Halakhah su Levitico 24:78

If someone is about to say birkat ha-mazon, he is required to wash his hands first, and then say the blessing “al rehitzat yada’im;” this washing is an obligation. And so they said, “Mayim rishonim is a mitzvah, mayim ahronim an obligation (hovah), washing during the meal optional.”¹⁶⁶B. Hullin 105a. An obligation – hovah – is a stronger requirement than a mitzvah. And when they said “during the meal,” they meant it is optional between one cooked dish and another. But between a cooked dish and cheese, it is an obligation.¹⁶⁷Ibid., 105b.

One has to be careful when he is about to say birkat ha-mazon not to leave the table without any bread on it, as they said in tractate Sanhedrin:¹⁸¹B. Sanhedrin 92a. “Whoever does not leave bread on his table, about him Scripture says, ‘With no remnant for him to eat, his goodness will not take hold.”¹⁸²Job 20:21. The reason for this practice is so that the blessing about which this was said will take hold; for if nothing is left, in what can the blessing take hold, because no blessing takes hold upon nothing, but only upon something? And the table in the sanctuary, which never was without bread, attests to this. And that bread was eaten by the priests who ministered to the sanctuary, and only a little of it was enough to feed many of them, and so our rabbis said, “Every priest who approached it was made doubly happy,”¹⁸³B. Yoma 39a. R. Bahya seems to allude to double portion of manna in the manna miracle as well as to the two loaves offered to the priests in Lev. 23:17. and through this very bread on the table blessing descended and was dispersed in the food of the world, from the showbread, by way of “something from something” and not something from nothing. For even the prophets who were “capable of serving in the royal palace”¹⁸⁴Dan 1:4. were not capable of producing something from nothing, but rather only something from something. Let me call for myself reliable witnesses:¹⁸⁵An allusion to Is 8:2.Elijah and Elisha, the former through “flour in a jar,”¹⁸⁶I Kg 17:12: “kad ha-kemah,” which R. Bahya used as the title for his famous encyclopedic collection of sermons. the latter “a jug of oil” – all was “something from something,” for no one has the power to make something from nothing but the Holy One Blessed be He, Shaper of creation which He created from nothing, and with all due to respect for Him, we find that even He only did it in the six days of the creation of the world. From then on till now, everything is “something from something.” And thus it is written, “which God created and made.”¹⁸⁷Gen 2:3. The explanation: “which God created” – something from nothing; “and made” – from then on, something from something, not something from nothing. So accordingly, it is necessary that a person about to recite birkat ha-mazon, leave a piece of bread on the table, for even a little of it is enough for the blessing to take hold in, and its power will be distributed through an increase of the small amount, just like the hidden miracles that are done for us every day, without us knowing or being aware of them. Just as our rabbis said: “¹⁸⁸B. Nidah 31a.No miracle-worker is aware of his own miracle.” And you should know that the cause behind the blessing that drops down in the food of the world and in the showbread is explained in the verse: “It [the frankincense] shall be a reminder-offering with the bread.”¹⁸⁹Lev 24:7. R. Bahya seems to allude to the miracle of the manna here in the language he uses about the showbread drawing miracles and blessings down to the earth, and of the priests being “doubly happy” See note 183 above . And later he explicitly associates the covering of bread on the table with cloths above and below with the miracle of the manna. As you already knew that they used to place frankincense on top of the bread, which is what is written just before, “With each row you shall place pure frankincense,”¹⁹⁰Ibid. the showbread and the frankincense used to counteract one another, just like the etrog and the lulav,¹⁹¹B. Menahot 27a. and the blue dye and white cloth (when blue dye could still be found). For the Most High has no share in the showbread, while the ordinary mortal has no share in the frankincense, which they would burn upon the fire. Therefore Scripture said, “It shall be a reminder-offering with the bread,” because by burning the frankincense which is on top of the bread, it becomes a reminder to the power above for blessing to drop down on it and from it into the food for the world. And understand this, that it is for this reason that there were twelve hallot arranged on top of the table. And from there the blessing came, which corresponded to the twelve angels¹⁹²Pirkei de Rabbi Eliezer 4. surrounding the throne of glory, which are called “four camps of the Shekhinah,” from which the world is blessed to the four winds, and they serve three to each wind, the meaning behind the four banners that were in the desert. Also corresponding to them below were the twelve lions on Solomon’s throne, and they are like these twelve hallot and the twenty-four tenth-measures,¹⁹³Lev 24:5. Each loaf – hallah – was made of two tenth-measures – ‘esronim – of choice flour, i.e., 24 = 2 x 12. and arouse your mind to this!

