Halakhah su Deuteronomio 13:76
Arukh HaShulchan
And we have been commanded to walk along G-d's path of goodness and righteousness, as the verse says, "you should travel in His ways" (Deut. 26:13). Furthermore it says, "After Hashem your G-d you shall go" (Deut. 13:5). And furthermore it says, "'to travel in all of His ways' (Deut 10:12)- just as He is gracious, you shall also be gracious. Just as he is merciful, you shall also be merciful" (a similar idea appears on Sotah 14b)". And [we are commanded] to emulate His positive actions and positive righteous traits to the best of our ability. It is a positive commandment to be attached to wise men and their students in order to learn from their actions as the verse says, "and to him you shall be devoted" (Deut. 13:5). Is it possible for one to be attached to the Sechinah (divine presence) if it is a consuming fire (Deut. 4:24)? Rather, to be attached to the wise men and their students (Ketuvos 111b), to spread dirt before their feet and to drink their knowledge with thirst, as the verse says, "he who goes with the wise will become wise" (Proverbs 13:20). And furthermore it says, " the praises of a man are that he did not follow the counsel of the wicked" (Psalms 1:1).
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That is that we are commanded to serve Him. And this command is repeated several times: His saying, "And you shall serve the Lord, your God" (Exodus 23:25); and His saying, "and you shall serve Him" (Deuteronomy 13:5). And although this command is from the inclusive commands - as we explained in Principle Four (Sefer HaMitzvot, Shorashim 4) - it nevertheless has specificity, since it is the command to pray. The language of the Sifrei is, "'And to serve Him' (Deuteronomy 11:13) - that is prayer." And they also said, "'And to serve Him' - that is [Torah] study." And in the Mishnah of Rabbi Eliezer, the son of Rabbi Yose HaGelili, they said, "From where [do we know that] the essence of prayer is a commandment? From here - 'You shall fear the Lord, your God, and you shall serve Him' (Deuteronomy 6:13)." And they said, "Serve Him through His Torah; serve Him in His Temple." This means, direct [yourself] towards it, to pray [towards] there, as Shlomo, peace be upon him, explained. (See Parashat Mishpatim: Mishneh Torah, Prayer and the Priestly Blessing 1.)
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Gray Matter IV
Rav Moshe goes even further, asserting that extending such an invitation not only violates Lifnei Iveir, but also constitutes violating a more serious sin, namely, meisit, convincing someone to sin (Devarim 13:7-12), which in certain circumstances constitutes a capital crime. Rav Moshe proves that meisit applies beyond cases of influencing someone to worship avodah zarah (idolatry), the case given in the Torah, from the Gemara (Sanhedrin 29a) that classifies the snake of the Garden of Eden (Breishit 3) as a meisit. The snake never attempted to convince anyone to worship avodah zarah; it “merely” convinced Chavah to violate Hashem’s command not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge. Rav Moshe notes that even though convincing someone to violate a prohibition other than avodah zarah does not constitute a capital crime, it nevertheless is a very severe prohibition, to the extent that the heavenly court will not muster a defense for such action on one’s Day of Judgment, just as Hashem did not suggest a defense for the snake of the Garden of Eden (Sanhedrin 29a).
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Gray Matter II
Rashi (Bereishit 1:1) notes that God’s name “Elokim” appears alone in the first chapter of Bereishit, whereas the tetragrammaton (“YKVK”) appears next to “Elokim” in the second chapter. Rashi explains that God intended to create the world “with strict justice” (midat hadin, the attribute associated with “Elokim”), but when He saw that the world could not exist this way, He presented “the Divine attribute of mercy” (midat harachamim, the attribute associated with the tetragrammaton) and coupled it with midat hadin. We are obligated by the verse “Vehalachta bidrachav” (Devarim 13:5 and 28:9; see Sotah 14a) to follow in His footsteps, so must therefore combine our own sense of rigid justice with our sense of compassion. Indeed, the Rambam (Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah 5:11) writes that a Torah scholar should always act lifnim mishurat hadin. If we follow only strict law, the world cannot exist.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol IV
In the immediately following responsum, Iggerot Mosheh, Oraḥ Hayyim, I, no. 99, a responsum actually authored some two years prior to the preceding responsum, Rabbi Feinstein offers somewhat broader guidance. The question posed to him is whether it is permissible to invite people to attend synagogue services when it is known that they will travel by automobile in order to do so. He responds by ruling that it is forbidden to extend such invitations to people living at a distance from which it is impossible to come by foot on the grounds that the invitation constitutes a forbidden act of "placing a stumbling block before the blind" that is prohibited on the basis of Leviticus 19:14. He further advances a novel thesis in declaring that an invitation of such nature entails an additional transgression in the form of "enticement" (meisit). Deuteronomy 13:7-12 establishes successful enticement to commit an act of idolatry as a capital transgression. Citing the statement of the Gemara, Sanhedrin 29a, declaring the serpent that tempted Eve to partake of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge as having had the status of an "enticer," Rabbi Feinstein argues that enticement to commit any infraction constitutes a distinct sin, although only enticement to idolatry constitutes a capital transgression.2Iggerot Mosheh’s assertion that the prohibition against “enticement” is not limited to idolatry is not found in earlier sources and is directly contradicted by R. Meir Dan Plocki, Klei Ḥemdah, Parashat Re’eh, sec. 4. The serpent’s declaration, “You shall be as God, knowing good and evil” (Genesis 3:5), constituted enticement to deny a fundamental principle of faith. Denial of fundamental principles of faith constitutes heresy which, in turn, is tantamount to idolatry in other areas of Jewish law as well, as shown in this writer’s “Be-Bi’ur Shitat ha-Rambam be-Sheḥitat Akum u-Mumar,” Bet Yiẓḥak, XX (1989), 279-284.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited us from preaching for an idol, and [for one] to call people to serve it and to make them enthused about it - and even if the preacher does not do any of the actions [of idolatry] besides preaching about it. And if he was preaching for it to the people, he is called, a instigator (mediach). And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "Ruffians appeared [... and instigated]" (Deuteronomy 13:14). But if he preached to an individual, he is called, an inciter (mesit). And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "If your brother, your mother’s son, incites you" (Deuteronomy 13:7). However in this commandment, we are only speaking about the instigator. And the prohibition that appears about this is His, may He be blessed, saying, "shall not be heard in your mouth" (Exodus 23:13). [And in the Gemara, Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 63b), they said, "'Shall not be heard in your mouth' -] that is the prohibition for the inciter. The inciter? It is written explicitly about him, 'And all of Israel will hear and see, and they will not continue to do' (Deuteronomy 13:12)! Rather it is a prohibition for the instigator." And likewise did they say in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta DeRabbi Shimon Bar Yochai 23:13), "'Shall not be heard in your mouth' - that is the prohibition for the instigator." And one who transgressed this negative commandment is liable for stoning. And the laws of this commandment have already been explained in the tenth [chapter] of Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 4.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited us from preaching for an idol, and [for one] to call people to serve it and to make them enthused about it - and even if the preacher does not do any of the actions [of idolatry] besides preaching about it. And if he was preaching for it to the people, he is called, a instigator (mediach). And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "Ruffians appeared [... and instigated]" (Deuteronomy 13:14). But if he preached to an individual, he is called, an inciter (mesit). And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "If your brother, your mother’s son, incites you" (Deuteronomy 13:7). However in this commandment, we are only speaking about the instigator. And the prohibition that appears about this is His, may He be blessed, saying, "shall not be heard in your mouth" (Exodus 23:13). [And in the Gemara, Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 63b), they said, "'Shall not be heard in your mouth' -] that is the prohibition for the inciter. The inciter? It is written explicitly about him, 'And all of Israel will hear and see, and they will not continue to do' (Deuteronomy 13:12)! Rather it is a prohibition for the instigator." And likewise did they say in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta DeRabbi Shimon Bar Yochai 23:13), "'Shall not be heard in your mouth' - that is the prohibition for the instigator." And one who transgressed this negative commandment is liable for stoning. And the laws of this commandment have already been explained in the tenth [chapter] of Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 4.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited us from preaching for an idol, and [for one] to call people to serve it and to make them enthused about it - and even if the preacher does not do any of the actions [of idolatry] besides preaching about it. And if he was preaching for it to the people, he is called, a instigator (mediach). And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "Ruffians appeared [... and instigated]" (Deuteronomy 13:14). But if he preached to an individual, he is called, an inciter (mesit). And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "If your brother, your mother’s son, incites you" (Deuteronomy 13:7). However in this commandment, we are only speaking about the instigator. And the prohibition that appears about this is His, may He be blessed, saying, "shall not be heard in your mouth" (Exodus 23:13). [And in the Gemara, Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 63b), they said, "'Shall not be heard in your mouth' -] that is the prohibition for the inciter. The inciter? It is written explicitly about him, 'And all of Israel will hear and see, and they will not continue to do' (Deuteronomy 13:12)! Rather it is a prohibition for the instigator." And likewise did they say in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta DeRabbi Shimon Bar Yochai 23:13), "'Shall not be heard in your mouth' - that is the prohibition for the instigator." And one who transgressed this negative commandment is liable for stoning. And the laws of this commandment have already been explained in the tenth [chapter] of Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 4.