Halakhah su Deuteronomio 22:76

Women who want to wrap themselves in a talit may do so privately. According to Ashkenazic practice, they would recite a berakha, and according to Sephardic practice, they would not.¹The law follows R. Shimon, who maintains that the mitzva of tzitzit is time-bound and that women are therefore exempt (Menaḥot 43a; Rif and Rosh ad loc.). Simply understood, however, if women wish to fulfill this mitzva they may, as is the case with other time-bound mitzvot. The only question is whether or not they would recite a berakha. Rambam (MT, Laws of Tzitzit 3:9) states: “Women and slaves who wish to wrap themselves in tzitzit do so without a berakha.” So states Sefer Ha-ḥinukh §386. In contrast, Rabbeinu Tam and Ran maintain that women who wish to wrap themselves in tzitzit may recite the berakha. They similarly disagree about whether women may recite a berakha on blowing the shofar or taking the lulav. The practice of most Sephardic women is not to recite the berakha, while the practice of Ashkenazic women is to recite the berakha, as clarified in SA 589:6 (see above, 2:8).
However, Maharil (New Responsa §7) says that women should not wrap themselves in a talit, mentioning several reasons, such as that we are concerned about forbidden fabric mixtures (sha’atnez), carrying on Shabbat, presumptuous customs, and arrogance. He also mentions an esoteric reason. In Minhagei Maharil (Tzitzit 4), he writes that there were women who wrapped themselves in tzitzit, including the wife of Mahari Brin. Even though he was not pleased with this practice, he did not object. See also Agur, Laws of Tzitzit 27, which mentions this practice. Targum Yonatan of Devarim 22:5 implies that it is forbidden for women to wear tzitzit because it is forbidden for women to wear men’s clothes. However, none of the Rishonim who dealt with the issue mentioned this concern, even though some Aḥaronim (including Ben Ish Ḥai, Year 1, Lekh Lekha 13) did mention it.
SA 17:1 rules:
Women and slaves are exempt, because it is a time-bound positive mitzva. Rema: Nevertheless, if they wish to wrap themselves in it and recite the berakha, they may do so, just like other time-bound positive mitzvot (Tosafot, Rosh, and Ran on the second chapter of Rosh Hashana and the first chapter of Kiddushin). Yet it appears arrogant, and therefore they should not wear tzitzit since it is not an obligation that devolves upon the individual (Agur §27), that is, one is not required to purchase a garment in order to become obligated in tzitzit.
Thus, there is no concern for any halakhic violation, whether out of concern for sha’atnez or wearing men’s clothing. Rema wrote that women should not wrap themselves in tzitzit only because it appears arrogant.
R. Moshe Feinstein addresses this issue thoroughly and writes that if a woman’s purpose in wrapping herself in tzitzit is for God’s sake, she may do so and it is a credit to her. She should use a garment that looks different from a man’s talit (such as by using other colors). According to Ashkenazic custom, she may recite the berakha. However, if she wishes to wrap herself in tzitzit because of external influence, and her purpose is to fight for the cause of feminism, and she wishes to join the fray out of resentment and in order to change the laws of the Torah, it constitutes a denial of the Torah, and she forfeits her share in the next world (Igrot Moshe OḤ 4:49).
Therefore, in my opinion, a woman who wants to wrap herself in tzitzit for God’s sake may do so in private. There is no concern for arrogance, and it is not an expression of resentment against halakha and the tradition. If many women do so for God’s sake and in private, then over time even if they wear tzitzit in non-private setting it will not be considered arrogance or an offense against the traditions of the Torah. Nevertheless, in my opinion, even today one should not object to a woman whose intentions are for God’s sake and who wraps herself publicly in tzitzit, for she has authorities upon whom to rely. However, one should object to women who are not meticulous about many mitzvot but who specifically wear a talit publicly in order to express their opposition to halakhic tradition.

Rambam, both in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Nedarim 4:4, and in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim 6:8, declares that the obligation to render medical assistance is encompassed within the scriptural exhortation "And you shall restore it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2). Although, in context, the verse refers explicitly to restoration of lost property, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, declares that this verse establishes an obligation to "restore" a fellow man's life as well as his property and, accordingly, posits an obligation to rescue a neighbor from danger such as drowning, mauling by an animal or being set upon by bandits. A number of latter-day authorities comment that the accompanying negative prohibition, "You may not hide yourself" (Deuteronomy 22:3) similarly applies to "restoration" of life as well as of property. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, also cites the admonition "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16) as requiring intervention in the aforementioned situations in order to preserve life.

Rambam, both in his Commentary on the Mishnah, Nedarim 4:4, and in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim 6:8, declares that the obligation to render medical assistance is encompassed within the scriptural exhortation "And you shall restore it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2). Although, in context, the verse refers explicitly to restoration of lost property, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, declares that this verse establishes an obligation to "restore" a fellow man's life as well as his property and, accordingly, posits an obligation to rescue a neighbor from danger such as drowning, mauling by an animal or being set upon by bandits. A number of latter-day authorities comment that the accompanying negative prohibition, "You may not hide yourself" (Deuteronomy 22:3) similarly applies to "restoration" of life as well as of property. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, also cites the admonition "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16) as requiring intervention in the aforementioned situations in order to preserve life.

These sources, however, serve only to demonstrate that animal-directed conduct which is compassionate in nature constitutes a "good deed" but do not serve to establish a system of normative duties or responsibilities. Particularly in light of the strong nomistic element present in Judaism, the absence of normative regulations might well be regarded as indicative of the absence of serious ethical concern for the welfare of members of the animal kingdom. But this is demonstrably not the case, for, in Jewish teaching, there is no dearth of nomoi designed to protect and promote animal welfare. The most obvious example of a regulation having such an effect, and one which is clearly biblical in origin, is contained in the verse "If thou seest the ass of him that hateth thee lying under its burden, thou shalt forebear to pass by him; thou shalt surely release it with him" (Exodus 23:5). The selfsame concern is manifest in the prohibition against muzzling an ox while it threshes in order that the animal be free to eat of the produce while working (Deuteronomy 25:4). Similarly, Scripture provides that both domestic animals and wild beasts must be permitted to share in produce of the land which grows without cultivation during the sabbatical year.⁴See Me’iri, Baba Meẓi‘a 33a, and Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 596. The purpose of other biblical laws pertaining to animals in less clear-cut. The prohibition against plowing with animals of different species, recorded in Deuteronomy 22:10, is understood by Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 550, as well as by Da‘at Zekenim mi-Ba’alei ha-Tosafot and Ba’al ha-Turim in their respective commentaries on Deuteronomy 22:10, as rooted in considerations of prevention of cruelty to animals, but is understood in an entirely different manner by Rambam, Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 49, as well as by Ramban in his commentary on Deuteronomy 22:10. However, Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 48, regards the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day, recorded in Leviticus 22:28, as a precautionary measure designed to prevent the slaughter of the offspring in the presence of its parent. The underlying concern is to spare the mother the anguish of seeing her young killed before her eyes “for in these cases animals feel very great pain, there being no difference regarding this pain between man and the other animals. For the love and the tenderness of a mother for her child is not consequent upon reason, but upon the activity of the imaginative faculty, which is found in most animals just as it is found in man.” Here, Rambam speaks of concern for the welfare of the animal rather than for the moral character of the human agent; see below, notes 14-15 and accompanying text. This interpretation is reflected in the comments of R. Baḥya ben Asher, Leviticus 22:28, and, in part, in Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 294. Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh regards the commandment prohibiting the slaughter of an animal and its young on the same day as designed both to spare the parent from anguish and as a conservation measure as well. See also Abarbanel’s Commentary on the Bible, ad locum. Rambam’s analysis of the rationale underlying this precept is rejected by Ramban in his Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6. According to Ramban, the concern is not to avoid pain to the animal but to purge man of callousness, cruelty and savagery.
Although the Gemara, Baba Meẓi‘a 32a, declares that assistance in unloading a burden from an animal is mandated by reason of ẓa’ar ba’alei ḥayyim but that the obligation to assist in loading the burden upon the animal is not independently mandated by reason of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim, Ritva, cited by Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Meẓi‘a 31a, s.v. aval te’inah, asserts that the commandment requiring a person to render assistance to another who is engaged in loading an animal is predicated upon considerations of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. According to Ritva, a single person engaged in this task is likely to cause additional discomfort to the animal by applying the full force of his body weight whereas, when he is assisted by another, there is no need to apply similar pressure.
Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 186, is of the opinion that the prohibition against the slaughter of sanctified animals outside the Temple precincts is rooted in considerations of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. According to Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, such slaughter is forbidden because no purpose is served thereby and hence constitutes ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. See below, note 29.
Neither the prohibition against mating animals of different species, Leviticus 19:19, nor the prohibition against emasculation of animals, Leviticus 22:24, is understood by classical rabbinic scholars as rooted in considerations of animal welfare. For a discussion of animal welfare as a possible rationale associated with other commandments, see R. Joel Schwartz, Ve-Raḥamav al Kol Ma’asav (Jerusalem, 5744), pp. 11-16. Although the literal meaning of the biblical text may be somewhat obscure, talmudic exegesis understands Genesis 9:4 and Deuteronomy 12:23 as forbidding the eating of a limb severed from a living animal. Jewish law teaches that this prohibition, unlike most other commandments, is universally binding upon all peoples as one of the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah. Sabbath laws contained in both formulations of the Decalogue reflect a concern which goes beyond the mere elimination of pain and discomfort and serve to promote the welfare of animals in a positive manner by providing for their rest on the Sabbath day: "But the seventh day is a Sabbath unto the Lord thy God, on it thou shalt not do any manner of work … nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle …" (Deuteronomy 5:14). Even more explicit in expressing concern for the welfare of animals is the verse "… but on the seventh day thou shalt rest; that thine ox and thine ass may have rest" (Exodus 23:12).⁵The requirement that the parent bird be released before the young are taken and the concomitant prohibition against taking both the parent and the young, recorded in Deuteronomy 22:6-7, quite obviously have the effect of sparing the parent from anguish. The Mishnah, Berakhot 33b, however, does not view this desideratum, laudable as it may be, as the underlying purpose of the commandment. Cf., however, Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 48; Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6; and Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 545.

Judaism, on the contrary, posits a clear and unequivocal obligation to preserve the life of another. The attitude reflected in that requirement is most eloquently captured in a talmudic passage regarding the creation of Adam: "Therefore, only a single human being was created in the world, to teach that if any person has caused a single soul of Israel to perish, Scripture regards him as if he had caused an entire world to perish; and if any human being saves a single soul in Israel, Scripture regards him as if he had saved an entire world" (Sanhedrin 37a). The normative obligation to save the life of an endangered person is formulated by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, on the basis of two separate biblical texts. The first is the scriptural exhortation with regard to restoration of lost property, "and you shall return it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2). On the basis of a pleonasm in the Hebrew text, the Gemara declares that this verse establishes an obligation to restore a fellow man's body as well as his property. A second source is the command "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). As indicated by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, the latter obligation mandates not only the rendering of personal assistance, as is the case with regard to the positive obligation applicable to restoration of lost property, but, by virtue of inclusion in the negative commandment, the obligation is expanded to encompass commitment of financial resources for the sake of preserving the life of a fellow man.⁵For sources elucidating the specific application of these obligations to medical intervention see this writer’s “The Obligation to Heal in the Judaic Tradition: A Comparative Analysis,” Jewish Bioethics (New York, 1981), ed. Fred Rosner and J. David Bleich, pp. 1–55; and J. David Bleich, Judaism and Healing (New York, 1981), pp. 1–10.