One has to be careful when he is about to say birkat ha-mazon not to leave the table without any bread on it, as they said in tractate Sanhedrin:¹⁸¹B. Sanhedrin 92a. “Whoever does not leave bread on his table, about him Scripture says, ‘With no remnant for him to eat, his goodness will not take hold.”¹⁸²Job 20:21. The reason for this practice is so that the blessing about which this was said will take hold; for if nothing is left, in what can the blessing take hold, because no blessing takes hold upon nothing, but only upon something? And the table in the sanctuary, which never was without bread, attests to this. And that bread was eaten by the priests who ministered to the sanctuary, and only a little of it was enough to feed many of them, and so our rabbis said, “Every priest who approached it was made doubly happy,”¹⁸³B. Yoma 39a. R. Bahya seems to allude to double portion of manna in the manna miracle as well as to the two loaves offered to the priests in Lev. 23:17. and through this very bread on the table blessing descended and was dispersed in the food of the world, from the showbread, by way of “something from something” and not something from nothing. For even the prophets who were “capable of serving in the royal palace”¹⁸⁴Dan 1:4. were not capable of producing something from nothing, but rather only something from something. Let me call for myself reliable witnesses:¹⁸⁵An allusion to Is 8:2.Elijah and Elisha, the former through “flour in a jar,”¹⁸⁶I Kg 17:12: “kad ha-kemah,” which R. Bahya used as the title for his famous encyclopedic collection of sermons. the latter “a jug of oil” – all was “something from something,” for no one has the power to make something from nothing but the Holy One Blessed be He, Shaper of creation which He created from nothing, and with all due to respect for Him, we find that even He only did it in the six days of the creation of the world. From then on till now, everything is “something from something.” And thus it is written, “which God created and made.”¹⁸⁷Gen 2:3. The explanation: “which God created” – something from nothing; “and made” – from then on, something from something, not something from nothing. So accordingly, it is necessary that a person about to recite birkat ha-mazon, leave a piece of bread on the table, for even a little of it is enough for the blessing to take hold in, and its power will be distributed through an increase of the small amount, just like the hidden miracles that are done for us every day, without us knowing or being aware of them. Just as our rabbis said: “¹⁸⁸B. Nidah 31a.No miracle-worker is aware of his own miracle.” And you should know that the cause behind the blessing that drops down in the food of the world and in the showbread is explained in the verse: “It [the frankincense] shall be a reminder-offering with the bread.”¹⁸⁹Lev 24:7. R. Bahya seems to allude to the miracle of the manna here in the language he uses about the showbread drawing miracles and blessings down to the earth, and of the priests being “doubly happy” See note 183 above . And later he explicitly associates the covering of bread on the table with cloths above and below with the miracle of the manna. As you already knew that they used to place frankincense on top of the bread, which is what is written just before, “With each row you shall place pure frankincense,”¹⁹⁰Ibid. the showbread and the frankincense used to counteract one another, just like the etrog and the lulav,¹⁹¹B. Menahot 27a. and the blue dye and white cloth (when blue dye could still be found). For the Most High has no share in the showbread, while the ordinary mortal has no share in the frankincense, which they would burn upon the fire. Therefore Scripture said, “It shall be a reminder-offering with the bread,” because by burning the frankincense which is on top of the bread, it becomes a reminder to the power above for blessing to drop down on it and from it into the food for the world. And understand this, that it is for this reason that there were twelve hallot arranged on top of the table. And from there the blessing came, which corresponded to the twelve angels¹⁹²Pirkei de Rabbi Eliezer 4. surrounding the throne of glory, which are called “four camps of the Shekhinah,” from which the world is blessed to the four winds, and they serve three to each wind, the meaning behind the four banners that were in the desert. Also corresponding to them below were the twelve lions on Solomon’s throne, and they are like these twelve hallot and the twenty-four tenth-measures,¹⁹³Lev 24:5. Each loaf – hallah – was made of two tenth-measures – ‘esronim – of choice flour, i.e., 24 = 2 x 12. and arouse your mind to this!

You should know that sometimes commands appear in the Torah; yet those commands are not commandments, but rather preliminaries to the doing of the commandment - as if He is recounting how it is appropriate for you to do the commandment. An example of this is His saying, "You shall take fine flour and bake of it" (Leviticus 24:5). As it is inappropriate to count the taking of fine flour as a commandment or the making of bread as a commandment. Rather that which is counted is His saying, "And on the table you shall set the bread of display, to be before Me always" (Exodus 25:30). Behold the commandment is that the bread always be before the Lord. And afterwards, He explained how this bread should be, and from what it should be - and He said that it should be from fine flour and that it should be twelve loaves. And in this very same way is it inappropriate to count His saying, "to bring you clear oil of beaten olives" (Exodus 27:20); but rather "for lighting, for kindling lamps regularly" - which is the maintenance of the lamps, as is explained in Tamid 83a. And in this very same way does one not count, His saying, "Take the herbs to yourself" (Exodus 30:34); but rather the offering of the incense every day - as Scripture explains about it, "he shall burn it every morning when he tends the lamps. And when Aharon lights the lamps" (Exodus 30:7-8). And that is the commandment that is counted; whereas His saying, "Take the herbs to yourself," is only a preliminary of the command, to explain how you should do this commandment and what matter this incense should be from. And likewise should one not count, "Take choice spices for yourself"; but rather certainly count the command that He commanded that we anoint the high priest, the kings and the holy vessels with the anointing oil described. And apply this to all that is similar to it, such that you will not add what is inappropriate to count. And this is our intention about this principle, and it is a clear matter. However we mentioned it and it has come to our attention because many have erred also about this, and counted some of the preliminaries of the commandments with the commandments themselves as two commandments. This is clear to the one who understands the count of sections that Rabbi Shimon ben Kiara mentioned - he and all those who followed him - to mention the sections in their counts.

R. Meir Simchah of Dvinsk, in his biblical novellae, Meshekh Hokhmah, Exod. 35:2, offers an interesting scriptural foundation for this prohibition, demonstrating that, while not a penal crime, the killing of a fetus is punishable by "death at the hands of heaven." ⁶However, cf. R. Samuel Strashun, Mekorei ha-Rambam le-Rashash (Jerusalem, 1957), p. 45, who writes that although feticide is biblically forbidden “perhaps there is no punishment even ‘at the hands of heaven.’ ” He observes that Scripture invariably refers to capital punishment by employing the formula "mot yumat—he shall surely be put to death." The use of the single expression "yumat—he shall be put to death" as, for example, in Exodus 21:29, is understood in rabbinic exegesis as having reference to death at the hands of heaven. Thus, R. Meir Simchah argues, the verse "and he that smiteth a man shall be put to death—yumat" (Lev. 24:21) is not simply a reiteration of the penalty for homicide but refers to such destruction of life which is punishable only at the hands of heaven, i.e., the killing of a fetus. Reference to the fetus as "a man" poses no difficulty since the fetus is indeed described as "a man" in the above cited verse (Gen. 9:6) prescribing death for feticide under the Noachide Code.

