Halakhah su Levitico 19:4
אַל־תִּפְנוּ֙ אֶל־הָ֣אֱלִילִ֔ים וֵֽאלֹהֵי֙ מַסֵּכָ֔ה לֹ֥א תַעֲשׂ֖וּ לָכֶ֑ם אֲנִ֖י יְהוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֵיכֶֽם׃
Non rivolgerti agli idoli, né farti divinità fuse: io sono il Signore tuo Dio.
Sefer HaMitzvot
That He prohibited us from inclining towards idolatry and occupying ourselves with its narratives - meaning to say, into this study of spirituality. [That] means, star x descends according to this description and [then] does such; and [when] they burn incense to y and stand before it according to this description, it does thing z - and that which goes in this way. For thought about these things and study with these [types of] expressions is what arouses a person to seek them and their worship. And the verse that prohibited us from this content is His saying, "Do not turn to the idols" (Leviticus 19:4). And the language of the [Sifra] (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 1:11) is, "If you turn to them, you make them gods." And there (Sifra, Kedoshim, Chapter 1:10), they said, "Rabbi Yehudah says, 'Do not turn to see them'" - it is not even permissible to observe the appearance of the image's form and the thought of its construction, so that one not spend any time [involved with any] part of it. And in the chapter [entitled] Shoel Adam (Shabbat 149a), they said, "[Regarding] writing that is under a picture or under graven images (deyokenaot), it is prohibited to read it on Shabbat. And [regarding] the image itself, even on a weekday it is prohibited to look at it, because it it is stated, 'Do not turn to the idols.' What is the [derivation from this verse]? Rabbi Yochanan said, 'Do not make a god from your minds.'" And the prohibition about this very content - meaning about the prohibition of the thought of idolatry - has already been repeated. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "Take heed to yourselves, lest your heart be seduced" (Deuteronomy 11:16). [This] means to say [that] if you have your heart delve into it, it will bring you to veer from the [true] path, and to become involved in its [actual] worship. And He also said about this exact content, "And lest you lift your eyes to the sky" (Deuteronomy 4:19). For He did not come to forbid a person from seeing them with his eyes, but rather forbade the matter in which one relates to their worship with the interest of the heart. And likewise, His saying, "lest you inquire about their gods," is forbidding the inquiry about the nature of their worship, even though one does not worship them. For this all leads to erring about them. And you should know that one who transgresses this is liable for lashes. And this has already been made clear at the end of the first chapter of Eruvin (Eruvin 17b), regarding that which they said, [that] we give lashes for [going outside of] the mixing of perimeters (eruvei techumin). And they gave as a proof, His saying, "let no (al) man go out of his place" (Exodus 16:29); and someone asked and said, "But how can they give lashes for a prohibition, with the word, al, when the commandment did not come with the word, lo? And they answered him rhetorically, "And do we not give lashes for anything that comes with the word, al? But if so, we would also not give lashes for, 'Do not turn to the idols!'" Behold this indicates that we give lashes for this negative commandment. (See Parashat Kedoshim; Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 2.)
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not make a statue: To not make statues that will be worshiped; even if the one that makes them does not worship them, the making is itself forbidden, [so as] to push off the stumbling block. And there is no difference between his making it with his hand or commanding someone else to make it, as it is stated (Exodus 20:4), "You shall not make for yourself a statue or any depiction." And the one who commands to make it is the one who causes its making - that is the opinion of Rambam, may his memory be blessed (Sefer HaMitzvot LaRambam, Mitzvot Lo Taase 4). And the opinion of Ramban, may his memory be blessed, (on that entry in Sefer HaMitzvot) it that there is no prohibition here except for not making idols with the intention of worshiping them. He also wrote that this negative commandment should not be counted from this scripture, as this verse only warns about the prohibition of idolatry which comes with the death penalty; but with the making of idols, the whole time that he does not worship them, the only thing he is liable for is lashes. And he, may his memory be blessed, wrote that this whole verse of "You shall have no," is considered one negative commandment [that] warns not to concede the divinity of anything besides Him; whether he accepts it as a god - meaning to say that he says to it, "You are my god" - or bows down to it, or worships it in one the four forbidden worships or worships it with the worship that is particular to it. Rather, he wrote that the [prohibition] of making idols and their preservation is extrapolated from the verse (Leviticus 19:4) of "Do not turn to idols or make molten gods for yourselves." And I wonder about that which Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote that there is no difference if he made it with his hand or if he commanded to make it - as behold, the one who commands is a dispatcher, and it is an established [principle] for us that a dispatcher is exempt.
