case of a pointless oath, which is making an obviously false claim. Because the term “pointless oath” refers most directly to an oath claiming the opposite of what is well-known, the mishna defines a pointless oath as “making an oath claiming the opposite of something well-known,” but indeed, any false oath concerning a past event would be included in this.
[*But there is a simpler approach. The Talmud says there (Shevuot 21b) that one who makes the oath “I have/haven’t eaten” is obligated to bring a sacrifice of atonement, whereas the abovementioned mishna says that one who makes a pointless oath is not obligated to bring a sacrifice. For this reason, the end of that same mishna says “this is the ‘pointless oath’ which one who makes intentionally must receive lashes for, but for which one who makes it unintentionally need not bring a sacrifice,” and the Talmud says that “this” means to exclude the case of “I have/haven’t eaten” which would require a sacrifice, as I wrote on that mishna (Shevuot 3:8, s.v. zo hi). Now even though the Talmud was in the middle of defending Ravin’s position, it is clear that even Rav Dimi agrees to this detail, as the Talmud says in Shevuot at the beginning of page 21a that Rav Dimi holds that swearing “I have/haven’t eaten” falsely would obligate one to bring a sacrifice.153This is why that mishna could not include the case of swearing about a past event in the “pointless oath”, even though it actually is—the mishna means to list those pointless oaths that would not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, and a false oath about a past event, even though it is included in the category of pointless oaths, does obligate one to bring a sacrifice.]
Midrash Shmuel writes in the name of R. Yosef ibn Shoshan that our mishna mentions pointless oaths and not false oaths because even when the law requires an oath and the one swearing is telling the truth, such an oath is considered a pointless oath as far as the litigant is concerned because he knows what is true, and making a true oath of something that is already known is called a pointless oath. If so, our mishna would be following the opinion of those who argue with Rav Dimi and hold that “I have/haven’t eaten” goes in the category of false oaths, which are forbidden by “do not swear falsely in My name” (Leviticus 19:12).154According to Midrash Shmuel, the mishna's warning is not that involvement in court cases will cause one to swear falsely. It is rather that even the legitimate oaths one makes in court have a dimension of pointlessness to them, and so our mishna is discussing piously refraining even from legitimate oaths as opposed to refraining from truly transgressing any prohibitions. If so, shav refers exclusively to these somewhat “pointless” oaths and not to any truly problematic ones, and cannot include false oaths. As such, it cannot be following the opinion of Rav Dimi, according to whom the word shav includes false oaths about past events; it must be following the opinion of those who argue and hold that the word shav simply means “pointless”, and can therefore be borrowed to describe these somewhat pointless oaths. Rambam follows this opinion in Hilchot Shevuot 1:3. Cf. Rav’s commentary on on 5:9.
I first wondered at this, because the mishna in Shevuot 3:8 asks “What is an oath of shav?” and does not list the case of one who makes an oath about past events. We can answer this as follows. The Talmud there says that Ravin disagrees with Rav Dimi and calls the oath of “I have eaten/I haven’t eaten” a false oath [*see my comments on Temurah 1:1, s.v. sofeg], while a pointless oath is one that involves an obviously false claim, such as “this is a woman” of a man. He holds that one who makes a false oath receives lashes, and the Talmud traces the source for this to the double use of the word shav in the verse in Exodus 20:7: one shav indicates that a pointless oath incurs lashes; the second shav, which now seems unnecessary, indicates that even a false oath incurs lashes. How, the Talmud asks, does Ravin know that a false oath is about a past event? It answers that, since the Torah clearly compares the false oath to the pointless oath, it is reasonable to assume that just as the pointless oath concerns a past event, a false oath concerns a past event. Rashi ad loc. explains that a pointless oath is about a “past event” because it makes a claim that is obviously false, as opposed to an oath about doing or not doing something in the future.
We can similarly say that Rav Dimi would agree that any oath about a past event would follow logically from the classic case of a pointless oath, which is making an obviously false claim. Because the term “pointless oath” refers most directly to an oath claiming the opposite of what is well-known, the mishna defines a pointless oath as “making an oath claiming the opposite of something well-known,” but indeed, any false oath concerning a past event would be included in this.
[*But there is a simpler approach. The Talmud says there (Shevuot 21b) that one who makes the oath “I have/haven’t eaten” is obligated to bring a sacrifice of atonement, whereas the abovementioned mishna says that one who makes a pointless oath is not obligated to bring a sacrifice. For this reason, the end of that same mishna says “this is the ‘pointless oath’ which one who makes intentionally must receive lashes for, but for which one who makes it unintentionally need not bring a sacrifice,” and the Talmud says that “this” means to exclude the case of “I have/haven’t eaten” which would require a sacrifice, as I wrote on that mishna (Shevuot 3:8, s.v. zo hi). Now even though the Talmud was in the middle of defending Ravin’s position, it is clear that even Rav Dimi agrees to this detail, as the Talmud says in Shevuot at the beginning of page 21a that Rav Dimi holds that swearing “I have/haven’t eaten” falsely would obligate one to bring a sacrifice.153This is why that mishna could not include the case of swearing about a past event in the “pointless oath”, even though it actually is—the mishna means to list those pointless oaths that would not obligate one to bring a sacrifice, and a false oath about a past event, even though it is included in the category of pointless oaths, does obligate one to bring a sacrifice.]
Midrash Shmuel writes in the name of R. Yosef ibn Shoshan that our mishna mentions pointless oaths and not false oaths because even when the law requires an oath and the one swearing is telling the truth, such an oath is considered a pointless oath as far as the litigant is concerned because he knows what is true, and making a true oath of something that is already known is called a pointless oath. If so, our mishna would be following the opinion of those who argue with Rav Dimi and hold that “I have/haven’t eaten” goes in the category of false oaths, which are forbidden by “do not swear falsely in My name” (Leviticus 19:12).154According to Midrash Shmuel, the mishna's warning is not that involvement in court cases will cause one to swear falsely. It is rather that even the legitimate oaths one makes in court have a dimension of pointlessness to them, and so our mishna is discussing piously refraining even from legitimate oaths as opposed to refraining from truly transgressing any prohibitions. If so, shav refers exclusively to these somewhat “pointless” oaths and not to any truly problematic ones, and cannot include false oaths. As such, it cannot be following the opinion of Rav Dimi, according to whom the word shav includes false oaths about past events; it must be following the opinion of those who argue and hold that the word shav simply means “pointless”, and can therefore be borrowed to describe these somewhat pointless oaths. Rambam follows this opinion in Hilchot Shevuot 1:3. Cf. Rav’s commentary on on 5:9.