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited us from inciting. And that is that one preach to an individual Jew to worship an idol. And this is called an inciter (mesit), as was previously explained. And the language of the prohibition of this is, "and they will not continue to do like this evil thing" (Deuteronomy 13:12). And one who transgressed this negative commandment is liable for stoning, as appears in the verse, "But rather surely kill him" (Deuteronomy 13:10). And the person that the inciter is trying to incite is the appropriate [one] to kill him - as He, may He be exalted, explains, "let your hand be the first against him." And the language of the Sifrei is, "This commandment is with the hand of the incited." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 5.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited us from inciting. And that is that one preach to an individual Jew to worship an idol. And this is called an inciter (mesit), as was previously explained. And the language of the prohibition of this is, "and they will not continue to do like this evil thing" (Deuteronomy 13:12). And one who transgressed this negative commandment is liable for stoning, as appears in the verse, "But rather surely kill him" (Deuteronomy 13:10). And the person that the inciter is trying to incite is the appropriate [one] to kill him - as He, may He be exalted, explains, "let your hand be the first against him." And the language of the Sifrei is, "This commandment is with the hand of the incited." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 5.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited an incited one from arguing the merit of the inciter. Even if he [knows of] a merit for him, it is not permitted for him to mention it and argue [it]. And that is His, may He be blessed, saying, "nor have compassion on him" (Deuteronomy 13:9). And it appears in the explanation (Sifrei Devarim 89:4), "[It means,] do not argue in his merit." (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 5.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited an incited one from being silent about something incriminating that he knows about the inciter that will bring about the punishment upon him. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "and you may not shield him" (Deuteronomy 13:9). And it appears in the explanation (Sifrei Devarim 89:4), "'And you may not shield him' - if you know something incriminating about him, you are not allowed to remain silent." (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 5.)
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Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited us - that we not benefit from, or at all hold on to, wealth from a condemned city. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "And let nothing that has been doomed stick to your hand" (Deuteronomy 13:18). And anyone who has taken anything from it is liable for lashes. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the tenth [chapter] of Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Re'eh; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 4.)
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol V
However, Hokhmat Adam 36:1,13Cf., however, R. Pinchas Eliyahu Eisenthal, Ha-Maḥaneh ha-Ḥaredi, 25 Adar 5764, p. 38, who interprets Ḥokhmat Adam’s comment as referring only to the question of ḥelev of a ḥayyah in conformity with Pri Megadim’s understanding of Shakh, i.e., as ruling that a mesorah is required only to establish that the animal is a ḥayyah rather than a behemah for purposes of permitting consumption of its ḥelev. Arukh ha-Shulḥan, Yoreh De'ah 80:10, and Hazon Ish, as well as Erekh ha-Shulḥan, Yoreh De'ah 80:10 and 82:29, understand Shakh as declaring that all animals are similar to birds in that no species may be accepted as kosher in the absence of a tradition confirming its status.14Rabbi Ari Z. Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals: The Buffalo,” Journal of Halacha and Contemporary Society, no. 38 (Fall, 1999), cogently draws attention to the fact that the status of the buffalo is also problematic. This may appear odd to students of Yoreh De‘ah since, basing himself on much earlier authority, Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De‘ah 28:4, identifies the buffalo as a kosher species. Rema agrees but, unlike Shulḥan Arukh who classifies the animal as a behemah, Rema declares that it is doubtful whether its status is that of a behemah or of a ḥayyah. That reference, however, is not to the American buffalo but to a different animal, probably the Asian water buffalo which was introduced to Europe at an early date, but possibly the European bison or, less likely, the African buffalo. The animal referred to in this country as a “buffalo” is not really a buffalo but a unique species of bison. The American bison is indigenous to North America and hence was unknown to the author of Shulḥan Arukh and certainly could not have been known to the much earlier authors upon whom Shulḥan Arukh relies. Since the animal is indigenous to the New World it is obvious that there exists no tradition with regard to its status as a kosher animal. The fact that sale of the meat of the American bison was sanctioned some years ago by a number of kashrut supervising agencies does not necessarily indicate reliance upon the position of Pri Megadim. It may signify nothing more than the understandable, albeit erroneous, assumption that the animal is identical to the “buffalo” expressly sanctioned by Shulḥan Arukh. Moreover, even Ḥazon Ish did not unequivocally brand the “Indian ox” or zebu as unacceptable but indicated that the ultimate determination must rest upon the extent of its similarity to more common cattle. Although halakhic categories and scientific classifications are by no means coextensive or even overlapping, the American buffalo is scientifically classified either as a member of the same genus as true cattle or together with the European bison. The matter can be resolved only by a comparison of the physical characteristics of the American bison with those of the cow or, assuming there is a tradition with regard to its status as a kosher animal, the European bison.
Cf., R. Israel Belsky, Mesorah, no. 20 (Adar 5764), who writes that Ḥazon Ish would have permitted the American bison because it should be considered to be an “ox.” That allegation is entirely unfounded. Zebu, forbidden by Ḥazon Ish are far more similar to cattle, both zoologically and in terms of gross appearance, than are bison. Cf., Halacha Berurah, published by Zeirei Agudath Israel, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 3 and p. 4, note 24, in which R. Belsky himself acknowledges that the American bison is not permissible according to Ḥazon Ish.
Parenthetically, the Gemara, Bekhorot 7a, states that a ḥayyah and a behemah cannot mate and produce progeny. Accordingly, the phenomenon of the “beefalo,” a cross between a buffalo and a cow whose meat is commercially available, should demonstrate that the American buffalo is a behemah rather than a ḥayyah. There appears to be no available information with regard to whether any of the other species of buffalo to which Rema may have referred can be crossbred with cattle. Hazon Ish professes that "it is not incumbent upon us to seek reasons" for this stringency15R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik, author of Bet ha-Levi, is quoted in Netivot Rabboteinu le-Bet ha-Levi Brisk, II (Jerusalem, 5763), 102, as stating, “for without a ‘masoret’ it is impossible to permit an ox, even if all the known characteristics are present, with the argument that it is the ox of which the Torah speaks.” The statement was made in the context of identification of the ḥilazon. Bet ha-Levi cites the verse, “Ask your father and he will tell you, your elders (zekenekha) and they will say to you” (Deuteronomy 32:7) and explains the apparent redundancy in the two clauses as follows: The term “zekenekha,” generally rendered as “elders,” also means “wise men.” In this instance it clearly has the latter meaning, i.e., the “wise men” are charged with responding to questions of Halakhah. The first clause, however, speaks of questions addressed to a father who must transmit the answer. The subject of that question addressed to fathers rather than Torah scholars, declares Bet ha-Levi, is empirical in nature, i.e., a matter of fact (meẓi’ut) upon which Halakhah is predicated that must be transmitted by means of a tradition passed down from generation to generation. but that it probably arose in order to prevent error with regard to identification of an unfamiliar species as a ḥayyah or as a behemah and consequent inadvertent transgression with regard to ḥelev or covering the blood. Hazon Ish also asserts that it serves to prevent transgression with regard to the prohibition of treifot that is attendant upon certain anatomical anomalies.16Thus, on the basis of the reasons for the prohibition spelled out by Ḥazon Ish, the fact that the zebu can hybridize with cattle is entirely irrelevant. Rabbi Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals,” pp. 126–127, seems to have missed this point. Cf., Halacha Berurah, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 3 and p. 4, note 27. Moreover, whether the basis of this halakhic position is fear of genetic mutation, possible treifut or some other consideration, it is clear that Shakh and those who follow his ruling declare that, in the absence of a mesorah, the biblical criteria of a kosher species, i.e., a split hoof and chewing of the cud, cannot be relied upon in establishing the kashrut of a species. If biblically prescribed criteria that tautologically define kosher species are for some reason unacceptable, a fortiori, a rabbinically recognized criterion that is merely emblematic of the presence of defining criteria cannot be acceptable. Thus it is not surprising that neither Shakh nor any authority following in his footsteps indicates that the hybridization phenomenon serves as a substitute for a mesorah. Nor, to my knowledge, is there any authority who accepts the hybridization phenomenon as a substitute for a mesorah with regard to birds.