These sources, however, serve only to demonstrate that animal-directed conduct which is compassionate in nature constitutes a "good deed" but do not serve to establish a system of normative duties or responsibilities. Particularly in light of the strong nomistic element present in Judaism, the absence of normative regulations might well be regarded as indicative of the absence of serious ethical concern for the welfare of members of the animal kingdom. But this is demonstrably not the case, for, in Jewish teaching, there is no dearth of nomoi designed to protect and promote animal welfare. The most obvious example of a regulation having such an effect, and one which is clearly biblical in origin, is contained in the verse "If thou seest the ass of him that hateth thee lying under its burden, thou shalt forebear to pass by him; thou shalt surely release it with him" (Exodus 23:5). The selfsame concern is manifest in the prohibition against muzzling an ox while it threshes in order that the animal be free to eat of the produce while working (Deuteronomy 25:4). Similarly, Scripture provides that both domestic animals and wild beasts must be permitted to share in produce of the land which grows without cultivation during the sabbatical year.⁴See Me’iri, Baba Meẓi‘a 33a, and Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 596. The purpose of other biblical laws pertaining to animals in less clear-cut. The prohibition against plowing with animals of different species, recorded in Deuteronomy 22:10, is understood by Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 550, as well as by Da‘at Zekenim mi-Ba’alei ha-Tosafot and Ba’al ha-Turim in their respective commentaries on Deuteronomy 22:10, as rooted in considerations of prevention of cruelty to animals, but is understood in an entirely different manner by Rambam, Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 49, as well as by Ramban in his commentary on Deuteronomy 22:10. However, Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 48, regards the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day, recorded in Leviticus 22:28, as a precautionary measure designed to prevent the slaughter of the offspring in the presence of its parent. The underlying concern is to spare the mother the anguish of seeing her young killed before her eyes “for in these cases animals feel very great pain, there being no difference regarding this pain between man and the other animals. For the love and the tenderness of a mother for her child is not consequent upon reason, but upon the activity of the imaginative faculty, which is found in most animals just as it is found in man.” Here, Rambam speaks of concern for the welfare of the animal rather than for the moral character of the human agent; see below, notes 14-15 and accompanying text. This interpretation is reflected in the comments of R. Baḥya ben Asher, Leviticus 22:28, and, in part, in Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 294. Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh regards the commandment prohibiting the slaughter of an animal and its young on the same day as designed both to spare the parent from anguish and as a conservation measure as well. See also Abarbanel’s Commentary on the Bible, ad locum. Rambam’s analysis of the rationale underlying this precept is rejected by Ramban in his Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6. According to Ramban, the concern is not to avoid pain to the animal but to purge man of callousness, cruelty and savagery.
Although the Gemara, Baba Meẓi‘a 32a, declares that assistance in unloading a burden from an animal is mandated by reason of ẓa’ar ba’alei ḥayyim but that the obligation to assist in loading the burden upon the animal is not independently mandated by reason of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim, Ritva, cited by Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Meẓi‘a 31a, s.v. aval te’inah, asserts that the commandment requiring a person to render assistance to another who is engaged in loading an animal is predicated upon considerations of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. According to Ritva, a single person engaged in this task is likely to cause additional discomfort to the animal by applying the full force of his body weight whereas, when he is assisted by another, there is no need to apply similar pressure.
Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 186, is of the opinion that the prohibition against the slaughter of sanctified animals outside the Temple precincts is rooted in considerations of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. According to Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, such slaughter is forbidden because no purpose is served thereby and hence constitutes ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. See below, note 29.
Neither the prohibition against mating animals of different species, Leviticus 19:19, nor the prohibition against emasculation of animals, Leviticus 22:24, is understood by classical rabbinic scholars as rooted in considerations of animal welfare. For a discussion of animal welfare as a possible rationale associated with other commandments, see R. Joel Schwartz, Ve-Raḥamav al Kol Ma’asav (Jerusalem, 5744), pp. 11-16. Although the literal meaning of the biblical text may be somewhat obscure, talmudic exegesis understands Genesis 9:4 and Deuteronomy 12:23 as forbidding the eating of a limb severed from a living animal. Jewish law teaches that this prohibition, unlike most other commandments, is universally binding upon all peoples as one of the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah. Sabbath laws contained in both formulations of the Decalogue reflect a concern which goes beyond the mere elimination of pain and discomfort and serve to promote the welfare of animals in a positive manner by providing for their rest on the Sabbath day: "But the seventh day is a Sabbath unto the Lord thy God, on it thou shalt not do any manner of work … nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle …" (Deuteronomy 5:14). Even more explicit in expressing concern for the welfare of animals is the verse "… but on the seventh day thou shalt rest; that thine ox and thine ass may have rest" (Exodus 23:12).⁵The requirement that the parent bird be released before the young are taken and the concomitant prohibition against taking both the parent and the young, recorded in Deuteronomy 22:6-7, quite obviously have the effect of sparing the parent from anguish. The Mishnah, Berakhot 33b, however, does not view this desideratum, laudable as it may be, as the underlying purpose of the commandment. Cf., however, Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 48; Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6; and Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 545.

But this was already missed by someone besides us to the point that he counted, "she does not go out like the release of slaves" (Exodus 21:7) - and he did not know that this was a negation and not a prohibition. And the explanation of this is as I will explain. And that is that since God already determined about someone who struck his [gentile] slave or maidservant - and at the time of the strike, caused him to lack one of his main limbs - that [the slave or maidservant] goes out to freedom, it would enter our minds that if the matter is like this with a gentile slave, all the more so would it be the case with a Jewish maidservant and that she would go out to freedom if she loses one of her main limbs. And He negates this conception from us, by His saying, "she does not go out like the release of slaves" - as if to say, there is no obligation for her to be sent out to freedom with the loss of her limbs. So this is the negation of a law about her, and not a prohibition. And the masters of the tradition also explained it like this: And they said in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta DeRabbi Shimon Bar Yochai 21:7), "'She does not go out like the release of slaves' - she does not go out with the main limbs in the way that [gentile] slaves go out." Behold that it is hence already clear to you that it is the negation of another law, which He is negating from her - not that He prohibited anything to us. And there is no difference between His saying, "she does not go out like the release of slaves," and His saying (Leviticus 13:36), "the priest does not examine the yellow hair, he is impure" - it is only a negation, not a prohibition. And that is that it is explaining to us that he does not require quarantine because of this indication (of impurity), and that there is no doubt about him - he is impure. And likewise is His saying (Leviticus 19:20), "they are not put to death, since she has not been freed," a negation and not a prohibition. For He is saying that they are not liable for the death penalty, since [her] freedom is not complete. And it would be inappropriate to explain this as if it were stated, "you shall not put them to death" - such that it would go from a matter of negation to a matter of prohibition. For His saying, "they are not put to death, since she has not been freed," is like His saying (Deuteronomy 22:26), "the girl has no sin worthy of death" - which negates the death penalty from her because of the rape. And likewise [here], He negated the liability of death from them because of [her] slavery - as if to say, they have no sin worthy of death. And likewise is His saying (Numbers 17:5), "and not be like Korach and like his congregation," a negation. And the Sages clarified that it is a negation: They explained its content and said (Midrash Tanchuma, Tzav 13:1) that He, may He be exalted, was telling us that anyone who argues about and challenges the priesthood will not have what happened to Korach and his congregation happen to him with regards to being swallowing up or burned; but rather his punishment will truly be like that which the Lord said through Moshe - meaning to say, tsaraat. For He, may He be elevated, had said to him (Exodus 4:6), "Put your hand into your bosom." And they brought a proof [for this] from what happened to King Uzziah of Judah (II Chronicles 26:19). And even though we find a different expression in the Gemara in Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 110a) - and that is their saying, "Anyone who maintains an argument, transgresses a negative commandment, as it is stated, 'and not be like Korach and like his congregation" - this is by way of an asmakhta (homiletic support), and not that their intention in this is the simple meaning of the verse. However the prohibition about this is included in a different negative commandment, which I will explain in its place.

A latter-day authority, R. Yehudah Leib Zirelson, Teshuvot Azei ha-Levanon, no. 61, asserts that the obligations posited by the Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, apply under nonlife-threatening circumstances no less than in life-threatening situations. The verse "And you shall restore it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2) mandates not only the return of lost property but, a fortiori, preservation of life as well. The verse, then, does not refer only to the return of objects of material value. Accordingly, declares Azei ha-Levanon, restoration of health to a person suffering from an illness is assuredly included in the commandment, "And you shall restore it to him."

Nontherapeutic life-saving intervention is talmudically mandated on independent grounds. The Talmud, Sanhedrin 73a, posits an obligation to rescue a neighbor from danger, such as drowning or being mauled by an animal. This obligation is predicated upon the scriptural exhortation with regard to the restoration of lost property, "And you shall return it to him" (Deut. 22:2). On the basis of a pleonasm in the Hebrew text, the Talmud declares that this verse includes an obligation to restore a fellow man's body as well as his property. Hence, there is created an obligation to come to the aid of one's fellow man in a life-threatening situation. Noteworthy is the fact that Maimonides,²Commentary on the Mishnah, Nedarim 4:4. Cf. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Nedarim 6:8. going beyond the examples supplied by the Talmud, posits this source as the basis of the obligation to render medical care. Maimonides declares that the biblical commandment "And you shall return it to him" establishes an obligation requiring the physician to render professional services in life-threatening situations. Every individual, insofar as he is able, is obligated to restore the health of a fellow man no less than he is obligated to restore his property. Maimonides views this as a binding religious obligation.

It is already well-known that there is a command to cease work on Shabbat and that it was repeated twelve times in the Torah. Would you see someone who counts the commandments saying that they are included as commandments of resting on Shabbat, and that they are twelve commandments? And likewise does the prohibition of eating blood come seven times. Would any learned one also think to say that the prohibition of blood is seven commandments? And this is something that no one would err about - meaning that resting on Shabbat is [only] one of the positive commandments. And you should know that even when you find the expression of the Sages, that one who transgresses prohibition x has transgressed so many negative commandments or when he who negates matter y has negated so many positive commandments - it does not necessarily come out of this that you should count each one of those negative commandments or positive commandments individually; for it is the same content and there is no [true] multiplicity. Indeed, they [are saying] that he transgresses so many positive or negative commandments on account of the repetition of the command or the prohibition of that commandment; for he transgressed many [statements of the] prohibition. This is unless you find that they say, he is given two or three [sets of] lashes. For then, each one is counted individually. For one cannot be given two [sets of] lashes for one category (shem), as is clarified from that which is made known in the Talmud in Makkot (Makkot 16a) and Chullin (Chullin 82b) and other places. Indeed one receives two [sets of] lashes for two categories - meaning for two matters about which a prohibition comes for each one. And that is the difference between their saying, "He transgresses for this and that," and their saying, "He receives two [sets of] lashes," or "three [sets of] lashes." And the proof to that which we are saying is their saying (Menachot 44a), "Whoever does not have tzitzit (fringes) on his garment violates five positive commandments" - since the language of the command is repeated five times (in Numbers 15:38-39 and Deuteronomy 22:12): The first is, "let them attach to the tzitzit at each corner." The second is, "make for themselves tzitzit." The third is, "That shall be your tzitzit." The fourth is, "You shall make tassels for yourself." And the fifth is, "on the four corners of the garment with which you cover yourself." But we found a clear statement from them that tzitzit is [only] one commandment, as I will explain when I discuss it (Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandments 14). And in this exact way do they say (Menachot 44a), "Whoever does not don tefillin violates eight positive commandments" - because of the repetition of the command about them, of the head and of the arm, eight times. And likewise their saying, "Any priest who does not go up on the platform (to bless the congregation) violates thirteen positive commandments" - because of the repetition of the command about it thirteen times. And none of those who count the commandments would be so foolish as to say that the blessing of the priests is thirteen commandments, that tzitzit is five commandments and that tefillin is eight commandments. And had it been so, it would have been appropriate for us to count abuse of a convert as three commandments, because of the repetition of the prohibition about it - on account of their saying in the Gemara in Bava Metzia (Bava Metzia 59b), "One who abuses the convert transgresses three negative commandments and one who oppresses him transgresses three negative commandments." But they are only two commandments - do not abuse and do not oppress him - however their prohibition was repeated. And this is clear and there is no doubt about it. And in explanation, they said in the Gemara, "For what reason are we warned in the Torah in thirty-six places with regard to a convert? It is due to the convert’s inclination being evil." Would it be possible for one to say that this is thirty-six commandments out of the 613 commandments? No one would be foolish enough to say it!

Noteworthy is not only Maimonides' extension of this concept to cover medical matters but also his failure to allude at all to the verse "and he shall cause him to be thoroughly healed." It would appear that Maimonides is of the opinion that without the granting of specific permission one would not be permitted to tamper with physiological processes; obligations derived from Deuteronomy 22:2 would he limited to the prevention of accident or assault by man or beast. The dispensation to intervene in the natural order is derived from Exodus 21:20; but once such license is given, medical therapy is not simply elective but acquires the status of a positive obligation.³Cf. R. Baruch ha-Levi Epstein, Torah Temimah, Exod. 21:19 and Deut. 22:2. Cf., also, R. Abraham Danzig, Ḥokhmat Adam, 141:25. As indicated by Sanhedrin 73a, this obligation mandates not only the rendering of personal assistance, as is the case with regard to the restoration of lost property, but, by virtue of the negative commandment, "You shall not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor" (Lev. 19:16), the obligation is expanded to encompass expenditure of financial resources for the sake of preserving life of one's fellow man. This seems to have been the interpretation given to Maimonides' comments by R. Joseph Karo, who, in his code of Jewish law, combined both concepts in stating: "The Torah gave permission to the physician to heal; moreover, this is a religious precept and it is included in the category of saving life; and if the physician withholds his service it is considered as shedding blood."⁴Yoreh De‘ah 36:1. See R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Ramat Raḥel, no. 21, and idem, Ẓiẓ Eli‘ezer, X, no. 25, chap. 7.