Consequently, it becomes apparent that ensoulment is a matter of philosophical, rather than halakhic, interest. Similarly, "personhood" is not a category of halakhic discourse. To be sure, there are statements in the writings of early rabbinic authorities to the effect that a fetus is not to be categorized as a nefesh.⁸See Rashi, Sanhedrin 72b, s.v. yaẓa rosho. However, the concept of a "nefesh" is not to be equated with the connotative meaning of the term "person." A treifah, i.e., a person suffering the loss or perforation of one of a list of specifically defined vital organs⁹Cf., however, Rambam, Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 2:9. is not a nefesh; but a treifah is certainly a person. Leviticus 24:17 provides that one who smites a nefesh shall be put to death. Talmudic exegesis of that verse as recorded in the Gemara, Sanhedrin 78a, yields a dispute with regard to capital culpability of one who hastens the death of a person who has already sustained a mortal wound at the hands of a previous aggressor. The disagreement is with regard to whether the phrase "kol nefesh" should be rendered as "a complete nefesh" or as "any nefesh" in the sense of even a minimal nefesh. Nevertheless, all are in agreement that there is no capital culpability for the killing of a treifah. Quite obviously, a treifah is not a nefesh and hence if a treifah is the victim of homicide the perpetrator is not guilty of a capital crime; yet for virtually all other aspects of Jewish law a treifah must certainly be regarded as a person. In an analogous manner, as already noted, a person who murders an individual who has already sustained a mortal wound is not executed because the victim is not a "complete nefesh"; yet there is no question that, so long as vital signs remain present, the victim remains a "complete person" for all other matters of law. As is the case with regard to many words and phrases employed in any legal system, the word "nefesh" is a technical term endowed with a narrow and precisely defined halakhic meaning that is not readily translatable into non-technical terms employed in common parlance.

Neither should you quarrel for [the right to perform] a mitzvah, such as to lead the congregation in prayer, or to be called up to the Torah, or the like. Just as we find it with the Show-bread,³⁰Lechem hapanim, literally “bread of the face” (see Lev. 24:5,8). It was so called because the sides were bent up. The loaves had the shape of a box with the ends removed. Twelve loaves were placed on the Table in the Sanctuary. They were arranged on a frame in the two stacks of six loaves each. Each Shabbos the loaves were replaced by fresh ones, and the old ones, which miraculously retained their freshness, were divided among the kohanim. that although it was a mitzvah to eat of it, yet, we are told, "The modest used to give up their share while the gluttons used to grab and devour it."³¹Yoma 39a.

Some latter-day authorities, including Parashat Derakhim, Derush 1, and R. Joseph Engel, Bet ha-Ozar, Ma'arekhet Alef, klal 1, marshal a variety of sources in support of the position that the Patriarchs, although not formally bound by the Sinaitic covenant, nevertheless enjoyed the status of full-fledged Jews for all other purposes.¹⁷The Brisker Rav, R. Yiẓḥhak Ze’ev ha-Levi Soloveichik, citing Ramban, Commentary on the Bible, Leviticus 24:10, argues that, since the days of Abraham, our ancestors enjoyed the status of Jews and hence, for them, Sabbath observance was not a “novel” religious observance. Nevertheless, prior to revelation at Sinai, they were not bound by the commandments. See Ḥiddushei Maran ha-Griz ha-Levi al Tanakh ve-Aggada, published in Batei ha-Leviyim (Jerusalem, 5746), no. 13, p. 7. If so, the problem is immediately resolved. However, even those authorities cite midrashic sources that serve to render the issue a matter of doubt or controversy.

The root of this commandment is revealed to all, as 'by justice a king sustains the land.' As were it not for the fear of judgment, people would kill one another. Therefore, God, blessed be He, commanded us to kill the murderer. And in His wisdom, blessed be He, He saw that it is fitting to punish him with the death penalty of strangulation. And the matter is beautiful, also according to our [understanding], since 'as he has done, so shall it be done to him' - since the intention of the killer was to kill the murdered quickly, as from [the killer's] fear of him, he will quicken his death with all of his might. And so too was the Torah lenient with his judgment to kill him with strangulation, which is a quick death penalty; and not with stoning and burning, which are with great pain. (In the other editions, it is written, "The truth is that the death penalty of the murderer is with the sword, [whereas] he who hits his father and mother has a death penalty of strangulation.") However with the statutes of licentiousness, in which the transgressors derived pleasure from the sin and the pleasure continued a bit, they sometimes get burning and sometimes stoning.

The commandment of the laws of penalties: That we were commanded about the law of one who injures his fellow to penalize that person, as it is written in the Torah in the section of "And if men fight" (Exodus 21:18). And this is called the laws of penalties. And in another verse, it includes all of the laws of penalties, and it is the verse, "as he did, so shall it be done to him" (Leviticus 24:19) – it means to say that what he pained [his fellow] should be taken away from his money, in accordance with that which he injured his fellow, as the tradition comes about it (Bava Kamma 83b). And even if he did not hit him, but only embarrassed him, the court must cause him pain through his money, that he should pay the one embarrassed, according to this amount. And these laws that are called the laws of penalties – for example, the laws of a man [who hurt another] man; an ox, an ox; an animal, a man; a man, an animal – must be judged in a court that has been ordained in the Land of Israel (Bava Kamma 84a).

