Halakhah su Levitico 27:29

And also included in these negative statements that are negations is His saying (Leviticus 27:29), "Any human being who has been proscribed is not ransomed." Indeed, once you know what the content of this statement is, it is clear to you that this is a negation and not a prohibition. And that is that Scripture here has already discussed the set values of appraisals according to the amount of years of the one appraised and whether they are male or female. And there is no difference whether one said, "My appraisal is upon me"; or "the appraisal of x is upon me" - as we see who this person is and how old he is, and he gives according to that. But if the one appraised was someone who was liable for a death penalty of the court and his judgment has been completed - and after that someone said, "The appraisal of that one is upon me" - he is not obligated to give anything, since that one is considered as if he is dead, for there is no value to him once his judgment has been completed. And this is the content He wanted [to express] by saying, "is not ransomed" - meaning to say, he has no value, such that the appraiser should give it. So this is one of the laws of appraisals and their regulations mentioned by Scripture, and not a prohibition. And the language of the mishnah (Arakhin 1:3) is, "One who is moribund and one who is taken to be executed is not vowed about nor appraised." And the Talmud (Arakhin 6b) explains that this is on condition that he has come out of a Jewish court with a guilty verdict. And the words of the Mekhilta are, "Those who are liable for the death penalty do not have redemption, as it is stated, 'Any human being who has been proscribed is not ransomed.'" And reflect upon the language of the statement and be precise in your study of it - how they explained that this negative statement is a negation and not a prohibition, by their saying, "do not have redemption"; and they did not say, "we may not redeem them." And they explained this very matter in the Sifra in the section about appraisals (Sifra, Bechukotai, Chapter 12:7) and said, "From where is it derived that if one liable for the death penalty of the court said, 'My value is upon me," he has said nothing? We learn to say, 'is not redeemed.'" That is to say [that the question was,] from where is it that [we know that] he is not liable [for any] value. And we have already explained this matter with complete clarity, such that no question is left about it, even for one whose intellect is the most dense among all people. And since we have spoken about this matter, you should know that the words that can connote a prohibition in the Torah are four. And anything that is prohibited by one of these four is called a negative commandment. And they are guard, lest, do not and no (hishamer, pen, al, lo). And in explanation, they said (Makkot 13b:5), "Wherever it is stated, guard, lest, or do not, it is nothing other than a negative commandment." But there is one thing that remains for us to explain in order to complete the intent of the section. And that is that when the Torah tells and commands us to cleanse ourselves by negating actions x and y, behold that action is included in the negative commandments. And even though the negative statement through which it comes is a negation and not a prohibition - since it commands us to negate it from ourselves, and say, "I have not done such and such," we perforce know that such and such an action is prohibited to us. And this is like when Scripture commands us to say, "I have not eaten of it while in mourning, I have not cleared out any of it while I was unclean and I have not deposited any of it with the dead" (Deuteronomy 26:14) - it is indicating that all of these actions are prohibited to us. And behold that this explanation will come in its place, when we speak about these commandments.