Azei ha-Levanon further contends that failure to provide a medical remedy, when available, entails violation both of the commandment "You may not hide yourself" (Deuteronomy 22:3) which, in its biblical context, refers to a person who comes upon lost property belonging to another and of the admonition "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). Sifra, Kedoshim 41, declares that these commandments establish an obligation making it incumbent upon an individual to act, if he is capable of doing so, not only to preserve the life of another, but also in order to prevent his fellow from sustaining a financial loss. This obligation is recorded by Rambam, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:13; Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 237, and Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1. It similarly follows, argues Azei ha-Levanon, that a person is under the selfsame obligation to prevent deterioration of another person's health if he possesses the requisite knowledge and skill to be of assistance in providing medical care. Failure to do so, concludes Azei ha-Levanon, would constitute transgression of these two negative commandments as well as of the positive commandment "And you shall restore it to him." Furthermore, as noted earlier, according to Ramban, failure to render medical assistance entails abrogation of the positive commandment "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself." Thus, even in situations which pose no threat to life, a person in a position to do so is bound to render medical assistance by no less than four separate mizvot.

Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that a general obligation to be kind to animals or, minimally, a duty to refrain from cruelty to animals, can be inferred from any of these biblical regulations or even from all of them collectively. These regulations have been understood by some Sages of the Talmud as establishing particular duties, not as expressions of a more general duty. Nor is it demonstrably certain that even these limited and particular duties are designed primarily for the purpose of promoting the welfare of animals. Even with regard to the particular duty concerning removing the burden borne by a beast, the commandment does not necessarily reflect concern for the welfare of the animal. The obligation to release the ass from its burden (Exodus 23:5), i.e., to assist the owner in unloading merchandise or materials carried by a beast of burden, and the similar obligation to come to the assistance of a fallen animal (Deuteronomy 22:4) are understood by many classical commentators as duties rooted in a concern for the financial loss which would be suffered by the animal's master were the animal to collapse under the weight of the burden. Thus, in formulating the rationale underlying this commandment, R. Aaron ha-Levi of Barcelona, Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 80, declares:

A turban is exempt, even those from the Western lands where both its ends are tossed over their shoulders and body... and even though one covers with it one's head and the majority [of his body], it is exempt, because its main purpose is to cover the head, and "your garment" (Deuteronomy 22:12) is written in the Torah, and not the garment of the head.

(Zayin) There is still more. This [required] study must be from love, such that he not use this trait for anything else at all, ‘but rather his desire is for the Torah of the Lord.’ And these are the words of the Midrash Tanchuma, Noach 3:4-7:
The Israelites did not accept the Torah until the Holy One, blessed be He, arched the mountain over them like a vessel, etc. If you should say it was because of the Written Law, isn’t it true that as soon as He said to them, “Will you accept the Torah,” they all responded (Exod. 24:7), “We will do and hear?” … But rather He said this to them because of the Oral Law, etc. And its jealousy is as harsh as Sheol.²⁸The pit, usually a reference to the nether-world. One does not study the Oral Law unless he loves the Holy One, blessed be He, with all his heart, etc., as it is stated (Deut. 6:5), “And you shall love, etc.” Whence do you learn that this word, “love,” refers only to studying the [Oral Law]? Observe what is written after this (Deut. 6:6): “And these words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart.” And what study is upon the heart? Scripture (Deut. 6:7) states [immediately thereafter], “And you shall review it to your children.” [Hence] this is the study that requires review (i.e. the Oral Law). We learn from these verses that the first part of the Shema (Deut. 6:4-9) does not mention a reward given in this world, while the second part does: “And if you shall hearken diligently, etc., I will give the rain of your land in its season” (Deut. 11:13). This reward is given to those who perform the commandments even though they neglect study [of the Oral Law], etc. As anyone who loves material riches and earthly pleasures is incapable of studying the Oral Law. [This is because] there is considerable anguish and sleeplessness in (store for him who studies) it; one wastes and neglects himself on its account. Therefore its reward is in the hereafter, as it is said (Isaiah 9:1), “The people that walk in darkness have seen a great light,” etc. Therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, established two academies (at Sura and Pumbeditha) for the Israelites where they studied the Torah day and night and where they assembled from all parts of the world twice each year – in the months of Adar and Elul. They came together to “battle” the problems encountered in the Torah until they had resolved them and reached a definitive decision concerning the law. [See there, as it is lengthy.]
And [the Rabbis] said in the Midrash that the Holy One, blessed be He, forced us [to accept the Oral Law] by arching the mountain, such that the Torah would not be severed from us forever. As with a [woman] forced [to have sexual relations], it is written (Deut. 22:19), “he may not send her away all of his days.”²⁹See the next paragraph and note 34. Also the manna that they ate in the wilderness was [given] with this intention. As it is written in Maggid Mesharim of Beit Yosef (R. Yosef Karo), that the manna that the Israelites ate was necessary in order [for them] to receive the Torah without any choice. And these are the words in Yalkut Reuveni, Beshelach: [The angel named] Yafefiyah who is the one who rained down the manna upon Israel, is numerically equivalent (with the letters adding up to 197) to Katseh, who is the angelic minister of Torah; whereas they said (Num. 21:5), “and our souls are sick (katseh)” – to make known that they were sick and disgusted of the manna and of the Torah. See there. And this was forcing them to receive the Torah, as the manna was coming from the minister of the Torah, and it was the bread of mighty ones from which the ministering angels are sustained. [Hence] they no longer had any physical desire or inclination. Rather it was [therewith only] the love of the Torah and of the commandments that was implanted in their hearts. And this [love] remained for [future] generations among the enlightened ones about whom it is stated (Num. 19:14), “when a man dies in a tent.”³⁰ See Berakhot 63b.

(Chet) [Yet] I saw ‘difficult visions’: Behold, it is written in Parashat Behaalotecha (Num. 11:35-12:1), “Then the people set out from Kivrot-Hataavah to Hatserot and were in Hatserot. Miriam and Aharon spoke against Moshe because of the Cushite woman he had married.” And Tosafot on Yevamot 62a (s. v. dekhtiv emor lehem) asked why it is that they waited a long time after the giving of the Torah to speak about Moshe (since their problem was that he had separated from his wife earlier, from when the Torah was given). And they answered that – according to that which is found in the Talmud Yerushalmi³¹The common text of Tosafot has the citation as Sifrei and presumably refers to the account in Sifrei Zuta 12:1. – the seventy elders were chosen at Kivrot-Hataavah. And [at that time] Miriam said to Tsipporah, “Happy are the wives of these [men] that were chosen for greatness.” Tsipporah [however answered], “Woe to them, as behold my husband Moshe separated from me from the day that the Holy One, blessed be He, started speaking to him.” And then the matter became known to them. See there. And it appears [that this is connected to] that which we find there (Num. 11:4-7) that “they desired a desire […] and they said, ‘Who will feed us meat? We remember the fish that we used to eat free in Egypt, etc. Now our souls are dry; there is nothing at all but this manna in our eyes.’ And the manna was like coriander seed, and in color it was like bdellium.” And Rashi (Rashi on Numbers 11:7) explained, “He who said that (i.e. the previous verse) did not say this […]; but rather [it is] the Holy One, blessed be He, who had, ‘And the manna was like coriander seed,’ written in the Torah (even though no one said it).” And it is [further] written (Num. 11:10), “And Moshe heard the people weeping, each family apart, each person at the entrance of his tent.” And Rashi (on this verse) explained [that] “each family apart”³²Le’mishpechoteichem, which can also be read as, for their families. [means], “because of family affairs – because of the sexual prohibitions [of blood-relatives] that had been forbidden to them.” See there. And that is astonishing; as what does the quarrel of the manna have to do with matters of sexual prohibitions? And it appears that it can be explained according to what the Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, said about that which is found in the Gemara (Shabbat 88a), “‘And they stood at the lowermost part of the mountain’³³Be’tachtit haHar, which can also be read as, in the lowermost part of the mountain. (Exod. 19:17) – […] teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, overturned the mountain above [the Jews] like a tub, [and said to them], ‘If you accept the Torah, excellent; but if not, there will be your burial.’” And it was asked [that] behold, they already assented and said (Exod. 24:7), “We will do and hear!”³⁴While this is essentially the same question that he cites from the Midrash Tanchuma in Paragraph Zayin, he will now proceed to give a different answer. And it is written in Gur Aryeh³⁵Gur Aryeh on Exodus 19:17. that it is not possible for the Torah to be received by choice – that they would accept it if they wanted to, and not accept it if they did not want to – but rather the Holy One, blessed be He, is showing them that the Torah is imperative for them (that it had to be accepted by them). And something imperative exists permanently; as it is found in the Midrash, that concerning a [woman] forced [to have sexual relations], it is written (Deut. 22:19), “he may not send her away all of his days.”³⁶This midrash is unknown. See Yehoshua Hartman’s edition of Gur Aryeh ad loc., Note 273; and M. Kasher’s Torah Shelemah ad loc., Note 224. See there. And behold we have found that they desired a desire; meaning that they did not have any physical desire and – as is written by (Rabbi Moshe) Alshekh (on Num. 11:4) – they desired that they would have desire. See there. And according to what I have written, the reason is that on account of the manna – that was from the minister of the Torah, and was the bread of mighty ones – all of their wish and yearning was only for Torah. And ‘their souls were dry’ and empty from all physical desire. And [so] they desired desire, such that the receiving of the Torah could be of their wish and wanting, like [when] they said, “We will do and hear” – as no one wishes forced love. Therefore they quarreled about the manna and its forcing the love of Torah [upon them]. And [when] they said, “We remember the fish that we used to eat free (chinam) in Egypt,” its explanation is [that it was] without force, but rather that [it was that] which we chose and which appealed to us. As this is the understanding of the word chinam, as is elucidated in Radak’s³⁷R. David Kimchi (Provence, 1160-1235) was a Biblical commentator and grammarian. Book of Roots under the root, chanan (graced). [And the meaning of] “Now our souls are dry; there is nothing at all but this manna,” is that we were forced, and we want that the choice be in our hands. However we would also eat the manna by choice. As if the manna were not ‘good to eat and appealing to the sight,’ we would have needed force; but in fact, “the manna was like coriander seed and in color it was like bdellium,” and we would certainly eat of it.³⁸In this way, one no longer has to resort to Rashi’s answer that this phrase was added by God to the quote of the people which accordingly ended abruptly. However all of the desires would [then] not be removed from us and the receiving of the Torah would be with wanting and choice – as [when] they said, “We shall hear and do.”

Rav Kalischer (Drishat Tzion, Ma’amar Kadishin 3) argues that we could make bigdei kehunah without techeilet, just as, in the absence of techeilet, we wear tzitzit with white strings only (Menachot 38a). Most authorities reject his position, noting that the Tosefta (Menachot 6:6) explicitly states that bigdei kehunah cannot be made without techeilet. Moreover, the bigdei kehunah contain sha’atnez (a prohibited mixture of wool and linen; see Devarim 22:11). The positive commandment to make bigdei kehunah overrides this prohibition, but wearing bigdei kehunah that were made improperly would violate it.

Rav Breisch then expands the definition of pain for which a doctor may injure. His source is the Gemara’s (Shabbat 50b) permission for a man to remove scabs from his body to eliminate pain, but not merely to beautify himself. Rashi (ad. loc. s.v. Mishum L’yafot) explains that removing scabs for beautification purposes is forbidden for a male because it is regarded as feminine behavior.⁵Halachah forbids both men and women from imitating the behaviors of the opposite gender; see Devarim 22:5 and Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 182). Tosafot, however, (ad. loc. s.v. Bishvil) qualify the Gemara’s statement: “If the only pain that he suffers is that he is embarrassed to walk among people then it is permissible, because there is no greater pain than this.” Thus, Tosafot extend the definition of pain to include psychological distress. Accordingly, since the inability to find an appropriate spouse is certainly most distressing and the prohibition to wound does not apply when attempting to alleviate pain, Rav Breisch permits the young woman to undergo cosmetic surgery.

Even if the earlier-cited authorities are correct in assuming that the prohibition "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" is limited to situations in which intervention is mandated by "and you shall restore it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2) and does not establish an entirely independent obligation, the conclusion reached by those authorities is not compelled. A person's life, unlike his property, does not belong to himself but to the Creator.⁵See Rambam Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 1:4; Radvaz, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 18:6; Shulḥan Arukh ha-Rav, V, Hilkhot Nizkei Guf va-Nefesh, sec. 4; and R. Shlomoh Yosef Zevin, Le-Or ha-Halakhah (Tel Aviv, 5717), pp. 222f. Cf., R. Shiloh Rafael, Torah she-be-al Peh, XXXIII (5752), 74-81, reprinted in idem, Mishkan Shiloh (Jerusalem, 5756), pp. 212-221. Accordingly, argues R. Yo'av Yehoshu'a Weingarten of Kintzk (Konskie), in a responsum included in R. Issachar Berish Graubert's Teshuvot Divrei Yissakhar, no. 168, the obligation to preserve life is not a duty owed to the potential victim but to the Deity and that duty is shared equally by the rescuer and the person rescued.⁶Indeed, Tur Shulḥan Arukh, Ḥoshen Mishpat 261, maintains that willfully abandoned property or property that a person attempts to destroy becomes res nullius. However, Rambam, Hilkhot Gezelah ve-Avedah 11:11, maintains that an attempt to destroy one’s property does not render it res nullius but that, nevertheless, there is no obligation to preserve such property. R. Yo’av Yeshoshu’a Weingarten’s line of reasoning is cogent according to both positions. See Rabbi Eliashiv, Sefer ha-Zikaron, p. 404. In a responsum of which the earlier-cited authorities were apparently unaware, R. Meir of Rothenberg, Teshuvot Maharam ben Barukh (Prague, 5368), no. 39, rules unequivocally that an individual must be rescued from potential death even if he protests and vehemently demands that there be no intervention. A similar rebuttal is offered by R. Meir Dan Plocki, Klei Hemdah, Parashat Ki Teze, sec. 6.⁷See also R. Chaim Joseph David Azulai, Birkei Yosef, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, 301:6, who rules that Sabbath restrictions are suspended for purposes of saving the life of a would-be suicide. Similar rulings are recorded in Teshuvot Maharil Diskin, Kuntres Aḥaron, no. 5, sec. 34, as well as in Iggerot Mosheh, Yoreh De’ah, II, no. 174, anaf 3 and Yoreh De’ah, III, no. 90.

