Halakhah su Esodo 21:21

Perhaps of even greater significance is the fact that war almost inevitably results in civilian casualties as well as the loss of combatants. The taking of innocent lives certainly cannot be justified on the basis of the law of pursuit. The life of the pursuer is forfeit in order that the life of the intended victim be preserved. However, should it be impossible to eliminate the pursuer other than by also causing the death of an innocent bystander, the law of pursuit could not be invoked even by the intended victim, much less so by a third party who is himself not personally endangered. Since the law of pursuit is designed to preserve the life of the innocent victim, it is only logical that it is forbidden to cause the death of a bystander in the process since to do so would only entail the loss of another innocent life. In such situations the talmudic principle "How do you know that your blood is sweeter than the blood of your fellow?" (Sanhedrin 74a) is fully applicable.³⁷Amud ha-Yemini, no. 16, chap. 4, discusses the applicability of this principle to the question of the sacrifice of gentile lives for the preservation of Jewish lives. Notwithstanding terminology employed by Rashi, Sanhedrin 74a, s.v. mai ḥazit, Rabbi Israeli rules that it is forbidden to take the life of a non-Jew in order to save the life of a Jew. Cf., Tiferet Yisra’el, Bo’az, Oholot 7:10; Noda bi-Yehuda, Mahadura Tinyana, Ḥoshen Mishpat, no. 59; Perashat Derakhim, Derush 17; Minḥat Ḥinnukh, no. 296; and R. Eliezer Waldenberg, Ẓiẓ Eli’ezer, X, no. 25, chap. 5, sec. 4. Cf., however, Palestinian Talmud, Shabbat 14:4, and R. Mordecai Halperin, Assia, vol. X, no. 4, (Tammuz, 5725), pp. 22-23. For an analysis of the problem posed by the Palestinian Talmud see this writer’s discussion in Or Ha-Mizraḥ, (Nisan-Tammuz 5748), pp. 293-295.
See Ra’avan, Baba Kamma 111b, and Kesef Mishneh, Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 2:11, who declare that taking the life of a non-Jew is encompassed in the prohibition against homicide; see also Mekhilta, Mishpatim 4:58. The line of reasoning employed by Ḥakham ẓevi, no. 26, and Ḥut ha-Meshulash, no. 17, with regard to theft of property belonging to a non-Jew would appear to apply, mutatis mutandis, to homicide as well. Meshekh Ḥokhmah, Parshat Mishpatim, s.v. ve-yitakhen, avers that the slaying of a non-Jew is a more severe transgression than taking the life of a Jew and that it is precisely for that reason that “punishment is reserved to Heaven.” See also Ibn Ezra, Commentary on the Bible, Exodus 21:21. Cf. R. Simchah Shustal, Koveẓ Nehora’i, I (5740), pp. 86-91.