Halakhah su Deuteronomio 19:78

But if they see that the sinner is one of the foolish scoffers who hate their reprovers, as it is written (Mishlei 9:8): "Do not reprove the scoffer, lest he hate you," and their words will certainly not be accepted, and men such as these readily return to their folly, so that he may very likely come to sin again — if so, it is better for them if they tell it to the judges of the city, so that they chastise him for his sin and keep him from future transgression. And it would seem that the same holds true for [telling] the relatives of the sinner if [we know that] their words [of reproof] will be accepted by him [see Be'er Mayim Chayim]. And the entire intent of the teller should be for the sake of Heaven and in zeal for the L–rd, and not because of their hatred of him for something else. And the judges, too, should chastise the sinner in secret and not "whiten his face" in public, as it is written (Vayikra 19:17): "Reprove shall you reprove your neighbor, but do not bear sin because of him." And all this if they saw him with [i.e., if they were] two witnesses, but if he were a single witness, he may not testify against his friend, for his testimony is in vain, the judges being unable to rely upon it, viz. (Devarim 19:15): "One witness shall not arise against a man for every transgression and for every sin." Therefore, [if he does so], he is considered a motzi shem ra [the spreader of an evil report], concerning which our Rabbis have said (Sha'arei Teshuvah 22): "One who testified singly against his friend receives stripes of rebellion." And our sages have said (Pesachim 113b): "Three are hated by the Holy One Blessed be He," one of them being "one who sees a thing of ervah [immorality] in his friend and testifies against him singly." But he can reveal the thing secretly to his [the sinner's] Rabbi and to his close confidant, if he knows that his words will be accepted as those of two witnesses. And his Rabbi is permitted to hate him for this and to distance himself from his company, until it becomes known to him that he has repented of his evil way. But his Rabbi may not tell this to others, it being no better than seeing it himself, as we have written above in section 4.

You should know that one thing can have in it [both] a positive commandment and a negative commandment in one of three ways: If any act should be a positive commandment; but one who violates it transgresses a negative commandment, like Shabbat and holidays and the release [of the seventh year] - in which work is a negative commandment and rest upon them is a positive commandment, as will be explained. And likewise the fast of Yom Kippur is a positive commandment, but eating upon it is a negative commandment. Or when it is a negative commandment that is preceded by a positive commandment; like it states about a rape (Deuteronomy 19:29) or one who puts out a bad name (Deuteronomy 19:19), "and she shall be as a wife for him" - which is a positive commandment - but it also states, "he many not send her away all of his days," and that is a negative commandment. Or if the negative commandment is first and is afterwards rectified by a positive commandment, such as "do not take the mother together with her young" (Deuteronomy 19:6); and then "You shall surely send away the mother" (Deuteronomy 19:7). And in each of these types, it is appropriate to count the positive commandment in it among the positive commandments and the negative commandment in it among the negative commandments. As the Sages said, in explaining each one of them, that they are a positive commandment and a negative commandment. And many times they will say, "the positive commandment in it," and "the negative commandment in it." And this matter is clear, for the content of the command in them is different than the content of the prohibition. And both of them are two different matters, one that He commanded and one that He prohibited. And no one ever erred about this principle.

You should know that one thing can have in it [both] a positive commandment and a negative commandment in one of three ways: If any act should be a positive commandment; but one who violates it transgresses a negative commandment, like Shabbat and holidays and the release [of the seventh year] - in which work is a negative commandment and rest upon them is a positive commandment, as will be explained. And likewise the fast of Yom Kippur is a positive commandment, but eating upon it is a negative commandment. Or when it is a negative commandment that is preceded by a positive commandment; like it states about a rape (Deuteronomy 19:29) or one who puts out a bad name (Deuteronomy 19:19), "and she shall be as a wife for him" - which is a positive commandment - but it also states, "he many not send her away all of his days," and that is a negative commandment. Or if the negative commandment is first and is afterwards rectified by a positive commandment, such as "do not take the mother together with her young" (Deuteronomy 19:6); and then "You shall surely send away the mother" (Deuteronomy 19:7). And in each of these types, it is appropriate to count the positive commandment in it among the positive commandments and the negative commandment in it among the negative commandments. As the Sages said, in explaining each one of them, that they are a positive commandment and a negative commandment. And many times they will say, "the positive commandment in it," and "the negative commandment in it." And this matter is clear, for the content of the command in them is different than the content of the prohibition. And both of them are two different matters, one that He commanded and one that He prohibited. And no one ever erred about this principle.