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Contemporary Halakhic Problems, Vol I
Surprisingly, there is one source which appears to rule that destruction of the fetus by Noachides, at least under some circumstances, does not constitute a moral offense. Maharit36Teshuvot Maharit, I, no. 99. writes: "I remember having seen in a responsum of the Rashba that he bears witness that Ramban rendered medical aid to a gentile woman in return for compensation in order that she might conceive and aided her in aborting the fruit of her womb."37The authenticity of this quotation is highly questionable. R. Unterman (p. 8) notes that he searched Teshuvot ha-Rashba in an unsuccessful attempt to locate this responsum. It seems probable that Maharit’s quotation is culled from responsum no. 120 of vol. I in the published text (B’nei Brak, 5718). This responsum deals with the permissibility of rendering medical assistance to Noachide women so that they may be enabled to conceive. In language similar to that quoted by Maharit, mention is made of Ramban’s actually having done so in return for financial compensation. However, no mention whatsoever is made of Ramban’s having assisted in medical abortion. Maharit apparently had a variant textual version. Cf., also, R. Samuel Hubner, Ha-Darom, Tishri 5729, p. 33, who attempts to resolve the issue by suggesting an alternate punctuation of this quotation. It is of course inconceivable that an individual of Nachmanides' piety and erudition would have violated the injunction "Thou shalt not place a stumbling block before a blind person" (Lev. 19:4) or that he would have actively assisted transgressors. Applying the line of reasoning adduced above, Rabbi Unterman draws the conclusion that there is a fundamental distinction between Jewish law and Noachide law with regard to the assessment of potential life. According to many authorities, Noachides are under no obligation to preserve the lives of their fellows, to "be fruitful and multiply" or to refrain from wasting the male seed.38See above, n. 14. They are forbidden to commit homicide and to take the life of "a man within a man" but bear no responsibility for the safeguarding and preservation of seminal life. It would appear, then; that Halakhah holds them accountable only for actual, in contradistinction to potential, life.39R. Unterman fails, however, to note the comments of R. Jacob Zevi Jalish in his Melo ha-Ro‘im, Sanhedrin 57b, who expresses a contrary view. Examination of the phraseology of Ḥemdat Yisra’el, Part I, p. 108, indicates that R. Plocki also had such a distinction in mind. In cases of danger to the mother he permits abortion of embryos of less than forty days without further qualification and adds that there are grounds for permitting abortion at subsequent stages of development provided this procedure is performed by a Jewish physician. Accordingly, there is no objection to Noachides aborting, or to a Jew giving advice and rendering indirect assistance to Noachides in aborting, a fetus within the first forty days of gestation. Since Halakhah considers that during this initial period the embryo has not as yet developed distinctly recognizable organs or an independent circulatory system it cannot be considered "a man within a man" and hence its destruction does not constitute murder under the Noachide dispensation. Nachmanides, Rabbi Unterman avers, sanctioned the performance of abortions by Noachides only within this forty-day period.40The absence, in the Noachide Code, of a ban on feticide during the first forty days of gestation would, in the opinion of this writer, provide insight into what is otherwise considered an erroneous translation by the Septuagint of Exodus 21:22–23: “And if two men strive together and hurt a woman with a child so that her children depart and yet no harm (ason) follow, he shall surely be fined. … But if any harm follows, then thou shalt give life for life.” Rabbinic exegesis regards the term “harm” as having reference to the death of the mother. Compensation is payable to the husband for the loss of his offspring only if the mother survives. Should the mother die as a result of this assault, the attacker is absolved from the payment of this fine. From these provisions the Gemara derives the principle that the commission of a capital crime, even if unintentional and hence not leading to the invocation of the statutory penalty, absolves the offender from the payment of any other compensation. The Septuagint, however, renders these verses as follows:
This reading understands the death penalty to which reference is made as being incurred for the killing of the fetus in cases where the fetus is formed, i.e., has already reached the fortieth day of gestation. It is clearly on the basis of this passage in the Septuagint that such a distinction is drawn by Philo (De Spec. Legibus, III, 108–10) and it was this reading of the Septuagint which influenced the attitude of the Church. Cf. Jakobovits, op. cit., pp. 174, 179, 328, n. 43, and 333, n. 152. Samuel Poznanski, “Jakob ben Ephraim ein Antikaraischer Polemiker des X Jahrhunderts,” Gedenkbuch zur Erinnerung an David Kaufmann, ed. M. Brann and F. Rosenthal (Breslau, 1900), p. 186, suggests that the mistranslation is based on reading ẓurah for ason. On the basis of R. Unterman’s thesis, the entire matter is quite readily resolved, particularly in light of the rabbinic tradition which states that modifications were intentionally introduced by the Jewish translators (see Megillah 9a). Addressed to gentiles, the translation may have been intended to incorporate ramifications of Noachide law. Since a Noachide incurs capital punishment for the destruction of a fetus, provided it is formed, he would be absolved from further punishment even in cases where the mother survives. An exhaustive interpretation of ason, then, signifies death of the mother if the attacker is a Jew, and either death of the mother or of a formed fetus if the attacker is a Noachide. The word ason as applied to a Noachide thus includes the death of a formed fetus and is rendered accordingly by the Septuagint. This interpretation is, of course, founded on the premise that the principle of absolution from the lesser of two simultaneously incurred punishments extends to Noachide law as well —a matter which bears further investigation. R. Joseph Babad is of the opinion that the principle “kim leh be-de-rabbah mineh” (imposition of the greater of two punishments to the exclusion of the lesser) does not apply to Noachides. See Minḥat Ḥinukh, no. 34. However, there is basis for assuming that the question is the subject of controversy between Rashi and Tosafot, Eruvin 62a. Cf. Encyclopedia Talmudit (Tel Aviv, 5711), III, 354.
This reading understands the death penalty to which reference is made as being incurred for the killing of the fetus in cases where the fetus is formed, i.e., has already reached the fortieth day of gestation. It is clearly on the basis of this passage in the Septuagint that such a distinction is drawn by Philo (De Spec. Legibus, III, 108–10) and it was this reading of the Septuagint which influenced the attitude of the Church. Cf. Jakobovits, op. cit., pp. 174, 179, 328, n. 43, and 333, n. 152. Samuel Poznanski, “Jakob ben Ephraim ein Antikaraischer Polemiker des X Jahrhunderts,” Gedenkbuch zur Erinnerung an David Kaufmann, ed. M. Brann and F. Rosenthal (Breslau, 1900), p. 186, suggests that the mistranslation is based on reading ẓurah for ason. On the basis of R. Unterman’s thesis, the entire matter is quite readily resolved, particularly in light of the rabbinic tradition which states that modifications were intentionally introduced by the Jewish translators (see Megillah 9a). Addressed to gentiles, the translation may have been intended to incorporate ramifications of Noachide law. Since a Noachide incurs capital punishment for the destruction of a fetus, provided it is formed, he would be absolved from further punishment even in cases where the mother survives. An exhaustive interpretation of ason, then, signifies death of the mother if the attacker is a Jew, and either death of the mother or of a formed fetus if the attacker is a Noachide. The word ason as applied to a Noachide thus includes the death of a formed fetus and is rendered accordingly by the Septuagint. This interpretation is, of course, founded on the premise that the principle of absolution from the lesser of two simultaneously incurred punishments extends to Noachide law as well —a matter which bears further investigation. R. Joseph Babad is of the opinion that the principle “kim leh be-de-rabbah mineh” (imposition of the greater of two punishments to the exclusion of the lesser) does not apply to Noachides. See Minḥat Ḥinukh, no. 34. However, there is basis for assuming that the question is the subject of controversy between Rashi and Tosafot, Eruvin 62a. Cf. Encyclopedia Talmudit (Tel Aviv, 5711), III, 354.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not turn after the worship of idols - not in thought, not in speech and not in vision To not turn after idolatry with thought or speech and not even only with sight; so that he not come from this to serve it, as it is stated (Leviticus 19:4), "You shall not turn to the idols." And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:11, "If you turn after them, you make them gods"; meaning to say, if you involve yourself with their matters - meaning to ponder after the follies that those that believe in them say about it, that constellation x or star y does this action, and so [too,] incense x or service y; or you constantly observe the forms that their worshipers make in order to know the manner of its worship. All of this [can cause] you to be seduced after it and that you would worship it.
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Sefer HaChinukh
To not make [idols] not for himself and not for those besides him: To not make [idols] for one that will worship it, not for himself and not for those besides him, and even if the one who orders that it be made is an idolater - as it is stated (Leviticus 19:4), "and molten gods do not make for yourselves." And they, may their memory be blessed, said in Sifra, Kedoshim, Section 1:12, even for others. And there is it said, "One who makes [an idol] for himself, transgresses on account of two warnings" - meaning to say, on account of "do not make," and on account of "for yourselves, etc."
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