In addition to Shabbat concerns, women are forbidden to bear arms any day of the week. The Torah (Devarim 22:5) prohibits women to wear clothing customarily worn by men and vice versa. The Rambam (Hilchot Avodah Zarah 12:10) rules in accordance with the view of Rabi Eliezer ben Yaakov (Nazir 59a) who includes women bearing arms in this prohibition. Rashi (ad. loc. s.v. Talmud Lomar) adds that it is for this reason that Yael killed Sisera with a peg instead of a conventional weapon (Shofetim 5:26 see Targum Yonatan ben Uzziel ad. loc. who presents the same explanation as Rashi).

Who Is Obligated in ציצית. Containing 3 Se'ifim:
Even though [the verse] states "And you shall look upon it" (Numbers 15:39), a blind man is [still] obligated in ציצית since the [verse] of "that you cover with" (Deuteronomy 22:12) comes to include [a blind man]. And the verse of "And you shall look upon it" is needed to exclude a nighttime garment.

An intriguing argument has been advanced in support of the view that airplane travelers should not recite the wayfarer's prayer during the course of airplane travel. That position is derived from a provision of Jewish law incorporated in the regulations pertaining to the commandment concerning sending a mother bird from its nest prior to taking nestlings or eggs. The terminology in which the commandment is couched, "If a bird's nest chance to be before you in the way" (Deuteronomy 22:6), makes it clear that this obligation exists only with regard to birds that a person comes upon on a roadway or the like. For this reason the Gemara, Hullin 139b, indicates that the commandment does not encompass a situation in which one comes upon a bird carrying its nest while flying:

In a similar vein, Rambam, Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 48, declares, "The reason for the prohibition against eating a limb [cut from] a living animal is because this would make one acquire the habit of cruelty." Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 17, makes the same observation with regard to the general obligation with regard to za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim in stating that that duty "is set down with a view to perfecting us that we should not acquire moral habits of cruelty and should not inflict pain gratutiously, but that we should intend to be kind and merciful even with a chance animal individual except in case of need."¹⁶See also Ramban’s comments in his Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6.

The question is a two-fold one: (1) Does the wearing of such attire involve a transgression of the biblical prohibition "A woman shall not wear men's apparel" (Deuteronomy 22:5)? (2) Does such garb violate halakhic norms of feminine modesty? Formal opinions in answer to these questions are found in the responsa of the head of the Jerusalem Bet Din, Rabbi Eliezer Waldenberg, Ẓiz Eli'ezer, XI, no. 62; the Bet Din of the Edah ha-Haredit of Jerusalem, Rabbi Yitzchak Ya'akov Weisz, Minḥat Yizḥak, II, no. 108; and of the late Sephardic scholar, R. Ovadiah Hadaya, Yaskil Avdi, V, Yoreh De'ah, no. 20 and VI, Even ha-Ezer, no. 54. A number of years ago, the question of the propriety of slacks was presented to a number of prominent scholars by Rabbi Yom Tov Lippa Deutsch and their answers appear in Rabbi Deutsch's Taharat Yom Tov, IX, 55 and 77-87.

Rabbi Meir Amsel (Ha-Ma'or, Kislev-Tevet 5733) notes that yet another prohibition is also applicable to sex-change procedures, a consideration which may extend as well to hormone treatment for purposes of sex-change. The commandment "A woman shall not wear that which pertains to a man, nor shall a man put on a woman's garment" (Deut. 22:5) is not limited to the wearing of apparel associated with the opposite sex but encompasses any action uniquely identified with the opposite sex, proscribing, for example, shaving of armpits or dyeing of hair by a male. A procedure designed to transform sexual characteristics violates the very essence of this prohibition.

Other authorities require that medical treatment be provided and circumcision delayed for entirely different reasons. R. Yehudah Leib Zirelson, Teshuvot Azei ha-Levanon, no. 61, argues that correcting the orthopedic problem in order that the child may have use of the limb constitutes the fulfillment of a positive commandment. Sanhedrin 73a declares that the verse "and you shall return it to him" (Deut. 22:2) mandates not only the return of lost property but, a fortiori, preservation of life as well. Azei ha-Levanon cogently argues that restoration of use of a limb similarly constitutes fulfillment of this mizvah. Citing Ritva, Sukkah 25a,²⁴A similar, but not identical, question arises with regard to whether it is permissible to delay fulfillment of a miẓvah in order to perform it in a more optimal manner. Terumat ha-Deshen, no. 35, analyzes this question in the context of delaying kiddush levanah until the conclusion of Shabbat in order to pronounce the blessing while attired in Sabbath garments; see Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 426:2. Teshuvot Shevut Ya‘akov, I, no. 34, discusses the same question in the context of whether one should perform the miẓvah of arba minim at the earliest possible hour or should postpone its fulfillment until a more beautiful etrog is available. Cf., also the comments of Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 25:2, in explanation of the ruling of Rema that one need not delay the donning of phylacteries until a tallit is also available. Sefer Ḥasidim (Berlin, 5651), no. 454, implies that an individual may delay prayer in order to pray with a minyan provided that there is no danger that in so doing he will delay beyond the appointed time for prayer. See also Teshuvot Yad Eliyahu, no. 42, and Magen Avraham, Oraḥ Ḥayyim 90:15. he further argues that it is permissible to undertake the performance of a mizvah even if, as a result, it may be impossible to fulfill an even greater mizvah at a subsequent time.²⁵See also Teshuvot Radbaz, IV, no. 1087; Cf., however, Teshuvot Ḥakam Ẓevi, no. 106; Teshuvot Tirosh ve-Yiẓhar, no. 127; Ḥokhmat Adam 68:1 and Nishmat Adam, ad locum; and R. Israel Meir ha-Kohen, (Ḥafeẓ Ḥayyim), Maḥaneh Yisra’el, ma’amarim, chap. 15. The situation addressed by Radbaz involved an incarcerated person granted freedom for one day of his choice each year. The question presented was whether he should avail himself of this privilege at the earliest opportunity in order to engage in communal prayer or whether he should delay exercising his prerogative until a time of particular significance such as Purim or the Day of Atonement. Radbaz ruled that the prisoner should not postpone the opportunity for performing a miẓvah even though delay would afford him the opportunity of performing a miẓvah of greater significance; see also Sefer Ḥasidim, no. 874. However, Ḥokhmat Adam and Ḥafeẓ Ḥayyim adopt the opposite position and rule that a soldier given the option of leave on a weekday or on Saturday should choose Saturday, provided that such choice does not involve excessive delay, in order that he may be able to pray on the Sabbath in the proper manner. This ruling applies even in situations in which the soldier’s duties do not involve violation of Sabbath laws and is based entirely upon the consideration that the prayer on the Sabbath constitutes a miẓvah of greater sanctity than prayer on a weekday. Thus this ruling reflects the position that a miẓvah of lesser sanctity may be left unfulfilled in order to fulfill a miẓvah of enhanced sanctity at a later time. Accordingly, he rules that it is permissible to apply the cast, even if circumcision is delayed thereby, because correction of the orthopedic condition itself constitutes the fulfillment of a mizvah.

Azei ha-Levanon further argues that failure to provide an available medical remedy entails a violation both of the commandment "you may not hide yourself" (Deut. 22:3) and the admonition "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Lev. 19:16). Rambam, Hilkhot Rozeaḥ, 1:13, Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 237; and Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1, basing themselves upon Sifra, Kedoshim 41, view those commandments as encompassing an obligation to prevent not only loss of life but also to prevent financial loss from befalling one's fellow.²⁶See also Ḥafeẓ Ḥayyim, Be’er Mayim Ḥayyim, Hilkhot Issurei Rekhilut 9:1. If so, argues Azei ha-Levanon, it is similarly forbidden to allow a person to suffer loss of the use of a limb. Circumcision under such circumstances, concludes Azei ha-Levanon, would constitute a violation of these two negative commandments. This latter argument is applicable with regard to the circumcision of a child suffering from hypospadias. Although, chronologically, the mizvah of circumcision on the eighth day following the birth of a child presents itself prior to the opportunity for therapeutic remedy of this anomaly, performance of milah effectively makes it impossible to correct the condition at a subsequent time. Thus the act of circumcision entails a violation of both "you may not hide yourself" and of "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow." Although a single negative commandment is suspended under certain conditions in order to permit the discharge of a positive obligation, multiple negative commandments are not suspended for this purpose.

Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 26, makes it clear that the concern evidenced in the prescription of the mode of slaughter is identical with the consideration underlying the admonition concerning za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim. Both the prescriptions concerning ritual slaughter and the prohibition against za'ar ba'alei ḥayyim are regarded by Rambam as having been imposed "with a view to purifying the people," i.e., in order to prevent internalization of cruelty as a character trait and to promote the development of compassion.¹⁸See also Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6, and R. Joseph Albo, Book of Principles, Book III, chapter 15 as well as Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Genesis 1:29, and Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, no. 54, s.v. u-mah. An identical view is expressed by Philo, De Virtutibus, 141.

(Bet) In Sefer HaIkkarim 3:35,⁹⁰A classic work of Jewish philosophy written by Rabbi Yosef Albo (Spain, c. 1380-1444). [it is written about (Deut. 6:5), “And you shall love the Lord, your God”]: “A person cannot love two things or two persons with a perfect love, for if he loves them both, neither love is perfect since it is divided between two. It is impossible for the lover to be completely united with the loved – such as the idea of love requires – unless the loved is one. […] But since ‘the Lord is one,’⁹¹The reference is to the previous verse, Deut. 6:4. [‘you shall love the Lord, your God’].” See there. And this appears to be the intention of the Scripture (Gen. 22:2), [wherein] the Holy One, blessed be He, says to Avraham, “Please take, etc., whom you love”; but after his passing the test, it is said to him (Deut. 22:16), “Because you have done, etc., your only one from Me” – but it did not repeat, “whom you love.” As the essence of the test was that God, may He be blessed, saw that [Avraham] loved the son he fathered when he was a hundred. And because of this, his love was [divided] and not perfect with Him, may He be blessed. Hence He told him to slaughter his son that he loved. This was in order to negate the love from his son and make it perfect for [God], may He be blessed. And after he passed the test and made his love perfect for God – to the point that in his love, he wanted to slaughter his only son – then his love for his son was already negated; and all of its divisions became wholly for God, may He be blessed. And therefore it no longer mentioned “love” for Yitschak, just “his only one.” And one must dedicate [his] fear and love to His name, may His name be blessed, as we have elucidated. And behold, from undiluted fear, he came to total love. And they said in the Talmud (Shabbat 31a), “‘The fear of the Lord was its storage chest’ (Isaiah 33:6) [… There is] a parable about a man who said to his emissary, ‘Bring […] wheat up to the attic for me.’ [So] he went and brought it up for him. He said to [him], ‘Did you mix a kav of ḥomton into it?’ He said to him, ‘No.’ He said to him, ‘It would have been preferable had you not brought it up.’” And Rashi explains that ḥomton preserves produce from getting wormy. But [it is found] in the Midrash (Shemot Rabbah 30:14), “[‘The fear of the Lord was its storage chest’] – there is a parable about a man who said to his fellow, ‘I have a hundred kor of wheat, a hundred barrels of oil [and] a hundred barrels of wine.’ [The other] said to him, ‘Do you have storehouses to put [them into?’ He said to him, ‘No.’ He said to him, ‘Then] you will have no [benefit] from them.’” And in Tur Bareket,⁹²A commentary on the Shulchan Arukh written by R. Chaim HaKohen (Syria, 1585-1655). it is written that in our Talmud, it is a parable for internal fear, but in the midrash – which calls it storehouses – it is a parable for external fear. See there. And behold, certainly one who has more wheat or fruit will need to have more homton and to have more storehouses to put them in. And for this reason, one who is a master of Torah, the commandments and many good deeds, will need more storehouses and homton – according to the value of the grain and barrels of wine and oil that he has. And if so, he needs more fear of Him, which ‘is his storage chest.’ And for this, he needs cooperation and association with those that fear – those that fear the Lord. And [it is] just like there is cooperation between the one who has grain but does not have storage chests and the one has many storage chests. And with this, it is possible to explain (Ps. 119:63), “I am a companion to all who fear You, to those who guard Your precepts” – since through fear, the commandments will be guarded. And [it is also possible to explain], “Fear God and guard His commandments” (Ecclesiastes 12:13), – as through fear of Him, [a person’s fulfillment of the] commandments will be guarded, like the kav of ḥomton preserves the wheat, and as I wrote in Paragraph Yod adjacently (immediately above).