You should know that one thing can have in it [both] a positive commandment and a negative commandment in one of three ways: If any act should be a positive commandment; but one who violates it transgresses a negative commandment, like Shabbat and holidays and the release [of the seventh year] - in which work is a negative commandment and rest upon them is a positive commandment, as will be explained. And likewise the fast of Yom Kippur is a positive commandment, but eating upon it is a negative commandment. Or when it is a negative commandment that is preceded by a positive commandment; like it states about a rape (Deuteronomy 19:29) or one who puts out a bad name (Deuteronomy 19:19), "and she shall be as a wife for him" - which is a positive commandment - but it also states, "he many not send her away all of his days," and that is a negative commandment. Or if the negative commandment is first and is afterwards rectified by a positive commandment, such as "do not take the mother together with her young" (Deuteronomy 19:6); and then "You shall surely send away the mother" (Deuteronomy 19:7). And in each of these types, it is appropriate to count the positive commandment in it among the positive commandments and the negative commandment in it among the negative commandments. As the Sages said, in explaining each one of them, that they are a positive commandment and a negative commandment. And many times they will say, "the positive commandment in it," and "the negative commandment in it." And this matter is clear, for the content of the command in them is different than the content of the prohibition. And both of them are two different matters, one that He commanded and one that He prohibited. And no one ever erred about this principle.

You should know that one thing can have in it [both] a positive commandment and a negative commandment in one of three ways: If any act should be a positive commandment; but one who violates it transgresses a negative commandment, like Shabbat and holidays and the release [of the seventh year] - in which work is a negative commandment and rest upon them is a positive commandment, as will be explained. And likewise the fast of Yom Kippur is a positive commandment, but eating upon it is a negative commandment. Or when it is a negative commandment that is preceded by a positive commandment; like it states about a rape (Deuteronomy 19:29) or one who puts out a bad name (Deuteronomy 19:19), "and she shall be as a wife for him" - which is a positive commandment - but it also states, "he many not send her away all of his days," and that is a negative commandment. Or if the negative commandment is first and is afterwards rectified by a positive commandment, such as "do not take the mother together with her young" (Deuteronomy 19:6); and then "You shall surely send away the mother" (Deuteronomy 19:7). And in each of these types, it is appropriate to count the positive commandment in it among the positive commandments and the negative commandment in it among the negative commandments. As the Sages said, in explaining each one of them, that they are a positive commandment and a negative commandment. And many times they will say, "the positive commandment in it," and "the negative commandment in it." And this matter is clear, for the content of the command in them is different than the content of the prohibition. And both of them are two different matters, one that He commanded and one that He prohibited. And no one ever erred about this principle.

(10) And if one arises and testifies against another by himself before beth-din concerning something forbidden, since no benefit can result from this vis-à-vis monetary [obligations, imposition of] an oath, or invalidation of the other's status of kashruth [halachic fitness] since he is only a single witness in the matter, the only thing he "accomplishes" by this is giving the other a bad name, and he also transgresses the negative commandment of (Devarim 19:15): "One witness shall not testify against a man for every transgression and for every sin," and beth-din must punish him with stripes for this.