This responsum of Maharit is quite remarkable not only for his unique characterization of abortion but for another reason as well. Although there is no dispute regarding the exclusion of therapeutic "wounding" from the prohibition "Forty stripes he shall give him, he shall not exceed" (Deuteronomy 25:3), classical sources describing permissible therapeutic "wounding" invariably describe "wounding" in the form of an incision or excision designed to be of therapeutic benefit to the patient himself. There is no reference in these sources to the "wounding" of one person for the therapeutic benefit of another. Yet that is precisely what Maharit permits. He rules that "wounding" the fetus in the course of its removal from the uterus is permitted in order to preserve maternal health, i.e., the wounding of the fetus is permitted for the therapeutic benefit of another, namely, the mother.⁸⁷The statement of R. Dimi bar Hinena, Sanhedrin 83b, “‘And he who kills a beast, he shall restore it; and he who kills a man, he shall be put to death’ (Leviticus 24:21): just as one who strikes an animal to heal it is not liable for damage so if one wounds a man to heal him he is not liable,” does not necessarily establish authority to “wound” a person for the benefit of a third party. Cf., R. Moshe Meiselman, Halakhah u-Refu’ah, II, 114. Nor does Rambam’s statement, Hilkhot ḥovel u-Mazik 5:1, limiting the prohibition to wounding “in the manner of strife” necessarily exclude wounding for the therapeutic benefit of a third party. Moreover, Rambam’s comments may serve to circumvent only the prohibition against “smiting” but not the prohibition against “wounding,” i.e., causing blood to flow. See R. Moshe Meiselman, ibid., p. 115, but cf., Iggerot Mosheh, Ḥoshen Mishpat, II, no. 66. Maharit's position is even more problematic in light of the fact that the fetus is a "minor." In positing an extension of the prohibition against "wounding" to encompass the fetus, Maharit establishes a fetus' right to bodily integrity. Since the fetus certainly has no obligation to preserve the life of another, much less so to preserve the health of another, it is remarkable that Maharit finds that it is permissible to "wound" the fetus in order to avoid a threat to maternal health.⁸⁸In Teshuvot Maharit, no. 99, Maharit makes no attempt to predicate his ruling sanctioning abortion for preservation of maternal health upon the premise “a fetus is a thigh of its mother” (ubar yerekh imo). In the first lines of Teshuvot Maharit, no. 97, Maharit states that feticide constitutes a transgression of the prohibition against “wounding” and only later in his discussion does he employ the principle “a fetus is a thigh of its mother.” See also R. Yechi’el Ya‘akov Weinberg, Seridei Esh, III, no. 127, who cites the statement of Tosafot, Sanhedrin 80b, in which Tosafot declares that a fetus preserves “independent animation” and hence the principle “a fetus is a thigh of its mother” does not render the fetus a treifah simply because its mother is a treifah. Similarly, argues Seridei Esh, since the fetus possesses “independent animation” its destruction in order to save the mother is not comparable to the removal of a limb in order to save the body. It is certainly noteworthy that, although Maharit's thesis concerning the nature of the prohibition entailed in performing an abortion was the subject of considerable controversy, there has been no challenge in rabbinic literature to the conclusion he draws from that thesis, i.e., that the "wounding" of the fetus is permissible for the purpose of preservation of maternal life or health. Indeed, it must be inferred that the authorities who challenge Maharit's ruling on other grounds would acquiesce in the position that an assault upon the fetus that does not lead to fetal mortality may be sanctioned for the purpose of preserving maternal health. The rationale underlying that conclusion requires explication.

That He prohibited us from cursing the great God, may He be greatly exalted from that which the secterians say. And this is the matter that has been called, 'blessing' God, may He be exalted. The punishment for one who transgresses this negative commandment is indeed explicit in the Torah - that he is stoned. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord shall surely be put to death and all the congregation shall certainly stone him" (Leviticus 24:15). However [regarding] the prohibition - behold that no verse came that is specific to this content by itself. Rather it came with a prohibition that includes this content and that besides it. And that is His saying, "Do not curse powers (elohim)" (Exodus 22:27). And in the explanation (Sanhedrin 56a), they said, "For the ineffable name, with death; and for appellations, with a prohibition." And in the Mekhilta (Mekhilta DeRabbi Shimon Bar Yochai 22:27), [it says,] "'Do not curse powers' - is to give a [prohibition] for 'blessing' God." And the regulations of this commandment have been explained in the sixth [chapter of] Sanhedrin. And you should know that this type of prohibition that includes two or three things need not be from the general negative commandments. For Scripture explained the punishment of each matter [separately] - so we know perforce that each matter was forbidden, such that [each] is a negative commandment. And since it is a principle in the Torah that it only punishes [for something] if it has prohibited [it], we will necessarily search for the prohibition. And sometimes it will be derived from an analogy and sometimes it will be included in something else, as we explained in Principle 14. It will however not be a general negative commandment unless no aspect of that which is prohibited by it is found in any place - and that is as we explained in Principle 9. However when we have prior knowledge that we are prohibited from that thing - such as His saying, "One who does this will have that done to them" - we will not be particular about the prohibition being explicit, or in one of these two ways; [or] it being specific or general. And know this. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, Mishneh Torah, Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 1.)