That He prohibited us from being drawn to the practices of the idolaters, such that women wear mens' clothes and adorn themselves with their ornaments. And that is His saying, "The garment of a man shall not be on a woman" (Deuteronomy 22:5). And any woman who adorns herself with a man's ornament - that is well-known in that city that it is an ornament specific to men - is lashed. (See Parashat Shoftim; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 11.)

That He prohibited us from men adorning themselves with women's ornaments. And that is His saying, "nor may a man wear a woman’s garment" (Deuteronomy 22:5). And any man who adorns himself like this or wears what is well-known in that city to be an ornament specific to women - is lashed. And you should know that this procedure - meaning that the women adorn themselves with men's ornaments and the men adorn themselves with women's ornaments - is done to arouse the drive for promiscuity, as is explained in the books written about this. And it is often placed in the stipulations for the making of some talismans and said, "If a man is occupied with it, he should wear women's garments and adorn himself with gold and pearls and that which is similar to them; but if it was a woman, she should wear armor and arm herself with swords." And this is very famous among those of this opinion. (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 11.)

Many smokers seek to excuse their behavior by stating that they are anusim, in effect coerced to smoke, since it is so difficult to free oneself from this addictive habit. In general, Halachah excuses one from sins committed under duress (see Devarim 22:26 and Ketubot 3a). This defense does not apply here, however, as smokers were not forced to begin smoking. The Chafetz Chaim (Likutei Amarim chapter 13 and Zechor L’miriam chapter 23) chides smokers who seek to excuse their behavior on the grounds that it is difficult to stop smoking, arguing that they had no right to start. As proof to his assertion, the Chafetz Chaim cites the Gemara (Bava Kama 92) that states that one is not permitted to harm himself.

Whence [do we learn] that an article lost through the flooding of a river may be retained [by the finder]? It is written, "And so shall you do with his ass; and so shall you do with his garment; and so shall you do with every lost thing of thy brother's, which he has lost and you have found" (Deuteronomy 22:3) [which means to say that only] if the object has been lost to him and may be found by any person [has it to be returned to him, and it follows that] a case like this is exempt [from the biblical law] since it is lost to him and cannot be found by any person.

Under Jewish law the treatment of a patient is not merely a matter of private contract but constitutes a religious obligation. Refusal to treat a patient in need of medical assistance is a clear violation of Jewish law. Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 336:1, declares, "If the physician withholds his services it is considered as shedding blood." The obligation to render assistance in life-threatening situations is predicated upon the verse, "Nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). A further obligation is predicated upon the scriptual exhortation with regard to restoration of lost property, "and you shall restore it to him" (Deuteronomy 22:2). On the basis of a pleonasm in the Hebrew text, the Gemara declares that this verse includes an obligation to restore a fellow man's body as well as his property. Hence, there is created an obligation to come to the aid of one's fellow man in a life-threatening situation. Every individual, insofar as he is able, is obligated to restore the health of a fellow man no less than he is obligated to restore his property.

Azei ha-Levanon further demonstrates that failure to provide a medical remedy, when available, entails violation both of the commandment "you may not hide yourself" (Deuteronomy 22:3), which, in its biblical context, refers to a person who comes upon lost property belonging to another and of the admonition "nor shall you stand idly by the blood of your fellow" (Leviticus 19:16). Sifra, Kedoshim 41, declares that these commandments establish an obligation making it incumbent upon an individual to act, if he is capable of doing so, in order to prevent his fellow from sustaining a financial loss. This obligation is recorded by Rambam. Hilkhot Rozeaḥ 1:13; Sefer ha-Hinnukh, no. 237; and Shulḥan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 426:1. It similarly follows that a person is bound by the selfsame commandments to prevent loss or deterioration of health if he possesses the requisite knowledge and skill to be of assistance in providing medical care. Failure to do so, concludes Azei ha-Levanon, would constitute transgression of these two negative commandments as well as of the positive commandment "and you shall restore it to him." Furthermore, Ramban, in Torat ha-Adam, observes that failure to render medical assistance entails abrogation of the positive commandment "And you shall love your neighbor as yourself." Thus, even in situations which pose no threat to life, a person in a position to do so is bound by no less than four separate mizvot to render medical assistance.

The Gemara, Sanhedrin 73a, attempts to derive the "law of the pursuer" from the commandment "You shalt not stand idly by the blood of your neighbor" (Leviticus 19:16). This commandment establishes a general obligation to come to the aid of a person whose life is endangered. Ultimately the Gemara derives an obligation to preserve the life of the victim even if it is necessary to sacrifice the life of the pursuer in order to accomplish this end from the verse "For … the betrothed damsel cried and there was none to save her" (Deuteronomy 22:27). From this statement the Gemara infers that were a bystander to be present he would be obligated to preserve the betrothed damsel from violation by any means possible, including summary execution of the would-be rapist. By virtue of the juxtaposition (hekesh) of homicide and rape of a "betrothed damsel" in the immediately prior verse the Gemara derives a binding obligation requiring any and all bystanders to intervene and to preserve the life of the intended homicide victim by any means possible.

The perfection of highly sophisticated medical techniques has led to the development of a wide range of elective surgical procedures. As a result, cosmetic surgery is becoming increasingly more commonplace in our society. From the perspective of Halakhah, elective cosmetic surgery gives rise to a number of significant questions. Plastic surgery undertaken solely for cosmetic or esthetic purposes differs significantly from other corrective procedures. The obvious halakhic problem associated with plastic surgery is whether or not such procedures involve infractions of the law against wounding (ḥavalah). A further, more general question is raised by the risk to life involved in such procedures. Any form of surgery, particularly when performed under general anesthesia, poses at least a minimal, but nevertheless significant, threat to life. Is it permissible, according to Halakhah, to expose oneself to such danger for cosmetic purposes? A third question is posed by cosmetic surgery performed upon male patients. The prohibition "a man shall not put on a woman's garment" (Deut. 22:5) extends not only to the wearing of female clothing by a male but also to the application of cosmetics or to any act of beautification usually associated with women. Dyeing of the hair and removal of armpit or pubic hair are specifically enumerated acts of this nature. Are such forms of plastic surgery as facelifting, nasoplasty, etc., so widely associated with women as to constitute a form of "female dress," or may men avail themselves of such methods for purposes of improving their appearance?

Minḥat Hinnukh cogently argues that the commandments expressed in Leviticus 19:16 and Deuteronomy 22:27 are incumbent only upon Jews and hence cannot establish obligations upon non-Jews who are bound only by the provisions of the Noachide Code. Minḥat Hinnukh does, however, adduce another source which serves as a basis for derivation of the "law of the pursuer" and which is applicable to Noachides as well. The Gemara, Sanhedrin 72b, cites the verse "Whosoever sheddeth the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed" (Genesis 9:6) as granting dispensation to preserve the intended victim by eliminating the pursuer. The phrase "by man" is understood as calling for the shedding of blood "by any man," i.e., by persons witnessing the act, rather than as a reference to punitive measures to be undertaken subsequent to the act. Thus the Gemara understands the verse as referring, not to an act of homicide which has already been committed, but to the prevention of a would-be homicide. The verse, which was addressed to Noah, establishes a law not only for Jews, but for Noachides as well. The general principle is that any commandment given prior to Sinai is binding upon Noachides even subsequent to the Sinaitic revelation provided it has been reiterated at Sinai. The law of the pursuer is indeed repeated in Exodus 22:1. In the course of the same discussion, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 72b, states that the statute formulated in this passage, which provides that a thief who breaks into a dwelling during the night may be smitten without penalty, is based upon the assumption that the thief is intent not only upon larceny but will commit homicide as well if he meets resistance. Hence the thief is in effect a pursuer and may be put to death if necessary by virtue of the "law of the pursuit." Tosafot, Sanhedrin 72a, commenting on the redundancy of the multiple scriptural sources for the "law of pursuit" states that Exodus 22:1 serves only to establish a license for execution of the pursuer but does not make such a course of action obligatory. The obligation, according to Tosafot, is expressed solely in Deuteronomy 22:27. Minḥat Hinnukh assumes that Tosafot intends this comment to apply as well to the interpretation of Genesis 9:6, which presents the same difficulty. The phrase ba-adam damo yishafekh, according to Minḥat Hinnukh's understanding should thus be translated "by man may his blood be shed" and serves to grant permission to put the aggressor to death when necessary to preserve the life of the victim, but does not mandate such action.¹³R. Shlomoh Zevin, Le-Or ha-Halakhah, p. 17, argues against Minḥat Ḥin nukh’s position and maintains that Noachides are not merely permitted, but are obligated, to execute the pursuer in order to preserve the pursued. He argues that this is evident from the phrase “domo yishafekh” which he maintains must be translated “by man shall his blood be spilled.” It would, however, appear that the question raised by Tosafot, Sanhedrin 73a, s.v. af, with regard to the earlier cited verse which speaks of the ba ba-maḥteret applies with equal validity to this verse. It would appear that Tosafot’s statement that the verse establishes permission rather than obligation applies to the subsequently cited verse “ba-adam damo yishafekh” as well. Accordingly, concludes Minḥat Hinnukh, Noachides are justified not only in acting in self-defense but may eliminate a threat to the lives of others as well, even though, in contradistinction to Jews who are bound by Sinaitic revelation, they are under no obligation to do so.

It is forbidden for a man to pluck even one white hair from among the black because of "A man shall not wear" (Devarim 22:5). It is likewise forbidden for a man to color (Rama: the white hairs so that they will be) black hairs, even one hair. It is likewise forbidden for a man to gaze at his reflection. (Rama: See above Siman 156.)

Said Rav Yitzchok the son of Rav Yehudah, "One should always plead for mercy that he should not get sick, for if one falls sick, he is told, 'Demonstrate your merit and you will be acquitted.'" Said Mar Ukva, "From which verse in the Torah is this inferred?" From the verse, "Lest any man fall from (mimenu) there."¹Deuteronomy 22:8. From within himself (mimenu) he must produce evidence; which means, since he has fallen, he must produce from within himself and from his deeds, evidence of his merit."²Maseches Shabbos 32a. It is also stated in the Talmud,²Maseches Shabbos 32a. "If a person has a headache he should view it as if he were put in chains. If he becomes ill and is confined to bed, he should view it as if he were placed onto a scaffold, (a place where capital cases are tried) for trial. Anyone who is placed onto the scaffold for trial, if he has great advocates, may be saved. But if he has none, he cannot be saved. These are the advocates of man: repentance and good deeds. Even if nine hundred and ninety-nine accuse him, and only one advocate defends him, he is saved, as it is said, "If there be for him an angel, an advocate, [even] one among a thousand, to vouch for man's uprightness, then he is gracious unto him, and says, 'Redeem him from going down to the pit.'"³Job 33:23, 24.

That is that He commanded us that an employee eat from the thing he is working upon, at the time of his work - when the thing is attached to the ground. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "When you enter the vineyard of [...] When you enter the standing grainstalks of" (Deuteronomy 22:25-26). And it has already been explained in the Gemara, Metzia (Bava Metzia 87b) that we learn from these two verses that a man may eat while at work from what is attached to the ground; and that one verse would not suffice without its fellow [being together] with it. [This is] as we explained earlier here (Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandments, 140), when they said, "Until both verses are stated. And, if not, we would not have understood [it]." Hence the content of this positive commandment - meaning the employee's eating from that which is connected - arose from two verses. And in the explanation (Bava Metzia 87a), they said, "These may eat, from the Torah, etc." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Chapter 7 of [Bava] Metzia (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Hiring 12).