If [a person] throws a stone into his courtyard and slays: if the victim had permission to enter therein [the slayer] goes into exile; but if not, he does not go into exile, as it is written "and when a person goes with his friend into a forest" (Deuteronomy 19:5)—just as a forest [both] the victim and the slayer are permitted therein, similarly [the law applies] in every domain in which [both] the victim and the slayer are entitled to enter, to the exclusion of the courtyard of the householder since the victim does not have the right to enter therein. Abba Saul says: Just as the cutting of wood is a discretionary act, similarly [the law applies] in all instances of discretionary acts, to the exclusion of a father who beats his son, a teacher who strikes his pupil and a messenger of the court [who administers lashes].⁹There is a significant disagreement among early-day authorities with regard to the nature of the activity undertaken by the agent of the bet din that, when it results in unforeseen death, is not punishable by exile. Rambam, Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 5:16, codifies the rule formulated in the Mishnah as applicable to a bailiff who seeks to compel a litigant to appear before the court. Ra’avad, ad locum, disagrees and asserts that the reference in the Mishnah is to an agent of the court who administers the punishment of flogging. Rabbenu Yonatan of Lunel limits the agent’s immunity from exile to situations in which the judges erred in ordering more than the appropriate number of lashes and the agent simply carried out their instruction. R. Jacob Reischer, Teshuvot Shevut Ya’akov, III, no. 140, understands Ra’avad as adopting that position as well. However, Ramban, Makkot 8a, apparently understands the reference to be to an agent of the bet din who administers the proper number of lashes as determined by the bet din in accordance with the transgressor’s physical condition but who nevertheless causes the death of the transgressor. See also R. Jacob Ettlinger, Arukh la-Ner, Makkot 22b; R. Zevi Alexander Halperin, Imrei ha-Ẓevi, Bava Kamma 32b; and R. Yitzchak Ya’akov Weisz, Teshuvot Minḥat Yiẓḥak, III, no. 10, sec. 2.

There is ample textual evidence demonstrating that burial of a nefel, a term that includes an abortus, a stillborn baby and a non-viable neonate, was the common practice among Jews in antiquity. For example, the Gemara, Ketubot 20b, speaks of places regarded as ritually impure by virtue of the fact that "women bury their nefalim" at such sites. Sifrei, Deuteronomy 19:14, declares that it is not permissible for a person to sell his gravesite in an ancestral burial ground.¹⁰Cf., Baba Batra 100b and Shulḥan Arukh, Ḥoshen Mishpat 217:7. Sifrei indicates that the prohibition becomes effective only upon actual use of the plot as a burial site but that interment of a nefel does not constitute dedication of the site as a burial ground for purposes of rendering this prohibition operative.¹¹See R. Naphtali Zevi Judah Berlin, Emek ha-Neẓiv, ad locum. Nevertheless, on the basis of these sources alone, it is not possible to determine whether burial of a nefel is merely a customary practice or a normative halakhic requirement.¹²Cf., however, R. Joseph Saul Nathanson, letter of approbation to publication of Sifrei, Lemberg, 5626. The Palestinian Talmud, Shabbat 18:3, reports that the placenta was commonly buried in the ground. However, burial of the placenta is not depicted as a halakhic requirement but as a “pledge,” i.e., a symbolic acknowledgement that every person will eventually be buried, as manifested in the burial of the placenta immediately following birth.

R. Akiva Eger takes issue with Kalisher regarding the requirement for supportive evidence for priestly yiḥus. He maintains that the genealogical claims of present-day kohanim are uncorroborated and therefore remain in doubt. Chafetz Chaim (Zevaḥ Todah¹²Zevaḥ Todah is the title of a series of expository notes included by Chafetz Chaim in his Likutei Halakhot (Pietrokow, 5670). The entire work is known by the latter name. Zevaḥim, chap. 13) also shares this view. This position is further elucidated by R. David Friedman, who quotes the exposition by the Sifri, Parshat Shoftim, of the verse, "One witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity, or for any sin, in any sin that he hath sinned" (Deut. 19:15). The words le-khol avon u-lekhol chat'at are understood by the Sifri as teaching that two witnesses are necessary for both admission to the priesthood and exclusion from performance of the priestly functions.²²R. Levine, Taharat ha-Kodesh, cites Rambam, Hilkhot Parah Adumah 3:4, who states that a total of nine red heifers was offered from the time of Moses until the destruction of the Second Commonwealth and that a tenth will be brought by the Messiah. He concludes that the reason that the red heifer cannot be prepared in our day is because we have no means of ascertaining the genealogical purity of the kohanim. See also R. Shlomoh Kluger, Ḥokhmat Shlomoh, Even ha-Ezer 6:8.