To not curse the judge: To not curse the judges, as it is stated (Exodus 22:27), "Lords (elohim) shall you not curse." And the understanding of elohim [here] is judges, as [in] (Exodus 22:8), "that the elohim deem guilty." And the verse [chose] this expression [which can also mean, God], so that another negative commandment would be included in this negative commandment, and that is the negative commandment of 'blessing' God. As they, may there memory be blessed, said in the Mekhilta and the Sifri, "The warning for 'blessing God' is from that it is written, 'Elohim shall you not curse.'" And that which is written in another place, "And the one that blasphemes the name of the Lord will surely die" (Leviticus 24:16), is [the mention of] its punishment. But the warning (prohibition) is from here. As mention of the punishment of a commandment without its warning is not sufficient for us. And this is what our Rabbis, may their memory be blessed, always said (Sanhedrin 54a), "We have heard the punishment, from where is the warning?" And the matter is because of this: That if the prevention of God did not come to us in the matter, but it would [only] state, "One who does thing x will be punished with this," it would be implied that there is permission to transgress the commandment in the hand of anyone who is willing to take the punishment and is not concerned with his pain, and that he will not go against the will of God and His commandment with this. And [so] the matter of the commandment will turn into a type of give and take, meaning to say that one who wants to do thing x, can give such and such and do it, or bare his shoulder to suffer such and do it. And the intention of the commandments is not like this, but rather that God prevented us from things for our [own] good, and informed us in some of them of the punishment that comes to us immediately, besides transgressing His will, which is weightier than anything. And this is [the meaning] of that which they, may their memory be blessed, said in every place (Yoma 81a), "He did not punish, unless He warned," meaning to say, God did not inform of the punishment that comes for a sin, unless He first informed us that His will is that we do not do that thing for which the punishment is coming.

Some of the laws of the commandments – for example, that which they explained that there is no guilt unless he pronounces the specific name, which is (yod-hay-vav-hay), or of (alef-dalet-nun-yod) according to the opinion of some commentators (Mishneh Torah, Laws of Foreign Worship and Customs of the Nations 2:7); that which they said (Sanhedrin 56a), that they would each and every day ask the witnesses with a nickname, "Yose should strike Yose," when the case was finished they would move all the people outside and ask the senior witness and say to him, "Say with your mouth what you heard," and he would say [it], they would [then] stand on their feet and tear [their clothing] and not [ever] mend [them], and the second witness would say, “I also heard like him,” and if there were many witnesses, they all say like this; that which they, may their memory be blessed said (Nedarim 87a), that the blasphemer, even though he recants within the time of speaking (right away) is [still] stoned; that one who curses God in the name of idolatry is to be attacked by zealots, but if they did not attack him and he comes to court, he is not stoned unless he 'blesses' with a name from the specific names [of God], and the reason he is not stoned is because, even at the time of his anger, he himself knows that his words are complete foolishness, but zealots attack him nonetheless, since he was destructive and caused abomination and was brazen-faced to speak bad things like these; that which they said that anyone who hears the 'blessing' of God from the mouth of an Israelite is obligated to tear [his clothes], but that one who hears it from a gentile is not obligated to tear, and Eliyakim and Shevna only tore because Ravshakeh was an apostate (Sanhedrin 60a); [that] all of the witnesses and the judges lean their hands one by one upon the head of the blasphemer and say to him, "Your blood is upon your head, since you caused [it to] yourself," and there is none else in all of those killed by the court besides only the blasphemer that we lean upon, as it is stated (Leviticus 24:14), "and all those who heard lean, etc."; and the rest of its details - are [all] elucidated in Sanhedrin, Chapter 7.

Our Sages taught: If ten men struck a man with ten staves, whether simultaneously or one after the other, and he died, they are not liable. R. Judah ben Batyra said, if one after the other, the last is culpable because he hastened [the victim's] death. R. Yoḥanan said: Both engaged in exegetical interpretation of the same verse, "and he that killeth kol nefesh [lit., 'all life'] of man shall surely be put to death" (Leviticus 24:17). The Sages maintain that kol nefesh limits [culpability] to [the taking of] the whole life; R. Judah ben Batyra maintains that kol nefesh [implies] whatever there is of life.

Despite the rejection of the view by both Ramban⁶⁶Divrei Sha’ul, Yoreh De’ah 336:1, attempts to show that Ramban, as cited in Ran’s commentary on Rif, contradicts the position Ramban espouses in his Torat ha-Adam and is in agreement with Rabbenu Nissim’s view. However, as shown by Ẓiẓ Eli’ezer, IV, no. 13, sec. 3, Divrei Sha’ul’s analysis is not compelling. and Shulḥan Arukh, Ran's position is cited with approbation by the nineteenth-century authority, R. Joseph Saul Nathanson, Divrei Sha'ul, Yoreh De'ah 336:1. Divrei Sha'ul notes, as did Besamim Rosh before him, that a person who inadvertently commits a transgression in the course of attempting to fulfill a mizvah is exempt from the sacrificial offering required for expiation of inadvertent sin. By the same token, asserts Divrei Sha'ul, it would be reasonable to assume that if a person commits a tort in the course of fulfilling a mizvah there should be no financial liability in the eyes of Heaven. More significantly, the Gemara, Sanhedrin 84b, establishes that therapeutic "wounding" is not proscribed by the biblical prohibition against battery. The exclusion of therapeutic "wounding" is predicated upon a principle of rabbinic exegesis knows as a hekesh, i.e., the juxtaposition of two different legal categories, which has the effect of transposing one or more halakhic provisions already established in one of those categories to the other category. In this instance the hekesh is based upon the juxtaposition of references to the smiting of an animal and the smiting of a man in Leviticus 24:17-18. The Gemara declares, "Just as a person who smites an animal for therapeutic purposes is not liable so also a person who smites a man for therapeutic purposes is not liable." The inference to be drawn from that statement, argues Divrei Sha'ul, is that a person who inadvertently causes harm in the course of attempting to perform a therapeutic procedure is totally exonerated even in the eyes of Heaven, as is the case with regard to a person who causes harm to an animal in the course of a failed attempt to cure the animal. Divrei Sha'ul apparently regards the Gemara's formulation of this rule to be at variance with the rule posited by the Tosefta holding the physician accountable at the hands of Heaven and, applying usual canons of halakhic decision-making, Divrei Sha'ul asserts that the rule formulated by the Gemara should be given preference over that recorded in the Tosefta.⁶⁷See Ẓiẓ Eli’ezer, IV, no. 13, sec. 3.