And Ramban, may his memory be blessed, does not hold of this approach and he does not lean towards it; but [rather] he holds that there always be an explicit warning about the one to be lashed or about the one being killed - and not from a general negative commandment. And even if Scripture makes his death penalty explicit a hundred times, the Rabbi will still say that it does not punish unless it warns (and not from a general negative commandment). And he does not consider a general negative commandment as a warning in the place of lashes, because of that which is a famous law in our hands, "We do not administer lashes for a general negative commandment." And therefore he, may his memory be blessed, said that they already clarified in the Gemara from which verse we learned to administer lashes to the rebellious son: And they said in Sanhedrin 71b, "It is like Rabbi Abahu, as Rabbi Abahu said, 'We learned lashes for one who puts out a bad name, as it is written about him (Deuteronomy 22:18), "and they shall chasten him," from "and they chastised him" (Deuteronomy 21:18) that is written about the rebellious son; and "son" from "son" [in] "And if the evildoer be a son of (liable for) lashing" (Deuteronomy 25:2).'" And there is also a difficulty for Rambam, may his memory be blessed, in this, [since] he writes in the second root, that we do not give lashes by the power of a comparison (which is what seems to be indicated here). And he also challenged the Rabbi about his statement that the rebellious son is liable for the death penalty for his indulging in much eating and he did not distinguish between the first eating and the second. But they said explicitly in the Gemara in Sanhedrin 71 that we do not punish the first eating of the rebellious son with the death penalty, but rather lashes, as they said, "We warn him in front of two [witnesses] and we lash him in front of three. [If] he goes back and goes bad, he is judged by twenty-three [judges for the death penalty]." He, may his memory be blessed, also wrote and this is his language, "And what is fit to take out from this is that the first eating is prevented (forbidden) and its punishment is lashes, and the punishment of the second is death, and they are two preventions (negative commandments) in the tally of commandments, and they are [both] included in 'You shall not eat upon the blood.'" To here [are his words].

He prohibited us from ignoring a lost object. Rather we must take it and return it to is owners. And that is His saying, "you may not remain indifferent" (Deuteronomy 22:1). And we have already explained (Sefer HaMitzvot, Positive Commandments 204) about their saying in the Mekhilta (Sifrei Devarim 222:2) regarding the matter of a lost object, "We have found to learn that one transgresses a positive and a negative commandment." And the language of the Gemara (Bava Metzia 30a) is, "Returning a lost object is a positive commandment and a negative commandment." And in Mishneh Torah (Deuteronomy), He repeated the prohibition about this content, and the negative commandment appears in it. And that is His saying, "You may not observe your brother’s ox or his sheep straying." And in the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 222:2): "'You may not observe' - that is a negative commandment. And earlier, He says, 'If you encounter, you must surely return' (Exodus 23:4) - that is a positive commandment." And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in the second [chapter] of [Bava] Metzia. (See Parashat Ki Tetzei; Mishneh Torah, Robbery and Lost Property 11.)

That He prohibited us - that we not have compassion upon a pursuer. And the explanation of this is that that which we mentioned in the commandment before this about saving the sinner, such that the witnesses not kill him before the court judges him - that is however when he sinned and did the act for which one is liable for the death penalty and completed it. However at the time that he is making efforts and seeking to do it, he is then called a pursuer - and it is an obligation upon us to prevent him from doing what his heart desires and to stop him, in order to prevent him from the sin. But if the does not want to listen to us, we fight against him: If we can prevent it by destroying one of his limbs - such as if we cut off his hand or his foot or blind his eye - behold that is preferable. But if it is impossible to prevent it without [killing him] - he must surely be killed, so that he does not do that evil act. So the prohibition comes [that we] not have compassion upon him and prevent ourselves from killing him. And that is His saying, "You shall sever her hand; you are not to have compassion" (Deuteronomy 25:12). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 293:1) is, "It teaches that you are obligated to rescue him with her hand. And from where [do we know] that if they are not able to rescue him with her hand, they rescue him with her soul (i.e., by killing her)? [Hence] we learn to say, 'you are not to have compassion.'" And there, they said, "Just like his genitals are specific in that they involve a danger to life - and it is with, 'You shall sever her hand'; so [too] is everything that involves a danger to life with, 'You shall sever.'" And that which we said, that the pursuer is to be killed, is not regarding anyone making efforts to do a transgression. However it is the same whether it is one who is pursuing his fellow to kill him - even if he is a minor - or one who is pursuing one of the forbidden sexual prohibitions to have sexual relations. And [the latter] is on condition that he is nine [years] old and a day; and it is clear that a male is among the sexual prohibitions [for a man]. And His saying, "the betrothed maiden cried out, but there was none to save her" (Deuteronomy 22:27), [tells us] - behold, if there was someone to save her, he must save her with everything he can. And He equated one pursuing her with one pursuing his fellow to kill him, with His saying, "for, just as if a man rises up against his neighbor and murders him, so is this matter" (Deuteronomy 22:26). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Chapter 8 of Sanhedrin. (See Ki Teitzeh; Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 1.)

That He prohibited us - that we not have compassion upon a pursuer. And the explanation of this is that that which we mentioned in the commandment before this about saving the sinner, such that the witnesses not kill him before the court judges him - that is however when he sinned and did the act for which one is liable for the death penalty and completed it. However at the time that he is making efforts and seeking to do it, he is then called a pursuer - and it is an obligation upon us to prevent him from doing what his heart desires and to stop him, in order to prevent him from the sin. But if the does not want to listen to us, we fight against him: If we can prevent it by destroying one of his limbs - such as if we cut off his hand or his foot or blind his eye - behold that is preferable. But if it is impossible to prevent it without [killing him] - he must surely be killed, so that he does not do that evil act. So the prohibition comes [that we] not have compassion upon him and prevent ourselves from killing him. And that is His saying, "You shall sever her hand; you are not to have compassion" (Deuteronomy 25:12). And the language of the Sifrei (Sifrei Devarim 293:1) is, "It teaches that you are obligated to rescue him with her hand. And from where [do we know] that if they are not able to rescue him with her hand, they rescue him with her soul (i.e., by killing her)? [Hence] we learn to say, 'you are not to have compassion.'" And there, they said, "Just like his genitals are specific in that they involve a danger to life - and it is with, 'You shall sever her hand'; so [too] is everything that involves a danger to life with, 'You shall sever.'" And that which we said, that the pursuer is to be killed, is not regarding anyone making efforts to do a transgression. However it is the same whether it is one who is pursuing his fellow to kill him - even if he is a minor - or one who is pursuing one of the forbidden sexual prohibitions to have sexual relations. And [the latter] is on condition that he is nine [years] old and a day; and it is clear that a male is among the sexual prohibitions [for a man]. And His saying, "the betrothed maiden cried out, but there was none to save her" (Deuteronomy 22:27), [tells us] - behold, if there was someone to save her, he must save her with everything he can. And He equated one pursuing her with one pursuing his fellow to kill him, with His saying, "for, just as if a man rises up against his neighbor and murders him, so is this matter" (Deuteronomy 22:26). And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained in Chapter 8 of Sanhedrin. (See Ki Teitzeh; Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 1.)

He prohibited us - that we not take the nest at the time of the snare - the mother and the young. And that is His saying, "you shall not take the mother bird upon the young" (Deuteronomy 22:6). And this negative commandment is rectified by a positive commandment; and that is, "You must surely send away the mother, and you may take the young for yourself" (Deuteronomy 22:7). And anytime it is [no longer] possible to send [it] away and to fulfill the positive commandment in it - such as when the mother died before he sent it away - he is lashed. And the regulations of this commandment have already been explained at the end of Chullin. (See Parashat Ki Teitzeh; Mishneh Torah, Ritual Slaughter 13.)

The commandment of fringes (tsitsit): To put fringes on the clothes that we wear, as it is stated (Numbers 15:18), "and they shall make fringes for themselves." And this obligation applies to garments with four or more corners, as it is written (Deuteronomy 22:12), "on the four corners of your garment." And 'four' includes five or more (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Fringes 3:1), provided that the garment is large enough that the head and most of the body of a child who is old enough to walk unescorted in the marketplace can be wrapped in it. And it seems that this age is around six or seven years old. The garment must be made of wool or linen to be obligated in fringes when it is worn. If it is missing one of these [conditions], i.e. if it has fewer than four corners or is not as large as described, or it is made from some other material, it is exempted from fringes on a Torah level. Garments of silk, and even camel hair, rabbit hair, and goat hair are all exempted from fringes on a Torah level; as 'garment' in the Torah [refers] only to those made from sheep's or lamb's wool or linen, and so [too] in relation to tsara'at of clothing, as I have written in its place (Sefer HaChinukh 172).

And if one has a linen garment, he should place linen fringes in it, for the law is not like [the view of] Beit Shammai who taught (Menachot 40a) that a [linen] cloak is exempted from fringes. [This] means to say that since a linen garment could never have tekhelet placed on it, because [it would form] a forbidden mixture [of wool and linen] - as tekhelet must always be wool, since the tekhelet dye would never be absorbed properly by linen but rather only by wool, and the Torah obligates us in proper tekhelet - and since it would be impossible to ever put a string of wool into the linen because of the forbidden mixture, even white strings, meaning strings of linen, are not put on. This is what [they meant when] they said that Beit Shammai exempts a [linen] cloak from fringes. But the law is not like them, since their reason is because they did not expound adjacent verses; rather the law is like Beit Hillel who did expound adjacent verses. And they [therefore] held that there is no prohibition of forbidden mixtures in fringes, as the Torah stated (Deuteronomy 22:11-12), "Do not wear shaatnez (wool and linen together). Make fringes for yourself" - meaning to say, but fringes you may make for yourself from shaatnez. And therefore Beit Hillel held that a [linen] cloak is obligated in fringes, and the law is like them. Still, we do not put tekhelet on [a linen garment] due to a concern about indigo; that is, lest they would dye it with a non-tekhelet dye and then it would be shaatnez without the [performance of a] commandment. They asked in the Gemara in Menachot 40a, "Why? Is it not just white [strings]?" That is, for Beit Hillel who did expound adjacent verses, why should we make such a decree? As even if it is indigo, what is with that? Behold, we said that the forbidden mixture is permitted in fringes, meaning even with white [strings] - that is to say, even to put fringes of white wool in a garment of linen - and it is not [even] necessary to say that [it would be allowed] with fringes of wool that are dyed with tekhelet as is its commandment. And it was answered that these words that Beit Hillel said forbidden mixtures were permitted in fringes on the [strength of the] expounding of adjacent verses is only in cases where there is not from it; meaning to say when it is impossible from its own type - e.g. in a linen garment, if you want to place tekhelet in it, you will need wool regardless, as tekhelet is impossible without wool. [Only] in such cases did Beit Hillel rely on the expounding of adjacent verses and obligate the use of tekhelet in a linen garment. If however, there is 'from it,' meaning to say where you want to use white strings without tekhelet in a linen garment, it is not acceptable to use wool on the strength of the expounding of adjacent verses, as those white strings can be made of linen. This [follows] the principle of Reish Lakish; as Reish Lakish said that in any case where it is possible to maintain both the positive and negative commandments it is better [to do so], and only otherwise do we say that the positive commandment supersedes the negative. And here it is possible to maintain both commandments, for if you do not wish to place tekhelet with the white, linen suffices. And since this is so, if you use wool [you have violated the law of] forbidden mixtures and there is nothing [to help you]. Because there are many interpretations of these matters, I have spent some time on it for you. And from what I found in my trap I have set the table for you. But if you merit, my son, you will distinguish the truth. And if you perhaps find valid reason to challenge my words in this matter - or even in another - you should not mind the honor of your father and teacher, and I will then read (consider) your destruction as building.

It is a positive commandment to make a fence on one's roof as it says "and you shall make a fence for your roof". This applies if it is a dwelling place, but a storage house or a cattle house and the like do not require one.

A house of two partners is obligated to have a fence around its roof, as it says “lest any one fall from it”. This is applicable whenever someone is liable to fall. If so, why does it say “your roof”? To exclude synagogues and study halls, since they are not made for residence.

If a public road is higher than the roof, a fence is not required. As it says: "lest the one who falls will fall from it".

All that do not build a fence on their roof violates a positive commandment and a negative commandment. As it says, "do not place blood in your home".

To return a lost item to an Israelite: To return a lost item to its owners, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 22:1), "you shall surely return them to your brother." And in the explanation, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Bava Metzia 30a) [that] returning a lost item is a positive commandment. And this commandment is repeated in another place in the Torah, as it is stated (Exodus 23:4), "When you encounter your [enemy’s] ox, etc., you shall surely return it to (your brother)."

To not avoid his eyes from it: That we should not avoid our eye from the lost item of our brother (Bava Metzia 26b), but we [rather] take it and return it to him. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:3), "you may not ignore [it]."

To not leave the beast of his fellow falling under its load: That we have been warned that if we see a Jew whose donkey or other beast fell from the weight of its load or from another reason, or if he, himself, is crouching under his load (See Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 270). that we should not leave him on the way and walk [away]; but [rather], we help him and lift up his beast with him, and we stay there until he has set up his load - either on his back or on his beast. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:4), "You shall not see the donkey of your brother, etc." - and they said in the Sifrei here [that], "'You shall not see the donkey, etc.' is a negative commandment."

To load the load that has fallen [together] with his fellow: That we were commanded to help our brothers when they need to place the load on the beast or on the person, and there is not someone to help them with the thing. And about this it states (Deuteronomy 22:4), "you shall surely pick it up with him." And this, they, may their memory be blessed, called (Bava Metzia 32a) 'loading (teinah).' And [there] they, may their memory be blessed, said that we [can] take payment for loading, but for the unloading - meaning to say, to help his brother to unload the load from upon him or from upon his beast - this obligation is upon us to do for free.