R. Ezekiel Landau, author of Teshuvot Noda bi-Yehudah employs this premise in explaining Rambam's position. Noda bi-Yehudah's elucidation of Rambam's position is formulated in the course of a responsum dealing with the divorce of Cleves. This responsum is also published in Or ha-Yashar, no. 27. Noda bi-Yehudah maintains that, even according to Rambam, a shoteh is exempt from mizvot only to the extent that his mental impairment interferes with rational fulfillment of such obligations. A person who is irrational in even a limited sense is exempt from any mizvah requiring an act which he cannot perform in a rational manner. Moreover, as noted earlier, any mizvah performed in an irrational manner is not deemed to constitute the fulfillment of an obligation. Nevertheless, such a person remains bound by any commandment which he can perform in a rational manner. However, a person who is to any extent exempt from mizvot by virtue of mental incompetence is excluded entirely from the category of qualified witnesses. The Gemara, Baba Kamma 88a, in establishing categories of qualified witnesses cites the verse "and behold, if the witness be a false witness and has testified falsely against his brother" (Deuteronomy 19:18). The phrase "his brother," (which certainly cannot be understood in a literal manner since no person's testimony is accepted for or against his brother) is understood by the Gemara as denoting "a brother in mizvot," i.e., a person equally bound by the commandments. Accordingly, the principle is established that a person who is not subject to the commandments is disqualified from serving as a witness. Noda bi-Yehudah argues that even if he behaves irrationally with regard to only one specific type of conduct, a shoteh is disqualified from serving as a witness even though he is exempt only from mizvot with regard to which such behavior serves as an impediment. Since such a person is bound by only a limited obligation regarding commandments he is not "a brother (i.e., an equal) with regard to commandments." According to Noda bi-Yehudah's analysis of Rambam's position, as distinct from that of Iggerot Mosheh, a person suffering from a limited form of mental incompetence is fully bound by those commandments whose rational fulfillment is not affected by his mental condition.

It seems to this writer that Ramban's comment must be understood in light of the dual nature of the transgression inherent in misappropriation of property, commission of a tort and manslaughter. A person who deprives another of his property has committed an act of theft and in doing so has sinned against his fellow. In addition, he has violated the divine commandment prohibiting theft and has thereby sinned against God. The dayyan's putative concern that he may err in rendering judgment is not born of a concern for the welfare of the financially harmed litigant but of the dayyan's fear of sullying his own immortal soul by sinning against God. The verse "God is with you in the matter of judgment" serves to assure the judge that God joins in the judgment even if it is in error, i.e., insofar as God is concerned, the qualified judge who errs commits no sin. Indeed, theologically speaking, his error may, in a certain sense, be providentially ordained.²⁹In explaining why false witnesses whose testimony leads not only to conviction but to actual execution are not put to death, Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 19:19, asserts that God does not abandon the totally guiltless and, moreover, God Himself participates in the judgment of the court. In concurring in the judgment of the bet din, The Heavenly Court renders judgment not simply upon the pleadings of the litigants but upon a totality of considerations, many of which are likely to be unknown to mortals.

And [it] is practiced in every place and at all time by males, but not by females. As women are not [included] in the category of testimony, since testimony requires focus and much concentration. And the verse put a limit on the punishment of the one who transgresses this negative prohibition and testifies falsely against his fellow, to do unto him as he thought to do his fellow (Deuteronomy 19:19). And there are also lashes for it (Makkot 2a). And it is also elucidated there in Sanhedrin.