In a letter to the editor published in Tradition, vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer, 2002), p. 108, Rabbi Zivitovsky claims that “… many authorities have been willing to rely on the hybridization principle to rule that a bird species is kosher even in the absence of a tradition (see the discussions in, e.g., Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De’a 74; Netsiv, Meshiv Davar, Yoreh De’a 22; Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De’a 1:75; Maharsham, Da’at Torah, Yoreh De’a 82:3). That being the case, it would seem that, kal va-ḥomer, the hybridization principle should govern in the case of animals, for whom the tradition requirement is less certain and generally considered a stringency of recent vintage.” Rabbi Zivitovsky reads into the first three sources that he cites much more than they contain. The fourth source, Da‘at Torah of the Maharsham, contains nothing of relevance to this discussion.
Each of the sources deals with problems associated with one or more species of wild duck or wild goose. Although accepted by Ẓemaḥ Ẓedek, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 60, as a member of the same species as the domestic duck or goose, the majority of rabbinic authorities of the day regarded the fowl under discussion as significantly different in its physical characteristics from the species recognized as kosher and, in the absence of a mesorah, refused to recognize the wild duck as kosher. [See, however, R. Yonatan Eybeschutz, Peleti 82:2 and Kereti 82:9, who refers to the bird as a “wild goose” and rules that it is a kosher species.]
Some ducklings of that species were permitted to mingle freely with domestic ducks. The question posed to Ḥatam Sofer was whether future born ducklings born to female domestic ducks were to be regarded as kosher since the fathers may well have been members of unacceptable species of wild duck, Ḥatam Sofer permitted those offspring on the basis of a combination of a number of considerations: 1) Ẓemah Ẓedek ruled that the wild duck was a permitted bird; 2) the ducklings had the physical characteristics of the mother duck, indicating that the father was probably of the same species; 3) the majority of male ducks having access to the females were of the kosher species; and 4) whether or not paternal status could render the offspring non-kosher (ḥosheshin le-zera ha-av) is itself a matter of halakhic doubt. For purposes of the present discussion, the crucial point is that Ẓatam Sofer did not rule that successful hybridization served to confirm Ẓemah Ẓedek’s ruling beyond cavil. Ḥatam Sofer regards the wild duck as a non-kosher bird despite the fact that it was capable of breeding with a kosher species. Indeed, Ḥatam Sofer explicitly affirms that hybridized progeny of that bird are also non-kosher; his lenient ruling is based in part upon the probability that the ducklings in question were not hybridized but sired by a kosher duck. Thus, Ḥatam Sofer clearly refuses to accept the hybridization principle as a substitute for the requisite mesorah.
Meshiv Davar addresses the status of an apparently different species of duck that had been accepted as kosher in some locales. His interlocutor points out that those ducks mate freely with species of duck accepted as kosher. Although Meshiv Davar accepts the species as kosher for a number of reasons, including the fact that it shows no preference whatsoever for its own species over partners from the domestic species, he explicitly rejects the hybridization principle as dispositive with the comment “… for we accept the wild duck as unclean [despite the fact that] it procreates from our duck.”
Rabbi Zivitovsky fails to cite Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 76, dealing with a particular species of duck or goose in which he notes that they breed with kosher species but nevertheless, without citing Bekhorot 7a, comments that, since the two species are housed together for breeding purposes, the fact that they mate does not establish the kashrut of the species. In the very next paragraph he then queries how any bird can be regarded as kosher since it may have a non-kosher progenitor and offers several resolutions to that problem. Quite obviously, Avnei Nezer does not accept the hybridization phenomenon as a substitute for a mesorah.
Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 75, discusses an apparently different species of duck. It seems that the only physical characteristic of the species in question that gave Avnei Nezer pause in issuing a permissive ruling was that, unlike other ducks, its quack was “hoarse.” Avnei Nezer points to the fact that the duck in question breeds with accepted duck species as indicating that they are truly the same species. In that responsum there is no evidence that he would have accepted the hybridization principle as independent validation of the kashrut of the bird in situations in which its physical characteristics were markedly different from an accepted species. Read together with the immediately following responsum, that conclusion is inescapable.
Parenthetically, Ḥatam Sofer and others express some reservation with regard to the applicability of the hybridization principle of Bekhorot 7a to birds. In context, the principle is formulated with regard to animals and hence its extension to birds is a matter of at least some doubt. Thus, logically, grounds for application of the principle to animals are stronger than for birds. However, methodologically, Rabbi Zivitovsky is quite correct. Since Shakh’s requirement of a mesorah to animals is simply an extension of the rule accepted with regard to birds, any alternative mode acceptable with regard to birds should therefore be acceptable with regard to animals as well.
However, since no authority accepts the hybridization phenomenon as an alternative to a mesorah with regard to birds, there is no evidence supporting its acceptability with regard to animals. In light of both Shakh’s failure to regard the hybridization phenomenon as an alternative to a mesorah and Ḥazon Ish’s formulation of the reasons underlying Shakh’s stringency which, as Rabbi Zivitovsky himself candidly concedes, apply with equal cogency in the presence of hybridization, there is simply no basis for concluding that, according to Shakh, hybridization is other than an irrelevant phenomenon. Those anomalies, he claims, particularly with regard to certain structures of the lung, are difficult to recognize in unfamiliar species.17Refraining from an act because of fear of actual transgression, even if such fear is unwarranted, or as a seyag or “fence” designed to prevent transgression in other instances does not involve transgression of “You shall not add thereto” (Deuteronomy 13:1). The statement to the effect that Rabbi Herzog suggested that those who require a tradition confirming the kashrut of an animal species are in violation of this commandment is misleading. See Rabbi Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals,” p. 126. Rabbi Herzog expresses doubt with regard to whether a “rebellious elder” (zaken mamre) who forbids the meat of such an animal, contra a formal ruling of the Great Sanhedrin, is in violation of the prohibition. Such an individual does not incur capital punishment for issuing a ruling of that nature since the matter cannot result in a transgression involving the penalty of excision (karet) on the part of any person who obeys his ruling. Rabbi Herzog expresses doubt with regard to whether, despite the absence of capital punishment, a person ruling in such a manner nevertheless violates the commandment “You shall not add thereto.” It may also be suggested that the consideration reflected in this practice is a fear that an unknown species may, in reality, be the product of genetic mutation of a progenitor that itself was a member of a non-kosher species. Progeny of non-kosher animals are non-kosher even if such progeny manifest all the indicia of kosher species.18For a fuller elucidation of this point see this writer’s “The Babirusa: A Kosher Pig?” Contemporary Halakhic Problems, III (New York: 1989), 66–67.
Cf., R. Israel Belsky, Mesorah, no. 20 (Adar 5764), who writes that Ḥazon Ish would have permitted the American bison because it should be considered to be an “ox.” That allegation is entirely unfounded. Zebu, forbidden by Ḥazon Ish are far more similar to cattle, both zoologically and in terms of gross appearance, than are bison. Cf., Halacha Berurah, published by Zeirei Agudath Israel, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 3 and p. 4, note 24, in which R. Belsky himself acknowledges that the American bison is not permissible according to Ḥazon Ish.
