Halakhah su Levitico 22:24

These sources, however, serve only to demonstrate that animal-directed conduct which is compassionate in nature constitutes a "good deed" but do not serve to establish a system of normative duties or responsibilities. Particularly in light of the strong nomistic element present in Judaism, the absence of normative regulations might well be regarded as indicative of the absence of serious ethical concern for the welfare of members of the animal kingdom. But this is demonstrably not the case, for, in Jewish teaching, there is no dearth of nomoi designed to protect and promote animal welfare. The most obvious example of a regulation having such an effect, and one which is clearly biblical in origin, is contained in the verse "If thou seest the ass of him that hateth thee lying under its burden, thou shalt forebear to pass by him; thou shalt surely release it with him" (Exodus 23:5). The selfsame concern is manifest in the prohibition against muzzling an ox while it threshes in order that the animal be free to eat of the produce while working (Deuteronomy 25:4). Similarly, Scripture provides that both domestic animals and wild beasts must be permitted to share in produce of the land which grows without cultivation during the sabbatical year.⁴See Me’iri, Baba Meẓi‘a 33a, and Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 596. The purpose of other biblical laws pertaining to animals in less clear-cut. The prohibition against plowing with animals of different species, recorded in Deuteronomy 22:10, is understood by Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 550, as well as by Da‘at Zekenim mi-Ba’alei ha-Tosafot and Ba’al ha-Turim in their respective commentaries on Deuteronomy 22:10, as rooted in considerations of prevention of cruelty to animals, but is understood in an entirely different manner by Rambam, Guide of the Perplexed, Book III, chapter 49, as well as by Ramban in his commentary on Deuteronomy 22:10. However, Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 48, regards the prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day, recorded in Leviticus 22:28, as a precautionary measure designed to prevent the slaughter of the offspring in the presence of its parent. The underlying concern is to spare the mother the anguish of seeing her young killed before her eyes “for in these cases animals feel very great pain, there being no difference regarding this pain between man and the other animals. For the love and the tenderness of a mother for her child is not consequent upon reason, but upon the activity of the imaginative faculty, which is found in most animals just as it is found in man.” Here, Rambam speaks of concern for the welfare of the animal rather than for the moral character of the human agent; see below, notes 14-15 and accompanying text. This interpretation is reflected in the comments of R. Baḥya ben Asher, Leviticus 22:28, and, in part, in Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 294. Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh regards the commandment prohibiting the slaughter of an animal and its young on the same day as designed both to spare the parent from anguish and as a conservation measure as well. See also Abarbanel’s Commentary on the Bible, ad locum. Rambam’s analysis of the rationale underlying this precept is rejected by Ramban in his Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6. According to Ramban, the concern is not to avoid pain to the animal but to purge man of callousness, cruelty and savagery.
Although the Gemara, Baba Meẓi‘a 32a, declares that assistance in unloading a burden from an animal is mandated by reason of ẓa’ar ba’alei ḥayyim but that the obligation to assist in loading the burden upon the animal is not independently mandated by reason of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim, Ritva, cited by Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Meẓi‘a 31a, s.v. aval te’inah, asserts that the commandment requiring a person to render assistance to another who is engaged in loading an animal is predicated upon considerations of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. According to Ritva, a single person engaged in this task is likely to cause additional discomfort to the animal by applying the full force of his body weight whereas, when he is assisted by another, there is no need to apply similar pressure.
Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 186, is of the opinion that the prohibition against the slaughter of sanctified animals outside the Temple precincts is rooted in considerations of ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. According to Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, such slaughter is forbidden because no purpose is served thereby and hence constitutes ẓa‘ar ba’alei ḥayyim. See below, note 29.
Neither the prohibition against mating animals of different species, Leviticus 19:19, nor the prohibition against emasculation of animals, Leviticus 22:24, is understood by classical rabbinic scholars as rooted in considerations of animal welfare. For a discussion of animal welfare as a possible rationale associated with other commandments, see R. Joel Schwartz, Ve-Raḥamav al Kol Ma’asav (Jerusalem, 5744), pp. 11-16. Although the literal meaning of the biblical text may be somewhat obscure, talmudic exegesis understands Genesis 9:4 and Deuteronomy 12:23 as forbidding the eating of a limb severed from a living animal. Jewish law teaches that this prohibition, unlike most other commandments, is universally binding upon all peoples as one of the Seven Commandments of the Sons of Noah. Sabbath laws contained in both formulations of the Decalogue reflect a concern which goes beyond the mere elimination of pain and discomfort and serve to promote the welfare of animals in a positive manner by providing for their rest on the Sabbath day: "But the seventh day is a Sabbath unto the Lord thy God, on it thou shalt not do any manner of work … nor thine ox, nor thine ass, nor any of thy cattle …" (Deuteronomy 5:14). Even more explicit in expressing concern for the welfare of animals is the verse "… but on the seventh day thou shalt rest; that thine ox and thine ass may have rest" (Exodus 23:12).⁵The requirement that the parent bird be released before the young are taken and the concomitant prohibition against taking both the parent and the young, recorded in Deuteronomy 22:6-7, quite obviously have the effect of sparing the parent from anguish. The Mishnah, Berakhot 33b, however, does not view this desideratum, laudable as it may be, as the underlying purpose of the commandment. Cf., however, Rambam, Guide, Book III, chapter 48; Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Deuteronomy 22:6; and Sefer ha-Ḥinnukh, no. 545.