What sort of murder is it that is not observed by the eye yet the punishment for it is very great, the transgression is light but regarded as very serious in heaven. It is “shame” and (this) refers to one who puts his neighbor to shame publicly ¹Baba Metzia 58b. or causes him to suffer in the presence of another before whom he is pained with embarrassment. It is as though he murdered him, because the other would surely suffer death rather than be so humiliated. One who shames his neighbor but later grieves and repents and is willing to receive punishment and comes before one who is God-fearing to find a way to repent, let them say to him, “Know that your evil is great, that you shed the blood of your neighbor.” For so we find with Abijam, the son of Rehoboam, who reproved Jeroboam and shamed him publicly and was stricken dead.²J. T. Yebamoth 16:3. Therefore go my son and entreat your neighbor until he is pacified, be exceedingly careful for your soul that you neither shame nor insult anyone. For the manner of penitents is to be exceedingly humble,³Maimonides, Hilkhoth Teshuvah, 7:8. meek and submissively forebearing. And the meek do not retaliate insult for insult, nor do they reply. They are joyful in the afflictions of their meekness. And if fools shame you saying, “Remember your former deeds,” say to them, “I know that I sinned greatly and I did many things unbecoming, but the Lord will forgive me.” Endure those that shame you measure for measure, (if you insult them and then they insult you) for in this way will you expiate for your sins.⁴Berakoth 12b. If his sin, involving unchastity, was made known to the public, because of this shame⁵Shulhan Arukh, “Orah Hayim,” 138, see Baer Hetev, note 3. let him not refrain from studying those laws that deal with unchastity. For it is better for him to obtain forgiveness in this world ⁶Kiddushin 81a. since shame sheds blood and turns back perversity. And so we find in the Jerusalem Talmud, a murderer who comes to a city and is shown honors must confess, “I am a murderer,” ⁷Makkoth 12b. for it is said in Scripture, “and this is the case of the man slayer” (Deut. 19:4) this refers to “speech,” that he verbalize and confess the slaying.

In enumerating situations of involuntary manslaughter in which the individual responsible for shedding innocent blood is not exiled to one of the designated cities of refuge, the Mishnah, Makkot 8a, cites the verse "and who comes with his fellow in the forest" (Deuteronomy 19:5) that occurs in the context of the Bible's description of an act of manslaughter necessitating exile. The Mishnah regards the reference to the forest as paradigmatic of the type of misadventure entailing such punishment. The Sages understand the term "forest" as restricting the penalty to manslaughter occurring at a particular site and declare that exile is warranted only if the accident occurs in a place comparable to a forest, i.e., a locale in which aggressor and victim equally enjoy a right of entry. Accordingly, they rule that no exile attends upon manslaughter that occurs pursuant to trespass by the victim upon the domain of the person responsible for his death. Abba Sha'ul, however, understands the verse as establishing a paradigm for the nature of the act itself rather than for the locale in which it is committed. Accordingly, Abba Sha'ul declares that exile is merited only if manslaughter results from an act that is entirely discretionary—as is the chopping of wood. Excluded from that penalty, declares Abba Sha'ul, is a father who strikes his son, a teacher who smites his pupil and a person deputized by the Bet Din to administer corporal punishment who in carrying out those acts inadvertently causes the death of the person he intends only to beat. Those acts are privileged since each of the enumerated persons acts with authority in administering punishment or chastisement and in order to achieve an end which those persons are charged with achieving. Such acts do not merely lie outside the ambit of prohibited "wounding," but are affirmatively required. Thus the actions of those individuals are not a matter of "discretion" (reshut) but constitute the discharge of a duty. Accordingly, bona fide misadventure in discharging those duties entails no penalty. Although the Sages disagree with Abba Sha'ul with regard to the implication of such categorization in establishing an exclusion to the punishment of exile, there is no dispute regarding the underlying premise, viz., that those acts are privileged batteries.

Not to have a sinner testify: That we not accept the testimony of a man who sins, and we not do anything on account of his testimony, as it is stated (Exodus 23:1), "do not place your hand with an evildoer to be a violent witness." And the explanation comes about this (Sanhedrin 27a), "Do not place an evildoer as a witness, do not place a violent one as a witness," meaning a violent person - to exclude violent people and thieves who are disqualified from testimony, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 19:16), "If a violent witness comes upon a man."

Do not bring yourself to a light transgression for it will bring you to a more serious one. If one transgressed the injunction “Thou shalt not hate” he ultimately comes to the “spilling of blood (murder),” for it is said, “But if any man hate his neighbor and lie in wait for him and rise up against him and smite him mortally that he die” (Deut. 19:11).¹Aboth 4:2.