Parenthetically, the Gemara, Bekhorot 7a, states that a ḥayyah and a behemah cannot mate and produce progeny. Accordingly, the phenomenon of the “beefalo,” a cross between a buffalo and a cow whose meat is commercially available, should demonstrate that the American buffalo is a behemah rather than a ḥayyah. There appears to be no available information with regard to whether any of the other species of buffalo to which Rema may have referred can be crossbred with cattle. Hazon Ish professes that "it is not incumbent upon us to seek reasons" for this stringency15R. Joseph Ber Soloveitchik, author of Bet ha-Levi, is quoted in Netivot Rabboteinu le-Bet ha-Levi Brisk, II (Jerusalem, 5763), 102, as stating, “for without a ‘masoret’ it is impossible to permit an ox, even if all the known characteristics are present, with the argument that it is the ox of which the Torah speaks.” The statement was made in the context of identification of the ḥilazon. Bet ha-Levi cites the verse, “Ask your father and he will tell you, your elders (zekenekha) and they will say to you” (Deuteronomy 32:7) and explains the apparent redundancy in the two clauses as follows: The term “zekenekha,” generally rendered as “elders,” also means “wise men.” In this instance it clearly has the latter meaning, i.e., the “wise men” are charged with responding to questions of Halakhah. The first clause, however, speaks of questions addressed to a father who must transmit the answer. The subject of that question addressed to fathers rather than Torah scholars, declares Bet ha-Levi, is empirical in nature, i.e., a matter of fact (meẓi’ut) upon which Halakhah is predicated that must be transmitted by means of a tradition passed down from generation to generation. but that it probably arose in order to prevent error with regard to identification of an unfamiliar species as a ḥayyah or as a behemah and consequent inadvertent transgression with regard to ḥelev or covering the blood. Hazon Ish also asserts that it serves to prevent transgression with regard to the prohibition of treifot that is attendant upon certain anatomical anomalies.16Thus, on the basis of the reasons for the prohibition spelled out by Ḥazon Ish, the fact that the zebu can hybridize with cattle is entirely irrelevant. Rabbi Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals,” pp. 126–127, seems to have missed this point. Cf., Halacha Berurah, vol. 7, no. 3, p. 3 and p. 4, note 27. Moreover, whether the basis of this halakhic position is fear of genetic mutation, possible treifut or some other consideration, it is clear that Shakh and those who follow his ruling declare that, in the absence of a mesorah, the biblical criteria of a kosher species, i.e., a split hoof and chewing of the cud, cannot be relied upon in establishing the kashrut of a species. If biblically prescribed criteria that tautologically define kosher species are for some reason unacceptable, a fortiori, a rabbinically recognized criterion that is merely emblematic of the presence of defining criteria cannot be acceptable. Thus it is not surprising that neither Shakh nor any authority following in his footsteps indicates that the hybridization phenomenon serves as a substitute for a mesorah. Nor, to my knowledge, is there any authority who accepts the hybridization phenomenon as a substitute for a mesorah with regard to birds.
In a letter to the editor published in Tradition, vol. 36, no. 2 (Summer, 2002), p. 108, Rabbi Zivitovsky claims that “… many authorities have been willing to rely on the hybridization principle to rule that a bird species is kosher even in the absence of a tradition (see the discussions in, e.g., Ḥatam Sofer, Yoreh De’a 74; Netsiv, Meshiv Davar, Yoreh De’a 22; Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De’a 1:75; Maharsham, Da’at Torah, Yoreh De’a 82:3). That being the case, it would seem that, kal va-ḥomer, the hybridization principle should govern in the case of animals, for whom the tradition requirement is less certain and generally considered a stringency of recent vintage.” Rabbi Zivitovsky reads into the first three sources that he cites much more than they contain. The fourth source, Da‘at Torah of the Maharsham, contains nothing of relevance to this discussion.
Each of the sources deals with problems associated with one or more species of wild duck or wild goose. Although accepted by Ẓemaḥ Ẓedek, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 60, as a member of the same species as the domestic duck or goose, the majority of rabbinic authorities of the day regarded the fowl under discussion as significantly different in its physical characteristics from the species recognized as kosher and, in the absence of a mesorah, refused to recognize the wild duck as kosher. [See, however, R. Yonatan Eybeschutz, Peleti 82:2 and Kereti 82:9, who refers to the bird as a “wild goose” and rules that it is a kosher species.]
Some ducklings of that species were permitted to mingle freely with domestic ducks. The question posed to Ḥatam Sofer was whether future born ducklings born to female domestic ducks were to be regarded as kosher since the fathers may well have been members of unacceptable species of wild duck, Ḥatam Sofer permitted those offspring on the basis of a combination of a number of considerations: 1) Ẓemah Ẓedek ruled that the wild duck was a permitted bird; 2) the ducklings had the physical characteristics of the mother duck, indicating that the father was probably of the same species; 3) the majority of male ducks having access to the females were of the kosher species; and 4) whether or not paternal status could render the offspring non-kosher (ḥosheshin le-zera ha-av) is itself a matter of halakhic doubt. For purposes of the present discussion, the crucial point is that Ẓatam Sofer did not rule that successful hybridization served to confirm Ẓemah Ẓedek’s ruling beyond cavil. Ḥatam Sofer regards the wild duck as a non-kosher bird despite the fact that it was capable of breeding with a kosher species. Indeed, Ḥatam Sofer explicitly affirms that hybridized progeny of that bird are also non-kosher; his lenient ruling is based in part upon the probability that the ducklings in question were not hybridized but sired by a kosher duck. Thus, Ḥatam Sofer clearly refuses to accept the hybridization principle as a substitute for the requisite mesorah.
Meshiv Davar addresses the status of an apparently different species of duck that had been accepted as kosher in some locales. His interlocutor points out that those ducks mate freely with species of duck accepted as kosher. Although Meshiv Davar accepts the species as kosher for a number of reasons, including the fact that it shows no preference whatsoever for its own species over partners from the domestic species, he explicitly rejects the hybridization principle as dispositive with the comment “… for we accept the wild duck as unclean [despite the fact that] it procreates from our duck.”
Rabbi Zivitovsky fails to cite Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 76, dealing with a particular species of duck or goose in which he notes that they breed with kosher species but nevertheless, without citing Bekhorot 7a, comments that, since the two species are housed together for breeding purposes, the fact that they mate does not establish the kashrut of the species. In the very next paragraph he then queries how any bird can be regarded as kosher since it may have a non-kosher progenitor and offers several resolutions to that problem. Quite obviously, Avnei Nezer does not accept the hybridization phenomenon as a substitute for a mesorah.
Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, no. 75, discusses an apparently different species of duck. It seems that the only physical characteristic of the species in question that gave Avnei Nezer pause in issuing a permissive ruling was that, unlike other ducks, its quack was “hoarse.” Avnei Nezer points to the fact that the duck in question breeds with accepted duck species as indicating that they are truly the same species. In that responsum there is no evidence that he would have accepted the hybridization principle as independent validation of the kashrut of the bird in situations in which its physical characteristics were markedly different from an accepted species. Read together with the immediately following responsum, that conclusion is inescapable.
Parenthetically, Ḥatam Sofer and others express some reservation with regard to the applicability of the hybridization principle of Bekhorot 7a to birds. In context, the principle is formulated with regard to animals and hence its extension to birds is a matter of at least some doubt. Thus, logically, grounds for application of the principle to animals are stronger than for birds. However, methodologically, Rabbi Zivitovsky is quite correct. Since Shakh’s requirement of a mesorah to animals is simply an extension of the rule accepted with regard to birds, any alternative mode acceptable with regard to birds should therefore be acceptable with regard to animals as well.