Rabbi Telushkin, although he does not base his argument upon the earlier-cited comment of Rashi, contends that, at least for some authorities, the restriction against intercourse is limited to instances in which external genital organs have been mutilated. He notes the juxtaposition of the prohibition against causing sterility which is derived from Leviticus 22:24 and the listing of the physical defects which disqualify a priest from performing the sacrificial rituals recorded in the same scriptual section. The latter are limited to external blemishes. The prohibition against mutilating sexual organs, suggests Rabbi Telushkin, is recorded subsequent to the proscription dealing with priestly blemishes as an indication that the prohibition against mutilation, and the pursuant prohibition against sexual intercourse, are limited to mutilation of external organs.⁸In point of fact, the regulation governing disqualification of priests suffering from physical defects is recorded in Leviticus 21:16-23. Rabbi Telushkin may have expressed himself unfelicitously but actually may have intended to note the juxtaposition of Leviticus 22:24 with the immediately preceding regulations disqualifying animals marred by certain physical blemishes from being brought as sacrificial offerings. The latter regulations are found in Leviticus 22:19-23.

The Gemara, Shabbat 110b, derives the prohibition against castration of both male human beings and male animals from the verse "And that which is mauled or crushed or tom or cut you shall not offer unto the Lord; nor should you do this in your land" (Lev. 22:24). This verse is understood by the Gemara as having reference to the male sexual organs and hence the latter part of the verse constitutes a prohibition against emasculation. Tosafot and Rashba, in their commentaries on Shabbat 111a, indicate that this prohibition is limited to the removal of male sexual organs, and there exists no biblical prohibition with regard to the sterilization of a female. The terminology employed by Rambam, Issurei Bi'ah 16:11, and Shulḥan Arukh, Even haEzer 5:11, would seem to indicate that the position of the latter authorities is that surgical sterilization of women, while not an actionable offense, is nevertheless biblically proscribed. Although the reference in Leviticus 22:24 is limited to external male organs, R. Elijah of Vilna, Bi'ur ha-Gra, Even ha-Ezer 5:25–26, cites Sifra in explaining that the ban against the removal of the internal female sexual organs is derived from the formulation employed in the very next verse, Leviticus 22:25. Nevertheless, other authorities, including Hatam Sofer, Even ha-Ezer 5:22, maintain that, even according to Rambam, the prohibition against the sterilization of females is rabbinic in nature. Turei Zahav, Even ha-Ezer 5:6, goes beyond the position of other authorities in averring that there is no prohibition with regard to female sterilization per se, but that it is nonetheless forbidden to subject female animals to this procedure because of the general prohibition against causing pain to animals. Similarly, nontherapeutic sterilization of women would constitute an unlawful act of "wounding"—ḥavalah.