That is that He commanded us to prepare six cities of refuge, such that they be ready for the accidental manslaughterer, that a path to them be fixed, that it be straightened and that nothing be left that would impede the fugitive from running [to them]. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "You shall prepare the path" (Deuteronomy 19:3). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Sanhedrin, Makkot, Shekalim and Sotah. And we have already mentioned (Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandment 176) their saying [that the laws of these cities] are only practiced in the Land [of Israel] (See Parashat Shoftim; Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 8.)

And from the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shevuot 30a) that it not be that one stand and one sit, but rather both of them stand. As in that they are in front of the court, it is fitting for them to stand as if they were in front of the Divine Presence; since the spirit of God dwells among the congregation of the judges of Israel, as it is stated (Psalms 82a), "God stands in the congregation of God." And nonetheless, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shevuot 30b) that if they wanted to seat the litigants, the option is in their hand. And about what are these words speaking? At the time of give and take. But at the time of the final judgement, there is an obligation to stand, as it is stated (Exodus 18:13), "and the people stood over Moshe." Except that all of the courts of Israel after the Talmud have become accustomed to seat them [in order to avoid] controversy. And even [regarding] the witnesses about whom it is written (Deuteronomy 19:17), "and the two men stand," they have also become accustomed today to seat them (Mishneh Torah, Laws of The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 21:5). [This] and the rest of its details are elucidated in [various] places in Sanhedrin and Shevuot (see Tur, Choshen Mishpat 17).

He prohibited giving false testimony. And that is His saying, "You shall not testify against your neighbor false testimony" (Exodus 20:13). And this has been repeated with a different language; and that is His saying, "vain testimony" (Deuteronomy 5:17). And the Torah has already decreed about this negative commandment, "You shall do to him as he schemed" (Deuteronomy 19:19). And the language of the Mekhilta (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 20:13:3) is "'You shall not testify against your neighbor' - that is the prohibition for scheming witnesses." And there is also lashes for [violation of] this negative commandment, as is explained at the beginning of Makkot (Makkot 2b). (See Parashat Yitro; Mishneh Torah, Testimony 17.)

He prohibited the judge - that he not accept testimony of a sinner and not do anything based on his testimony. And that is His saying, "Do not place your hand with an evildoer to be a violent witness" (Exodus 23:1). And the explanation appeared (Mekhilta d'Rabbi Yishmael 23:1:2) - "Do not make a violent one a witness; to exclude thugs and robbers from being witnesses - as it is stated, 'If a violent witness rise up' (Deuteronomy 19:16)." And the regulations of this commandment have been explained in Chapter 3 of Sanhedrin. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Testimony 10.)

The commandment to prepare six cities of refuge: To separate six cities of refuge from the cities of the Levites, that they should be designated for the one that slays a soul inadvertently to flee there; to fix and straighten the roads that correspond to the cities - and like the matter that they, may their memory be blessed, said (Makkot 10b) that they would write [signs] at the crossroads [saying], "refuge, refuge"; and clear the paths, so that there not be anything on them to delay the fugitive from his run. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 19:3), "You shall prepare the path for yourself and divide the border of your land into three, etc."

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Murderer and the Preservation of Life 8:2, 4) [regarding] these six cities that Moshe separated three of them in Transjordan and Yehoshua separated three of them in the Land of Canaan, but the ones of Moshe did not shelter until the three of Yehoshua were separated. And if so, why did Moshe separate them? He said, "[If] a commandment comes to my hand, I will fulfill it." And at the time of the King Messiah, we will add another three, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 19:9), "and you shall further add for yourself three cities upon these three, etc." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Murderer and the Preservation of Life 8:10) that all of the cities of the Levites would shelter, as it is stated (Numbers 35:6-7), "and upon them you shall give forty-two cities. All of the cities that you shall give to the Levites, etc." - Scripture compared all of them (the six cities of refuge and the forty-two additional ones). But there is this difference between them - that the cities of refuge shelter, whether knowingly (when the inadvertent killer is seeking refuge there) or not knowingly; whereas the cities of the Levites only shelter knowingly. [Also] a murderer that lives in a city of refuge does not [pay] rent; whereas in the other cities, he [pays] rent. And [also that which] they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Batra 100b) that the width of the path [to the] city of refuge is thirty-two ells; and that on the fifteenth of Adar, the court would send agents to fix the paths - and if they were negligent in the matter, it is as if they spilled blood. And [also that which] they, may their memory be blessed, said (Makkot 11b) that the perimeter of any city that shelters, [also] shelters. And the rest of the details of the commandment are in Sanhedrin, in Makkot, in Shekalim and in Sotah.