However, since no authority accepts the hybridization phenomenon as an alternative to a mesorah with regard to birds, there is no evidence supporting its acceptability with regard to animals. In light of both Shakh’s failure to regard the hybridization phenomenon as an alternative to a mesorah and Ḥazon Ish’s formulation of the reasons underlying Shakh’s stringency which, as Rabbi Zivitovsky himself candidly concedes, apply with equal cogency in the presence of hybridization, there is simply no basis for concluding that, according to Shakh, hybridization is other than an irrelevant phenomenon. Those anomalies, he claims, particularly with regard to certain structures of the lung, are difficult to recognize in unfamiliar species.17Refraining from an act because of fear of actual transgression, even if such fear is unwarranted, or as a seyag or “fence” designed to prevent transgression in other instances does not involve transgression of “You shall not add thereto” (Deuteronomy 13:1). The statement to the effect that Rabbi Herzog suggested that those who require a tradition confirming the kashrut of an animal species are in violation of this commandment is misleading. See Rabbi Zivotofsky, “Kashrut of Exotic Animals,” p. 126. Rabbi Herzog expresses doubt with regard to whether a “rebellious elder” (zaken mamre) who forbids the meat of such an animal, contra a formal ruling of the Great Sanhedrin, is in violation of the prohibition. Such an individual does not incur capital punishment for issuing a ruling of that nature since the matter cannot result in a transgression involving the penalty of excision (karet) on the part of any person who obeys his ruling. Rabbi Herzog expresses doubt with regard to whether, despite the absence of capital punishment, a person ruling in such a manner nevertheless violates the commandment “You shall not add thereto.” It may also be suggested that the consideration reflected in this practice is a fear that an unknown species may, in reality, be the product of genetic mutation of a progenitor that itself was a member of a non-kosher species. Progeny of non-kosher animals are non-kosher even if such progeny manifest all the indicia of kosher species.18For a fuller elucidation of this point see this writer’s “The Babirusa: A Kosher Pig?” Contemporary Halakhic Problems, III (New York: 1989), 66–67.
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Kitzur Shulchan Arukh
It is a positive commandment to give charity to poor Jewish people, as it is said "Open your hand to him."1Deuteronomy 15:8. And it is said: "That your brother may live with you."2Leviticus 25:36. Anyone who sees a poor person seeking help and ignores him, and does not give him charity, transgresses a prohibitive commandment, as it is said: "Do not harden your heart nor shut your hand from your brother in need."3Numbers 15:7. [Giving] charity is a characteristic of the descendants of Abraham, as it is said: "For I have a special love for him because he commands his children and his household after him [to preserve the way of Hashem] doing charity and justice."4Genesis 18:19. And the throne of Israel will be established and the religion of truth confirmed only through charity, as it is said: "Through charity will you be reestablished."5Isaiah 54:14. Greater is he who performs acts of charity than [one who brings] all the sacrifices, as it is said: "Performing acts of charity and justice is more desirable to Hashem than sacrifices."6Proverbs 21:3. The Jewish people will be redeemed only through [the merit of] charity, as it is said: "Zion will be redeemed through justice and its captives through acts of charity."7Isaiah 1:27. A person never becomes poor through giving charity, nor will any evil or harm befall him because of his giving charity, as it is said: Through acts of charity, there will be peace."8Isaiah 32:17. Whoever is merciful with others will be treated with mercy [from Heaven], as it is said: "He [God] will show you mercy; and have compassion upon you and multiply you."9Deuteronomy 13:18. Anyone who is cruel, causes his lineage to be suspect.10The descendants of Abraham are known for their kindness and generosity. One who does not possess this attitude causes his lineage to be doubtful. The Holy One blessed is He, is near to the cry of the poor, as it is said: "He will hear the cry of the poor."11Job 34:28. Therefore one must beware of their anguished cry, for a covenant was made with them, as it is said: "When he cries out to me I will listen, for I am compassionate."12Exodus 22:26. The Jerusalem Talmud says: The door that doesn't open for the poor will open for the doctor. A person should consider, that he continually requests his sustenance from the Holy One blessed is He; and just as he requests that the Holy One blessed is He, listen to his cry and prayer, so should he listen to the cry of the poor. A person should also consider that [fortune] is a wheel that revolves in the world, and in the end he or his children or his children's children might [have to] accept charity. Let no man think: "Why should I diminish my wealth by giving it to the poor?" For he should know that the money is not his, but rather [it was given to him as] a trust, with which to do the will of the One Who entrusted the funds to him. And this [charity giving] will be his real share from all his toils in this world, As it is written:13Isaiah 58:8. "Your acts of charity shall preceed you [into the World to Come]. Charity voids evil decrees and prolongs life.
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Sefer HaMitzvot
He prohibited us from wearing a garment woven of wool and linen, like that which would be worn by the idolatrous priests at that time. And that is His saying, "You shall not wear shatnez" (Deuteronomy 13:18). And this [practice] is famous today among the idolatrous priests in Egypt. And one who transgresses this negative commandment is liable for lashes. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Tractate Kilayim, Shabbat, Sotah and Makkot. (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 10.)
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Sefer HaChinukh
From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Avodah Zarah 51b) that every thing from which they made a gift to idol worship is forbidden, even water and salt - meaning to say that even though water and salt are lesser things and it is possible to say about them that they are not for a gift and that they did not place them in front of idols for the sake of [its] glory at all - nonetheless, it is forbidden. And for great distancing, they, may their memory be blessed, also forbade (Avodah Zarah 29b) all wine of a gentile, even though we do not know that he used it as an idolatrous libation. And this is called their undifferentiated wine (stam yeinam). However, they, may their memory be blessed, distinguished (Avodah Zarah 74a) between known libations and their undifferentiated wine - as the prohibition of the known is [prohibited] by Torah writ for the smallest amount. And we administer lashes for it, as it is written (Deuteronomy 13:18), "Nothing is to cling to your hand from the anathema." But with the prohibition of their undifferentiated wines, which is only rabbinic, the [punishment] for its drinking is only lashes of rebellion for one who drinks a revi’it of it. But it does not [carry] lashes of rebellion for less than a revi’it. And nonetheless even the smallest amount is rabbinically forbidden to benefit from. And regarding other things in the world besides wine, they, may their memory be blessed, were not stringent to forbid everything found in their hand undifferentiated - out of the concern for sacrifices to idol worship or the concern [that it is] itself idolatry, besides with things that are [specifically] made for it; for example, that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Avodah Zarah 41a) regarding idols, that undifferentiated idols are made for idol worship. And therefore, they forbade them. And even one who finds them discarded is not allowed to take them without well-known conditions, as they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Avodah Zarah 41a). And so [too,] is it certainly with anything that an Israelite thinks was made as a sacrifice - that it is forbidden to take of them.
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Sefer HaChinukh
And this warning (prohibition) is practiced in every place and at all times by males and females. And one who transgresses it and eats the smallest amount - or drinks even a drop of true wine libation - is lashed. As the law of these things is not like the law of other laws of prohibited foods, which are with a kazayit, and the law of drinking [which] is with a reviit; since the Torah warned about idolatry and stated (Deuteronomy 13:18), "Nothing is to cling to your hand from the anathema" - meaning to say even the smallest amount.
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Sefer HaChinukh
In this prevention of wine libations, both Rambam (in Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 194), may his memory be blessed, and Ramban (in his gloss to the Sefer HaMitzvot), may his memory be blessed, conceded that there is a negative commandment in this and that it is counted in the tally of the negative commandments. However they did disagree about it in the [following] matter: that Rambam extracts the prohibition of wine libations from the verse that is written in Parshat Haazinu (Deuteronomy 32:38), "drank the wine of their libations"; and the prohibition of other gifts to idolatry from, "Nothing is to cling to your hand from the anathema"(Deuteronomy 13:18) and from "You shall not bring an abomination" (Deuteronomy 7:26); [whereas] Ramban, may his memory be blessed, wrote that we learn the prohibition of all of the gifts of idolatry from this verse of "Guard yourself," and wine libations are included. And I have written this verse, like his opinion - not like my custom in all of the book, as I have written all [of the other verses] according to the opinion of Rambam, may his memory be blessed. But in this [case] I saw that this verse is very fit to expound the matter from it; and also that there is a warning in it. And [it is] as they, may their memory be blessed, said (Eruvin 96a), [that] every place where it states, "guard yourself," or "lest" or "do not," it is nothing but a negative commandment. However in the verse, "drank the wine of their libations," there is no warning. And I also saw great ones from the enumerators of the commandment that wrote like this.