We were commanded in all of these things, such as the table, the menorah, the bread of display and the sacrifices, from the angle of the receivers (people), and like the matter that I wrote. There is no doubt or qualm to anyone who understands, or student that is not lacking in comprehension in the world who would think that with the arrangement of bread in the Temple upon the table, which we place complete and we take [away] complete, that there is any benefit (enjoyment) accrued by the Above, God forbid - not in its appearance, not in its smell and not from any angle. Rather, He commanded us like this in His desire, blessed be He, that we be blessed from Him, in His great trait of kindness. And [this is] also [true about] the frankincense that comes with the bread, about which it is written, "a burnt offering to the Lord." And [when] some of the commentators (Rashi on Leviticus 24:7) said that there is nothing from the bread that is for the Above except for the frankincense, their intention was not, God forbid, that there be any distinction between the frankincense and the bread for the Above. And the fulfillment of the commandment of God is the same with the bread and the frankincense: As just like God, blessed be He, commanded to arrange the bread in front of Him, so too is His will done, with the frankincense that He commanded to burn, and they burned it - one standard for all. Rather, all of these matters were written from the angle of those involved [in them]. As it cannot be written about the bread - that we feed the priests - that it is all for God; as others have a portion in it. But with anything that man does not have any benefit in it at all, and it is completely consumed in the commandment - with that we can say about it that it is completely for God. [That] means to say that all of it is included in the commandment - no man ate from it, nor enjoyed any physical benefit from it at all. And since smell is not from the pleasures of the body, but rather from the pleasures of the spirit - as the body only receives tangible pleasure - the matter of smell is always attributed to God, blessed be He. [This is] even though He, blessed be He and blessed be His name, is not - due to His supernal level and His greatness - connected to these matters at all; as He is not a body, and not the attribute of a body. This is known to all that understand. And they, may their memory be blessed, already explained (Rashi on Zevachim 46b, s.v. hanachat ruach) [that] every place that it is stated, "a pleasing smell to the Lord" (for example, Leviticus 1:9), [it means] "I said something, and My will was done." And so [too,] "And the Lord smelled the pleasant smell" (Genesis 8:21), [should be understood] in this way. This is what appears [correct] to us regarding the matter of the arranging of the bread in the House of God. And Rambam, may his memory be blessed, wrote (Guide for the Perplexed 3:45), and this is his language: But I do not know a reason for the table and the bread always being put upon it; and to this day, I do not know to what thing to ascribe it.

From the laws of the commandment is that which they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sifra, Emor Chapter 18 5) that in each array, they would put a vessel that would have a fistful of frankincense in it, as it is stated (Leviticus 24:7), "And you shall set on the array," meaning to say on each one of them, "pure frankincense" - and this vessel is called a bazakh (bowl), And [that which] they, may their memory be blessed, said (Menachot 26a) that [the absence of one of] the two sets [of loaves] impinges on the other, and [that] the two bowls impinge upon one another; that they would remove the bread and arrange other bread immediately, from one Shabbat day to another Shabbat day (Menachot 99b); [that] that which they take out is what is split by the two shifts, the incoming [one] and the departing [one], along with the high priest, and they [would all] eat it (Yoma 17b); and how it was arranged, that four would come in with the bread and the bowls, and four would precede them to take the [old] bread from upon the table. And they, may their memory be blessed, said (Menachot 99b) that they would orchestrate [it], that in their setting them down, the [edge] of [the new one] would be alongside the [edge] of the [old one] - to fulfill that which it states, "before Me always," And the form of the bread; how was the matter of its placement, such that it [be exposed] to the air; and the rest of its details - are [all] elucidated in the eleventh chapter of Menachot (see Mishneh Torah, Laws of Daily Offerings and Additional Offerings 5).