To not show pity upon the killer or injurer: That we were prevented from having mercy upon the one that killed his fellow or removed one of his limbs; that the judge not say, "This poor man that cut off the hand of his fellow or blinded his eye, he did not do it intentionally," and he have mercy upon him from having him repay [the injured] according to his evil. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 19:21), "And your eye shall not show mercy, a soul for a soul, etc." And the prevention of this is repeated in a different place, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 19:13), "Your eye shall not show mercy upon him, and you shall purge the innocent blood."

To not show pity upon the killer or injurer: That we were prevented from having mercy upon the one that killed his fellow or removed one of his limbs; that the judge not say, "This poor man that cut off the hand of his fellow or blinded his eye, he did not do it intentionally," and he have mercy upon him from having him repay [the injured] according to his evil. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 19:21), "And your eye shall not show mercy, a soul for a soul, etc." And the prevention of this is repeated in a different place, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 19:13), "Your eye shall not show mercy upon him, and you shall purge the innocent blood."

To not remove a landmark: That we not remove a landmark. And the content is that we not change a landmark that is between us and someone else to the point that it is possible for the liar to say that the land of another's is his; and likewise if he changes the indicators of the landmark (border) and sets them firm into the land of his fellow, and say that he did not change it and that the land is his until the landmark. About all of this is it stated (Deuteronomy 19:14), "You shall not remove the landmark of your neighbor, etc." And they said in Sifrei Devarim 188, "'You shall not remove the landmark' - has it not already been said, 'you shall not rob?' [Hence it] teaches that anyone who removes the perimeter of his fellow transgresses two negative commandments. It is possible also outside of the Land. [Hence] we learn to say, 'in the inheritance that you inherit' - in the Land of Israel, he transgresses two negative commandments; outside the Land of Israel, he transgresses one negative commandment." The matter comes out like this: One who removes the landmark of his fellow, even a finger breadth - if it is by force, he has transgressed, "you shall not rob"; if secretly, he has transgressed, "you shall not steal." And this is outside of the Land, but in the Land of Israel, he transgresses two negative commandments.

To not establish a matter of testimony with one witness: That we have been prevented from establishing the parameters of a punishment upon the body of the convicted - and likewise that we not extract money - according to the testimony of one witness; and even if he is the most fit and wise, or even if he is a prophet. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 19:15), "One witness shall not rise against a man for any iniquity or for any sin."

To do to the collusive witness like he colluded: That we were commanded to do to the witnesses that testified false testimony according to what they sought to damage the one they testified against with their testimony - whether with money, with lashes or with death. And even though it is possible [for the witnesses to do this damage] without an act, they are lashed; due to the inclusion from the verse (Deuteronomy 25:1), "and they shall justify the righteous one, etc.," as it is found in the chapter [entitled] Arba Mitot (Sanhedrin 25a). And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 19:19), "And they shall do to him like he colluded to do to his brother." And this is the law of the colluding witnesses mentioned in the Gemara in many places. And the content of collusion is that two witnesses come and contradict the first ones about their testimony - for example, that they say to them, "But how can you testify about thing x? And is it not that on that day that you are saying that story [happened], you were not in the place that you say it happened there, but rather you were with us in a different place?" This is the crux of refutation [of collusive] testimony. And the Torah commanded us to believe the latter witnesses over the first - whether the first were two, or even a hundred or more, as regarding testimony, two is like a hundred, and a hundred is like two.