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Sefer HaChinukh
That which we said, the trappings of idolatry, the matter is to say, anything that is prohibited for us from any prohibition specific to idolatry. And [it is] similar to that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in [Pesachim 25a], "One who is in peril may be healed by anything except for asheirah (a tree-god) wood." And they said about this in Yerushalmi Shabbat 14:4 [that] it is not only if the physician said, "Bring me leaves of asheirah x," that he would [then] seem like he concedes to it. Rather even if he just said to him, "Bring me leaves of tree x," and he went and he only found [them] on the asheirah, he should be killed and not transgress. And even though when he is healed with the wood of the asheirah, it is not truly idolatry - for he did not worship it - nonetheless he benefited from it, and there is in it the matter of the negative commandment of "Nothing is to cling to your hand from the anathema" (Deuteronomy 13:18), which is a negative commandment specific to idolatry. But the many prohibitions of idolatry that exist, which we learn from the negative commandment of "in front of the blind you shall not place a stumbling block" (Leviticus 19:14), are not included in trappings of idolatry to be killed for them - since the negative commandment of "in front of the blind," is not specific to idolatry itself, as it is also with all of the [other] commandments.
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Sefer HaChinukh
And this commandment is practiced in the Land of Israel at the time when Israel is there - whether by Levites or by Israelites - by males and females, as all are obligated never to change the three places spoken about: the city; the open space; and the fields and vineyards. And it would seem that anyone who did change them with witnesses and a warning would be liable for lashes. But I did not know the measure of this change - how much it would be for him to be liable for it. Be wise, my son, and know it. And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote concerning this commandment (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Sabbatical Year and the Jubilee 13:12), "Why did the Levites not merit [a portion] in the possession of the Land of Israel and in the spoils of war, with his brethren? Because they were set aside to serve God, may He be blessed, and minister unto Him and to instruct His just paths. And therefore they were set apart from the ways of the world: They do not wage war like the remainder of the Israelites, nor do they [receive an inheritance], nor do they acquire [things] for themselves through the power of their bodies. Instead, they are God's legion - as it is stated (Deuteronomy 13:11), 'May the Lord bless His legion' - and He provides for them, as it is stated (Numbers 18:20), 'I am your portion and your possession.' And it is not only the tribe of Levi that is included in this, but each and every man that comes to the world whose spirit has moved him to be separated and to stand in front of God and to serve Him, to know His straight and righteous paths and to teach them to others - the yoke of the many calculations that people seek out is lifted from upon his neck. And behold, he is sanctified to become holy of holies, and God will be his possession for ever and ever. And he will acquire the thing that he needs in this world, just as the tribe of Levi acquired [it]. And so David states (Psalms 16:5), 'The Lord is my appointed portion and my cup, You sustain my fate.'"
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not derive benefit from the coverings of idolatry and from its auxiliaries: That we were prevented not to benefit from the coverings of idolatry. And even when it is not forbidden to benefit from the idolatry itself - such as if one bowed to something that is not in the holding of a man's grasp (not created by him), like a mountain, an animal or a tree, as it is not prohibited to benefit from them - nonetheless, the covering that is upon them is forbidden to benefit from nonetheless; since they are included in the auxiliaries of idolatry that are forbidden. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 7:25), "you shall not covet silver and gold that is upon it and take it for yourself." And even though it is stated in another place more generally (Deuteronomy 13:18), "And nothing shall cling to your hand, etc.," a negative commandment was specified about the covering - as the fools will place their eyes upon them.
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Sefer HaChinukh
And [also] included in this commandment is that a person should not have cling to his money that God has graced him with justly, other money that is from theft, extortion, interest or from any ugly thing; since all of this is included in the auxiliaries of idolatry. As the evil impulse of a man's heart desires it and brings it to his house - and the evil impulse is called by the name, idolatry; and like they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Batra 10a) that about it is it stated (Deuteronomy 15:9), "lest there be a wanton thing with your heart," and it is written about the matter of idolatry (Deuteronomy 13:14), "Wanton men have gone out from you and have induced, etc." And about monies like this that we mentioned and about the auxiliaries of idolatry - about all of them - is it stated (Deuteronomy 7:26), "and you will be an anathema like it"; meaning to say that all that clings to it is anathema. As the blessing of God is not found in it, and [so] it disappears and is lost; like the matter that they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 71a) that a small coin of interest makes several treasuries of money disappear. As this comes and destroys that.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not add to the commandments and their understanding: That we were prevented not to add to the written Torah, nor to the oral Torah. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:1), "do not add to it." And how is the addition? Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Rebels 2:9), "For example, one who instructs that chicken meat with milk is forbidden by Torah writ - that is adding upon the word of the received tradition. As so did we receive about the understanding of 'you shall not boil a goat, etc.' - that the meat of a [domesticated] beast and a [wild] animal are forbidden to cook in milk, but not chicken meat. And so [too,] if he instructed that meat from a [wild] animal is permitted with milk, he has transgressed on account of 'you shall not subtract.' As this is subtracting, since so did we receive [about the verse's understanding], that the meat of a [domesticated] beast and a [wild] animal are [both] included in the prohibition." To here [are his words].
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not subtract from the commandments of the Torah: That we were prevented from subtracting a thing from that which the perfect Torah commanded us. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:1), "do not subtract from it." And how is this prohibition? For example, that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in the third chapter of Rosh Hashanah 28b that if blood that requires one sprinkling is mixed up with blood that requires four sprinklings, "Rabbi Eliezer says, 'It is to be sprinkled four times.' And Rabbi Yehoshua says, 'It is to be sprinkled once - since when you sprinkle four times, you transgress, "do not add," and you perform an act; whereas when you sprinkle once, even if you transgress "do not subtract," you do not perform an act.'" To here [is the excerpt from the Talmud]. We know from this that the negative commandment of 'do not subtract' is in this way and all that is similar to it.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not listen to one who prophecies in the name of idolatry: That we not listen [to] the prophecy of one who prophecies in the name of idolatry - meaning to say that we not ask him for, and investigate him with, a sign or wonder about his prophecy, as we do with one who prophecies in the name of God. Rather we prevent him from the thing, as is fitting with any criminal or guilty one. And if he persists in his evil, we apply the well-known punishment for which the Torah makes him liable, and that is to kill him with strangulation. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:4), "You shall not listen to the words of that prophet."
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not love the seducer: That we have likewise been prevented from bending our ear to the words of a seducer and that we not endear him in any manner. And the content of a seducer is one who seduces one Israelite to worship idolatry, such as one who praises the actions of idolatry to him; and he praises it in order that he will follow it and serve it and leave from under the wings of the Divine Providence. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:9), "You shall not long for him."
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not leave the hatred towards the seducer: That the hatred of the seducer be fixed in our hearts, meaning to say that we not lighten in the grudge of vengeance upon him for all of the evil that he thought to do. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:9), "and you shall not listen to him" - meaning to say, do not be amenable to him to remove the grudge of vengeance upon him from your heart. And so did they, may their memory be blessed, say in explanation of this verse (Sifrei Devarim 89:2), "Since it is stated (Exodus 23:5), 'unload shall you unload with him'" - and Onkelos translated, "unload shall you unload what is in your heart against him," - "it is possible that you should unload for this one, too; [hence] we learn to say, 'and you shall not listen to him.'"
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not save the seducer That the seduced is prevented from saving the seducer when he sees him in danger of death and perdition. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:9), "and your eye shall not be concerned for him." And so did they, may their memory be blessed, say (Sifrei Devarim 89:3), "Since it is stated (Leviticus 19:16), 'and you shall not stand upon the blood of your neighbor,' it is possible that you do not stand upon [the] blood of this one [too]; [hence] we learn to say, 'and your eye shall not be concerned for him.'"
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Sefer HaChinukh
Not to advocate innocence for a seducer: That the seduced is prevented not to claim something of merit for the seducer. And even if he knows a merit for him, he should not advocate it and not mention it about him. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:9), "you shall not have pity." And so did they, may their memory be blessed, say (Sifrei Devarim 89:4), "Do not advocate innocence for him." And its content is like the other [related commandments] that we mentioned adjacently.