That a woman should not wear the adornments of a man: That women should not wear the clothing of men and not arm themselves with their weapons. And about this it states (Deuteronomy 22:5), "There shall not be the vessel of a man upon a woman." And Onkelos translated [it], "There shall not be a weapon of a man upon a woman" (see Nazir 59a). And that which is similar [is also prohibited]; since this is the reason that [Onkelos] explained Scripture as regarding weapons - because they are vessels that are completely unique to men, as it is not the way of a woman in the world to go out with weapons. But the same is true, that it is forbidden from the Torah, for them to go out with clothes that it is the custom of the men of that place to use - for example, that she should place a turban on her head or other vessels that are unique to a man (see Targum Jonathan on Deuteronomy 22:5).

That a man should not wear the clothes of a woman: That men should not wear the clothes of women, and about this it states (Deuteronomy 22:5), "and a man should not wear the garment of a woman."

To not take the mother upon the young: That we should not take a bird's nest - the mother and the chicks or the eggs together - but rather that we should send away the mother. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:6), "do not take the mother upon the young."

To send away the mother [bird] if he takes it upon the young: To send away the mother from the nest before he takes the young, as it is stated (Deuteronomy 22:7), "you shall surely send away the mother and the young you shall take for you."

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Chullin 139b), "'If you chance upon a bird's nest in front of you on the path' - just like the path which is not acquired by you; so too all, etc. From here they said, 'Doves from the coop and doves from the attic that nested in cubicles and in edifices, and geese and chickens that nested in an orchard, [one is] obligated in sending away; but [if] they nested within the house, and also Herodian doves, [one is] exempt from sending away. [... And] Rav Yehudah ... said, '[If] he found a nest in the sea, [he is] obligated in sending away,'" as it is included in the expression, 'on the path,' "as it states (Isaiah 43:16), 'So said the Lord, who makes a path in the sea.'" And (Chullin 12:3) "[If] it was flying - [... if] its wings do not touch the nest, one is exempt from sending. [... If] there were [...] damaged eggs, one is exempt from sending, as it states (Deuteronomy 22:6), '[...] young birds or the eggs' - just as young birds are viable, so too [the] eggs [must be] viable [to fall under the law...]. If one sent her away and she returned, [...] - even [several] times - one is obligated [to send her away again], as it states (Deuteronomy 22:7),' You shall surely send.'" And the rest of the details of the commandment are elucidated in the last chapter of Chullin.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Chullin 139b), "'If you chance upon a bird's nest in front of you on the path' - just like the path which is not acquired by you; so too all, etc. From here they said, 'Doves from the coop and doves from the attic that nested in cubicles and in edifices, and geese and chickens that nested in an orchard, [one is] obligated in sending away; but [if] they nested within the house, and also Herodian doves, [one is] exempt from sending away. [... And] Rav Yehudah ... said, '[If] he found a nest in the sea, [he is] obligated in sending away,'" as it is included in the expression, 'on the path,' "as it states (Isaiah 43:16), 'So said the Lord, who makes a path in the sea.'" And (Chullin 12:3) "[If] it was flying - [... if] its wings do not touch the nest, one is exempt from sending. [... If] there were [...] damaged eggs, one is exempt from sending, as it states (Deuteronomy 22:6), '[...] young birds or the eggs' - just as young birds are viable, so too [the] eggs [must be] viable [to fall under the law...]. If one sent her away and she returned, [...] - even [several] times - one is obligated [to send her away again], as it states (Deuteronomy 22:7),' You shall surely send.'" And the rest of the details of the commandment are elucidated in the last chapter of Chullin.

The commandment of a parapet: To remove stumbling blocks and obstacles from our dwelling places, and about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:8), "and you shall make a parapet for your roof." And the matter is that we should build a wall around the roofs and around the pits and the ditches and that which is similar to them, so that no creature should stumble to fall in them or from them. And included in this commandment is to build and fix every wall and fence from which it is likely that there come a mishap from it. And that which verse mentioned "for your roof," is [because] the verse spoke in the present (using the most common example). And the language of Sifrei is "'And you shall make a parapet' is a positive commandment" (see Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Ase 184).

To not leave a stumbling block: To not leave stumbling blocks and snares in our land and in our homes, so that people not die or get injured from them (see Mishneh Torah, Murderer and the Preservation of Life 11). And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:8), "and you shall not place blood in your house." And they said in Sifrei, "'And you shall make a parapet for your roof' is a positive commandment and [that] and 'you shall not place blood in your house' is a negative commandment."

To not plant forbidden mixtures in a vineyard: To not plant types of grain in a vineyard, and [also] not hemp or arum (loof). And this type of forbidden mixtures is called forbidden mixtures of the vineyard (kilayei hakerem). And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:9), "Do not plant your vineyard a forbidden mixture." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifrei on this verse), "[Why] do I need this, is it not stated (Leviticus 19:19), 'your field you shall not plant a forbidden mixture?' It teaches that anyone who keeps a forbidden mixture in his vineyard transgresses two negative commandments." And they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Kiddushin 39a) that forbidden mixtures of the vineyard are two types of grain seeds with grape seeds. And this is what Rabbi Yishaya said, "He [has not transgressed] until he plants wheat and barley and grape-seed in one fall of the hand," as this is what is implied to them by "forbidden mixtures in a vineyard," meaning to say that you need a forbidden mixture besides "your vineyard."

To not eat forbidden mixtures of the vineyard: That we are forbidden from eating forbidden mixtures of the vineyard only. And we have already explained in the previous commandment what forbidden mixtures of the vineyard are. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:9), "lest it be set aside (tikdash), the crop, the seed that you planted and the produce of the vineyard." - and they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Kiddushin 56b), "Lest it be incinerated by fire (tukad esh)," which is to say that it is not fitting that there be a purpose [from it], as it should all be forbidden in benefit. And the proof that there is a negative commandment in it, is that it is written in its prevention, "lest (pen)." And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Eruvin 96a) that in every place that it states, "guard yourself," "lest," and "do not" (heeshamer, pen ve-al), it is certainly a negative commandment.

To not do work with two species of animals: To not plow with an ox and a donkey together. And the same is the case with any two species of animals, when one is pure and the other one is impure. And it is not specifically plowing that is forbidden, but rather the same is true for all types of work - for example, threshing or pulling a wagon [or] any of the types of work. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:10), "You shall not plow with an ox and a donkey together."

To not wear shaatnez: To not wear clothing that is composed of wool and flax (linen), and that is what is called, shaatnez. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:11), "You shall not wear shaatnez, wool and flax together."

To marry a woman with a marriage contract and betrothal: That we were commanded to acquire a woman in one of three ways before the marriage. And the sages elucidated these ways (Kiddushin 2a) - that they are money (monetary value), a contract and sexual relations with her. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:13), "If a man takes a woman and has sexual relations with her," which is to say [that] if a man wants to take (marry) a woman for himself, he should acquire her first with sexual relations. And about that which the verse stated (Deuteronomy 24:2), "And she shall go out [...] and she shall be," the traditional understanding came [to explain] that [just] like the departure (divorce) of a woman is with a contract - as we will write in this Order (Sefer HaChinukh 579), with the help of God - so too is [her] being with him; meaning to say, the acquisition of a woman is with a contract. And they, may their memory be blessed, also learned (Kiddushin 4b) that she is acquired with monetary value, since it is written about an Israelite maidservant (Exodus 21:11), "and she shall go out, there is no silver (monetary value)" - and the understanding about it came [to explain] (Kiddushin 3b), "'There is no monetary value' for this master, but there is monetary value (when she goes) from another master. And who is he? Her father."

The commandment that the wife of one who 'puts out a bad name' [about her] dwell with him forever: That we are commanded [about] one who puts out a bad name about his wife that she shall dwell with him forever - and even if she is blind or has a skin disease - as it is stated (Deuteronomy 22:19), "and to him shall she be a wife." And included in this law is that the court is commanded also to lash him about that which he put out a bad name falsely and to [fine] him one hundred coins (sela) of refined silver, as it is stated in the section [of the Torah that deals with this]. And they, may their memory be blessed, explained (Ketuvot 46a) that the warning against putting out a bad name is included in "do not go tale-bearing among your people" (Sefer HaChinukh 236).

That he should not divorce her all of his days: That one who puts out a bad name about his wife and is found to be a liar with his words is prevented from divorcing her forever. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:19), "he may not send her away all of his days."

The commandment upon the court to stone the one liable: That the court is obligated to pelt with stones one who has transgressed some sins. And one of them is one who has sexual relations with an engaged maiden, as it states (Deuteronomy 22:24), "and you shall stone them with stones." And this is one of the four well-known death penalties of the court - and they are stoning, burning, killing (beheading) and strangulation. And in Sanhedrin 49b in the chapter [entitled] Arba Mitot, Rabbi Shimon and 'our rabbis' disagreed [regarding] which is more severe, stoning or burning. And it is 'our rabbis' that said that stoning is more severe. And the matter of stoning is thus (see Mishneh Torah, The Sanhedrin and the Penalties within their Jurisdiction 15:1): Four ells distant from the house of stoning, we remove the clothes of the man who is obligated in stoning, until he remains naked, and [then] we cover his nakedness in front of him. And a woman is not stoned naked but rather with one garment. And the house of stoning was two stories tall. And he goes up there - [as do] his witnesses - and his hands are tied. And one of the witnesses pushes him on his midriff and he falls to the ground on his heart. And if he does not die from the pushing, the witnesses pick up a stone that was laying there - [weighing] a load for two people - and they release their hands and hurl the stone on his heart. And if he [still] doesn't die, his stoning is by all of Israel, as it states (Deuteronomy 17:7), "The hand of the witnesses shall be upon him first, etc."

Not to punish one coerced into a sin: That we have been prevented from judging one who is coerced into doing a sin, which is to say that we should not punish any person for a thing that he does against his will. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:26), "But to the maiden you shall not do a thing, etc." And this is a negative commandment that includes anyone that is coerced into doing a bad deed; that we should not punish him for it. And explicitly did they, of blessed memory, say (Sanhedrin 27a), "The Merciful One exempts the one coerced, as it states, 'But to the maiden you shall not do a thing.'"

The commandment on the rapist to marry the one he has raped: That we have been commanded that one who rapes a virgin maiden must marry her as a wife and that he must give to her father fifty silver [shekel-coins], as it states (Deuteronomy 22:29), "And the man who lays with her shall pay the maiden's father fifty [coins of] silver."

That he not divorce her all of his days: That the rapist is forever prevented from divorcing the one he raped. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 22:29), "because he has violated her, he cannot send her away all of his days."

And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Shabbat 132b) about the matter of this prohibition that one who has tzaraat on his foreskin should not have a concern about circumcising, as the positive commandment of circumcision pushes off this negative commandment; [just] like we hold in every place, that a positive commandment comes and pushes off a negative commandment. And that is when it is impossible to fulfill the positive commandment without the negation of the negative commandment - for example, this [case of] circumcision with tzaraat. And the sages, may their memory be blessed, learned (Yevamot 3b) that this law was not said generally with all negative commandments, but rather only with a light negative commandment, meaning to say one that doesn't come with excision (karet). [This is] as in the case of the negative commandment of "You shall not wear shatnez" (Deuteronomy 22:11), which we push off with the positive commandment of "You shall make for yourselves tassels." And so too, this negative commandment of not cutting off his bright spot, where there is also no excision - with these and and with similar to them, behold, the thing is as if the Torah said explicitly, "I have not prevented you in the case of this positive commandment." But with any negative commandment that comes with excision, we do not push [them] off because of a positive commandment. Since the verse was so stringent about it to obligate him excision, behold it is as if it stated explicitly, "Do thing x, so long as you will not need to transgress negative commandment y in doing it." And the rest of the details of this commandment are elucidated in Tractate Negaim (Chapter 7).