The monarch is empowered to punish malefactors in a manner more severe than is provided by biblical law.¹⁰Teshuvot Ḥatam Sofer, Oraḥ Ḥayyim, no. 208, states that this authority is derived from Leviticus 27:29. Ramban understands this verse as conferring upon the community the power of declaring a ḥerem and prescribes the death penalty for its violation. Ḥatam Sofer suggests that the power is vested in the monarch by virtue of the acceptance of his authority and the concomitant duty of obedience owed him by the populace. Cf., Me’iri cited in Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Kamma 84b, and R. Saul Israeli, Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, II (Iyar 5710), 77, 85-88. Thus, he may, for example, decree the execution of an individual who has taken the life of another even though the culprit's act does not, for various reasons, constitute capital homicide under biblical law.¹¹It should be noted that Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 3:8 and 3:10, in describing the royal prerogatives, speaks only of the crimes of lèse majesté and homicide. In Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 2:4, Rambam speaks of “murderers and the like.” Avnei Nezer, Yoreh De‘ah, II, no. 312 and R. Saul Israeli, Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, II, 81, opine that the king’s jurisdiction is limited to these crimes. R. Benjamin Rabinowitz-Teumim, Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, IV (Elul 5712), 74, understands Rambam in this manner as well. See also Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Melakhim 3:10. This interpretation of Rambam is difficult to sustain in light of Rambam’s own statement, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 18:6, to the effect that Achan—who was not guilty of homicide—was executed by virtue of application of the “king’s justice.” However, Ritva, cited in Shitah Mekubeẓet, Baba Meẓi‘a, 83b, explains that R. Elazar ben Shimon’s action in turning over thieves to government authorities, although sharply censured by R. Joshua ben Karchah, was deemed appropriate in R. Eleazar’s opinion because those individuals were lawfully liable to punishment by virtue of exercise of the royal prerogative. Ritva apparently maintains that the king’s authority extends to punishment of theft as well. Ran, Sanhedrin 46a, offers a similar explanation and is obviously in agreement with Ritva. Rashba, in a responsum published by D. Kaufmann, The Jewish Quarterly Review, o.s. VIII (1896), 236, explains R. Eleazar ben Shimon’s action in the same manner and further states that R. Joshua ben Karchah does not forbid such execution but states only that as an act of piety one should refrain from delivering the wrong-doers into the hands of government officials. It is presumably this responsum which is alluded to by Bet Yosef, Ḥoshen Mishpat 388. Bet Yosef’s citation appears only in early editions of Tur Shulḥan Arukh and was deleted by the censor in later editions; see Shmuel Shilo, Dina de-Malkhuta Dina, p. 67, note 28. Or Sameaḥ, Hilkhot Melakhim 3:10, also understands Baba Meẓi‘a 83b in this manner. R. Benjamin Rabinowitz-Teumim, Ha-Torah ve-ha-Medinah, IV, 80, adds that R. Eleazar ben Shimon acted in an official capacity and even according to his view, as opposed to that of R. Joshua ben Karchah, only a person specifically delegated by the non-Jewish king to perform such functions may deliver a criminal into the hands of civil authorities. See also Malbim’s commentary on II Samuel 12:5 in which that commentator assumes as a matter of course that the king is empowered to impose the death penalty for theft. Moreover, the king, in administering justice, is not bound by the strict laws of evidence.¹²The Bet Din may also impose extraordinary punishment and ignore usual judicial procedure, but only as an emergency measure; see Rambam, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 18:6 and 24:4 as well as Hilkhot Roẓeaḥ 2:4; cf., Rambam, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:4. As formulated by Rambam, Hilkhot Melakhim 3:10.

Hatam Sofer finds a source for the exercise of such power in Ramban's comments on Leviticus 27:29, "Kol ḥerem asher yeḥeram min ha-adam lo yipadeh, mot yamut." The standard translation of the verse, "None devoted, that may be devoted of men, shall be ransomed; he shall surely be put to death," renders its meaning utterly incomprehensible. Little wonder, then, that medieval rabbinic exegetes and commentaries struggled to arrive at a proper interpretation of the verse. Ramban understands the term "ḥerem" as used in this context as connoting societal proscription of certain acts upon pain of death. Understood in this manner, the verse, by inference, serves to confer legislative power upon society for the purpose of achieving socially desirable goals and also to confer penal authority to enforce such decrees. According to Ramban, the verse must be understood as an elliptical reference to the violation of a ḥerem pronounced by society and serves to forbid substitution of a financial penalty for capital punishment incurred in violation of a communal edict. The verse then should be rendered as "No [violation] of a ḥerem, pronounced as a ḥerem by man, shall be ransomed; he [the violator of the ḥerem] shall surely be put to death." The biblical narrative, I Samuel 14:24–45, recounting the actions of Jonathan and his incurrence of capital liability is explained by Ramban as predicated upon this scriptural provision. In eating honey Jonathan violated the communal edict pronounced by King Saul against partaking of food on the day of battle against the Philistines; hence Jonathan was subject to the death penalty. The verse "So the people rescued Jonathan, that he died not" (I Samuel 14:45) is understood by Ramban as meaning that the community retroactively nullified its edict and, pursuant to that nullification, Jonathan was exonerated. Such edicts may be promulgated, asserts Hatam Sofer, either by the community as a whole or by the sovereign as the executive authority of the community. It is quite apparently Hatam Sofer's opinion that such authority is vested only in the Jewish community and hence only in a Jewish monarch. To be sure, the Jewish community in any country, utilizing its power of ḥerem, could promulgate an edict making lèse majesté against the gentile sovereign a culpable offense as a violation of Jewish law. However, no such edict was ever promulgated. Accordingly, only the sovereign of a Jewish state may legitimately impose penal sanctions upon violators of his decrees.