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Sefer HaChinukh
Not to refrain from advocating guilt for the seducer: That the seduced not be silent from advocating guilt for the seducer, but rather that he should advocate if for him. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:9), "and you shall not cover for him." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Devarim 89:5), "If you know [claims of] guilt, you are not allowed to be quiet." All of its content is like its colleagues adjacent to it.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not seduce one of Israel to worship idolatry: To not seduce one of Israel to worship idolatry. And one who does so is called a seducer. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:12), "and they shall not continue to do like this evil in your midst."
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Sefer HaChinukh
The laws of the commandment are, for example, that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 67a), [that] how is the matter of the seduction of the seducer? For example, one who says to his fellow, "Let us go and worship idolatry x," or "Let us go and sacrifice," or "Let us go and burn incense," or "Let us go and pour a libation," or "Let us go and bow down"; or if he said to his fellow in the singular form, "I will go and worship, I will go and sacrifice," or "I will burn incense, I will pour a libation, I will bow down" - whether it is in the singular form or whether it is in the plural form - behold, this is called a seducer. And even though no act was one, such that they did not worship idolatry - not the seducer and not the seduced - nonetheless, their sentence is like that of a seducer because of speech alone. And [also] that which they said (Sanhedrin 67a) [about] one who seduces two, they are his witnesses, and they bring him to court and we stone him upon their [testimony]. And [also] that which they said (Sanhedrin 80b) that a seducer does not require a warning because of the severity of the matter, as it is an evil thing - and so did they, may their memory be blessed, say (Ketuvot 33a) about plotting witnesses, that they not require a warning due to their great evil, and as we will write with God's help in the Order of Shoftim (Sefer HaChinukh 523). And [also] that which they said (Sanhedrin 67a) [about] one who seduces one, that the seduced is obligated to say to him, "I have fellows that want from this, say it to them also"; and that this is done so that two will testify against him and he will be sentenced by a court. And they, may their memory be blessed, said further that if he does not want to seduce two, it is a commandment to conceal witnesses for him. And the matter is that he hides witnesses in a place that they will see the seducer and he will not see them, and [then] he enters with him into things that he said to him in isolation. And [then] the seduced answers him, "How can we leave our God in the heavens and serve wood and stones?" And if the seducer recants or is quiet, he is exempted. But if he says to him, "So is it fitting to do and so is it proper for us," those witnesses bring him to court. And with no other death penalty besides this do we conceal witnesses for them. And this whole matter is to distance idolatry. And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei Devarim 89:8) that it is a commandment in the hand of the seduced himself to kill him after the court has sentenced him; and about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:10), "your hand shall be upon him first to put him to death." And this commandment to kill him is part of the commandment, and we should not consider it as a [separate] commandment on its own. [These] and its other details are in Tractate Sanhedrin.
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Sefer HaChinukh
The commandment of investigating the witnesses well: To make a formidable investigation of the testimony and to inquire about it well according to all of our ability, so as to known the root of a thing and its completely exact truth. And from the foundation of this matter, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Avot 1:1), "Be deliberate in judgment." And it is all so that we can reflect on the thing and know the truth about it; and that we not hurry in judgement, lest we kill the innocent and cause a loss of money, because the truth is concealed. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:15), "And you shall inquire and investigate and ask well, and behold, the thing is correct truth." And anyone who has eyes in his head will observe and see that the multitude of warnings and repetition of the matter in different words that the Torah repeated about this thing is is to properly warn us about the matter; as it is a great thing and a strong pillar upon which the blood of the souls of the creatures depends.
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Sefer HaChinukh
The burning of an enticed city and to kill its people: To burn an enticed city and everything that is in it. And a city of Israel [whose inhabitants] have been enticed by wanton men to leave from under the wings of the Divine Presence, and go after the whims of their hearts to worship idolatry, is called an enticed city. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:17), "and you shall burn the city with fire, and all of its booty."
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Sefer HaChinukh
From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 111b) that the city does not become an enticed city - meaning, to judge them with the law of an enticed city, the people of which are killed with the sword and their property is burned with the city - until its enticers are two, or more than two, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 13:14), "Wanton men came out, etc."; and that its enticers are from that tribe and from that city, as it is stated, "from among you, and entice you"; and until they entice its majority, and that the enticed be from one hundred up to the majority of the tribe. But if the majority of a tribe is enticed, they are not judged by the law of the enticed city, but rather as individuals who are stoned and their property is for their heirs, as it is stated, "the residents of the city" - and not a small village and not a large [metropolis], and less than a hundred is a small village, and the majority of a tribe is a large [metropolis]. And the law that a city of refuge and so [too,] Jerusalem cannot be made an enticed city, and so [too,] a city that is on the border cannot be made an enticed city; the law of how we make it into an enticed city, and the warning that we send to it through two Torah scholars; that which they said concerning its plaza; that which they said about the properties of the righteous within it who were not enticed with it; the law of consecrated things within it; the law of the fruit of palm trees within it; the law of the properties of the people of another city that are within it or the properties of the people of the enticed city in another place; and the rest of its details are [all] in Tractate Sanhedrin (Chapter 11).
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not rebuild an enticed city: To not ever rebuild an enticed city. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:17), "and it shall be an everlasting mound; you shall not build it again."
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not benefit from the property of an enticed city: That we have been prevented from benefiting and taking from the property of an enticed city. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 13:18), "And no thing from the anathema shall stick to your hand." And also included in this negative commandment is anything from idolatry, as I have written above in the Order of Vehaya Ekev in the last warning (negative commandment) in the Order (Sefer HaChinukh 429). And in it, I wrote about the roots of this commandment, and all of its content is the same.
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Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim
All (types of) work (for whose transgression) a person is guilty on the Sabbath is also guilty on Yom Kippur. And all types of work for whose transgression on the Sabbath a person is free from punishment but are still prohibited, are also prohibited on Yom Kippur in a like manner except that on the Sabbath a conscious sin is punishable by stoning,79Stoning, sekilah, סקילה, is a Biblical form of capital punishment which was the standard penalty for crime in all ancient civilizations. In the Torah there are two explicit methods of executing a criminal or a sinner; stoning and burning. According to the Talmud, the Torah has four methods of execution: stoning, burning, beheading, and strangling, (See B. Sanhedrin 49b., ff).
Stoning was an instinctive violent expression of popular wrath, (Exodus 17:4, 8:22; Numbers 14:10; I Samuel 30:6; I Kings 12:18; II Chronicles 10:18) and often in the Bible it is the prescribed mode of execution (Leviticus 20:2, 27, 24:16; Numbers 15:35; Deuteronomy 13:11, 17:5, 21:21, 22:21, et al). Originally, the whole community participated in the stoning and were required to throw stones at the guilty person. Stonings were probably the standard form of judicial execution in Biblical times, (Leviticus 24:23; Numbers 15:36; I Kings 21:13; II Chronicles 24:21).
The Mishna (Sanh.6:4) states that a "stoning place" was established where instead of a person being pelted by stones, the convicted person would be pushed down from a high place to his death provided it was not too high so as to mutilate the body which was a concern of the rabbis. It also was not to be too low so the death would be instantaneous. The reason for the stoning place was that the scriptural rule states "The hands of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death," (Deuteronomy 17:7) and then afterwards the "hand of all the people (should be on him)", (Deuteronomy 17:7). To insure that the witnesses put him to death they were the ones to push him and thereby be first to put him to death. Thus this method of "stoning" became acceptable as opposed to the actual throwing of stones. This also seemed the more "humane" way of carrying out capital punishment as the convicted person died more quickly and the danger of mutilation was reduced. In Maimonides' comment to Sanhedrin 6:4 he stated that it really made no difference if stones were thrown at one or if one were thrown at stones.
cf., Haim Hermann Cohn, v. 5, pp. 142-43. but on Yom Kippur it is punishable by karet.80Karet, כרת; see footnote 78. Everything that is forbidden to be moved (or handled) on the Sabbath is also forbidden to be moved (or handled) on Yom Kippur, (but it is permitted to clean vegetables and to open (shell) nuts from the Minḥah time81Minḥah, מנחה, a time designating afternoon, meaning after the six and one half hour or after 12:30 P.M. according to our present day time system. (See footnote 40 for a more complete explanation). onward when (Yom Kippur) falls on a weekday, but nowadays (presently) it is customary to forbid that.)