Dayan Just points out that the first discussion of this question appeared in one of the earliest Torah journals, the Shomer Zion ha-Ne'eman, which was published in Altona in the mid-nineteenth century under the editorship of R. Jacob Ettlinger and Samuel Joseph Enoch. In his treatment of this problem in issues no. 98 (36 Nisan, 5610) and no. 99 (14 Iyar, 5610), R. Samuel Bondi of Mainz reached a similar conclusion but hesitated to implement his ruling pending a concurring opinion on the part of prominent halakhic authorities. These responsa evoked a contrary opinion penned by R. Moses Schick, which appeared in issue no. 110 (22 Elul, 5611) of the same journal, and was later reprinted in a more comprehensive form in Teshuvot Maharam Schick, Yoreh De'ah, no. 299. A similarly dissenting view is expressed by Hazon Ish, Even ha-Ezer 6:7 and 16:17. According to this opinion, a child can never acquire the tribal identity of its mother because the paternal genealogical relationship does not merely supersede that of the mother and hence become the governing factor in the determination of tribal identity, but serves as the sole operative relationship with regard to tribal status. Hence the first-born issue of a mixed marriage does not have the tribal status of a Levite and is exempt from redemption as a first-born solely by virtue of the fact that he is a son of a female Levite. Accordingly, Hazon Ish defines the term "disqualified Levite" employed by the Gemara as having reference to one who is the progeny of a Levite but who himself lacks any such tribal identity. A similar interpretation is to be found in the commentary of the Rit Algazi on Bekhorot. In support of the view of these authorities, Rabbi Just cites the commentary of Nachmanides on the verse "and the son of an Israelite woman and a son of Israel strove together in the camp" (Lev. 24:11). Nachmanides remarks that despite his unquestioned status as a Jew, Scripture speaks of the child of an Israelite mother and Egyptian father as the "son of an Israelite woman" and not as an Israelite in his own right as an indication that such progeny lacks tribal identity. We are, then, confronted by the odd case of an individual who is unquestionably a Jew by birth but is not a member of any of the twelve tribes and hence lacking in tribal status. The halakhic ramifications of this anomalous status precludes such individuals from encampment around the banners in the wilderness and from inheritance in the Land of Israel.

That is that He commanded us about the law of one who injures his fellow. And that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "And when men quarrel" (Exodus 21:26); and this is called, fines. And a verse already came that includes all of the laws of fines - and that is His, may He be exalted, saying, "as he has done, so shall it be done to him" (Leviticus 24:19): That [which is] taken away from him is in exchange for that which he hurt him, according to the measure of the hurt - as it appears in the tradition. And even if it was only that he embarrassed him; behold he is fined this measure of his money. And you should know that all of these laws of fines that are laws between one person and another - and likewise, when an animal damages a person or a person damages an animal - are indeed only judged and fined by a court of those who have been ordained in the Land of Israel. And the details of the law of this commandment have already been explained in Chapter 1 of Bava Kamma. (See Parashat Mishpatim; Mishneh Torah, One Who Injures a Person or Property 1.)

The commandment of fearing God: That the fear of God, may He be blessed, should always be on our faces, that we not sin; meaning to say that we fear with a fear of His punishment and that our hearts not be without fear of Him, the whole day. And about this is it stated (Deuteronomy 10:13), "The Lord, your God, you shall fear." And the proof that this is a positive commandment from the tally of the six hundred and thirteen commandments that we were commanded is that which they said in Sanhedrin 56a by way of the debate about the understanding of "And he who blasphemes the name of the Lord, etc." (Leviticus 24:16): "I will say [that it is] to express, [like that] which is written (Numbers 1:17), 'And Moshe and Aharon took these men that are expressed by name'; and its prohibition is from 'The Lord, your God shall you fear.'" It means to say by way of the debate that maybe we should explain "blaspheme" (nokev), as the expression of [God's] name, alone, without him 'blessing' [it]; and the sin that there would be in this is because he loses the fear - as it is from the fear of God not to mention His name in vain. And they answered there, that one should not say like this, as there are two answers to the thing, "One is that it is necessary that [it involve] the name of God with the name of God, and there is not [this in such a case]" - meaning to say that he must 'bless' the Name with the Name, as in, "Yose should strike Yose!" "And also it is a [prohibition] of a positive commandment, and a [prohibition] of a positive commandment [is not called] a prohibition" - meaning to say that the verse of "The Lord, your God shall you fear" is a positive commandment.

And both capital cases and financial cases are included in this commandment, as it is stated (Leviticus 24:22), "One judgement shall there be for you." But the Sages said that in order not to close the door in front of borrowers, that we not require inquiry and investigation of the witnesses of money [cases]. How is this? [If] the witnesses said, "This one lent that one a hundred in front of us in year x" - even though they were not precise about the month and the place in which he borrowed, and not which coin the hundred was [composed of, if] their testimony was the same about the value of the hundred, their testimony stands with that. And about what are these words speaking? About admission, loans, gifts, sales and that which is similar to them. But with cases of penalties, we require inquiry and investigation, and there is no need to say with lashes and exile [that they are required]. And likewise, they, may their memory be blessed, said (Sanhedrin 32b) that if the judge sees that the case is forged, even with the cases of admissions and loans, he needs to do inquiry and investigation upon them. And if they contradicted one another in the investigations and inquiries, their testimony is nullified; but if they contradicted each other in the checks, their testimony stands. How is this? If the one said, "He borrowed in Nissan," and the other said, "No, rather [it was] in Iyar"; or the one said, "In Jerusalem," and the other said, "No, rather [it was] in Lod." And so [too,] the one said, "He borrowed a barrel of wine," and the other said, "No, rather [it was] a barrel of oil" - this is investigation and inquiry, and [so] their testimony is nullified. But if the one said, "He borrowed a black hundred," and the second said a white hundred - and the value of both of them is the same - or the one said, "They were in the upper floor when he lent to him" and the second said on the bottom floor - this is checks and their testimony stands. [These] and the rest of its details are in Tractate Sanhedrin (Chapters 4 and 5).