One may immerse (inaritual bath³⁰Mikveh, מקוה, is a pool or a bath of clear water. When a person immerses in it, it renders ritual cleanliness to one who has become ritually unclean through contact with the dead (Numbers 19) or any other defiling object, or through an unclean flux from the body (Leviticus 15), especially for a menstruant. The mikveh is also used to purify vessels (Numbers 31:22-23). Today the mikveh is used for the menstruant since the laws of ritual purity no longer apply due to the destruction of the Temple. A woman must immerse in the mikveh and purify herself following her menstruation in order to again participate in marital relations. It is also obligatory for proselytes to immerse as part of the ceremony for conversion. Many people still use the mikveh for spiritual purification and thus immerse in it on the eve of the Sabbath, festivals, and especially on the eve of the Day of Atonement. The mikveh serves to purify the spirit, not the body, as described by Maimonides. One has to have a mental intention to purify oneself by immersing in the mikveh.
According to Biblical law any collection of water whether drawn or collected naturally is suitable for a mikveh as long as one person can immerse himself, but the rabbis later stated that only water which has not been drawn, that is not collected in a vessel or recepticle, could be used. The rabbis also established a minimum for the amount of water to be used, that is the amount of water needed to fill a square cubit to the height of three cubits. This is between 250-1,000 liters depending on various calculations. If it contains at least this much undrawn water, any amount of drawn water can be added to it. A whole talmudic tractate Mikva’ot. is devoted to mikvehs and how they are to be constructed.
A mikveh cannot be prefabricated and just installed on a site since this makes it a vessel and constitutes water that has been drawn or collected. It may be built anywhere and out of any material that is water-tight. No water may leak from it, and it must contain the minimun of forty se’ah (250-1,000 liters) of valid, undrawn, water. Originally its height had to be one-hundred and twenty centimeters so one could stand and be totally immersed (even if bending was required). Later it was established that any height was valid if a person could be immersed laying down provided the minimum quantity of water was there.
All natural spring water provided it was not discolored by any admixtures is valid. Rain water or melted snow or ice is ideal for the mikveh provided that it flows unstopped into the mikveh. Pipes may be used to carry this water provided they touch the ground and are thus not considered vessels. A mikveh must be emptied by any means, even a pump, from above. No drain in the bottom is permitted as it makes the mikveh a vessel and subject to leakage. As long as the mikveh has contained at least forty se’ah of valid water, all water added to it, even drawn water is valid.
David Kotlar and Editorial Staff, E. J., v. 11, pp. 1534-44.
A prayer is normally recited after the immersion called al ha-tevilah, “Blessed art Thou, O Lord, our God, King of the Universe, who hast sanctified us by His commandments, and commanded us concerning the immersion”.) and accept lashes³¹Lashes and Malkkut Ar’ba’im, מלקות ארבעים, forty lashes is also known as flogging which is a Biblical form of punishment. When no other form of punishment was specifically prescribed, flogging became the standard form of punishment (Deuteronomy 25:2). Flogging was the only punishment in the Bible used as a general rule and not in relation to any particular offence except for the slandering of a virgin where the lashes as well as a fine were prescribed (Deuteronomy 22:18).
The maximum number of stripes to be administered in any one case are forty (Deuteronomy 25:3) for any further flogging the Bible stated, would degrade your brother in your eyes (Deuteronomy 25:3). The intent of the Bible seems to be that forty is the maximum number of stripes allowed, but that each offense and its seriousness could determine the number of stripes from one to forty provided the maximum number was not exceeded.
Talmudical law detailed how the Biblical punishment of flogging was to be administered. All the laws are found in the Talmudic tractate Makkot, מכות. The rabbis altered the Biblical law of flogging reducing the number of the maximum number of stripes to ever be received from forty to thirty-nine (Mak. 22a) so as to avoid the danger that the flogger accidentally might exceed the number of forty lashes. If he were permitted to administer forty lashes, the flogger might have given an extra one before he could have been stopped thus administering forty-one lashes which exceeds the maximum number of lashes allowed by the Bible and disgracing the man in the eyes of his brothers and thus also would the flogger be made subject to flogging for his transgression. Therefore the rabbis ruled that the maximum number of stripes they would allow was thirty-nine, for even if the flogger made a mistake he could be stopped before he exceeded the maximum number of forty stripes even if he gave an extra one as he was being stopped. (This is the reason for the comment by Isserles to this law given by Caro, see footnote 55).
The rabbis carefully defined all the offenses for which flogging would serve as a punishment. The number thirty-nine became the maximum number of stripes for offenses for which flogging was administered. The rabbis though, were careful not to cause death by flogging which would have exceeded the Biblical law. Therefore all people to be flogged were first examined to see if they could physically withstand the punishment. The examiner would then determine the safe number of stripes to be inflicted (Mak. 3:11). Flogging would be stopped if it appeared during the stripes that the man could not take anymore (Mak. 17:5). Flogging could also be postponed a day until a person would be fit to under-go the punishment (Mak. 17:3).
Floggings were administered with a whip made of calfskin to the bare upper body of the offender. One-third of the lashes were given on the breast and the other two-thirds on the back. The one being flogged would stand in a bowed position and the flogger would stand on a stone above him. As the stripes were being given admonitory and consolatory verses from the Bible would be recited (Mak. 3:12-14). If death did result and the flogging had been conducted according to the law, the flogger was not liable. If though, he had not faithfully followed the law, he had to flee to a city of refuge which was the case in any accidental homocide.
Flogging for disciplinary reasons as well as for punishment for other than transgressing actively a prohibition of the Torah was also prescribed by the rabbis and this was usually done in a public place so as to be a deterrent to others to violate laws. Usually disciplinary stripes were given in lesser numbers (that is less than thirty-nine) and were not administered to the bare upper body nor were they given with a leather whip. As time passed, people were more often allowed to pay fines rather than be whipped and whipping all but replaced capital punishment in Israel.
On Yom Kippur a custom arose that after the Minḥah Afternoon Service, forty stripes (according to Caro, but only thirty-nine in Ashkenazi communities as pointed out by Isserles) were administered while the victim repeated the confession, viddui (see footnote 39). The one who administered the flogging was to say “And He (God) pities and will atone sins”, (Psalms 78:38). The purpose of this custom was to increase one’s awareness of his need for confession to atone for his sins. This was a visual and physical admission of sins and it was believed to help one receive complete atonement.
Haim Hermann Cohn, E. J., v. 6, pp. 1348-51; Moshe David Herr, E. J., v. 5, p. 1381. (to effect atonement) whenever desired provided that it is before nightfall, but one does not bless over the immersion.
Hagah: One needs to immerse one time without a confession because of pollution (urinary emmission). The same holds true if one pours nine kavs³²A kav, was a unit of measurement for a liquid. According to present day standards a kav is approximately equivalent to 1.2 liters. of water (upon himself), (if the immersion pains him, (מגן אברהם),³³Magen Avraham, מגן אברהם, is a seventeenth century commentary on the Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim which was first printed in Dyhernfurth in 1692. It was highly accepted in Poland and Germany where it became the model for halakhic decisions by the scholars of that country who often differed from other codifiers. The Magen Avraham was written by Abraham Abele ben Ḥayyim ha-Levi Gombiner who lived from 1637 until 1683. He was of Polish birth but he moved to Lithuania after the death of his parents in Chmielnicki Massacres in 1648. After studying there with his relative Jacob Isaac Gombiner he moved to Kalisz where he was appointed head of the yeshivah and dayyan, judge, of the bet din rabbinical court.
Abraham’s commentary is evidence of his vast knowledge of halakhic material. The goal of his work, Magen Avraham was to provide a compromise between the decisions of Joseph Caro and the glosses of Moses Isserles. When no compromise could be arrived at Abraham usually sided with his fellow Ashkenazi, Isserles. Abraham felt that all Jewish customs were valid and sacred and he attempted to justify them even when there was a disagreement among the codifiers. Abraham highly regarded the Zohar and Kabbalists and he occasionally accepted their opinions over that of the codifiers.
Gombiner was also the author of a commentary on the Yalkut Shimoni called Zayit Ra’anan and a collection of homilies on Genesis called Shemen Sason in addition to a short commentary of the Tosefta of Nezikim.
Shmuel Ashkenazi, E. J., v. 7, pp. 766-67.), this is also effective, (מהרי״ו וכל בו ותשב״צ).³⁴Mahariv and Kol Bo and Tashbaẓ, מהרי״ו וכל בו ותשב״ץ.
Mahariv, מהרי״ו, see footnote 27.
Kol Bo, כל בו, which when translated means “everything within” is an anonymous work which contained both halakhic decisions and explanations of halakhot arranged according to subject matter. The book, Kol Bo, was written either at the end of the thirteenth century or at the beginning of the fourteenth century. The work is very similar to a commentary on Oraḥ Ḥayyim called Orḥot Ḥayyim written by Aaron b. Jacob ha-Kohen of Lunel and published in Florence in 1750-51. The fact that they were so similar and covered the same material except that the Orḥot Ḥayyim contained more material than did the Kol Bo caused some scholars to believe that the Kol Bo was a later abridgment to the Orḥot Ḥayyim. But this may not be true due to the differences in their arrangement, the Orḥot Ḥayyim being more systematic. There is another view that the Kol Bo was, the first edition to the Orḥot Ḥayyim and probably by the same author, Aaron b. Jacob ha-Kohen; the material in the Kol Bo certainly preceded that of the Orḥot Ḥayyim.
There are one-hundred and forty-eight sections to the Kol Bo which cover many subjects of Jewish ceremonial, ritual, civil, personal, and community life. The anthology includes collections of laws from numerous and varied halakhic works. The Kol Bo was basically patterned after the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides together with the additions of the scholars of Germany, France, and Provence. There were in addition a few rulings by Spanish scholars included. Many of the laws included in the Kol Bo are from books no longer in existence today. It is possible that the Kol Bo never had much original material, but was mainly an anthology of rules from various sources. The Kol Bo was first printed in Naples in 1490-91.
Shlomoh Zalman Havlin, E. J., v. 10, pp. 1159-60.
Tashbaẓ, תשב״ץ, see footnote 20. One who incurs a death between Rosh HaShanah and Yom Kippur, it is permissible to wash and to immerse on the Eve of Yom Kippur because Yom Kippur cancels the “shiva³⁵Shiva is a seven day mourning period which begins immediately after the funeral. The mourners traditionally gather in the house of the deceased where they sit on low stools or over-turned couches with their heads enrobed. This is obligatory for close relatives of the deceased, be it husband or wife, mother or father, son or daughter, or brother or sister. The mourners must perform keri’ah, a rending of their garments as a symbol of mourning and they are required to recite the blessing dayyan ha-emet proclaiming God as the true judge. During the shiva period, mourners are not permitted to work physically, conduct financial transactions, bathe, annoint the body, cut the hair, cohabit, wear leather shoes, wash clothes, greet acquaintances, and study the Torah. Study, though of sorrowful portions of the Bible and Talmud, such as Job, Lamentations, parts of Jeremiah and the laws of mourning is permitted.
The first meal of the mourners after the funeral is called se’udat havra’ah, the meal of consolation. This meal is provided by friends and neighbors for the mourners in accordance with the talmudic law that a mourner is forbidden to eat of his own bread on the first day of mourning (Mk. 27b). A mourner is also not permitted to put on teffilin, prayer phylacteries, on the first day of the Shiva period.
The first three days of this period are considered the most intense and are known as the three days for weeping the entire seven day period is known as a time of lamenting. The shiva period is suspended on the Sabbath and ends on a holiday even if the total period of seven days has not elapsed. (see also footnote 37).
Aaron Rothkoff, E. J., v. 12, pp. 488-89.”, (the seven day mourning period), (מהרי״ל, הלכות שמחות).³⁶Maharil, מהרי״ל, “The Laws of Mourning”, הלכות שמחות, (“שמחות”, “Pleasures” is a euphemism). The Laws of Mourning as discussed by Moellin; see footnote 8. Even though it is customary not to wash (bath) during the entire “sheloshim³⁷Sheloshim, means thirty and it refers to the thirty days of mourning after the death of a close relative; mother, father, wife, husband, son, daughter, brother, or sister, and it begins from the time of the burial. The mourner during the sheloshim is not to wear new or even festive clothes; not to shave or have a hair cut; not to participate in festivities including wedding, circumcision, or pidyon ha-ben (redemption of the first born male child) banquets unless it is one’s own child; not to marry; and to abstain from going to entertainment. It is also customary to change one’s usual seat in the synagogue during these thirty days. If the last day of sheloshim falls on the Sabbath then the mourning period ends prior to the Sabbath.
The three pilgrimage feativals and Rosh HaShanah may shorten the shiva or sheloshim period. If the mourner observes at least one hour of the shiva (see footnote 35) before Passover or Shavuot, the shiva is waived and the sheloshim is reduced to fifteen days after the holiday, but in the case of Succot the mourner has to observe only eight days of sheloshim after the festival. If a mourner observes at least one hour of shiva before Rosh HaShanah, the shiva is waived and the Day of Atonement ends the sheloshim. If a mourner observes at least one hour of shiva before Yom Kippur shiva is waived and Succot ends sheloshim. Minor festivals such as Ḥanukkah and Purim do not shorten the shiva or sheloshim. If a person only learns of a death within thirty days of the passing (shemu’ah kerovah) he must observe the complete rites of shiva and sheloshim. If the news reaches him more than thirty days after the death has occurred (shemua’ah reḥokah) then he must only observe the mourning rites of shiva and sheloshim for one hour. When one is mourning the death of one’s parents the prohibitions of the sheloshim period are observed for an entire twelve months along with the recitation of the mourner’s Kaddish (see footnote 177) for eleven months, (see Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, 399).”, (thirty day mourning period), a commanded immersion is permitted, (דעת עצמו).³⁸Da’at Aẓmo, דעת עצמו; this is the way indicated in Isserles’ glosses that the comment he was making was Isserles’ own opinion and was not taken from another source.