Hagah: If a fire occurs on Yom Kippur, it is permitted to save one meal for the need of the night (following Yom Kippur) as one (may) save on the Sabbath the afternoon meal,82The afternoon meal on the Sabbath is also referred to as Se'udah Shelishit, the third meal which is eaten on the Sabbath between the Minḥah, Afternoon Service (see footnote 40) and the Ma'ariv, Evening Service (see footnote 144). (ר״ן פרק כל כתבי),83Rabbenu Nissim on the chapter Kol Khit-vey, כתבי ר״ן פרק כל, which is a commentary on the talmudic tractate Shabbat.
For Rabbenu Nissim, ר״ן; see footnote 47. and it is already explained in section 33484See in the Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, chapter 334 which contains twenty-seven paragraphs on the laws that apply when a fire breaks out on the Sabbath. These same laws apply regarding a fire, according to Isserles to Yom Kippur. (as to) how to act at this time when a fire (occurs) on the Sabbath and the same law (applies) for Yom Kippur. It is customary that the children play with nuts (אגודה ומהרי״ל).85Agudah and Maharil, אגודה ומהרי״ל.
The Agudah, אגודה, is a collection of halakhic decisions derived from talmudic discussions and arranged in the order of the talmudic tractates. It was written by Alexander Suslin ha-Kohen of Frankfort who died in 1349. The Agudah was published in Cracow in 1571 and it also included novellae of his own as well as those of his predecessors, and a commentary and collection of halakhot to the minor tractates and to the Mishnayot of the orders Zera'in and Tohorot. The language of the Agudah is very concise and it is evident that it was written quickly under the threat of the persecutions of the time since Suslin died a martyr's death in Erfurt. Suslin was the last of the early German halakhic authorities. This German talmudic scholar was born Erfurt where he taught, as well as in Worms, Cologne, and Frankfort.
The Agudah, Suslin's most famous work, gives halakhic rulings in concise form and it ignores differences of opinion. He used as sources Mordecai b. Hillel and Asher b. Jehiel. It is often necessary to consult the work of these two scholars to understand fully the Agudah. Jacob Weil (see footnote 27) wrote a digest to the work called Ḥiddushei Agudah which was published in Venice in 1523 and accompanies the Agudah. Later halakhic authorities such as Jacob ha-Levi Moellin (see footnote 8) and Moses Isserles considered his decisions authoritative and they quoted from him. Isserles mentioned the Agudah often in his glosses to the Shulḥan Arukh.
Editorial Staff, E. J., v. 2, p. 585.
Maharil, מהרי״ל; see footnote 8. One should not object to them (the children) even before the Afternoon Prayer86Minḥah, מנחה; see footnote 40., and the custom is widespread with respect to the mentioned law of breaking nuts, (ד״ע).87Da'at Aẓmo, ד״ע, Isserles' own opinion; see footnote 38.
Stoning was an instinctive violent expression of popular wrath, (Exodus 17:4, 8:22; Numbers 14:10; I Samuel 30:6; I Kings 12:18; II Chronicles 10:18) and often in the Bible it is the prescribed mode of execution (Leviticus 20:2, 27, 24:16; Numbers 15:35; Deuteronomy 13:11, 17:5, 21:21, 22:21, et al). Originally, the whole community participated in the stoning and were required to throw stones at the guilty person. Stonings were probably the standard form of judicial execution in Biblical times, (Leviticus 24:23; Numbers 15:36; I Kings 21:13; II Chronicles 24:21).
The Mishna (Sanh.6:4) states that a "stoning place" was established where instead of a person being pelted by stones, the convicted person would be pushed down from a high place to his death provided it was not too high so as to mutilate the body which was a concern of the rabbis. It also was not to be too low so the death would be instantaneous. The reason for the stoning place was that the scriptural rule states "The hands of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death," (Deuteronomy 17:7) and then afterwards the "hand of all the people (should be on him)", (Deuteronomy 17:7). To insure that the witnesses put him to death they were the ones to push him and thereby be first to put him to death. Thus this method of "stoning" became acceptable as opposed to the actual throwing of stones. This also seemed the more "humane" way of carrying out capital punishment as the convicted person died more quickly and the danger of mutilation was reduced. In Maimonides' comment to Sanhedrin 6:4 he stated that it really made no difference if stones were thrown at one or if one were thrown at stones.
cf., Haim Hermann Cohn, v. 5, pp. 142-43. but on Yom Kippur it is punishable by karet.80Karet, כרת; see footnote 78. Everything that is forbidden to be moved (or handled) on the Sabbath is also forbidden to be moved (or handled) on Yom Kippur, (but it is permitted to clean vegetables and to open (shell) nuts from the Minḥah time81Minḥah, מנחה, a time designating afternoon, meaning after the six and one half hour or after 12:30 P.M. according to our present day time system. (See footnote 40 for a more complete explanation). onward when (Yom Kippur) falls on a weekday, but nowadays (presently) it is customary to forbid that.)
Hagah: If a fire occurs on Yom Kippur, it is permitted to save one meal for the need of the night (following Yom Kippur) as one (may) save on the Sabbath the afternoon meal,82The afternoon meal on the Sabbath is also referred to as Se'udah Shelishit, the third meal which is eaten on the Sabbath between the Minḥah, Afternoon Service (see footnote 40) and the Ma'ariv, Evening Service (see footnote 144). (ר״ן פרק כל כתבי),83Rabbenu Nissim on the chapter Kol Khit-vey, כתבי ר״ן פרק כל, which is a commentary on the talmudic tractate Shabbat.
For Rabbenu Nissim, ר״ן; see footnote 47. and it is already explained in section 33484See in the Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, chapter 334 which contains twenty-seven paragraphs on the laws that apply when a fire breaks out on the Sabbath. These same laws apply regarding a fire, according to Isserles to Yom Kippur. (as to) how to act at this time when a fire (occurs) on the Sabbath and the same law (applies) for Yom Kippur. It is customary that the children play with nuts (אגודה ומהרי״ל).85Agudah and Maharil, אגודה ומהרי״ל.
The Agudah, אגודה, is a collection of halakhic decisions derived from talmudic discussions and arranged in the order of the talmudic tractates. It was written by Alexander Suslin ha-Kohen of Frankfort who died in 1349. The Agudah was published in Cracow in 1571 and it also included novellae of his own as well as those of his predecessors, and a commentary and collection of halakhot to the minor tractates and to the Mishnayot of the orders Zera'in and Tohorot. The language of the Agudah is very concise and it is evident that it was written quickly under the threat of the persecutions of the time since Suslin died a martyr's death in Erfurt. Suslin was the last of the early German halakhic authorities. This German talmudic scholar was born Erfurt where he taught, as well as in Worms, Cologne, and Frankfort.
The Agudah, Suslin's most famous work, gives halakhic rulings in concise form and it ignores differences of opinion. He used as sources Mordecai b. Hillel and Asher b. Jehiel. It is often necessary to consult the work of these two scholars to understand fully the Agudah. Jacob Weil (see footnote 27) wrote a digest to the work called Ḥiddushei Agudah which was published in Venice in 1523 and accompanies the Agudah. Later halakhic authorities such as Jacob ha-Levi Moellin (see footnote 8) and Moses Isserles considered his decisions authoritative and they quoted from him. Isserles mentioned the Agudah often in his glosses to the Shulḥan Arukh.
Editorial Staff, E. J., v. 2, p. 585.
Maharil, מהרי״ל; see footnote 8. One should not object to them (the children) even before the Afternoon Prayer86Minḥah, מנחה; see footnote 40., and the custom is widespread with respect to the mentioned law of breaking nuts, (ד״ע).87Da'at Aẓmo, ד״ע, Isserles' own opinion; see footnote 38.
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