All (types of) work (for whose transgression) a person is guilty on the Sabbath is also guilty on Yom Kippur. And all types of work for whose transgression on the Sabbath a person is free from punishment but are still prohibited, are also prohibited on Yom Kippur in a like manner except that on the Sabbath a conscious sin is punishable by stoning,⁷⁹Stoning, sekilah, סקילה, is a Biblical form of capital punishment which was the standard penalty for crime in all ancient civilizations. In the Torah there are two explicit methods of executing a criminal or a sinner; stoning and burning. According to the Talmud, the Torah has four methods of execution: stoning, burning, beheading, and strangling, (See B. Sanhedrin 49b., ff).
Stoning was an instinctive violent expression of popular wrath, (Exodus 17:4, 8:22; Numbers 14:10; I Samuel 30:6; I Kings 12:18; II Chronicles 10:18) and often in the Bible it is the prescribed mode of execution (Leviticus 20:2, 27, 24:16; Numbers 15:35; Deuteronomy 13:11, 17:5, 21:21, 22:21, et al). Originally, the whole community participated in the stoning and were required to throw stones at the guilty person. Stonings were probably the standard form of judicial execution in Biblical times, (Leviticus 24:23; Numbers 15:36; I Kings 21:13; II Chronicles 24:21).
The Mishna (Sanh.6:4) states that a "stoning place" was established where instead of a person being pelted by stones, the convicted person would be pushed down from a high place to his death provided it was not too high so as to mutilate the body which was a concern of the rabbis. It also was not to be too low so the death would be instantaneous. The reason for the stoning place was that the scriptural rule states "The hands of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death," (Deuteronomy 17:7) and then afterwards the "hand of all the people (should be on him)", (Deuteronomy 17:7). To insure that the witnesses put him to death they were the ones to push him and thereby be first to put him to death. Thus this method of "stoning" became acceptable as opposed to the actual throwing of stones. This also seemed the more "humane" way of carrying out capital punishment as the convicted person died more quickly and the danger of mutilation was reduced. In Maimonides' comment to Sanhedrin 6:4 he stated that it really made no difference if stones were thrown at one or if one were thrown at stones.
cf., Haim Hermann Cohn, v. 5, pp. 142-43. but on Yom Kippur it is punishable by karet.⁸⁰Karet, כרת; see footnote 78. Everything that is forbidden to be moved (or handled) on the Sabbath is also forbidden to be moved (or handled) on Yom Kippur, (but it is permitted to clean vegetables and to open (shell) nuts from the Minḥah time⁸¹Minḥah, מנחה, a time designating afternoon, meaning after the six and one half hour or after 12:30 P.M. according to our present day time system. (See footnote 40 for a more complete explanation). onward when (Yom Kippur) falls on a weekday, but nowadays (presently) it is customary to forbid that.)
Hagah: If a fire occurs on Yom Kippur, it is permitted to save one meal for the need of the night (following Yom Kippur) as one (may) save on the Sabbath the afternoon meal,⁸²The afternoon meal on the Sabbath is also referred to as Se'udah Shelishit, the third meal which is eaten on the Sabbath between the Minḥah, Afternoon Service (see footnote 40) and the Ma'ariv, Evening Service (see footnote 144). (ר״ן פרק כל כתבי),⁸³Rabbenu Nissim on the chapter Kol Khit-vey, כתבי ר״ן פרק כל, which is a commentary on the talmudic tractate Shabbat.
For Rabbenu Nissim, ר״ן; see footnote 47. and it is already explained in section 334⁸⁴See in the Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, chapter 334 which contains twenty-seven paragraphs on the laws that apply when a fire breaks out on the Sabbath. These same laws apply regarding a fire, according to Isserles to Yom Kippur. (as to) how to act at this time when a fire (occurs) on the Sabbath and the same law (applies) for Yom Kippur. It is customary that the children play with nuts (אגודה ומהרי״ל).⁸⁵Agudah and Maharil, אגודה ומהרי״ל.
The Agudah, אגודה, is a collection of halakhic decisions derived from talmudic discussions and arranged in the order of the talmudic tractates. It was written by Alexander Suslin ha-Kohen of Frankfort who died in 1349. The Agudah was published in Cracow in 1571 and it also included novellae of his own as well as those of his predecessors, and a commentary and collection of halakhot to the minor tractates and to the Mishnayot of the orders Zera'in and Tohorot. The language of the Agudah is very concise and it is evident that it was written quickly under the threat of the persecutions of the time since Suslin died a martyr's death in Erfurt. Suslin was the last of the early German halakhic authorities. This German talmudic scholar was born Erfurt where he taught, as well as in Worms, Cologne, and Frankfort.
The Agudah, Suslin's most famous work, gives halakhic rulings in concise form and it ignores differences of opinion. He used as sources Mordecai b. Hillel and Asher b. Jehiel. It is often necessary to consult the work of these two scholars to understand fully the Agudah. Jacob Weil (see footnote 27) wrote a digest to the work called Ḥiddushei Agudah which was published in Venice in 1523 and accompanies the Agudah. Later halakhic authorities such as Jacob ha-Levi Moellin (see footnote 8) and Moses Isserles considered his decisions authoritative and they quoted from him. Isserles mentioned the Agudah often in his glosses to the Shulḥan Arukh.
Editorial Staff, E. J., v. 2, p. 585.
Maharil, מהרי״ל; see footnote 8. One should not object to them (the children) even before the Afternoon Prayer⁸⁶Minḥah, מנחה; see footnote 40., and the custom is widespread with respect to the mentioned law of breaking nuts, (ד״ע).⁸⁷Da'at Aẓmo, ד״ע, Isserles' own opinion; see footnote 38.